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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores how climate policy is developing at sub-national or “regional” scales of 
decision-making. It considers local-global connections on both the science and the politics of 
climate change by investigating four main research questions as they pertain to regional climate 
action: What triggers regional policy action on global climate change? What arguments and lines 
of evidence underlie the policy discourse? How do “winning” arguments gain salience? How does 
regional action make a difference to broader scale climate policy?  The research is conducted 
through one in-depth case study in California. It shows that action on climate change mitigation in 
California is enabled in part by past action in related policy arenas of air pollution control and 
energy policy within a multilevel, social-practice environmental governance framework. More 
recently the emergences of a comprehensive policy framework is triggered by a unique policy 
window where a change in California’s leadership capitalised on the void of federal policy to re-
frame arguments for state-level action on climate change.  The case study identifies two dominant 
policy frames leading to a third master frame or meta-narrative in the period 2004-6: i) climate 
change as a problem of regional environment risk; ii) mitigation policy as a “win-win” for the 
local economy and the environment; iii) climate change as a regional policy issue. This period 
represents a paradigm shift from a previous dominant framing that characterised climate change 
as predominantly a national rather than a state policy issue. The case study shows that today’s 
dominant policy frames rely upon a process of co-construction that combine insights from expert 
and local knowledge, thus intertwining “facts” and “ values in the policy process.  “Winning 
arguments” or policy frames gain salience through a relatively open policy process, which permits 
an  array  of  non-governmental  actors  --  including  social  movement  organisations,  business 
organisations and experts -- to operate in the outer-periphery of the policy process and generate 
ideas in a timely way to influence policy decisions.  The research underscores the power of 
localising problems of global environmental change and their solutions, of taking up climate 
change as a regional policy issue where solutions can be tapered to reflect regional contexts and 
norms. It shows that there is a relatively larger scope for experimentation and social and technical 
innovation at regional scale, compared to broader scales of action, which can open the way for 
cross-scale learning and influence to emerge.  
 Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, global climate change has escalated from an obscure area of scientific research 
to become an international political priority. Although it has risen quickly to the top of public 
policy agendas, climate change remains a problem in search of solutions.  This research explores 
the interface between science, society and the politics of climate change with the aim to better 
understand and identify opportunities to improve climate policy responses at different scales of 
governance. 
Climate change is a scientifically complex problem that involves broad uncertainty about how 
physical and natural systems interact over the long-term (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [IPCC] 2001).  Despite the complexity of the problem, the scientific community has 
made  an  increasingly  compelling  case  that  human-induced  climate  change  is  a  problem  for 
society  that  requires  political  attention.  On  the  scientific  side,  there  is  broad  consensus  that 
man-made greenhouse gas emissions are driving global mean temperature increases, changes in 
precipitation  patterns  and  sea  level  rise,  and  that  these  climate  changes  are  presenting 
unprecedented risks to human and natural systems.  
The principal causes of climate change are emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), in particular 
carbon dioxide (CO2) but also methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), from fossil fuel use and 
unsustainable land use practices (IPCC 2001; IPCC 2007d).  Unsustainable trends in each of these 
areas  stem  from  a  vast  array  of  human  economic  activities  –  from  industrial  production  to 
household energy use and urban sprawl, and agriculture and forestry practices. The causes of 
human-induced climate change, looking across the “sources” of greenhouse gas emissions, are 
interwoven within the fabric of modern, post-industrial society.  Addressing climate change to 
effectively limit long-term climate change and to adapt to inevitable climate changes implies 
substantial changes in the way we live and organise economic activity, including urban and rural 
patterns  of  development  as  well  as  changes  in  lifestyles  and  technologies.    Solutions  that 
significantly limit climate change in this century and beyond suggest a radical transformation of 
the economy and to move away from fossil energy and away from entrenched, unsustainable 
consumption and production patterns worldwide. They also suggest a radical departure from the 
way that we govern the environment. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
 
  11 
This research project explores how climate change policy is developing at sub-national scales and 
whether this matters to broader climate policy developments. The focus of the research project is 
sub-national decision making, however I have chosen to use the term “regional” throughout the 
thesis as shorthand for sub-national or state-level governing processes and activities in the United 
States of America (US).  The research includes an in-depth case study in one state (California) 
situated in the US. In the California context, the term regional is referring to state government as 
one  form  of  sub-national  authority  and  as  an  important  centre  of  environmental  policy 
decision-making.  It  must  be  recognised  from  the  outset  that  California  is  large  in  terms  of 
population, economic activity and geographic area.  As a result California is in a somewhat 
unique situation compared to smaller or more local actors.  Nevertheless it is interesting as a case 
study location precisely because it is one type of regional or sub-national, non-state actor.  Given 
its non-state status, what influence might California action have on the politics of global climate 
change, or on the technical, economic or policy frameworks that emerge to deal with it? 
The California case study is designed to explore a range of issues that aim to understand the 
“how” and the “why” of policy at this sub-national or regional scale.  It explores the evidence and 
argument  used  in  decision-making  processes,  the  interface  between  expert  knowledge,  local 
knowledge and politics, and the role of agency to influence policy decisions at regional scale on 
climate change.  Relevant actors and institutions span businesses, environmental organizations, 
scientists  and  other  experts,  the  media  and  various  parts  (and  levels)  of  governments.    The 
research sets regional policy in the context of historical developments and experience in areas 
related  to  energy  and  environmental  policies,  and  it  relates  climate  policy  developments  in 
California to national and international scale developments and decision-making. The research 
thus explores the “how” and the “why” of California’s leadership position on climate change.  
I acknowledge from the outset that this case study has some anomalies that may be unique to the 
US federal system and the tradition of decentralised decision-making in the US in areas key to 
climate policy, such as environmental policy.  These issues are treated however in the design of 
the research and become part of the evidence for understanding action at the regional scale in the 
US, i.e. at the level of state government. 
1.1.  The problem: understanding local in global-local environmental governance 
Despite the urgency accorded to climate change by the large parts of the expert community and 
internationally, concrete actions are lagging (OECD 2001b). While there is strong consensus 
amongst experts that human-induced climate change is underway and that, over time, it will 
present  increasingly  more  serious  problems  for  society  (IPCC  2001;  IPCC  2007d), there  are Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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competing framings of the problem, what to do about it, how, where and when to act (Grubb and 
Yamin 2001; IPCC 2001; Lomborg 2001; Miller 2000). National governments are struggling to 
establish  climate  change  as  a  policy  priority  and  to  reduce  greenhouse gas  emissions.  There 
appears to be a divide between international agreements and the political call for action at global 
scale on the one hand, and slow progress in national policy implementation on the other.  A recent 
review of national policies and emission trends demonstrates slow progress across nation-states 
(UNFCCC  2006)  and,  in  some  cases,  outright  refusal  to  abide  by  international  agreements 
(e.g. the  United  States’  and  Australia’s  refusal  to  ratify  the  Kyoto  Protocol)  (Grubb  and 
Yamin 2001; Yamin and Depledge 2004).
1  
The slow progress across industrialised nations raises questions about the validity of the continued 
emphasis on international scales of governance to address climate change.  Much of the policy 
activity, and the policy-relevant research on the topic, have relied on a top-down model – where 
international action remains centre stage and guides nation-states to act collectively through an 
increasingly complex institutional system of coercion and cooperation.  This view is captured in 
literature on global environmental governance and more recently climate change governance, 
much of which derives from regime theory and international relations literature (Haas et al. 1993; 
Newell 2000; Paterson 2008 in press; Vogler 2003).  This literature builds on Krasner’s classic 
definition of a regime: “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors expectations converge”
2 and extends it to understanding about how nation-states structure 
interactions to define and address global or regional environmental problems in a collaborative 
manner (Fisher 2004; Paterson 2008 in press).   
More recently, social research on international regimes is covering questions of the operation of 
institutions  at  different  scales  or  “different  levels  of  social  organisation  and  on  examining 
interactions among distinct or discrete institutional arrangements” (Young 2002):xiv). This brings 
attention to multilevel governance phenomena (Hooghe and Marks 2003) and particularly to the 
growing role of non-state actors on global environmental issues (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004; 
Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Fairhead and Leach 2003; Vogler 2003).  While a relatively mature 
literature exists on the role of market, expert and civil society actors, as compared to the state or 
governmental actors (e.g. Gough and Shackley 2001; Hall and Taplin 2006; Newell 2000; Newell 
                                                         
1 It is important to also note that there are also some encouraging trends in a handful of nation-states 
indicating that where action is taken early and policies are broad based, emissions can be effectively 
curbed without handicapping the economy (UNFCCC 2006; UNFCCC 2007b; UNFCCC 2007c). 
2 As cited in Paterson 2008. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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2005), relatively less explored in empirical and theoretical terms is how sub-national or regional 
decision-making works and what influence it may have on global environmental regimes and 
governance.   
An emerging literature points to the potential for bottom-up, local actions and policy processes to 
influence the pace and direction of global environmental governance, where social learning about 
global environmental change in practical national and local settings also begin to drive policy 
reform and change (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Cash and Moser 2000; 
Harris  2001;  Social  Learning  Group  2001).    Social  learning  is  defined  as  experience-based 
learning in the local context for policy (Hall 1993).  In this model, national, sub-national and local 
action on climate change necessarily leads to a dynamic process of social learning, both drawing 
on and serving to increase “local” knowledge about the nature of the climate problem and how to 
deal with it in a variety of different contexts (Jasanoff and Martello 2004b).  
This literature suggests a global-local model for climate risk governance and decision-making. It 
acknowledges the role of international policy in the form of treaties or regimes to set out broad, 
collectively defined rules and norms to shape a framework for action but it also focuses on how to 
empower bottom-up action.   A bottom-up model brings into focus the political challenge of 
moving from relatively well-established global framings of problems such as climate change to 
more salient framings at local scales.  It also opens the possibility to explore the insights of critical 
social  theory  and  the  “argumentative  turn”  in  policy  analysis  (Fischer  and  Forester  1993; 
Habermas  1998;  Hawkesworth  1988)  to  highlight  the  potential  for  experience,  learning  and 
culture at local scales to influence decision-making and eventually, in the aggregate, for local 
actions to shape the dynamics of national and international policies.  In this bottom-up model for 
decision-making  social  practices  drive  change,  deriving  explanatory  power  from  culture  and 
norms at local scale (Young 2002). Furthermore, it is a model where climate change is at once a 
global and a local problem (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Jasanoff and Martello 2004a) (see also 
Chapter 2).  
1.1.1.  Why regional scale? 
The research focuses on regional climate policy process, drawing in particular on the case of 
California.    Before  going  into  more detail  about how  to  approach  the  research,  a  legitimate 
question is why regional scale policy processes are worth investigating at all: will regional policy 
and  decision-making  make  a  difference  given  the  global  dimensions  of  the  climate  change 
problem? And why focus on regional policy over and above other issues? Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Aside from the gap in the social research literature underscored above on the interface between 
local and global decision-making, regional actors and institutions may be particularly well placed 
to design and implement cost-effective actions to address climate change.  Any political decision 
to deal with climate change inevitably involves balance and tension amongst a range of choices: 
the balance of effort “now versus later” and tension between efforts to “mitigate and/or adapt” in 
any particular nation, region or local setting. Perhaps most importantly, dealing with climate 
change implies shifting investment patterns and redistributing public and private resources to alter 
existing patterns of development.  Public policy will inevitable play a key role in bringing about 
such change and in navigating society through the wide range of choices it has to address climate 
change.  Regional processes in particular are well-suited to design policies that are adapted to 
local conditions and preferences.   
Regional policy processes may be uniquely well placed to facilitate decision-making on how to 
deal with climate change.  This is in part because regional policies and institutions determine land 
use,  human  settlement  patterns  and  influence  transportation  planning,  which  affect  both 
vulnerability and exposure to climate change as well as the level of greenhouse gas emissions to 
occur  from  these  sources  over  decades  to  come  (Cash  and  Moser  2000).  Regional  policy 
processes also work more closely with a particular set of constituents and local actors than is 
possible  in  national  or  international  process.    In  turn  this  means  that  there  is  necessarily  a 
narrower set of cultural experiences, values and preferences to be addressed. Thus the potential to 
gather political support and build constituencies for change to address a global environmental 
problem might be comparatively greater at regional than at broader scales of governance.  
Without  more  concrete  regional  understanding  and  framings  of  climate  change,  important 
mitigation  and  adaptation  decision-making  will  inevitably  be  delayed.  For  example,  global 
framing  of  science  of  the  climate  change  problem  --  through  the  use  of  predictive  general 
circulation models of atmospheric change -- may not provide particularly meaningful information 
to regional and local decision-makers on important dimensions of the climate problem, such as 
how to assess local vulnerability and identify adaptation options (see Chapter 2).  A different, 
more  localised  framing  of  the  climate  problem  may  be  an  important  ingredient  to  support 
national, regional and local policymaking. With respect to influence over institutional factors that 
guide investment and behaviour, regional level governments are also well positioned to influence 
change and to bring attention to climate change.  
Regional  decisions  are  thus  critically  important  to  the  implementation  of  mitigation  and 
adaptation strategies to respond to climate change. Yet political decisions at regional scale to deal 
with climate change will necessarily be “nested” within institutions and policies that deal more Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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generally with sector or development patterns, or with climate change issues but at larger scales of 
decision-making  (Dietz  et al.  2003;  Hooghe  and  Marks  2003).  Regional  governments  are 
certainly  not  the  only  important  actors  as  we  will  see,  but  they  are  central  to  design  and 
implementation of policy decisions and governance process that can bring climate change more 
fully into public and private sphere decision-making.
3 
1.1.2.  Why California? 
I have chosen California as the location for a single in-depth case study to explore the question of 
how important regional climate policy processes may be to broader scale policy efforts to deal 
with climate change.  California is interesting as a case study location because it has a large level 
of governmental power, albeit under a federal system.  It is unlikely that any other state in the 
United  States  (or other “regional” government  elsewhere  in the  world) operating on  its own 
would  command  similar  market  power  (see  Chapter  4).    However,  as  California  is  not  a 
nation-state it is not part of the formal multilateral climate change regime.  As a player that stands 
outside  of the  multilateral  process, it  has  no  formal influence in international  policy  circles. 
Nevertheless the large size of California’s economy, and its market power linked through trade to 
the global economy, suggests that it does have the potential to influence the landscape of national 
and international policy as well as the pace of technological change through increasingly global 
markets.  In the area of air pollution regulations, pollution control and clean vehicle technologies 
California’s leadership influence has already been documented (Vogel 1995).  While identifying 
and taking into account “California differences” is important, the aim of the in-depth case study 
conducted here is to think more broadly to explore the comparative advantages and disadvantages 
of  working  at  regional  scale  to  facilitate  pro-environmental  change  compared  to  national  or 
international platforms for action. 
The choice of California as location for this research relates in part to me as the researcher: I am a 
native Californian (see below). I was born in California and spent the first half of my life there. I 
still have strong personal and family ties there. I thus had a particular interest to look carefully at 
how and why climate policy was emerging there.  
                                                         
3 I use here Habermasian notion of the public sphere as the area of public life which mediates between 
and connects the political system to the private sphere on key “public” issues such as the environment.  
While the private sphere operates largely behind closed doors through face-to-face interactions that are 
outside  of  public  scrutiny,  the  public  sphere  is  “a  highly  complex  network  that  branches  out  into  a 
multitude  of  overlapping  international,  national,  regional,  local,  and  subcultural  arenas” 
(Habermas 1998: 373). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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1.2.  Aim and approach of this research 
Broadly this research aims to contribute theoretical and empirical findings on the nature of this 
global-local  model  for  climate  risk  governance,  looking  in  particular  at  the  unique  set  of 
opportunities and challenges for regional action to advance socio-political change to better protect 
the global environment.  It considers how and why climate change policies are developing at 
regional scales and whether and how these matter to climate change policy dynamics, politics and 
governance at national and international scales of decision-making. 
This research project explores these issues through a single, in-depth case study:  the state of 
California in the United States.  It looks at how different actors and institutions influence the 
discourse and, in particular, how the policy process interacts with expert and local knowledge to 
advance decisions.
4  It  sets  California  policy  developments  in  the  context  of national  and 
international climate policy and considers the linkages between these different scales of policy 
action. It also explores the unfolding of climate policy in key sectors, in particular the electricity 
sector and to a lesser extent in the water sector, to consider whether and how issue-linkage shapes 
policy processes and outcomes. Relevant actors and institutions span businesses, environmental 
organizations, scientists and other experts, as well as media actors and various parts (and levels) 
of government. The objective is to better understand the constraints and opportunities of regional 
climate  processes  to  promote  meaningful  change  across  society  to  address  climate  change, 
looking from the “inside out” or through the eyes of those involved in the policy process. 
The working hypothesis of the research is that the growing scope and level of policies to deal with 
climate change at regional levels of governance have potential to exert a “bottom-up” influence 
on the politics and patterns of governance at national and international scales.  The presumption 
from the start is that international policy will continue to recognize and emphasise sovereignty of 
nation-states to determine and implement the precise design and mix of policies to stimulate 
change (Putnam 1988), while the international process continues to guide the direction and the 
pace of the  uptake of such policy action but not the  precise  form  (Gupta 2005;  Yamin  and 
Depledge 2004; Young 2002).  Serious consideration of social learning with respect to climate 
change  is  therefore  usefully  approached  through  the  study  of  national,  regional  and  local 
policy-making processes, where policy decisions concretely aim to influence a broad range of 
                                                         
4 At the time that I began this research project, there were to my knowledge no academic articles on the 
origins and drivers of California’s climate policy process. However after I interviewed a number of elite 
actors early in 2006, two different articles have since appeared on some of the questions investigated here 
(Hanemann 2008; Franco et al. forthcoming 2008).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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actors and organisational decisions across civil society, investment and development patterns in a 
particular place (Social Learning Group 2001).  
In particular, the research is designed to explore a hierarchy of research questions, focusing on 
four themes that concern the influence of regional scale action in climate change, as follows:  
1.  What triggers climate policy action at regional scale? 
•  Is the apparent slow regulatory policy response to global climate change a problem of 
a knowledge gap or of knowledge interpretation or something else?  
•  Is policy driven by what we know or how we interpret it and by how we construct 
arguments for action?  
•  To what extent is regional action driven by developments at national or international 
scale versus more local interests and institutional structures? 
2.  What are “winning” arguments driving climate action at regional scale  
•  What  is  the  role  of  expert  information  and  knowledge  (e.g. through  scientific 
discovery, or economic analysis)? 
•  What  role  for  experiential  or  local  knowledge    (e.g. through  business,  regulatory, 
public opinion and interests)? 
•  How do different types of knowledge interact at regional scale to advance salient 
arguments for policy? 
3.  How and why do different policy arguments gain salience? What institutional 
forms of decision-making facilitate closure and action at regional scale, when 
science and economic evidence remain ambiguous, and political controversy 
high?  
•  What  is  the  nature  of  the  interests  and  the  relations  between  state  and  non-state 
actors, experts in governance and decision-making? 
•  How  does  engagement  of  different  types  of  actors  affect  their  interests  and  vice 
versa? How does the policy process affect the pace and the nature of decision-making 
and outcomes?  
•  What  governance  structure(s)  facilitates  experimentation,  social  learning, 
decision-making?   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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4.  In what ways do regional actions influence national and international climate 
policy discourse? 
•  How  does  experience  gained  at  regional  level  filter  up  or  over  through  nested 
institutions and transnational networks of actors and organisations? 
•  What role do increasingly globalised markets for investment, technology and services 
play in spreading influence of regional action? 
Beyond  these  general  research  questions,  the  California  case  study  is  used  to  explore  three 
specific  cross-cutting  themes  that  are  hypothesised  to  influence  the  how  and  why  of  policy 
decision-making on climate change
5:  
•  Regional risk characterisation of climate change and the science-policy interface: 
framing  or  “sensemaking”  of  climate  change  in  a  regional  context,  including 
whether and how scientific expert knowledge combines with local knowledge in 
decision-making on policy;  
•  Issue-linkages: how do climate policies build on, fit or interact with other policy 
issues at this scale (referred to as issue-linkages); 
•  Scale-linkages: how does governance of climate change at regional scales interact 
with national and global scale policy developments (referred to as scale-linkages) 
and with the features of global climate change as an environmental problem?  
These themes derive from a growing literature in the social sciences, which provides a backdrop 
for the research and is briefly reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3. Before moving on to this backdrop 
for the thesis, it is first useful to highlight the choice of methodology and some more of my own 
background  with  respect  to  how  I  fit  into  the  research  project.    In  the  end  the  choice  of 
methodology and initial use of it to gather a first round of empirical data, led to a broadening of 
the conceptual framework for the thesis.  Thus it is useful to describe the methodology here, in 
advance of the conceptual framework and literature review to follow. 
                                                         
5  These  cross-cutting  themes  are  addressed  in  very  general  terms  in  Oran  Young’s  work  on  the 
institutional dimensions of environmental change, albeit in some instance with a different set of terms and 
largely in relationship to international regime theory  (see Young 2002).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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1.3.  Methodology: ethnography of the California expert-policy network 
This research is  conducted  using  interpretive  social  research  methods  and develops  a single, 
in-depth case study in California. The methods used for the field work are ethno-methodological 
and thus qualitative and interpretive (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Yanow 2000).  The 
choice of methods facilitates an investigation of co-constructed meanings of climate change and 
climate change policy in California’s regional policymaking context (see also Chapter 3).  
The focus of the research is on the process, the context and the outcomes of climate policy 
decision-making, taking into account the knowledge, institutions and actors and the events that 
influence decisions.  Empirical data for the research are gathered principally through interviews 
with  elite  participants  in  the  California  policy  process.    Analyses  of  empirical  data  from 
interviews and primary source documents are combined with a review of contextual variables to 
provide  the  basis  for  “thick”  description  (Thompson 2001).    Thick  description  enhances 
understanding of the patterns of discourse and decision-making in California as they relate to 
broader policy developments elsewhere at national and international scale. 
Interpretive policy research is grounded in face-to-face contacts and discussions with elite actors. 
The term elite actors (McDowell 1997) is used here to refer to those who are formally part of the 
decision-making process either from within or from outside of government.  For example, elite 
actors  include  researchers,  experts  or  representatives  of  non-governmental  organisations  that 
participate  in  activities  that  influence  climate  policy  discourse  and  outcomes,  however  the 
definition  excludes  the  much  larger  numbers  of  people  who  are  “affected  stakeholders”  or 
consumers of policy decisions.   
This type of ethnographic data gathering and research permits the researcher to investigate “what 
matters” within this exclusive world of elite policy actors and within the context of a particular 
policy process. It allows the researcher to tell the policy story from the “inside out” – through the 
eyes of the elite actors engaged in the policy process -- about how and why climate policy is 
developing at regional scale.  Penetrating the network of policy elites is part of this research 
approach.    It  is  necessary  to  meet  and  discuss  policy  issues  on  a  “one-on-one”  basis  with 
individual  policy  actors.  Each  individual  participant  is  “reflective”  and  each  individual  can 
provide insights into whether and how decision-making is “reflexive” drawing on the ideas and 
the experiences of those engaged in the policy process.  
The interviews provided a means to gather ethnographic data and these data were used to develop 
“thick description” of contextual background and experience within the policy process (Denzin 
1997; Geertz 1973; Thompson 2001). Thick description as used here is both descriptive and Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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interpretive as it provides “a means to discover and reveal the depth and meaning that actors 
inscribe in their language and actions” (Thompson 2001: 64).  Thompson (2001) suggests that it 
can be defined along four axes: i) provides the context of an act; ii) states intentions and meanings 
that organize the action; iii) traces the evolution of an action; iv) presents the action as a text that 
can then be interpreted.  In this way, thick description is more than just the reporting of facts.  
Denzin (1989: 83) notes that thick description allows one to hear the “voices, feelings, actions, 
and meanings of interacting individuals” (as cited by Thompson, 2001).  Thus an ethnographer’s 
notes become  “thick,” not just  with  description  but with interpretation of those  descriptions, 
bringing out “underlying inferences and implication.  Analysis becomes the determination of what 
is important and what is the basis for that importance” (Thompson 2001: 66).  Thick description is 
therefore a way to “add layers of understanding” to triangulate events and their meaning from as 
many directions as possible (Thompson 2001 citing Dear 1995).  
Combining the “thick description” approach outlined above and interpretive analysis of texts from 
primary source documents and interview transcripts, the research aims to develop “grounded 
theory” (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987). Interviews were typically audio-recorded and 
later transcribed to become texts.  Grounded theory provides a strategy for interpretive analysis of 
the textual data and this was used to guide the research from the outset.  The notion of grounded 
theory is that theory can be usefully generated from the analysis of data, as contrasted to its 
development from logical deduction and a priori reasoning (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Grounded 
theory  is  based  on  comparative  analysis  and  prioritizes  a  triad  of  operations  aiming  first  to 
identify  key  conceptual  categories  and  then  conceptual  properties  and  finally  to  elaborate 
theoretical implications through comparison and analysis.  The triad includes data collection, 
coding and memoing or assessment (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987).  
The research conclusions aim to extend theoretical insights that focus on the science, policy and 
global  environment  interface,  focusing  on  the  relationship  between  expert  and  local  or 
experiential knowledge, and particularly on the use of argument and persuasion to interpret and to 
frame  scientific  and  other  expert  evidence  in  meaningful  ways  in  regional  scale  public 
decision-making.   
My insights draw on my own experience as a climate policy expert. Inevitably, I have interpreted 
what I was told and observed in California within the broader context of my own experience and 
knowledge of the international policy discourse and decision-making process. As noted above, I 
am also a native Californian and although I have not lived or worked in California for more than 
twenty years, my attachment to the “place” known as California dates back to the beginning of the 
20
th century when my grandmother was born in northern California. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The choice in methodology is thus influenced by my “position” within the broader international 
network of policy elites.  Given this it is clear that I was not setting out to conduct “objective” 
research, but rather to establish a project where I am both the researcher and an integral part of the 
policy-relevant  research  (Denzin  1989;  Yanow  2000).  Strauss  (1987)  and  McCracken (1988) 
advise that the researcher should acknowledge and draw upon her “experiential data” or own 
experience and understandings of issues in conducting qualitative social research.  McCracken 
(1988) refers to this using a metaphor where the researcher is seen as an “instrument” or tool in 
the  research.  Yanow  (2000:  ix)  extends  this  understanding  to  policy  research  to  outline  an 
interpretive approach that focuses on “values, beliefs and feelings as a set of meanings” and 
emphasizes the “centrality of human interpretation” in sense-making of policy problems.  Such an 
approach is necessarily subjective since it places the “subject” or actors in the policy process at 
the centre of the research.   
My  interest  in  environmental  policy  stems  from  two  decades  of  professional  experience  on 
climate change, energy and environmental policy issues. For most of this time, I have worked 
with an intergovernmental organisation known as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (see Box 1.1).
 Working first as a policy analyst and later as a manager, 
I have worked closely with national government representatives and decision-makers as they 
struggle to address climate change. I am also active as an expert author in the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, where I contributed most recently to the Working Group II and III 
volumes of the Fourth Assessment Report. I am therefore knowledgeable about the practical 
aspects of the international politics of climate change and about national and international policy 
practices.  Thus I also have some firsthand experience with the linkages between international 
policy processes and epistemic networks in the area of climate change. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Box 1.1: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
The OECD is an inter-governmental forum for dialogue and policy assessment. The OECD does 
not make policy decisions but it facilitates international consensus on a range of policy issues, facilitates 
frank  exchanges  and  promotes  understanding  of  “good  practice”  among  Member  countries.  It  is  a 
knowledge-based organisation, based on discursive practice, albeit one that is largely confined to OECD 
government representatives.   
The OECD conducts applied policy research and sometimes acts as a mediator between experts 
and policymakers, thus to some extent playing the role of a “boundary” organisation (Eden 2005; Gieryn 
1983a; Jasanoff 1990).  Typically a boundary organisation or function refers to a science-policy interface 
however in  this  case  I refer  more generally to an expert-policy  interface  where the principal area of 
expertise of concern to the OECD is that of economics. When the process works well, analytical reports 
are grounded in real-world challenges and policy experience within OECD Member countries.  When it 
works poorly, analytical reports may never be formally published or released, or they may be diluted of 
politically controversial findings.  Even when the process “fails” there is often an appreciable amount of 
progress  in  establishing  common  framings  for  issues  and  understanding  of  different  points  of  view, 
constraints and perspectives amongst Member countries.  
Reflecting  the  norms  and  preferences  of  its  Member  countries,  the  dominant  paradigm  in  the 
OECD is welfare economics.  Governments look  to the  OECD to promote national and  international 
environmental protection through principles of environmental economics and open market systems (Hajer 
1995). That is, firstly, to identify and establish a “value” for the environment and, secondly, to use market 
instruments and incentives to incorporate environmental values into market systems.  Indeed, ecological 
modernisation as a social theory (see Chapter 3) fits neatly into this paradigm and reinforces linear or 
techno-rational models of policymaking (Hajer 1995).  In the OECD, ecological modernisation is not a 
“theory” -￿  something to be tested and explored - rather it is a starting point for discussions. 
 
This research project has provided a vehicle to expand my understanding about policy practice, to 
connect my experience to a broader foundation of conceptual and empirical findings available in 
academic social research. The research differs from my professional experience and writings to 
date in two fundamental ways: first it is grounded in conceptual understanding of political and 
social theory on the environment; second it is regional or place-based in its focus and thus only 
indirectly related to the international and national policy processes with which I am more familiar. 
1.3.1.  Why this approach? 
A  central theme  of investigation is  the  context  for  decision-making  on global environmental 
change.  The importance of context in policy analysis was recognised by the founder of the policy 
movement Lasswell (1971).  Lasswell outlines the policy process in seven phases, the first of 
which is “intelligence” or problem recognition. In an argument for an alternative, non-linear 
model of policy-making and analyses, Kingdon (1984) also identifies three major process streams 
for policymaking: i) problem recognition and agenda setting; ii) formation and refining of policy 
proposals; iii) politics (see also Chapter 3). Agenda-setting refers to why a particular problem is Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
 
  23 
added to the agenda or not.  Kingdon (1984) highlights problem definition and participants as well 
as  politics  in  the  policy  process  as  the  most  significant  determinants  of  “agenda-setting.”  
Thompson  (2001)  notes  that  the  intelligence  phase,  or  what  Kingdon  refers  to  as  problem 
recognition and agenda setting, may be the one phase where thick description can be most helpful 
to policy analysis.  This is especially important to the issue of framing or alternative ways of 
understanding and presenting the policy issues, both the problems and solutions that derive from 
climate change.  
The use of thick description can help to identify how the policy agenda is shaped through problem 
definition, who is influencing the policy agenda and why.  This approach includes looking at 
conceptual and methodological assumptions used to describe the problem, including evidence and 
development of arguments as well as the identification of policy alternatives.  If, in the past, 
policy  analysis  was  intended to  avoid the  ‘problem’ of  politics, the new  approach  to policy 
analysis  advanced  by  Hawkesworth  (1988),  Dryzek  (1990)  and  DeLeon  (1997)  and  others 
confronts it but requires a methodology in which underlying meanings, that is, politics, are laid 
bare.    Understanding  meanings  requires  context;  thick  description  provides  that  context 
(Thompson, 2001:70). 
Potential drawbacks of thick description and the use of grounded theory in policy analysis include 
problems  of  the  validity  of  the  claims  after  data  are  gathered  (Glaser  and  Strauss  1967; 
McCracken 1988; Thompson 2001).  Relevance is a test of validity and can only be known after 
analysis is completed depending on whether conclusions and recommendations from the analysis 
are  adopted  (Thompson,  2001:  74),  i.e. on  whether  policymakers  find  the  analysis  useful.  
Another problem is subjectivity – but Yanow (2000), Thompson (2001) and McCracken (1988) 
reject this criticism, as there are multiple ways of seeing, depending upon the standpoint of the 
observer, and from this perspective all research could be said to be subjective.  What one person 
may see another will miss (Denzin 1997; McCracken 1988; Thompson 2001). Another drawback 
is that thick description and grounded theory strategies are time-consuming activity (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Thompson 2001).  Overall Yanow (2000) argues that the subjectivity 
of interpretive research is its strength and that the approach is equally as systematic, rigorous and 
methodical as are alternative approaches. 
1.3.2.  How did I use the approach? 
The research is developed through a single in-depth case study to explore the development of 
regional climate policy. The case study of California is constructed through the collection and Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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analysis of ethnographic data.  These data were collected largely through long, semi-structured 
interviews with a large number of elite policy actors.    
In total, I interviewed fifty-three individuals over the year of 2006 (see Table 1.1; and Appendix 
for more detail). The year of 2006 was important for two reasons.  First, the state government, 
under Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order of 2005, took a careful look at alternative emission 
reduction strategies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, in an effort to come up with a concrete 
plan of action to meet to Governor’s short and medium term emission reduction goals.  Second, 
and  perhaps  more  importantly,  several  major  new  pieces  of  climate  change  legislation  were 
debated and ultimately approved in the September 2006 session of the legislature (see Chapter 4). 
Thus it was an exciting time period for the research, as it was a period of great movement on the 
policy front.  It is important to remember that all of the interviews were conducted prior to 
conclusion of the September 2006 legislative session, thus there was still great uncertainty about 
the timing and the shape of the emerging policy framework for climate change.  Nevertheless, 
most of those interviewed held the view that climate change was a priority for the California 
policy agenda and was there to stay for the foreseeable future. 
With few exceptions, the selection of interviewees was limited to include only “elite actors” in the 
climate policy process in California (referred to also as the “policy elite”). I chose to focus on 
policy elites to attempt to better understand the decisions on climate policy from the perspective 
of those directly engaged in the policy process. This approach has been demonstrated elsewhere 
as a valid approach to interpretive policy analysis and research (McDowell 1997).  Interviewees 
were selected to include a range of different types of actors, political interests and persuasions, 
and  disciplines.    The  interviews  covered  people  who  were  both  “governmental”  and 
“non-governmental actors,” including those from within the government and those external to it.  
Within these two broad categories, I attempted to include individuals that would represent a wide 
range of different interests (see Appendix).   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The choice of interviewees was a multi-step procedure. First, an initial list of interviewees was 
developed based on a quick review of the grey literature,
6 media and website information on 
recent  climate  policy  developments  in  California  over  the  course  of  2005.  Second,  I 
complemented this with numerous conversations with expert colleagues and friends working in 
the field in California. Some of these people are international experts, however, I also contacted a 
number  of  local  experts  on  related  policy  issues  (e.g. energy  efficiency).  I  also  used  the 
snowballing approach asking initial interviewees about who would be important to include in the 
research. In the process of covering 
the  question  of:  “Who  was 
influencing  the  debate  and  the 
outcomes  in  the  emerging  climate 
policy  process?”  This  was 
particularly  important  in  the  first 
round  of  interviews  to  identify 
further  interviewees.    As  outlined 
below the first round of interviews 
was conducted in January 2006 and 
a  second  round  of  interviews  was 
conducted in May to June 2006.   
Of  the  total  of  53 interviews,  50 
interviews  followed  the  long, 
semi-structured  interview  format, 
and were recorded for later analysis 
(See  Table  1.1).
7    The  remaining 
three  interviews  were  essentially 
unrecorded  or  off  the  record 
entirely, providing only background 
information for the research; as they 
were not recorded, they were not formally analysed for the research.  The principal recording 
                                                         
6 Grey literature is a term referring to analytical reports that are targeting the policy audience, designed to 
influence the policy elite that were the core participants in this research. An example of grey literature is:  
(Milford et al. 2005). 
7  Three  other  interviews  were  informal  (no  formal  record  was  made),  however  they  provided  useful 
background information. 
Table 1.1: Interviews and interview data characteristics 
Type of actor   
NGO-Business sector  10* 
NGO-Environmental Advocacy  8 
Experts – Academia or Other  11* 
Media  1 
City government  1 
State government  14 
State legislative, Governor’s office or 
political appointee (i.e. 
Commissioner)  5 
Total  50 
 
Timing and Interview 
Protocols 
January 06 – Protocol I  15 
May-June 06 – Protocol II  35 
   
Type of interview 
Face-to-face  43 
Telephone  7 
*  Three  interviews  were  conducted  informally  to  provide 
background  information;  two  of  these  were  with 
NGO-business  people  and  another  was  with  an  Expert. 
Only  4  of  the  50  formal  interviews  were  not  digitally 
recorded; instead these were recorded through hand-written 
notes. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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method  used  was  audio-recording;  however  four  of  the  interviews  were  recorded  through 
hand-written notes. The large majority of the interviews were conducted “face-to-face” or in 
person (43), with several others (7) conducted, in the same long interview format, but over the 
telephone. I also engaged some interviewees in follow up discussions over the period 2006-07 by 
telephone or occasionally in person, however most often through written exchanges.  Also each 
interviewee whose words are cited in the thesis was given the opportunity to review the extracts 
of the transcripts that are used here, and to correct them if necessary.  They were also given the 
opportunity to request that transcript material not be attributed to them directly.  In all instances 
this interaction was fruitful, leading to small, often editorial changes in the material used to 
construct arguments in the thesis. 
The protocols supporting the semi-structured interviews evolved over the course of the project 
with two main protocols being used across the fifty different formal interviews.  The protocols 
and background documentation for the research were provided to interviewees in advance of the 
interviews (see Appendix 1).   
There were two distinct phases of interview data collection.  First I conducted an initial or “pilot” 
round of interviews in January 2006 using an initial pilot protocol (see Appendix).  This first stage 
of the data collection included little less than 30% of the total number of people interviewed.  
Interview questions were designed to focus directly on some of the research questions identified 
during  the  conceptual literature  review  (see  Chapters  2  and  3).    For  example,  the  questions 
covered: what types of knowledge, and which actors and networks were most influencing the 
policy  process  and  its  outcomes?  After  working  with  this  protocol  in  the  course  of  these 
interviews, I learned that interviewees found the questions to be too abstract and they struggled to 
respond to them.  Working as they were in the day-to-day policy process, the interviewees were 
inclined to want to talk about what the important issues were and how they were being addressed, 
rather than to think through and discuss why and how these issues had moved onto their policy 
agenda.   
Second, and as a result of these first interview experiences, I again reviewed relevant conceptual 
literature (Chapter 3), this time with a particular focus on policy sciences and policy research 
(Herrick 2004; Kingdon 1984; Majone 1984; Majone 1989; Schön and Rein 1994; Grindle and 
Thomas  1991).    This  literature  is  often  combined  with  case  study  material,  thus  providing 
practical suggestions about how to approach the same types of questions (e.g. insights into what 
types  of  knowledge  and  which  actors  were  influencing  the  process)  from  the  pragmatic 
perspective of an actor engaged in this process.  In particular, I found that Kingdon (1984) in his 
classic policy research project in the United States obtained insights into many of these questions Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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with a much simpler interview protocol.  I therefore revised the interview protocol to be based 
partly on the model that Kingdon had developed for his research.   
The second and final interview protocol (see Appendix) was therefore designed to focus more on 
questions about what participants perceived to be the main policy issues and on how the issues 
were being framed by policy elites.  I asked interviewees to tell me what they saw as the main 
challenges for climate policy and the policy solutions (i.e. what is the problem that you are trying 
to address?  What are the main solutions, and why?).  In this way I was able to learn what the 
policy actors saw as the main issues, and what evidence was influential in the debate about policy 
solutions.  Following  Malone  (1989),  Schön  and  Rein  (1994)  and  Herrick  (2004),  I  became 
interested in how the debate was being shaped not only by scientific and expert knowledge but 
also  by  active  framing  of  this  knowledge  through  argument  and  choice  of  evidence.    This 
argumentative policy process appeared to be driven by different types of actors and by different 
types of knowledge – not solely expert knowledge.  The ideas and arguments that were circulating 
were  not  originating  solely  from  within  the  policy  process  per  se,  but  sometimes  on  the 
peripheries  through  the  non-governmental  actors  or  institutions  working  in  parallel  with  the 
formal policy process.  
The  second  protocol  was  therefore  designed  to  relate  to  the  policy  practitioners’  day-to-day 
challenges  of  decision-making.  Rather  than  asking  them  to  think  about  my  research  agenda 
directly, the broad questions underlying my research were left to the background. This second 
protocol  worked successfully  as  a  vehicle  to  get the interviewees  talking  about how  climate 
change policy was developing in the State of California.  It was easily accessible to interviewees 
and provided a platform for them to talk about climate change as a policy issue in California, why 
both the decision-makers and the public cared about it, and what the main lines of evidence were 
in the policy debate. 
Texts  from  the  interviews  became  the  basis  of  the  interpretive  analysis,  which  followed  the 
interviews, in a search for recurring themes and perceptions among different actors. “Factual” 
references from the interview transcripts were also verified through both primary and secondary 
source documents, for example, with respect to the links between current climate policy decisions 
and past action in the areas of energy and environment or air pollution.   Key interpretive themes 
were identified from interview data and coupled with concepts in the theoretical literature and 
further  confirmed  (or  rejected)  for  further  assessment  through  the  analysis  of  primary  and 
secondary source documents. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Importantly, it was during this interview process that I discovered a number of “new” theoretical 
issues.  In particular, a clear underlying theme emerged from the interview data about the strong 
connection  of  climate  change  policy  to  “experiential”  or  “local  knowledge”  about  other 
environmental  and  energy  issues  across the state.    Although  I  had understood  that this past 
“institutional” experience was important right from the start, I had underestimated the role that it 
would play in the stories that people told, and in terms of the understanding and the evidence that 
this experience provided for doing something about climate change.  As a result of this emergent 
conceptual theme, I added a new dimension to the thesis on the role of local knowledge, referred 
to here as “experiential knowledge”, in the policy process. 
The interview data and supplementary documents were analysed using a framework that derived 
from both the conceptual literature (Herrick 2004; Kingdon 1984; Majone 1984; Majone 1989; 
Schön and Rein 1994) and the interviews themselves.  From the interaction of the conceptual 
literature and the interview data, I identified four different drivers of change that could be used to 
structure analysis and provide insights to answer the main questions of the research (see above).   
In particular four different themes emerged as the basis for an analytical framework to guide the 
research: i) “framings” for climate policy problems and solutions; ii) different types of evidence 
used to support these framings; iii) key events, turning points or windows of opportunity for 
action; iv) social interactions in the policy process including: who the key actors are and how they 
interact with each other.
8 These driving factors provided a framework for analysis of the interview 
data  and  also  guided  analysis  of  primary  and  secondary  source  documents.  This  analytical 
framework is further elaborated in Chapter 3. 
Beyond interview data, the research included the collection and analysis of numerous primary 
source documents.  This included review of written and audio records of workshops and other 
public  meetings  supporting  the  California  policy  process.  Records  of  public  meetings  and 
workshops on climate change in California go back to 1990, however policy in related areas 
moved forward much earlier. Public media, both newspaper and magazine reporting as well as 
local  radio broadcasts  were  also  surveyed  to  provide  another  source of  information  on  how 
climate policy in California was developing, focusing particularly on the period 2004-2006, but 
also continuing to the completion of the core thesis writing (to the end of 2007).  
The research also builds on secondary sources including general academic and state institutional 
literature on climate policy and other related policy processes in California as well as “grey 
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literature” on these topics. The latter are reports and papers publicly available, for example on the 
internet or on request in paper form, but they are not formally published or to be found in the 
peer-reviewed literature.    Such  literature provides  prime  examples  of how  different types  of 
knowledge are being used to provide evidence and construct argument to support climate policy 
decisions. 
Experience in air pollution policy and energy and environmental policy was identified early on in 
the interview process as central to the climate policy debate and to pro-policy arguments.   Two 
institutional histories exist on air pollution policy (CARB 2006; SCAQMD 1997) and a number 
of  other  legal  reviews    (Carlson  2003;  Revesz  2001)  proved  to  be  valuable  as  a  means  of 
cross-checking  interviewee  statements  about  past  events  or  roles  of  people  or  legislative 
developments.  However, on the issue of energy efficiency in the power sector in California there 
does not seem to be a comprehensive institutional history available, however there are some 
partial  sources  which  proved helpful  (e.g. Rosenfeld 1999).  A  small  academic literature  also 
documents  and  analyses  the  history  of  California’s  leadership  in  environmental  policy  (e.g. 
Bernstein  et  al.  2000;  Carlson  2003;  Kamins  2006;  Roe  1984;  Vogel  et al.  2006).    This 
information is more synthetic and easier to work with than primary sources and offers different 
storylines and perspectives on some of the issues related to climate change policy treated here 
(e.g. on  the  role  of  federalism  in  environmental  policy).  The  research  therefore  drew  upon 
secondary source material as one input to support the analysis.  Where information was not 
available from secondary sources, I referred back to primary source documents (e.g. the texts of 
laws or of the regulatory decisions themselves) to gather information and crosscheck interview 
transcript data on factual events and institutional developments. 
1.4.  Roadmap for the thesis  
In summary, the research investigates regional climate policy processes from the “inside out” 
attempting to understand the meaning of the climate change problem and the emerging policy 
responses through the eyes of those shaping the policy.  What framings of the climate problem 
were dominant and why? How and who were shaping arguments for action?  What influence and 
interaction  occurred  with  national  and  international  policy  processes  and  decision-making?  
Emerging from the iterative nature of grounded theory development, several key questions and 
ideas about how to approach the research arose in the course of the field work in California.  
Importantly  this  included  how  the  policy  processes  use  local  or  experiential  knowledge  to 
complement or in place of scientific and expert knowledge to construct arguments for policy?   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The roadmap for the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 contains a focused literature review on the 
nature of the problem of global climate change and of the policy challenge.  This includes a brief 
review of how the environmental risk dimension of global climate change is being treated at 
different scales of public decision-making. Chapter 3 provides a conceptual backdrop for the 
research,  which  is  used to  anchor  the  project in social  research on the  relationship  between 
society, science and global environmental decision-making.  The literature reviews contained in 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the conceptual framework and the basis for the main research questions 
outlined above.   
Chapters 4 to 8 contain the core of the case study and its findings based on primary data collection 
and analysis.  Chapter 4 sets out the geographic, economic and social context for decision-making 
in California and the 2006 emergent framework for climate policy.  Chapter 5 traces a number of 
key early developments in the long history of environmental and energy policy in California.  
Chapter 6 highlights how the policy process on climate change is unfolding, beginning with early 
legislation  to  “study”  the  problem  following  through  to  early  policy  developments  that  are 
extensions of air pollution and energy policy.  It provides an overview of the more focused 
climate  relevant  policy  actions  in  recent  years.  Combined,  both  Chapters  5  and  6  point  to 
significant experiential or local knowledge in air pollution control and energy efficiency policy 
arenas as key sources of knowledge, evidence and argument and thus as a driver of change in the 
climate policy arena.  Chapters 7 and 8 shift the focus of the analysis to the structure of arguments 
and evidence found in the California policy discourse. Chapter 7 sketches the emergence of the 
framing of climate change as a problem issue of environmental risk pointing to the use of regional 
impact science assessment in the regional policy process.  And Chapter 8 sketches the framing of 
regional policy solutions as win-win for both the local economy and the environment.  Chapters 4 
to 7 broadly combine to examine the interaction between expert and local knowledge, both used 
as evidence to shape pro-environmental policy arguments and to influence the active framing of 
climate change issues in the policy debate.    
The last two chapters conclude with Chapter 9 looking across the empirical evidence to highlight 
issues of scale and agency as drivers of change in the context of multilevel governance.  Chapter 9 
explores the back and forth between state and federal authority in key areas related to climate 
change  and underscores the  role of non-governmental  actors  and  networks in  state decision-
making as well as institutional and individual leadership in California.  Chapter 10 concludes by 
relating the findings of the research to the conceptual literature and responds to the main questions 
set out at the outset of the research.  This concluding chapter generalises the lessons learnt for 
multilevel  governance  and  adds  insights  into  more  general  theoretical  understanding  of  how Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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global change decision-making connects to sub-national or regional communities of people and, 
more broadly how this reflects on our understanding of relationships between science, society and 
nature.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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2.  GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM AND 
THE POLICY CHALLENGE 
2.1.  Introduction 
The scientific study of climate change has evolved over the last century or more. Only in the late 
1960s did climate change become a focused area of research (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007; Hart and 
Victor 1993; Maslin 2004). Much of the scientific research on climate change centres on two 
main challenges: detection of past climate change that can be attributed to human causes; and 
prediction of climate change associated with alternative socio-economic development pathways in 
the  coming  century  or  beyond.  However  given  long-time  spans  and  complex  system 
characteristics of climate change, scientific observations and predictions are associated with a 
certain  amount  of  ambiguity  and  broad  uncertainty.  The  science  is  thus  difficult  for  the 
non-specialist or expert audience to access, interpret and use to guide decision-making.  In an 
effort to make the growing body of scientific research more “useable” for policy decision-making, 
the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Program established 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988 and tasked it to provide a periodic 
review and assessment of the science of climate change (Agrawala 1999a; Hecht and Tirpak 
1995).   
The 2007 IPCC assessment concludes that observed climate changes showed an increase of 0.74 
degrees Celsius (
oC) for global mean temperature above pre-industrial levels (1906-2005) (IPCC 
2007a;  IPCC  2007d).  Consistent  with  the  previous  assessments  (IPCC  2001,  p.5),  the  2007 
assessment notes that most of the rise in global mean temperatures over the last fifty years can be 
attributed to human activities and highlights a range of other 20
th century changes in natural and 
human systems that are thought to be early signs of a warming world, from rising sea levels with 
impacts on coastal settlements and ecosystems to retreating glaciers with impacts on water supply 
and quality as well as mountain habitats  (IPCC 2007d).   
Global climate models predict a wide range of possible climate changes, which can be related to 
different  visions  of  the  future  as  well  as  scientific  understanding  of  atmospheric-oceanic 
interactions.  A few robust conclusions can be drawn when looking across what is now hundreds 
of model runs in the literature. A doubling of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 compared to Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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pre-industrial levels will increase equilibrium (long-term) global mean temperatures from 2.0 to 
4.5 
o Celsius (IPCC 2007a).  If left unchecked, current rates of growth in GHG emissions lead to 
such a doubling in atmospheric concentrations by the middle of this century with significant risks 
of serious impacts (IPCC 2007b).  Current baseline, or “no policy” reference scenarios suggest 
that global mean temperature change could reach 6
o C by the end of the century (IPCC 2007d).  
The IPCC assessment shows that it is possible to significantly curb the pace and the extent of 
global climate change this century and beyond through aggressive mitigation efforts that begin 
early to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Such mitigation efforts can only be possible if policies 
establish  incentives to  trigger  social,  behavioural  and  technical  changes to  curb global  GHG 
emissions  growth in the near  term,  eventually  reducing  global  emissions significantly  below 
current levels (IPCC 2007c).  For example, the IPCC outlines that limiting the extent of global 
warming to the range of 2.4-2.8
o Celsius (best estimate) above pre-industrial levels in the very 
long term would require global emissions of CO2 to peak by 2020, if not before, and to fall -30 to 
-60% below 2000 emission levels by 2050 (Fisher et al. 2007). 
2.2.  Unique-features of climate change as a policy problem 
Previous reviews of the politics of climate change have identified a number of unique features of 
the problem that complicate political decision-making (Newell 2000). Four are highlighted here 
and used to structure the discussion that follows.  First, climate change is a global problem that 
requires  significant  cooperation  amongst  diverse  (nation-state)  actors  with  vastly  different 
geo-political interests (Newell 2000).  It is widely recognised that the challenge of establishing 
agreement  amongst  diverse  nation-states  inevitably  complicates  and  slows  international 
decision-making (Fisher 2004). Second, the inter-linkage of climate change to a wide range of 
other policy issues makes it difficult to govern, to coordinate across different interest groups or 
governmental agencies and to speak with “one voice”. In this sense, climate change can be fitted 
into  a  number  of  other  on-going  policy  agendas,  from  energy policy  and  urban planning to 
agriculture, forestry and land-use management policies.
9 Third, climate change is most often seen 
as  a  distant  and  abstract  problem  (Leiserowitz  2005).  It  has  uncertain  physical  and 
socio-economic impacts, which are expected to be lagged in time and space compared to causes 
of impacts.  The ambiguity of the meaning of climate change in local contexts makes it difficult to 
prioritise  policy  action  and  incites  delay  (see  Box 2.1).  Finally,  political  understanding  and 
responses to climate change, as with other problems of global change, depend upon scientific 
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advice to interpret complex science and to frame inevitable uncertainty in a meaningful way for 
policymakers   (Beck 1992a;  Giddens 1990;  Miller and  Edwards  2001b).  This science-policy 
interface is a fourth key feature of the problem.  Literature on each of these issues is briefly 
reviewed here to set the scene for this research.   
2.2.1.  Climate change as a problem of global cooperation 
In recognition of the need for global collaboration to address the problem of climate change, more 
than 150 nations signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change into international law 
in  1992  (UNFCCC  1992).    The  Convention  establishes  an  international  framework  for 
collaborative  action  to limit human-induced  climate  change  as  well  as to  adapt to inevitable 
climate changes.  The objective of the Convention is:  
“to  achieve  …  stabilization  of  greenhouse  gas  concentrations  in  the 
atmosphere  at  a  level  that  would  prevent  dangerous  anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within 
a time-frame  sufficient  to allow ecosystems  to adapt naturally  to climate 
change;  to  ensure  that  food  production  is  not  threatened  and  to  enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (Article 2).  
In addition, the Convention calls for "precautionary, cost-effective and equitable measures to 
address  climate  change"  (Article  3.3).    It  also  works  off  of  the  principle  of  common  but 
differentiated capacities and responsibilities to act across world regions, with the most developed 
nations  of  the  world  agreeing  to  lead  mitigation  efforts  worldwide  (UNFCCC,  1992).    The 
Convention has been ratified by more than 180 nations to date, including all major developed and 
developing countries of the world.   
The Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997 yet only entered in to force in 2004 when the fifty-fifth 
nation  to  ratify  it,  Russia,  took  action  (Yamin  and Depledge  2004).
10  The  Protocol  sets out 
ambitious  emission  targets  for  all  “industrialised”  nations  of  the  world  in  the  2008-2012 
timeframe and establishes the broad framework for the use of a variety of international market 
mechanisms -- international emission trading, joint implementation and the clean development 
mechanism -- for countries to work together to reach these targets (UNFCCC 1998).  These 
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market mechanisms are designed to deliver least-costs emission reductions Other key features of 
the  Protocol  are  also  found in  the  Convention,  notably, all  countries  agree to take  action to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change however industrialised countries agree to provide financial 
support,  technology  transfer  and    capacity  building  to  support  developing  countries  in  these 
efforts.    
The Kyoto Protocol represents the first major international effort for countries to work together to 
curb GHG emissions to bring climate change under control.  It followed nearly a decade of work 
led by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which in 1996 presented an increasingly 
convincing and consensual case from the scientific community that human activity was making a 
“discernable” difference to the climate and raising global temperatures (IPCC 1996; Grubb et al. 
1999; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007).  The inclusion of the Kyoto mechanisms built upon experience, 
particularly in the US, with the use of emission trading to achieve ambitious regulatory targets by 
creating  a  permit  market  and  allowing  flexibility  about  where  emission  reductions  occurred 
(OECD 1992).  
The Convention also recognizes the need for adaptation (Najam et al. 2003; Yamin et al. 2005; 
Yamin and Depledge 2004).  Adaptation is expected to rise in prominence in policy strategies in 
part out of necessity.  Even if aggressive mitigation policy moves forward, mitigation strategies 
require time  to  have  an  effect  and thus  some  amount  of  climate  change  in the near-term is 
inevitable.  Unavoidable climate changes that extend beyond the range of natural variability are 
expected to occur through the middle of the 21
st century and possibly beyond (Corfee-Morlot 
et al. 2005; IPCC 2001; IPCC 2007b).  This leads to a need to plan adaptations that will limit 
vulnerability to climate change by addressing the worst of near-term, unavoidable climate impacts 
(Agrawala 2005; Yamin et al. 2006).  
While the international regime establishes the broad objectives for collective international action, 
only sovereign nation-states can negotiate climate policies to curb emissions and limit or avoid 
impacts. This makes the international regime an extremely slow and blunt instrument to address 
the nuances of climate change, especially as it  plays out at more local scales. Increasingly it is 
recognized that sub-national, or local governments and communities have a role to play to govern 
climate change from the bottom-up, along with a range of non-state actors, such as business and 
environmental organizations (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Newell 2000). At a more theoretical 
level, Putnam (1988) points to the two-level game dimensions of any international negotiation, 
where diplomacy and domestic politics are inevitably linked and being played out simultaneously 
across both international and domestic levels, each influencing the other.  Fisher (2004) points to 
the dynamics of national-international policy dynamics as well as to how national governments Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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relate to different types of actors and institutions in the policy process as a determinant of national 
policy positions in the international negotiations on climate change.  However so far this literature 
has  ignored  the  influence  of  sub-national  action  on  either  national  or  international  policy 
developments. 
2.2.2.  Inter-linkages to other policy issues 
Another important  set  of questions for governance  has to do  with  cross-issue linkage  where 
climate change is connected to other policy issues that may be better established on the political 
agenda. Many sectors are relevant, ranging from energy to water and agriculture. Lindseth (2004) 
suggests that cross-issue linkage may be especially important at national, sub-national and local 
scales of governance especially since there is no clear link between emissions at this scale and 
climate impacts. Connecting climate change to sector themes is important as it may serve to open 
long-standing coalitions of actors and unlock power for change to deal with global environmental 
change across conventional boundaries (e.g. across spatial scales of governance).   
A  key  question  is  whether  and  how  global  environmental  problems  are  being  effectively 
integrated  into  national  or  sub-national  institutions  that  are  designed  to  address  other, 
long-standing, and perhaps more widely accepted, policy issues (Warrick and Riebsame 1983; 
Young 2002). Better integration of global environmental concerns into mainstream policies in 
other  (non-climate)  areas  may  offer  a  range  of  opportunities to improve the  effectiveness of 
efforts to protect the climate by building this concern into issues that are higher priorities and thus 
receiving greater attention from governments than climate change ever will (Agrawala 2004; Beg 
et al. 2002; Heller and Shukla 2003).  Efficiencies in carrying out necessary functions may also be 
possible, for example, policy design and implementation or even monitoring, might be at least 
partially carried out through pre-existing institutions designed to deal with sector issues rather 
than global environmental change per se. Issue linkage is one means to extend networks for action 
at national or local scale to bring meaning to global issues, however it necessarily complicates 
action  and  may  slow  it  as  it  requires  consultation  and  coordination  across  many  different 
institutions and actors with different and sometimes conflicting policy agendas. 
On issue-linkage there is less focus in academic social research
11 but a great deal of information 
exists in the “grey” literature that circulates amongst policy practitioners (OECD 1999; UNFCCC 
2006).  Some researchers have criticised the policy communities growing up around climate 
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change as defining the policy problem narrowly either as an energy problem (Lindseth 2004) or 
an emissions problem (Gupta 2005), thus avoiding more difficult dimensions of the problem 
(e.g. social justice, or long-term risk aspects).  Yet the linkage to sector or resource management 
policies is inevitable, as the champions of climate policy do not have the choice of starting from 
scratch and inevitably must layer climate objectives into pre-existing policy frameworks in related 
areas.  For this reason, climate policy processes at national levels, are often organised around 
sector themes focusing to a great extent on mitigation (OECD 1999). Some of the most common 
targets of early climate mitigation policy therefore are found in the areas of energy efficiency 
(appliances and buildings), waste management, urban traffic and/or land use policy, where there 
are  large  co-benefits  for  climate  policy  reforms  (OECD  1999;  UNFCCC 2007b;  UNFCCC 
2007c).  More difficult challenges lie in formulating climate-specific policies to achieve deeper 
emission  reductions.    Climate-specific  policies  have  only  recently  emerged  to  be  significant 
forces of change, for example in the form of greenhouse gas emission trading in Europe which 
has targeted large stationary sources in the power generation and industry sectors (UNFCCC 
2006;  UNFCCC  2007d;  UNFCCC  2007e).  Although  adaptation  is  also  an  essential  part  of 
national climate policy, it has only recently begun to receive attention even in the most developed 
nations where resources are greatest (UNFCCC 2006). Lessons from the “bottom-up” on how 
adaptation and mitigation can be integrated into mainstream sector policies and how far this might 
take cities, sub-national governments or nations towards achieving ambitious climate objectives – 
whether mitigation or adaptation responses -- may eventually provide useful policy insights for 
broader scale policy efforts.
12  
2.2.3.  Global-local understanding and decision-making  
As a political issue at national and sub-national scales, human-induced climate change presents 
major  challenges  to  decision-makers.    Science  and  politics  clearly  intertwine  in  the  policy 
discourse (Miller and Edwards 2001b), with interactions becoming even more prominent at more 
local scales (Cash and Moser 2000).  Contested and complex scientific knowledge is another 
central  feature  of  the  policy  debate  on  climate  change,    notably  in  the  United  States 
(Crowley 2005), yet scientific arguments also establish a foundation upon which policymakers 
build the case for climate change as a problem that requires political action (e.g. see Box 2.1).  
                                                         
12 At the international scale, mainstreaming or the integration of climate and other sector policies has 
received some attention especially in recent years (see Agrawala et al 2005; also Heller and Shukla 2003).  
It is also formally part of the Climate Convention (see Article 4.1.f which requires Parties to take climate 
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Box 2.1: Reasons for Concern About Climate Change 
In an effort to lay out scientific evidence as it relates to the ambitious objective as found in Article 2 
of the UN Convention,  the IPCC  (2001)  identified five “reasons  for  concern” about predicted  climate 
change in the coming century.  This framing of the problem was recently reaffirmed in the IPCC’s 2007 
assessment (IPCC 2007d). These reasons include uneven distribution of impacts across regions and 
peoples, shifts in extreme weather events and irreversible changes to unique and threatened systems, 
such as coral reefs (IPCC 2001, p.11). In the face of various sources of uncertainty, it is clear that the 
stakes for  society of  inaction are also high.  Inaction could lead to serious negative and irreversible 
consequences for society over the long-term (IPCC 2007c; IPCC 2007d; Schneider and Lane 2006). 
This characterisation of reasons for concern highlights distributional or social justice issues as 
central to  the climate change problem.  Historical emissions that  cause  climate  change have largely 
originated  in  industrialised  countries,  yet  vulnerability  to  climate  change  may  be  highest  amongst 
developing countries (IPCC 2001; Tol et al. 2004).  Thus there is a fundamental asymmetry between the 
causes and the effects of climate change.  At least on the surface it appears the largest of the direct 
benefits of mitigation policy action, in the form of avoided climate change impacts, will not necessarily 
accrue to locations that spend the most to abate emissions (Corfee-Morlot and Agrawala, 2004).   
Yet a number of new developments in understanding about climate change and its impacts could 
also shift this conclusion to show significant vulnerability to climate change also in developed countries.  
One example is greater attention to extreme events, rather than mean climate change into integrated 
assessment of climate change and policy analysis. Extreme events include heat waves, droughts, floods, 
fires and storms. Increasingly a link has been made between the intensity of hurricanes and climate 
change  (Emanuel  2005)  (IPCC  2007a)  through  rising  surface  temperatures  in  the  ocean.  Hurricane 
Katrina and its devastating impact in New Orleans demonstrated the vulnerability of even wealthy nations 
to extreme events, where the poor are more exposed and more vulnerable (Mathew 2007). All types of 
countries, rich and poor, are vulnerable to extreme events (IPCC 2007b).  
Another example is that of potentially catastrophic events, such as the melting of the Greenland Ice 
Sheet or the West Antarctic Ice Sheets. This could alter the pace and the magnitude of global sea-level 
rise and a large share of  the world’s population on or near the  coast.13  Considering these risks  in 
integrated assessments implies higher global benefits of earlier and stronger mitigation, or alternatively 
radical adaptation strategies (Nicholls et al. 2008). 
While scientific evidence outlines the principal features of climate change, its possible impacts or 
reasons for concern, and its causes, technical and economic analyses suggest the main lines of 
required responses to effectively mitigate or adapt to climate change (e.g. see IPCC 2007d).  
Increasingly these expert assessments point to the urgent need for policy intervention to mobilise 
large scale shifts in investment and development patterns to limit the risks of climate change, 
through both preventive mitigative action and through adaptation to limit the vulnerability of 
society to inevitable climate changes (IPCC 2007b; IPCC 2007c).  
Despite some convergence around the global science and dimensions of the policy challenge, at 
the local scale,  predictions  of the  impacts  of  climate  change  remain  uncertain  and  action to 
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address it is fragmented.  Climate change impacts are a key issue for policymakers faced with the 
challenge of communicating climate change to their constituency, of relating it to the daily lives 
of people, either today or in the future. Choices between the building of higher and stronger dikes 
or not, or investing in cleaner energy sources, or not, are as much social choices as they are 
economic  or  technical  ones.  Communication  about  what  climate  change  is,  and  why  it  is 
significant enough to warrant political attention, is a first step to facilitating action. Some research 
suggests that establishing an understanding of climate change risk at local scale is potentially 
empowering and thus may be a central task of the policy process as it provides a means for 
“localizing” climate change and for dealing with scientific uncertainty to establish a rationale for 
policy action (Brunner 1996; Harris 2001).    
A literature on multilevel governance provides a useful framework for understanding how nested 
institutions and decision-making may operate across different tiers of government (from local to 
international);  parallel  decision-making  and  authority  may  be  exercised  through  issue-based 
institutions to manage where necessary across the typical tiers of governmental authority (e.g. 
water or air basin management) (Hooghe and Marks 2003; Foster 1997).  A key driver is the 
embedded  nature  of  decision-making  authority,  most  typically  anchored  in  higher  tiers  of 
governmental authority (Gray 1997; Hooghe and Marks 2003).  
Multilevel governance is seen by a growing number of analysts as central to advancing policy 
responses to global environmental change, since both the impacts and solutions to such problems 
are  local  in  nature  (Bulkeley  and  Betsill  2005;  Dietz  et al. 2003;  Fairhead  and  Leach  2003; 
Jasanoff and Martello 2004a; Young 2002).  Stronger understanding and capacity to address 
climate change at the local scale, when combined with the broader institutional forces that operate 
nationally  or  internationally,  may  provide  a  means  for  local-scale  social  learning  and 
breakthroughs to address difficult issues that may be deadlocked in larger scale contexts.  These 
global-local connections may be a key to moving climate action forward – indeed a key to altering 
public perception of climate change from that of an “abstract and distant” problem (Leiserowitz 
2005) to a problem that is at once global and local. 
2.2.4  Climate change as a risk governance problem: the science-policy interface 
A large social sciences literature suggests that dealing with climate change, as with other global 
environmental change issues, represents a trans-science challenge, where knowledge must be 
co-constructed in the public sphere (Weinberg 1972). Global environmental change encompasses 
a complex array of interactions between a large number of human and natural systems across vast 
spatial and temporal scales, which in turn challenges scientific assessments and policy efforts that Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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aim to identify and manage these changes  (Rayner and Malone 1998; Schellnhuber et al. 2004). 
Despite growing recognition and understanding of global environmental change, the nature of 
such change is necessarily uncertain especially with respect to the future, hence the broad use of 
the terms risk and risk governance (De Marchi 2003; Renn 2001).  
Science is central to understanding global environmental problems and to climate policy decisions 
yet it is also complex, uncertain and ambiguous, and thus contested.  When a policy challenge 
combines broad uncertainty with potentially high decision-stakes for society as a whole, political 
legitimacy requires special attention to how decisions are made (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; 
Jasanoff 1990; Ostrom et al. 2002; Stern and Fineberg 1996).  This procedural question will be as 
important to determining the success of climate policy over time as what the decisions are (Dietz 
et al.  2003;  Dietz  2003b;  Hajer  and  Wagenaar  2003).  While  substantive  expert  knowledge 
remains important, it is not sufficient to provide a political basis for policy decisions (Jasanoff 
1990; Renn 2001).  Robert Watson recently noted that science is a “necessary but not sufficient” 
precursor to the formation of an effective international regime, qualifying it as “one small input” 
to a broad policymaking exercise (as cited by Fisher 2004: 147).  Although scientific knowledge 
establishes an important set of “facts” or common technical understanding about environmental 
issues,  how  these  “facts”  are  interpreted  can  and  does  vary  widely  depending  upon  who  is 
interpreting and the argument presented (Herrick 2004; Majone 1989) (see also Chapter 3). 
Risk and uncertainty is not a new concept in environmental policymaking.  In an environmental 
context,  typically  risk  is  defined  as  probability  times  consequence,  and  in  this  case  the 
consequence is an environmental impact.  Dealing with risk in a policy or other decision process 
attempts to identify and describe possible risk outcomes such that they can be managed (Adams 
and Thompson 2002; Morgan and Henrion 1990).  Where risks are assessed to be too uncertain, 
there may be an explicit decision to delay policy action and this is in itself a policy decision.  
Policymakers may also decide to regulate even uncertain risks, should the possible hazard to 
society be judged to be sufficiently high (Jones 2001; Morgan and Henrion 1990).  There is also a 
link between environmental risk and application of the “precautionary principle” in environmental 
policymaking (De Marchi 2003; Stirling 2003), where precaution is seen as a means to limit the 
risk of an event which has a small probability but very significant environmental outcome, for 
example committing the Earth to sea level rise of more than several meters due to the melting of 
the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets.
14  Precaution is also a means to deal with ignorance, 
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or with impossible to predict but plausible events, a category in which one might place abrupt 
climate change (see also Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti 2002). 
Although several relevant strands of social theory can be related to environmental risk,  Krimsky 
(1992: 21) concludes that only cognitive and cultural theories “come closest to fulfilling the role 
of a mature paradigm.” He sees risk, at best, as “a field of study among and beyond traditional 
disciplines.”  Social scientists have long understood that judgements about risk are required, 
hence there is a role for the social sciences in risk assessment and management (Golding 1992). 
Cognitive and cultural theory highlights that these judgements are culturally-based (Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982; Jasanoff 1990) and that they are based on human perceptions and values.  In this 
sense,  judgements  about  the  risk  of  global  environmental  change  are  normative  as  well  as 
empirical decisions (Slovic 1987).   
Global environmental risk acceptability raises questions about who decides what is acceptable. 
Climate change, as with other global environmental risks, inevitably implies changes on a global 
scale  that  are  distributed  unevenly,  thus  raising  issues  of  social  justice.    In  turn,  this  raises 
questions about power and authority of different actors (Redclift and Benton 1994).  Although 
risk and global environmental problems are characterised as highly technical in nature due to the 
need to understand them by integrating different strands of scientific and expert knowledge across 
conventional  disciplinary  boundaries    (Krimsky  1992;  Stern  and  Fineberg  1996),  the  equity 
implication  of  the  uneven  distribution  of  climate  change  consequences  suggests  the  need  to 
include lay knowledge in problem definition, policy- and decision-making processes (Irwin and 
Michael 2003; Jasanoff and Martello 2004a).   
Given the importance  of  science to  climate  change or  other  global  environmental policy,  an 
important notion is "boundary" work, which operates between the domain of science and that of 
politics. Boundary-work was originally introduced by Gieryn (1983a) to describe actions that 
demarcate the differences and competing authority between scientists and others. Jasanoff (1990) 
uses this notion in a different way, to identify the boundary between policy or regulatory agencies 
and science advisory processes which officially mediate the science to support decision-making. 
This  approach  advances  understanding  scientific  knowledge  and  its  relationships  to  political 
power (Jasanoff 1990: 18), noting that a blurring of the boundary between science and politics 
allows for essential negotiation leading to the definition of "acceptable risk."  Acceptable risk is 
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necessarily a socio-political decision even if it is couched in technical evidence. Negotiation 
among scientists to bring together divergent technical opinions is necessary but not sufficient to 
bring closure on a public policy issue (Jasanoff 1990: 234-5).  In this thesis, the notions of 
boundary work and boundary organisation are used to refer to activities that intentionally blur the 
boundaries between science and policy to influence the latter.    
Further, Jasanoff (1990) suggests a circular model where negotiation iterates with construction 
and deconstruction of validity claims to provide "the construction of regulatory science" which, in 
turn, interacts with boundary work that establishes legitimacy for science advice.  Involvement of 
science  community through this  iterative  process is  shown  to  be important  to  help  establish 
stronger  consensus  for  policy  decisions.    Jasanoff  explains  how  risk  constructions  and  how 
negotiation  and  boundary  work  shape  policy.    She  states:  "what  emerges  from  a  successful 
recourse to scientific advice, then, is a very special kind of construct: one that many, perhaps 
most, observers accept as science, although it both shapes and is shaped by policy" (Jasanoff 
1990:  234).  Jasanoff  (1990)  also  notes  that  flexible  role-playing  is  important  to  successful 
boundary  work  and  risk  management  outcomes.    In  this  case,  scientists  serve  in  various 
professional capacities such as technical consultants, educators, advocates, judges and mediators.  
Habermas (1996: 351) also states that it is unrealistic to try to separate specialised knowledge 
from values and moral points of view since problems of “functional coordination, when handled 
politically, are intertwined with the moral and ethical dimensions of social integration.” More 
pointedly,  Habermas  (1991:  351)  argues  for  deliberative  politics,  “shaped  by  the  publicly 
organized  contest  of  opinions  between  experts  and  counter-experts  and  monitored  by  public 
opinion.”  Especially  on  complex  issues  such  as  climate  change,  this  literature  suggests  that 
science interfaces through a variety of socially-mediated pathways to build understanding and 
knowledge and to facilitate decision-making (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007).  
2.3.  Climate change policy as a risk governance challenge 
Given the broad social implications of climate change and the wide uncertainties in our scientific 
knowledge  of  the  problem,  there  may  be  special  value  from  a  policymaking  perspective  to 
framing climate change as an environmental risk problem (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2005; IPCC 2001; 
Lindseth 2004).  This author has argued with others elsewhere that environmental risk framings of 
climate change could reformulate political boundaries that currently divide diverse geopolitical 
groups of countries in the international negotiations on the issue of mitigation, for example to 
reflect on post-2012 commitments (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2005). In a recent example, the Stern 
Review highlighted climate change as a global risk management problem, underscoring the costs Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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of  inaction  (Stern 2007).    Focusing  on  national  and  local  (sub-national)  geographic  scales, 
Lindseth (2004) also suggests that a risk framing in policy discourse could bring meaning to 
climate  change.    Indeed,  a  different  situation  and  set  of  opportunities  for  meaningful  risk 
characterisation on climate change may exist at the local level. 
Framing climate change from a local environmental risk perspective also provides a means to 
address two other challenges implicit in climate policy.  First, it may also help to bridge the 
current divide in the climate policy community between adaptation and mitigation, as risk relates 
both to adaptation and mitigation responses (Corfee Morlot and Höhne 2003; Corfee-Morlot et al. 
2005).  Second, social research on risk suggests that contrary to techno-rational approaches that 
aim to provide more and better information (see  also Chapter 3), there will be a need for new 
institutions that embody principles of governance through democracy, competence and fairness to 
guide understanding and any policy or decision process on the meaning of what is acceptable risk  
(Bohman  1996;  Rydin  2003;  Stern  and  Fineberg  1996).    This  pertains  to  issues  of  global 
environmental governance, a dimension that has only begun to emerge in the social research 
literature (Jasanoff and Martello 2004a).  In the climate policy debate such an approach appears to 
at least partially respond to concerns that equity and justice dimensions be more fully integrated 
into decision-making (Brown 2003), but to date there is little attention to the local dimensions of 
decision-making.  
2.3.1.  International climate assessment and policy 
The notion of climate change as an environmental risk issue is still not widely used in national 
and international climate policy circles, which to date have focused on mitigation. However it is a 
prominent feature of scientific assessments. This may be because other framings are more salient 
or understandable to key policy stakeholders and decision-makers (Lindseth 2004; Miller 2000).
15 
Clearly  a  starting  point  in  international  negotiations  is  the  objective  of  the  UN  Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which embodies a “risk” based notion as the ultimate goal of 
international collaborative action. Impact science and notions of climate change risk were central 
to early science-policy studies of climate change dating back to the start of the IPCC.  At the 
international level, tolerable rates and ecological thresholds as a driver for climate policies were 
discussed by the UNEP and WMO advisor to the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) 
                                                         
15 Alternative framings vary but include: climate change as an energy problem (where the alternative 
responses are various forms and combinations of mitigation policy);  climate change as  a problem of 
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in the late 1980s and also in the Villach/Belagio conferences of the same period (Agrawala 1998; 
Agrawala  1999a).    This  select  group  of  science  advisors  –  as  predecessors  to  the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) -- proposed numerical estimates for tolerable 
rates  of  climate  change to policy  makers  before the drafting of  Article 2  of  the  Framework 
Convention. In the end, the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve: “…stabilization of 
greenhouse  gas  concentrations  in  the  atmosphere  at  a  level  that  would  prevent  dangerous 
anthropogenic  interference  with  the  climate  system…”  This  objective  remains  open  to 
interpretation today. 
2.3.1.1.  Science advisory processes on climate policy: the IPCC
16 
The creation of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change in 1988 established a process 
whereby different expert communities “negotiate” to interpret and synthesize a wide-range of 
expert literatures on climate change. IPCC assessments are also shaped by extensive and open 
peer-review from national governments and other outside experts (Agrawala 1999b). This process 
is consistent with what some social research scholars have recognized as a need for diverse expert 
communities to  conduct  an  “epistemological discourse”  (Renn 2001)  or the  need to  mediate 
amongst  themselves  to  reach  consensus  on  conclusions  inherent  in  an  otherwise  disparate 
knowledge base (Jasanoff 1990). 
The mandate of the IPCC is such that it stops short of recommending policy at any scale of action.  
And a number of other features of IPCC procedures can be argued to prevent it from creating 
“usable  knowledge”  for  the  climate  policy  process  (Haas  2004).    At  least  with  respect  to 
providing a basis for the interpretation of Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), this would appear to be true.  
After the adoption of the Framework Convention in 1992, the IPCC was asked by governments 
through its inter-governmental management structure to address issues related to its Article 2 
objective, leading to a workshop on this topic in 1994 and to some treatment relevant issues in the 
Second Assessment Report (IPCC 1996).  Even these relatively early reports carefully avoid 
taking a stance on this issue, noting instead that it is the work of policymakers rather than of 
scientists and researchers to balance different perspectives on risk, to value risk avoidance and to 
make judgements about what is acceptable (IPCC 2001; Agrawala, 1999 & 1998).  This cautious 
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position has continued in subsequent IPCC reports and eventually led to the framing of the issue 
as a problem of risk management or decision-making in the context of uncertainty (see Box 2.2). 
Box 2.2: IPCC – framing of the climate change as a risk problem 
Much attention in international research and scientific assessment communities currently focuses 
on the effective integration of the wide range of relevant scientific knowledge into comprehensive 
assessments of climate change.  A textual analysis of the third IPCC assessment shows that 
climate  change is framed as a risk problem. For example, the Synthesis Report of  the Third 
Assessment states (IPCC 2001: 3): Decision making has to deal with uncertainties including the 
risk of non-linear and/or irreversible changes and entails balancing the risks of either insufficient or 
excessive action, and involves careful consideration of the consequences (both environmental and 
economic), their likelihood, and society’s attitude towards risk. 
In its Fourth Assessment Report, the IPCC underscored again the risk management challenge of 
climate  change in  stating:   “Decision-making about  responding to climate  change involves an 
iterative risk management process that includes both mitigation and adaptation, taking into account 
actual and avoided climate change damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity, and attitudes to 
risk.” (see IPCC 2007d & IPCC 2007c). 
The  IPCC  was  again  asked  to  address  Article  2  in  its  Third  Assessment  Report  where  the 
Synthesis  notes  only  that  “scientific  evidence  helps  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  increase 
knowledge…” about what might constitute dangerous interference with the climate system, but 
that  decisions  on  this  “…are  value-judgements  determined  through  socio-political  processes, 
taking into account considerations such as development, equity, and sustainability, as well as 
uncertainties and risk. …” (IPCC 2001, p. 38; see also Box 2.2). Thus the IPCC has not been 
entirely silent on this issue but it has made clear that they see their role as limited to providing 
technical input to policymakers’ inevitably normative decisions on the issue of what is acceptable 
risk (Agrawala 1999a; Oppenheimer and Petsonk 2005).  
The  IPCC’s  Fourth  Assessment  reinforced this view while  also  presenting  evidence  of  even 
higher levels of risk to natural and social systems for a given level of global mean temperature 
change, which can be used as a proxy for levels of climate change more broadly (IPCC 2007d). 
The Synthesis Report of the fourth IPCC assessment reiterates its previous view on this when it 
states:  “Determining  what  constitutes  ‘dangerous  anthropogenic  interference  with  the  climate 
system’ in relation to Article 2 of the UNFCCC involves value judgements. Science can support 
informed decisions on this issue, including by providing criteria for judging which vulnerabilities 
might be labelled ‘key’” (IPCC 2007d).  In this way, the IPCC has consistently attempted to 
highlight evidence for what might be considered “dangerous” while not crossing the boundary to 
make such a judgement.  In their view, such a judgement is necessarily a normative, political 
judgement and would thus not be an appropriate judgement to make as an “expert” body.  This 
position draws a relatively clean line between science and policy advice. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Jasanoff  and  Wynne  (1998)  point  to  the  IPCC  as  an  example  of  standardised  science  –  or 
normalisation  process  –  that  frames  diverse,  trans-scientific  issues  for  decision-makers 
(Weinberg 1972).  ‘Normalisation’  is  a  Foucauldian  concept  that  establishes  a  common 
understanding of science (or other expert knowledge) into “what is normal” and institutionalises 
this understanding into routines that shape behaviour (Foucault 1980; see also Chapter 3). The 
notion of normalisation of science in this context maintains a certain amount of “plasticity” as 
IPCC products can be used to serve different ends and support different framings of climate issues 
(see discussion Jasanoff and Wynne 1998: 23).
17  
This  literature  combines  with  the  significant  science-policy  experience  encapsulated  in  the 
IPCC’s products and processes to highlight its co-production of knowledge about climate change, 
drawing on scientific endeavour as well as on social means of interpretation.  The combination of 
experience  and  analytical  work  embodied by the  IPCC  also  underscores the  role  of  agency, 
institutions for deliberation and epistemic networks in knowledge creation designed to address 
global change (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998).  Interpretation and argumentation, building on the 
scientific evidence presented by the IPCC (and possibly other similar networks operating at more 
local scales) could play a key role in any policy process aiming to identify what is “dangerous” 
and therefore what is safe and acceptable in terms of climate change and its impacts.  The work of 
the IPCC is helping to advance understanding of climate change risk and this may influence 
decision-making.  But  to  date  it  has  had  limited  direct  influence  and  there  is  no  practical 
international agreement on how to interpret what is “dangerous” climate change. 
2.3.1.2.  The political process: UN FCCC 
Internationally, the  central  institutional  mechanism  for  policymaking  is  embodied in the  UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Conference of the Parties (Yamin 
and  Depledge  2004).  The  principal  means  of  decision-making  is  through  negotiation  among 
nation-states (Depledge 2001; Yamin and Depledge 2004).  There is no formal advisory function 
where negotiators seek and consider expert advise for their decisions, either from the IPCC or 
from other knowledgeable experts in either an institutional or individual capacity. The design of 
the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technological Advice (SBSTA) reflects this gap between 
expert  advise  and  political  decision-making,  operating  as  a  shell  for  the  pre-negotiation  on 
scientific  and  technical  issues  that  must  pass  through  the  Conference  of  the  Parties  (COP) 
                                                         
17 There are different views about the legitimacy and policy relevance of IPCC’s work on climate change.  
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(Agrawala  1999b;  Miller  2001).    Technical  and  science  assessment  background  information 
targeting the negotiations is prepared long in advance, either through other formal mechanisms 
such as the UNFCCC secretariat “technical papers”, the IPCC assessments or informally through 
other ad-hoc advisory bodies.
18  Despite its label, the SBSTA has never had the ambition nor the 
mandate to play a truly scientific or technical advisory role, but rather operates within the highly 
political  context  of  the  Convention  negotiations  with  its  membership  exclusively  limited  to 
governmental officials.  
With respect to the role of the SBSTA within the Convention process, the situation regarding a 
political interpretation of “what is dangerous?” under Article 2 could be said to be much different 
as  it  is  presumably  part  of  the  SBSTA  mandate  to  consider  and  speak  out  on  this  issue. 
Negotiators are not climate scientists nor are they experts. Further, the non-expert character of 
negotiating bodies under the Convention could be an opportunity for reflection and dialogue 
about science and other expert knowledge and to combine this with political judgements on what 
constitutes salient public risk.  
There is some history of dealing with the notion of “dangerous” in the UN FCCC but negotiations 
to date they have not led to any closure (Depledge 2001; Oppenheimer and Petsonk 2005; Yamin 
and  Depledge 2004;  Corfee-Morlot  and  Höhne  2004).    As  attention  turns  to  a  post-2012  or 
post-Kyoto Protocol agreement, there is again discussion of how much mitigation is enough and 
of the notion of what is “dangerous” climate change (UNFCCC 2007f; UNFCCC 2007g).   
Although the issue of defining “dangerous” appears to be moving back into the political debate 
internationally,  there  is  still  only  a  weak  link  at  best  between  political  decisions  under  the 
UNFCCC and IPCC expert assessments. Some observers remain optimistic that an interpretation 
of “dangerous” climate change in the form of some type of long-term target will emerge with time 
through the international negotiations (Berk et al. 2002; Corfee-Morlot and Höhne 2003; Metz 
et al. 2002; Oppenheimer and Petsonk 2005; Yamin and Depledge 2004), while others remain 
more sceptical (e.g. Pershing and Tudela 2003).  There are of course other ways to reach similar 
end points, such as through the negotiation of emission targets, which may or may not be directly 
linked in negotiations to climate change targets or to a definition of what is dangerous climate 
change.
19   
                                                         
18 For example the OECD operates one such mechanism in the form of its Ad-hoc Annex I Expert Group 
on the UNFCCC. 
19 Meanwhile other “dangers” appear to have received more attention in negotiations to date including the 
fear that too much mitigation too soon might brake economic growth.  Some would argue that these Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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2.3.2.  National, sub-national or trans-national scales of action and assessment 
In contrast to limited attention to the risks of climate change in formal international negotiations, 
several national governments have advanced views on this topic and made hortatory statements 
about long-term objectives for climate policies, which are driven by concern about dangerous 
impacts.    This  includes  actions  in the  UK,  and  the  Netherlands  and  more  recently  Sweden, 
Germany and Canada (for a detailed, historical account see Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005). In 
2005, the EU formally reaffirmed its view on the Convention objective by stating that global 
mean temperature should not exceed a 2
oC increase above pre-industrial levels (EU 2004; EU 
2005).  This consensus view across EU states was confirmed again in 2007 with a clear statement 
about the implication of such an overall risk target for emission reductions to be achieved in 
developed nations (EU 2007) (see Table 2.1). At the level of full governmental commitment, as 
established  through  law  or  legally-binding  policies,  only  a  few  emission  targets  have  been 
formally agreed.  Even when such targets exist, there is often extensive debate about how to 
implement them. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
questions are linked in an implicit if not explicit cost-benefit framework (e.g. Jacoby 2004).  My personal 
experience  is  that  this  link  is  weak  at  best  in  the  negotiating  context  and  that  goal-setting  is  often 
addressed with only vague attention to the costs of goal achievement.  Once the goal is set however, 
attention turns to the question of how to achieve it in the most cost-effective manner (see also Chapter 7).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Table 2.1: Overview of national and sub-national greenhouse gas targets with “all of government” 
support 
Country or 
Sub-National 
Government 
Source, status of 
objective 
Reference 
Year  Horizon  Target 
European Union 
(EU 2007) 
European Council 
(Presidency 
conclusions, of the 
Brussels European 
Council; 7224/1/07, 
REV 1, 2 May 2007) 
1990 
 
 
1990 
2020 
 
 
2050 
2oC above pre-industrial 
levels -20% GHG or -30% 
GHG (if other developed 
nations do likewise) 
Developed nations long-term 
aim: -60 to -80% GHG 
United Kingdom 
- Federal Government 
Recommendation 
White Paper on Energy 
(24 February 2003) 
1990 
1990 
2050 
2020 
-60% CO2 
-10 to -20% CO2 
Germany 
- Federal Government 
National Climate 
Change Programme – 
2005 
(Law, 13 July 2005) 
1990  2020  -40% GHG 
If the EU establishes a target 
of -30% in the 2020 
timeframe 
Sweden 
- Federal Government 
National Climate 
Change Strategy 
(Decision no. 
2001/02:55) 
1990  2050  4.5 tonnes CO2eq per capita 
per year 
California* 
(CA-Code 2006a; 
California 2005a) 
Executive Order 
(E-3-05; June 2005) 
Global Warming 
Solutions Act (State 
law, September 2006) 
2000 
 
1990 
1990 
1990 
2010 
2020 
2050 
2020 
GHG to 2000 levels 
GHG to 1990 levels 
GHG to - 80% 1990 levels 
GHG to 1990 levels 
New Jersey* 
(NJ-Code 2007) 
Executive Order 54 & 
Global Warming 
Response Act (State 
law, July 2007) 
1990 
2006 
2020 
2050 
GHG to 1990 levels 
GHG to - 80% 1990 levels 
Source: Original documents as cited, also see  (MEFI and MEDD 2006).  
* Notes :  Both California  and  New Jersey have legislated that GHG emissions from power 
generated out of state but consumed in state should be accounted for in achieving the state-wide 
emission targets for 2020 & 2080.  
Transnational  activities,  that  link  networks  of  non-state  actors  in  new  ways  across  national 
boundaries, are also increasingly active in their attention to climate change and the need for 
long-term climate policy goals.   In an effort to influence a G-8 ministerial, a multilateral task 
force of prominent scientists and policymakers recently recommended the establishment of the 
same long-term temperature change goal as a guide for further policy actions (ICCT 2005). The Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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G-8 did eventually recognise the threat of climate change and the urgency to respond to it, stating 
recently: “Since we met in Gleneagles, science has more clearly demonstrated that climate change 
is a long term challenge that has the potential to seriously damage our natural environment and 
the global economy. We firmly agree that resolute and concerted international action is urgently 
needed  in  order  to  reduce  global  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  increase  energy  security” 
(G-8 2007). 
More  recently,  an  environmental  initiative  linking  cities  across  nations  –  known  as  the 
International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)  – coordinated an hortatory 
statement  of  the  intent  of  more  than  100  cities  to  work  towards  the  achievement  of  Kyoto 
objectives  (ICLEI  2004).    These  actions  demonstrate  an  ongoing  political  interest  in  some 
countries,  regions  and  among  some  communities  of  experts  to  interpret  the  Convention’s 
objective in a practical way. Since this time, interest has grown in the power and influence of city 
scale  governments  to  move  action  forward  on  climate  change.    For  example,  following  an 
initiative of city of Seattle’s Mayor Nickels, by mid-2005 more than 130 US cities had announced 
plans to achieve Kyoto-like emission reductions (Brown 2005a).  Focusing on a more limited but 
international effort, in August 2006 the Clinton Climate Initiative joined Mayor Ken Livingston’s 
international initiative to network and work together to reduce emissions from urban areas in 
across at least 40 or more of the world’s largest cities (C40-Cities 2007a; C40-Cities 2007b). 
Within the US, state level initiatives have also grown with initiatives ranging from the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative which is a collaboration among North-eastern US states to California, 
all of which are working toward mandatory emission goals and regulation of greenhouse gas 
emissions across sources within state boundaries (Rabe 2002; Rabe 2004b). Some states are also 
aiming to have influence beyond national boundaries.
20  For example, California and the Brazilian 
state  of  Sao  Paulo  have  signed  a  Memorandum  of  Agreement  as  have  California  and  the 
Government of the United Kingdom, both of which to extend collaborative efforts particularly 
with respect to climate-friendly technology (California 2006a; Reid et al. 2005).  There is also an 
agreement between the state of California and the Province of Jiangsu in China (CPUC 2005).  
Beyond  its  actions  internationally,  California  was  the  first  US  state  to  legislate  long-term 
mitigation goals (i.e. 2020; see Table 2.1).  New Jersey has followed and recently adopted a law 
                                                         
20  See  also  the  Pew  Center  on  Climate  Change  website: 
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/emissionstargets_map.cfm  [accessed  28 
October 2008].  An interesting recent development with respect to California is the Western Climate 
Initiative  linking  governors  from  numerous  western  US  states  and  premiers  from  several  Canadian 
provinces; see: http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ [accessed 5 October 2008].  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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with mandatory near-term and long-term GHG emission targets. Given its size and influence in 
the  global  economy,  California’s  move  has  been  heralded  as  an  important  development  to 
demonstrate  international  and  national  leadership  on  climate  change  (Koizumi  2006;  Martin 
2006). 
Climate change risk assessment has to some extent accompanied and supported policy-making on 
climate change at national and sub-national scales.  In particular regional risk assessment in the 
last decade is characterised by:    
•  regional climate modelling and impact assessment methods which now make possible 
the assessment of global climate change and climate impacts  in regional planning 
contexts;   
•  growing experience with analytic-deliberation in climate policy processes at national 
and sub-national regional scales.   
Some  regional  and  local  climate  change  impact  assessments  have  featured  state-of-the-art 
deliberative processes to engage stakeholders from the start to shape the framings and findings of 
assessments.  In Canada, for example, there is now some experience with regional (sub-national) 
participatory  integrated  assessment  to  support  watershed  management  and  climate  change 
adaptation decision-making (Cohen et al. 2004b; Vescovi et al. 2007; Yin and Cohen 1994). An 
example of multilateral collaboration using deliberative methods exists in the recent assessment of 
the Arctic region.  This study was unique as it was both deliberative, employing a number of 
different methods to engage affected stakeholders, as well as an international process to facilitate 
deliberation  among  state  actors  with  an  interest  in  the  region.    The  Arctic  Climate  Impact 
Assessment was published in 2004 and, importantly, sponsored by the Arctic Council, which 
represents  eight  member-state  governments  (Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  Iceland,  Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the US) and six permanent participants including two indigenous peoples 
non-governmental organisations (ACIA 2004).
21 
Relatively recent policy-driven scientific efforts to predict regional climate changes are also found 
at local and regional scales, for example, in the UK (McKenzie Hedger et al. forthcoming; West 
and Gawith 2005) and in the United States  (Hayhoe et al. 2004; Moser 2005; Parson et al. 2003).  
The UK programme is somewhat unique in that it is initiated, organised and to a great extent 
                                                         
21 See also http://www.amap.no/acia.  It is interesting to note that the report stopped short of having 
powerful policy recommendations in part because of reluctant state actors.   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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funded by local and regional stakeholders, although the institutional mechanism overseeing the 
coordination of such regional efforts is national (McKenzie Hedger et al. 2006). 
In the US, initial climate impact assessment was conducted through an extensive nationwide 
effort (NAST 2000).  This national process featured a state-of-the-art process to engage local 
stakeholders (Moser 2005; Parson et al. 2003).  However a change in political administration in 
the White House in 2000 brought a shift in stance towards climate change issues.  This led to a 
discontinuation of the national led effort to coordinate ongoing climate impact assessment across 
US regions. This void has been filled to some extent by a combination of non-governmental 
activity, building on on-going federally funded research activities (see Hayhoe et al. 2004; also 
Chapter 7). 
2.4  Conclusion 
In  summary,  there  are  at  least  four  unique  dimensions  of  the  climate  change  problem  that 
challenge policy decision-making.  These features render climate policy-making complex and 
slow to advance.  They can also be seen to call for new and different forms of governance 
compared to past practice for more local and regional environmental problems. They are:  
•  a global problem that requires significant cooperation amongst diverse (nation-state) 
actors with vastly different geo-political interests;  
•  a problem inter-linked with a wide range of other policy issues, making it difficult to 
govern, to coordinate across different interest groups or governmental agencies and to 
speak with “one voice”;  
•  most  often  seen  as  a  distant  and  abstract  problem  with  uncertain  physical  and 
socio-economic  impacts,  which  are  expected  to  be  lagged  in  time  and  space 
compared to causes of impacts – further the ambiguity of the meaning of climate 
change in local contexts makes it difficult to prioritise policy action and incites delay;  
•  a problem where political understanding and responses depend upon scientific advice; 
the  broad  uncertainty  surrounding  the  science  of  climate  change  makes  this 
dimension particularly challenging and calls for an active science-policy exchange.   
The chapter has reviewed a variety of different strands of the social research literature, organising 
it along these four dimensions of the problem. The discussion will return to some of these themes 
to support the empirical analysis of the California case.  In particular, the challenge of speaking 
with “one voice” on climate change, even in a more narrow sub-national context, remains as Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse: Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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climate change can implicitly be framed in many different ways to different audiences. The issue 
of  multilevel  governance,  including  issue-linkage,  underscores  the  analysis  of  California’s 
regulatory history (Chapter 5).  
The conceptual literature on the science-policy interface has highlighted the importance of both 
cognitive  and  cultural  theories  to  understanding  risk  problems  such  as  climate  change.  This 
dimension of the climate problem raises procedural equity questions – i.e. how decisions get made 
and who gets to decide how to proceed.  The conceptual literature on  these will be further 
explored in the next chapter on decision-making. 
 Finally  the  chapter  has  also  reviewed  the  origins  of  risk-governance  in  the  climate  change 
mitigation discourse at different scales of the policy process – internationally within the IPCC 
assessment  process  and  within  the  political  negotiations  of  the  UN  FCCC,  particularly  with 
respect to efforts to interpret the Article 2 objective of the Convention.  Understanding climate 
change as a risk governance problem also extends to national and sub-national decision-making as 
is shown by recent developments taken by some national governments to independently set long-
term goals for emission reductions and similar actions within the US at state and local levels.  In 
parallel, there is a growing capacity to develop an use regional impact assessment as a tool to 
support communication and decision-making.   
On the science-policy dimensions it is important to note that sub-national decision-making and 
governance requires a change in the way that science is brought into policy discussion, forcing it 
to  come  in  more  scale-relevant  ways.  The  chapter  points  to  some  evidence  of  this  change. 
Through the use of regional climate impact assessments -- in regionalisation of the issues, in 
possibly more explicitly deliberative practice, and in the specific policy-driven context – there 
may be an opportunity to influence the politics of climate change to shift the debate from the 
global to the more local scales (Harris 2001; Shackley and Deanwood 2002). This shift may help 
make the climate problem more tractable to advance action.  The science-policy interface is 
further explored in the empirical analysis (Chapter 7).   
The next chapter completes the review of the conceptual literature by focusing on the process of 
environmental decision- and policy-making. 
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3.  SOCIETY, SCIENCE & GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
3.1.  Introduction 
This chapter traces various strands of the conceptual social science literature as they relate to our 
questions about global environmental change decision-making.  The chapter is organised in three 
parts starting with broad theoretical background on society, science and nature relationships.  The 
second  section  focuses  in  on  the  policy  process  to  address  decision-making  and  global 
environmental governance with an emphasis on who is engaged and why.  The final section is on 
interpreting  knowledge,  constructing  argument  and  social  learning  in  global  environmental 
decisions – or the “how” of the globalisation policy process.  The chapter closes with concluding 
remarks that move this conceptual framework towards a more structured analytical framework to 
guide the empirical analysis and discussion that follows. 
3.2.  Science, society and nature: theoretical background
22 
Theory regarding interactions between science, environment and society is messy at best, and 
conflicting at worst.  The conflict stems in part from the 19
th century origins of social and political 
theory,  which aimed  to  distance its  interests  and  central  tenets  from  the  positivism that had 
dominated  social  thought  during  the  Enlightenment.    At  this  time,  contemporary  social  and 
political  theory  placed  culture  and  society  in  opposition  with  biological  thinking  and  nature 
(Benton and Redclift 1994; Goldblatt 1996).  Humanist, social thought emerged in part as a 
reaction to positivism, as part of a conscious an effort to counter pervasive biological thinking, 
which was dominant at the time.  This derived from philosophers including Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, where Nietzschean “negativism” challenged positivist rational knowledge and its role 
in matters of social concern and politics (Agrawala 1999b; Barry 1999).  In parallel, classical 
social  theorists  –  Durkheim  and  Weber  --  tried  to  functionally  separate  society  and  social 
functions from nature and biology in order to distinguish it as a separate and worthy field of study 
(Goldblatt  1996).  Recognising  the  material,  natural  basis  for  production,  Marx  was  also 
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concerned  that  society  was  constrained  by  nature.    The  primary  ecological  concern  in  this 
classical social theory was to understand how nature constrains society and, more particularly, 
how to separate society from and transcend the constraints of nature (Goldblatt 1996).   
3.2.1.  Reductionism meets constructivism: towards co-construction 
Co-constructionist  perspectives  can  be  traced  to  the  interface  between  reductionism  and 
constructivism.    The  reductionist  or  positivist  perspective  on  society’s  interactions  with  the 
environment  identifies  the  main  problem  as  a  lack  of  scientific  and  technical  understanding 
amongst experts and decision-makers (Irwin and Wynne 1996; Owens 2005). This view is also 
referred to as a “deficit”,  “knowledge-gap”, or techno-rational model of decision-making.  The 
notion can be traced from Enlightenment and pre-Enlightenment thinking, when natural science 
first began to replace metaphysical religious thought as an input for governance, to the modern 
tradition of positivism (Agrawala 1999b).  In this modern tradition, science provides a unique 
knowledge basis for social decisions and scientific knowledge creates an unproblematic base of 
scientific “facts” or “truths” and is given a special status to help resolve social problems. 
The “knowledge gap” model also suggests a deficit and gap of knowledge between the “experts” 
and the “lay public.”  Since the public is seen as lacking scientific knowledge, they may not have 
the potential to usefully engage in decision-making concerning scientific issues (Irwin and Wynne 
1996; Wynne 1992a).  This perceived knowledge gap necessarily extends to a large number of 
environmental  issues  since  understanding,  or  at  least  the  initial  discovery  and  framing  of 
environmental problems, is usually science-based.  Understanding in this model is largely seen as 
a process of individual cognition and perception (e.g. Slovic 2000), while ignorance is due to a 
lack of scientific literacy and competence (Wynne 1992a).   
Modern criticism of the reductionist model of nature-society relationships emerged in the 20
th 
century, when a number of sociologists and philosophers suggested the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of how humanity interacts with science and nature (Brulle 2000; Goldblatt 1996; 
Redclift and Benton 1994; Skinner 1985a).  The vision associated with this perspective is referred 
to as critical social theory and can also be characterised as largely optimistic about the future 
(Skinner 1985a).  By comparison to environmental sociology or even ecological modernisation, 
critical  theory  places  more  emphasis  on  the  role  of  civil  society  and  social  movement 
organisations (from environmental justice proponents to environmental advocacy organisations) 
to also affect change in advanced capitalist society.  Drawing on Habermas’ work (Habermas 
1979; Habermas 1998) among others, some policy analysts suggest there is a possibility for more 
deliberative and open democracy to influence environment politics and policy reforms in favour Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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of environmental protection (Brulle 2000; Dryzek 1990; Fischer and Forester 1993).  This is often 
referred to as reflexive modernisation or post-materialism (e.g. see Beck 1992 and discussion 
below).    In  the  policy  sciences  research  literature,  this  is  more  popularly  known  as  the 
“argumentative turn” in policy analysis (Fischer 1998; Fischer and Forester 1993), where the 
distinction between “fact” and “value” is blurred (Hawkesworth 1988). 
The  emergence  of  critical  social  theory  also  led  to  scholarly  social  research  investigating 
questions such as whether greater public knowledge of science will lead to a more favourable 
environment for science and technology and more favourable social outcomes in the use of that 
knowledge (Beck 1992a; Giddens 1990). Reductionist perspectives suggest that the content of 
science is separate from the institutions that create it, yet social science research has shown that 
they are intimately intertwined (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Kuhn 1962; Latour 1987; Shackley 
and Wynne 1995; Wynne 2002). The reductionist perspective also presupposes that people have 
the capacity and are interested to “learn” about science and technology through an expert lens 
(Ungar  2000).    Yet  research  has  shown  that  people  make  sense  of  science  in  complex  and 
culturally diverse ways, for example, through metaphors that translate complex issues to everyday 
life and experience (Harrison and Burgess 1994; Leiserowitz 2006; Ungar 2000). Overall this 
strand of social theory is known today as contextual or constructivist as it places instrumental 
knowledge of nature in a societal context, where interpretation is required to bring meaning to 
such knowledge. 
Contextual or constructivist models of environmental science start from interpretive assumptions 
that nature, science and observed human behaviour must be understood in its social, cultural and 
historical context.   Emphasis is on the diversity of meanings, texts and local frames of reference 
in knowledge creation (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). Constructivist models are also reflexive as 
they focus on the uniquely human role of reflection and ideas to create institutions that guide 
social interactions (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). At one extreme, they deny that objective reality or 
“truth” exists, rather that reality is constructed by the norms, values and practices of the scientific 
community  that  produces  it  (Jasanoff  1998;  Jasanoff  and  Wynne  1998;  Latour  1987).  
Constructivist  approaches  emphasise  the  role  of  “trust”  in  expert-generated  knowledge  and 
institutions  mediating  between  knowledge  and  policy.    Trust,  access  and  influence  within 
institutions that guide decision-makers are of over-riding concern in this view, as are institutions 
that facilitate interaction between science and local environmental knowledge.  These institutions 
can help to construct networks that allow these different sources of knowledge to interact and 
inform each other on complex science and environmental issues (Carolan and Bell 2003; Irwin 
and Wynne 1996; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Wynne 1992a). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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In parallel, Foucault’s study of social institutions and their influence on society and individual 
behaviour, centres on notions of power and knowledge (pouvoir/savoir) and the ways in which 
institutions, through legal and administrative means, take on power to control  social behaviour 
and direct change (Fairhead and Leach 2003; Foucault 2004; Hajer 1995; Rydin 2003).  Although 
Foucault’s extensive field work and writing does not address environmental issues specifically, he 
establishes an understanding and approach to the study of discourse – the use of language to 
express thought, intentions, values, and courses of action – as a key notion that has been adapted 
to guide interpretive social research on the interactions between environmental politics (power) 
and science (knowledge) (Fairhead and Leach 2003; Hajer 1995; Rydin 2003; Weingart et al. 
2000). 
In practice the emphasis in the constructivist model is on the two-way process of communication 
from  scientific  and  expert 
communities to concerned publics 
and back again in a circular model 
of  ongoing  exchange  and 
influence that passes through the 
public  and  the  private  sphere  of 
influence  (Betsill  and  Bulkeley 
2004;  Carvalho  and  Burgess 
2005).  Thus, constructivist social 
theory  suggests  that  science  and 
other  expert  knowledge  is  only 
one type of knowledge relevant to 
environmental  problem-solving.  
Other types of knowledge that can be brought to bear on environmental problem solving include 
local, lay-knowledge – also referred to here as “experiential knowledge.”   
A  hybrid  between  reductionist  and  constructivist  perspectives  is  the  co-constructionist  view, 
which combines the undeniable strengths of realist, scientific discovery with contextual insights 
and lay knowledge (including experiential knowledge).  In this view, both contextual and realist 
perspectives  have influence  as society  and science  co-construct  meanings of global  warming 
(Benton and Redclift 1994; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Latour 1987; Lorenzoni et al. 2000; Stern 
and  Fineberg  1996;  Woodgate  and  Redclift  1998;  Wynne  2002).  This  theoretical  approach 
acknowledges the power and influence of scientific discovery as an input to social processes that 
mediate understanding in a political context for decision-making (Jasanoff 1990; see Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1: Conceptual context for understanding social 
change and the environment 
 
Source: author. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Expert knowledge however is mediated through social perceptions and cultural processes  (rather 
than through individual or psychological perception) to shape understandings of environmental 
risk as they play out in the policy process (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).   
This conceptual model of co-construction suggests that the recognition of climate change in the 
public sphere provides opportunities to promote social learning and adaptive responses to climate 
change over time as knowledge, preferences and social norms shift (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007).  
A  key  question  for  policy  is  whether  co-constructionist  perspectives  have  potential  to  help 
improve  decision-making.  In  this  context  it  may  be  particularly  interesting  to  look  at  the 
formation of networks of influence and power across different types of actors, sub-politics and the 
possibility for meaningful action to emerge from the “ bottom up” on the basis of co-constructed 
meanings of climate change.  The decision-making frameworks in which such meanings are used 
are also a central part of the policy process. 
3.3.  Decision-making and global environmental risk governance 
A range of social theoretical perspectives exists to explain the rise of environmental problems and 
how society deals with them or approaches to environmental governance (Fisher 2004; Paterson 
2008).  Environmental sociology focuses on the crisis of modern society, and locates the origin of 
environmental problems in the political economy of the advanced capitalist state (O'Connor 1998; 
Schnaiberg 1980). Theories of the environmental state on the other hand are more optimistic and 
place more emphasis on the interactions between state and non-state actors to identify and address 
environmental problems (Fisher 2004; Figure 3.2).  
The  most  prominent  strand  of  environmental  state  theories  is  known  as  “ecological 
modernisation”  describing  a  situation  where  the  nation-state  goes  green  and  there  is 
“unproblematic use of science and technology” to advance environmental protection (Mol and 
Spaargaren  1993):  12,  as  cited  in  Fisher  2004;  see  also  (Hajer  1995;  Matthews  and 
Paterson 2005).  In  this  worldview,  market,  science  and  the  state  work together to  determine 
political outcomes.  In the practical manifestations of ecological modernisation, market actors 
play  the  greatest  role  to  bring  about  change  but  their  action  is  facilitated  by  policy  and 
institutional change that is driven by the state (Paterson 2001).  In an ecological modernisation 
worldview, the political process looks to modern institutions, including science and technology to 
lead the way to better environmental outcomes (Fisher 2004; Spaargaren and Mol 1992).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 3.2: Social actors, social theories and the environment 
 
Source: adapted from Dana Fisher, National Governance and the Global Climate Change Regime, 1994. 
Another  strand  of  social  theory  focuses  on  the  strengths  of  civil  society  to  lead  in 
decision-making, for human agency to interact with expert knowledge through civil society to 
shape “reflexive” outcomes (Beck 1992a; Giddens 1991). With respect to global environmental 
change,  Anthony  Giddens  and  Ulrich  Beck  figure  prominently  among  contemporary  social 
theorists explicitly drawing attention to these in a risk context.  Giddens (1991) refers to climate 
change as a high-consequence risk.   He notes that global environment consequences and risk 
culture are part of a broader set of societal problems related to modernity and globalisation trends, 
suggesting that climate change is but one example of the consequences of shifts in time and space 
relationships between people and places, of rapid technological and of rapid social change (Barry 
1999; Giddens 1991; Goldblatt 2000).  Barry (1999: 95) sees global environmental change as 
“one of the most tangible problems” stemming from Giddens’ theory of globalisation.   
Similarly Beck advances the notion of a “risk society” to underscore the difficulties for society to 
address complex industrial (and post-industrial) hazards and the inevitable questions of social 
accountability and responsibility (1992a; 1996).  Beck suggests that we are in an age of global 
pollution where an individual or group of individuals can no longer escape the hazards of such 
pollution,  thus  there  is  little  distinction  between  socio-economic  differences  “eliminating  the 
protective  zone  and  social  differentiations  within  and  between  nation-states”  (1992b:  110).  
Nevertheless, in the case of climate change there will be an asymmetry between the sectors and 
the regions that cause the pollution and those that are hardest hit (IPCC 2001), splitting the world 
into the “risk winners” and the “risk losers” (Beck 1992b). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Indeed high consequence  risks, such  as  climate  change,  are seen  to  establish  an  inescapable 
dependence on abstract expert systems and experts to mediate meaning and understanding for 
society (Beck 1992a; Giddens 1991).  Giddens (1991: 128-129) builds this argument in part from 
Goffman’s (1972) ethnographic work and his notion of “Umwelt” — a “ ‘moving’ world of 
normalcy” — where individuals have a general awareness of high-consequence risk from which 
no one can ever escape fully. High-consequence risks of climate change constitute a part of what 
McKibben  calls  “socialised  nature,”  where  the  climate  is  no  longer  part  of  ‘old  nature’  as 
understood through history and historical observation but is now less predictable and extends 
beyond  observed  experience  (Giddens  1991;  McKibben  2003).  McKibben  identifies  climate 
change as a clear example of a shift in the human relationship with nature: “We are no longer able 
to think of ourselves as a species tossed about by larger forces - now we are those larger forces” 
(McKibben 2003:xiv).   
Global  environmental  risk  problems  present  a  challenge  to  conventional  models  of  policy 
assessment  and  decision-making,  where  rational  actor  theory  and  techno-rational  approaches 
dominate  and  aim  to  develop  recommendations  that  optimise  outcomes  or  maximise  social 
welfare  based  on  quantitative  (scientific  and  economic)  assumptions  of  the  impacts  or  risks 
(Owens 2005).  Increasingly social research, both within and outside of the field of economics, 
has raised questions about the validity of such models on questions of risk and the environment.  
First is a criticism that techno-rational models ignore questions of social justice and fairness 
(Jaeger  1998;  Rawls  1972;  Ryan  1985).  As  Jaeger  (1998)  and  Azar  point  (1998)  out, 
non-optimising behaviour is commonplace in public decisions on issues of social justice, such as 
in the decision to establish child labour laws to protect the health and well-being of children. Do 
the social justice aspects of climate change warrant the same type of reasoned and moral approach 
to  decision-making?  Second,  techno-rational  models  overlook  the  strengths  of  human 
intelligence, that is, the ability to reason, reflect and collaborate for the collective good (Dietz 
2003b; Ostrom 1998; Ostrom 2000a; Sagoff 1988).  They assume that individuals are able to do 
the mental calculus to weight the costs and benefits of alternatives and to identify and select 
optimal  outcomes  for  themselves  (Dietz  2003b).    A  related  criticism  is that  they ignore the 
complexity and contribution of institutions as they shape individual behaviour as well as create 
opportunities  and  outcomes  for  collective  decision-making  (Jacobs  1994;  North  1990;  North 
2005; Ostrom 1990).   
Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. (2000) report on extensive empirical research to document the 
extent  and  nature  of  collective  action  taken  to  successfully  govern  common  environmental 
resources, and the institutional and social conditions that lead to such cooperative behaviour.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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These examples expand the rational actor model to include a more complex structure of collective 
reasoning in an institutional context.  The model that emerges is one where “deliberative spaces” 
can  be  created  to  raise  stakeholder  awareness,  build  trust  and  understanding  and  ultimately 
facilitate  collection  decision-making  and  collaboration  to  protect  common  environmental 
resources (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2000a; Ostrom et al. 2002). This socio-institutional perspective 
reinforces the importance of dialogic processes – of dialogue and of the notion of trust - by 
offering opportunities for meaningful exchange among affected stakeholders, including experts, 
and in so doing building human and social capital that contributes to problem solving over time 
(Bohman 1996; Dietz 2003b; Healy 1997; Rydin 2003). 
This  strand  of  social  research  on  environmental  decision-making  suggests  the  need  for  new 
institutions that embody principles of governance through democracy, competence and fairness to 
guide  any policy or decision  process on risk   (Bohman  1996; Jasanoff  and  Martello 2004a; 
Rydin 2003; Stern and Fineberg 1996).  In this decision-making model, key questions for policy 
include:  
•  Who is to make critical judgements to regulate or not, in what manner and on what 
basis?   
•  What  conditions  for  decision-making  and/or  knowledge  creation  (and  uptake 
processes) will ensure political legitimacy for global environmental policy decisions? 
Communication issues become important in risk governance as any assessment or management 
decision requires significant understanding and judgement about technical and scientific issues.  
Judgements  in  particular  are  needed  about  what  aspects  of  global  environmental  risk  are 
potentially most harmful in different contexts. While only science and knowledge about nature 
can  help  to  highlight  systematic  linkages  between  society  and  natural  systems,  non-expert 
viewpoints  from  the  community  of  affected  stakeholders  can  provide  unique  and  invaluable 
insight to understanding risk in a local context, framing it as a locally meaningful policy problem 
and responding to it (Stern and Fineberg 1996; Wynne 1992a). 
Policymaking on risk issues will necessarily embrace a range of normative choices about the 
“framing” of the risk problem, for example, to identify what dimensions of risk are most salient in 
the policy process (Kingdon 1984; Majone 1989; Schön and Rein 1994) (see below). How risk 
assessment is framed will determine the range and nature of management responses. Making such 
choices  can  only  legitimately  occur  by  seeking  inputs  from  a  wide  range  of  experts  and 
non-expert stakeholders to ensure that the framing used represents key interests of those most 
affected by decisions.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Stern and Fineberg (1996) advance a risk characterisation model of decision-making where risk 
assessment and risk management are inseparable.  At the core of this model of decision-making is 
the creation of new deliberative policy spaces to facilitate the exchange of ideas and reason, and 
“back  and  forth  movement” in  a general  process  of interpretation,  reflection  and  revision  of 
understanding  in  the  public  sphere  (Bohman  1996:  58).  Conflict  is  seen  as  central  and 
unavoidable in this process (Bohman 1996) and working as a means of enhancing solidarity and 
eventually collective action, by stimulating learning about the conflicting issues in a community 
context (Rydin 2003: 63). Exploring these concepts in an environmental planning context, Rydin 
(2003: 65) sees collaboration and deliberation as a distinctive form of environmental governance 
involving experiment, where "new outcomes are posited, based on new knowledge, joint thinking 
and  previously  unconsidered  possibilities."  In  this  risk  characterisation  model,  dialogue  and 
reflection move centre stage to interpret scientific information in ways that are meaningful to 
local contexts and decision-makers. 
The role of different types of agents and institutions is central in Habermas’ work on deliberative 
democracy and public decision-making. Focusing on institutional design and the cultural and 
societal dimensions of decision-making, it is possible to extend a Habermasian model of circuits 
of power (1998: 354) to highlight how deliberation and persuasion interact to mediate expert and 
other  knowledge  to  inform  decision-making  (Figure  3.3).  First  is  the  “core  area”  of  public 
decision-making,  which  includes  formal  governmental  decision-bodies.  Second  is  an  “inner 
periphery” that operates close to the core and includes a range of institutions that have a degree of 
autonomy and self-governance functions.  Third is the “outer periphery” of policy action, which 
encompasses a wider variety of “suppliers” of information and ideas for policy decisions and 
“customers” who are the target audience of decisions. To be legitimate, binding decisions “must 
be  steered  by  communication  flows  that  start  at  the  periphery  and  pass  through  sluices  of 
democratic  and  constitutional  procedures…”  at  the  (Habermas  1998:  356).  This  model 
emphasises the social integration function of public discourse and decisions, where the true outer 
periphery is part of the civil-social infrastructure of the public sphere, dominated by the mass 
media (see Table 3.1; Figure 3.3).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 3.3: Circulation of Power for Public Decision-making on Climate Change 
 
Source: author, based on Habermas, 1998. 
 
Table 3.1: Habermas: Circulation of Power for Public Decision-making 
Centre-Periphery Axis  Actors and circulation of power 
Core area 
Government  administration,  judicial  system,  parliamentary  bodies: 
formal  decision-making  powers.    Capacity  to  act  varies  with 
organisational complexity. 
Inner-periphery 
Various  institutions  equipped  with  rights  and  self-governance 
delegated  by  the  state  (i.e. universities,  public  insurance  systems, 
professional agencies and associations, charitable organisations and 
foundations): informal decision-making powers, significant autonomy 
Outer-periphery 
Suppliers  of  ideas  and  customers  and  decisions:  this  includes 
experts, businesses, and consumers as well as the media; it is the 
civil-social infrastructure of the public sphere. 
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When applied to problems of global environmental risk, these strands of social research and 
theory point to new models of governance and the need for new institutions to facilitate the 
co-production  of knowledge  about  global  environmental  risk  (De  Marchi  2003;  Renn  2001).  
These models can also usefully focus on the global-local connections to underscore the centrality 
of  “both  the  normative  and  the  organizational  structure  of  institutions”  (Jasanoff  and 
Martello 2004b).  Jasanoff  and  Martello  (2004b)  call  for  improved  transparency  and 
self-awareness  in  institutional  process  and  practices  with  attention  to  the  “why”  of  problem 
framings; and how they capture local knowledges and practices. This model embraces expert 
knowledge as essential but moves beyond it, especially where risk and uncertainty prevail to 
underscore  issues  of  social  justice,  social  preferences  and  values  in  any  policy  choice.    On 
questions such as climate change, opening up decision-making encourages public sphere activity 
through which the media, non-governmental organisations and other institutions interact with the 
core political process to “frame” the policy questions. 
3.3.1.  The role of the mass media in shaping understanding of climate change
23 
Related to the issue of policy discourse, and the Habermasian theory of deliberative democracy is 
the role of media to shape discourse, public perception and the call for social change (Habermas 
1998). Media coverage does not tell people what to think however it is able to direct public 
attention toward specific policy concerns and in this way to influence agenda setting for social 
concerns and policy issues (Mazur and Lee 1993).  Mazur and Lee (1993: 682) note that agenda 
setting by media players is not powerful per se, rather it is “limited to raising an issue to salience.”  
Most viewers and readers will carry away simple images, thus it is also important to distinguish in 
media coverage between the “substantive” content and a “simple image”, which is conveyed from 
visuals and from lead text in reporting (Mazur and Lee: 683).  Cognitive psychology tells us that 
simple images repeated often become “availability heuristics” of real and potent danger (Mazur 
and Lee 1993; Tversky and Kahneman 1973).  A similar notion is that of “affect heuristics” where 
affect refers to a person’s feelings about a particular risk; when combined with images, this notion 
describes how a person may draw on experience and feelings to quickly bring meaning to an 
image (Leiserowitz 2006). Further, the “quantity of coverage theory” says that increased coverage 
turns public opinion in a negative direction – increasing the fear of environmental hazards or 
technology  –  whether  the  reporting  of  an  environmental  or  technology  issue  is  positive  or 
negative (Mazur and Lee 1993).  This implies, for example, that even when media coverage of 
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global warming may report on the potential benefits of global warming in certain regions for 
agricultural crops or for people’s lifestyles (i.e. fewer cold days), there is a tendency for lay 
publics to interpret this negatively. 
A range of social research has shown that media coverage tracks key events on climate change 
and shapes discourse,  understanding  and  action  in  the  public  sphere.  (Hart  and  Victor 1993; 
Mazur  1988;  Mazur  and  Lee  1993).  Despite  ongoing  scientific  and  political  debate,  media 
attention to global warming has served to legitimize it as a public issue and to establish it as a 
mainstream concern within society. Certain actors, such as the scientific elite, have been adept in 
using the media to achieve desired ends (Hart and Victor 1993). Yet how issues are presented 
varies  by  the  institutional  position  and  biases  of  the  particular  media  player(s)  in  question 
(Carvalho  and  Burgess  2005),  and  by  disciplinary  biases,  such  as  the  notion  of  “balanced” 
reporting (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). The media operate through formal social and institutional 
means but they affect individual consumption and re-production of knowledge in the private 
sphere.  Carvalho and Burgess (Carvalho and Burgess 2005) highlight the media’s capacity to 
reflect social learning on climate change issues.  
Figure 3.4 shows that worldwide major newspaper coverage of global warming has risen rapidly 
in the last decade.  These data show that the quantity of media coverage tracks well with major 
international climate change developments such as in the international negotiations (e.g. 1997 
Kyoto Protocol signature; 2001 US pulls out of Kyoto) and the release of major IPCC reports 
(e.g. 1996 and 2001).  They also show the influence of major weather-related extreme events, 
such as the Hurricane Katrina late in 2005. Yet reporting that links climate change with shifts in 
patterns of extreme events has risen only slightly in recent years as a share of total global news 
coverage of climate change, suggesting that reporting of major world new services has followed 
the lead of the scientific community to be cautious about making these links. 
Perhaps more powerful than newspaper coverage, are other forms of media that rely on visual 
information, such as film, television and the internet.  Recently researchers have studied the 
effects of the Hollywood blockbuster 2004 film The Day After Tomorrow.  With a huge viewing 
public  (estimated  at  21 million  people  in  the  U.S.  alone),  The  Day  After  Tomorrow  was  a 
commercial success and also appears to have helped to promote climate change from an obscure 
scientific  issue  to  one  of  popular  public  concern  (Leiserowitz  2004;  Reusswig  and 
Leiserowitz 2005).  Leiserowitz, Reusswig and others surveyed public opinion in several different 
western countries and concluded that the film shifted public risk perceptions on climate change 
amongst the viewing public.  In addition, in 2006 media coverage in glossy magazines began to Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 3.4: Worldwide newspaper coverage of climate change and 
extreme events linked to climate change, 1993 to 2006, number of 
major newstories 
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Source: author from data in Lexis-Nexis 2006. 
convey  a  sense  of  urgency  about  climate  change  (e.g. Vanity  Fair,  May  2006,  and  Time 
magazine, April 2006).
24  
Ungar  (1992)  and  others have  shown  how  public  awareness  on  climate  change  is  enhanced 
through chance events or “scares”, such as experience of extreme weather events of droughts or 
heat-waves or, alternatively, independent events in linked areas (Mazur and Lee 1993; Ungar 
1995; Ungar 2000; Ungar 1992). Examples include the energy crises in 1973 and 1979, which 
heightened  attention  to  energy-climate  linkages,  and  the  discovery  of  the  ozone  hole  in  the 
mid-1980s,  generally 
raising  awareness  about 
the potentially destructive 
nature of human activities 
for the global atmosphere 
(Corfee-Morlot  et al. 
2007).  The occurrence of 
events  such  as  the 
European  heat  wave  in 
2003,  and  Hurricane 
Katrina  in  2005,  may 
have contributed in recent 
years  to  the  growth  in 
media  attention  by  the 
popular  press  to  climate 
change.  
Finally,  widespread  media  coverage  of  climate  change  has  also  been  stimulated  by  the 
international release of the documentary film An Inconvenient Truth by Al Gore
25 and by a 
growing number of television documentaries on climate change (e.g. “60 Minutes”, ABC News 
and HBO documentaries in 2006).
26  This rise in “visual” media coverage in the last decade – 
                                                         
24 Time magazine of 3 April 2006, where the cover page headline read: “Special Report: Climate Change 
- Be Worried, Be Very Worried”. 
25 In 2007 both Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change won the Nobel Prize for 
Peace due to their contributions on climate change.  This award attests to  the general recognition of 
climate change as a social priority and to the links between climate change and long-term social stability 
of civilisation. 
26 For details and internet resources on each of these, see www.net.org/warming/earthday.vtml [accessed 
6 June 2006]. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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including images of melting mountain glaciers and Arctic ice sheets, stranded polar bears and 
flooded river basins and coastal zones -- suggests a dramatic rise in the “availability heuristics” 
for promoting public understanding of climate change.    
These examples illustrate the influence of the media as part of the civil-social infrastructure to act 
as translators or filters of substantive expert knowledge.  One important dimension of a global 
environmental risk governance model is the access and engagement of the media on different 
dimensions  of  the  policy  problem  and  its  possible  solutions.    Non-governmental  and 
governmental actors may also influence the media’s uptake of global environmental issues by 
cultivating their engagement. 
3.3.2.  Agency, networks, sub-politics and scales in governance 
Emergence of climate change in the public sphere to date has been shown to depend on the 
interaction between science, the media and other social processes, including filtering through 
various networks of elite actors and institutions across the political system (e.g. Corfee-Morlot 
et al. 2007; see also Liverman and O’Brien 2001). Epistemic communities of experts have been 
influential in the emergence of climate change as a policy issue in different contexts (Agrawala 
1998; Hart and Victor 1993; Mazur and Lee 1993).  Such a review also highlights the influence of 
sub-politics in global environmental decisions and its interaction with mainstream politics, as well 
as  more  generally  the  interaction  between  politics,  expert  knowledge  and  different  actors  of 
influence  across  different  scales  of  governance.  This  influence  is  labelled  “sub-political” 
(Beck 1992a) because it is not necessarily formally operating in the public sphere but may be 
weaving back and forth between the public and the private sphere. Cities are one prominent 
example where networks of non-state actors and sub-politics are playing an influential role.
27  
These patterns put emphasis on “governance” rather than on “governments” as a centre for social 
research on global environmental change and decision-making. 
As noted above, actors influencing the climate policy process can be identified in at least four key 
areas: state (government), market (business and business institutions), science (or other expert 
actors, including research institutions), and civil society, which encompasses the media as well as 
social movement organisations.  In the environmental policy area non-state actors and institutions 
have played an increasingly large role in shaping practices and outcomes, most notably in the 
                                                         
27 For cities it is useful to look at the ICLEI – International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives – 
climate protection campaign as an example of environmental networks at this scale (Betsill and Bulkeley 
2004; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Lindseth 2004). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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form  of  environmental  social  movement  organisations,  by  championing  ideas  and  providing 
platforms for dialogue and debate (Bramwell 1989; Brulle 2000; Carpenter 2001; Gough and 
Shackley 2001; Yearley 1994).  Aside from scientists and expert communities, other examples of 
powerful non-state actors include those from  the business community (Falkner 2003; Levy and 
Newell 2005; Newell 2000).  In the expert area, science and economics have typically played a 
dominant role in environmental policy processes (Layzer 2006) and this has also been true on the 
issue of climate change (Hart and Victor 1993; Kwa 2001; Miller and Edwards 2001a).
28 
More  specifically,  within  the  realm  of  science  actors,  Haas  (1990)  developed  the  notion  of 
epistemic communities to include authoritative experts, collaborating on a transnational basis, 
from both within and outside of government and international organizations of influence, to affect 
policy change. He defines an epistemic community as: 
…a  professional  group  that  believes  in  the  same  cause-and-effect 
relationships, truth tests to assess them and shares common values.  As well as sharing 
an acceptance of a common body of facts, its members share a common interpretive 
framework,  or  “consensual  knowledge,”  from  which  they  convert  such  facts,  or 
observations, to the policy-relevant conclusions. (Haas, 1990: 55). 
Epistemic communities on global and regional environmental issues have been shown to operate 
across  national  boundaries  to  frame  and  establish  cooperative  responses  to  international 
environmental problems, most notably climate change (Agrawala 1998; Haas 2004). Although it 
is  well  established that  epistemic  communities  are  an  important  part of international  climate 
policy processes, less well explored are how such communities interface with national or regional 
policy processes.   
Overall many have argued that the authority of state actors is considerably weaker today than it 
has been in the past on issues of public concern (Sathaye et al. 2007).  On climate change, 
non-state  actors  have  been  increasingly  influential  and  part  of  the  transnational  epistemic 
networks  that  convey  understanding  and  connect  actions  on  these  issues  across  scales  of 
governance  (Betsill  and  Bulkeley  2004;  Blowers  1997;  Levy  and  Newell  2005;  Paterson 
et al. 2003).  Both Hajer (1995) and Fairhead and Leach (2003) also point to the formation of 
coalitions  of  actors  that  cut  across  these  conventional  groupings  to  work  towards  common 
                                                         
28 In a separate article, developed in the course of this research, I trace the role of these different networks 
of actors over time in the movement of the issue of climate change from an obscure scientific issue to a 
priority policy issue in the United States.  See Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  69 
endpoints on environmental issues based on common discourses or framings and interpretations 
of the problem at hand.  These networks of largely non-state social and corporate actors point to 
the  emergence  of  a  sub-politics  of  climate  change  that  works  across  scales  of  governance, 
wielding power to influence policy and decision-making in the political system (Bulkeley 2001; 
Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Lindseth 2004).   
In climate change, a key governance challenge is how to create and extend networks to support 
the wide range of actions needed.  Lindseth (2004) suggests that there is value in leaving a 
"margin of negotiation" for individual actors to engage with and help spread an idea, statement or 
understanding  on  an issue  like  climate  change  (citing  Latour  1987).  Thus the  ability  to link 
climate  change  to  different  sectoral  issues  allows  climate  change  issues  to  be  taken  up  and 
transformed by different individuals or groups with different purposes, each looking through their 
preferred lens.  However, Lindseth notes the ultimate challenge in the words of Latour is to 
establish wider networks to "make many act as one" and to keep "informants on your side while 
they are far away" (Lindseth 2004, citing Latour 1987:234).   
The  physical,  transboundary  nature  of  global  environmental  change  establishes  an  unspoken 
imperative for collaborative, multilevel governance in modern society, where nation-states are 
increasingly required to act in collaboration with other nation-states, with sub-national or local 
governments and with non-state partners to influence the course of climate change and other 
global  environmental  problems  (Biermann  and  Dingwerth  2004;  Vogler  2003).  A  growing 
number of studies show how global environmental governance is operating across multiple scales 
of decision-making (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Levy and Newell 2005; Vogler 2003). Some 
indicate the natural formation of epistemic communities that operate across national boundaries 
from local to international scales (Fairhead and Leach 2003; Haas 2004).  
Although not specific to climate change, David Vogel has documented examples of coalitions of 
non-governmental actors working from national and sub-national positions of power to strengthen 
environmental  and  consumer  regulation  through  nation-state  influence  in  multilateral  trade 
relations.  A  central  force  is  what  Yandle  (Yandle  1982)  has  called  “Baptist-bootlegger 
coalitions,” where different types of actors join together to strengthen regulations to deliver public 
goods for different reasons. The original reference describes the Prohibition era coalition between 
the Baptists on the one hand opposing sale of alcoholic beverages for religious and moral reasons, 
and the bootleggers on the other hand, opposing sale so as to maintain market position and high 
prices  for  bootleg  alcoholic  beverages.    Looking  across  multiple  modern  examples  of  such 
coalitions, Vogel highlights at least three different scales and institutional avenues of action in the 
context of increasingly global product markets (Vogel 1995; Vogel 2003). First, at national or Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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sub-national scale, political interests combine to enact strict regulatory standards to create new 
markets where local firms profit. Second, where export-oriented businesses work through national 
authorities to influence broader domestic and supra-national regional regulations and markets for 
their  “superior”  products  (e.g. from  a  state  to  multi-state  level  in  the  US;  from  national  to 
EU-wide  regulations  in  Europe).  Third,  working  through  national  authorities  to  influence 
international agreements that recognise and endorse stricter regulatory standards (e.g. as in the 
case of US support for the Montreal Protocol). Vogel (1995) uses California vehicle regulations 
as a specific example where the Baptist-bootlegger coalition drove changes in the vehicle market, 
which eventually had international market influence, referring to this as a “California effect.” 
This raises the issue of multilevel governance as a central part of the policy approach that has 
arisen in the public and private sphere on climate change and other issues.  As noted in Chapter 2, 
questions arise about where best to situate public authority and responsibility for climate policy 
decision-making (i.e. at what tier of government? National, sub-national, community level?)  as 
well as to what extent specific aspects of the climate problem can be best managed through issue-
based mechanisms (e.g. through water districts or energy associations that work across multiple 
local jurisdictions) (Foster 1973; Hooghe and Marks 2003). An important question is what drives 
action and innovation at sub-national levels and to what extent this action is anchored in federal 
authority or support (Gray 1973).   
Multilevel governance on climate change must also be seen in the broader context of globalisation 
of  economic, political  and  social  relations  and increasingly  complex, overlapping  and  nested 
institutions for the oversight of these relations (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004; Dietz et al. 2003; 
Powell 2007). Governance practices inevitably must embrace a range of different types of state 
and  non-state  actors  and  work  across  scales  of  action.      Particularly  in  the  context  of  an 
increasingly  globalised  world,  it  is  possible  to  imagine  the  results  of  regional  policies  and 
decisions to “filter up” to affect national or international deliberations and decisions, as well as to 
“filter down” or “filter over” to influence local level or other local level deliberations on climate 
change (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Harris 2001; Shackley and Deanwood 2002).  
3.3.3.  Social practice model of governance 
The foregoing suggests the power of a social-practice model of governance over environmental 
problems, which sees “culture, norms and habits as sources of behaviour” (Young 2002:29;  see 
also North 1990; North 2005; Ostrom 1990; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). This model is anchored 
in historical and “new” institutionalism, which sees institutional theory as a theory of change as 
well as of stability, and one that aims to understand how outcomes occur, who and what affects Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  71 
outcomes and why? Steinmo (2001) highlights that in their simplest form, institutions are rules.  
Powell and Scott bring attention to the social and political environments that shape organisations 
and decision-making through rules, beliefs and conventions (Powell 2007; Scott 2007).   
This social-practice model can be contrasted with rational actor or techno-rational models of 
decision-making  –  or  those  referred  to  by  Young  as  “collective  action”  models  –  that  treat 
decision-makers  as  “utilitarian”  and  economically  rational  thinkers,  seeking  to  maximize 
individual utility (Dietz 2003b; Sagoff 1988; Young 2002). Utilitarian models focus on stability 
of systems, are more deductive and aim to predict outcomes or change, rather than attempting to 
understand change (Steinmo 2001).  A social-practice model also recognizes a causal role for 
institutions to shape behaviour of actors and organisations with respect to any particular field or 
sector of action – or the endogenous nature of norms, beliefs and rules (Powell 2007; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991; Young 2002). In this conceptual framework, climate change can be seen as an 
emerging field of action where such debate is occurring and institutions are rapidly developing to 
shape, knowledge production and consumption, decision-making and outcomes.  Such institutions 
are not fixed over time, but rather evolving along with the ongoing competition of ideas to find 
consensual framing of the problem and its solutions. 
Regarding  global  environmental  problems,  a  social-practice  model  highlights  the  role  of 
institutions to facilitate the development of “common discourse” about issues, and help to create 
social practices and routines that direct behaviour in ways that lead to collective well-being. 
Repeated interaction and building of trust and reciprocity, as observed in environmental planning 
processes,  can  both  change  incentive  structures  as  well  as  how  actors  respond  to  these 
(Rydin 2003). Institutions can help to build social capital and transform strategies into norms and 
routines (Rydin 2003; Ostrom 1990).  Moreover, institutions that ensure deliberative practices can 
contribute  to  the  shaping  of  pro-environmental  behaviour  (Dietz  2003a;  Dietz  2003b). 
Institutions,  in  this  way,  can  be  a  source  of  change  and  lead  to  a  form  of  “communicative 
rationality” in decision-making (Healy 1997; Rydin 2003), helping to build trust and social capital 
over time to create new social norms and values with respect to contested environmental issues 
(Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2000a; Rydin 2003).  
New institutional research has also pointed to “contested, multilevel aspects” and to “critical 
junctures” of institutional change as a means to study and to understand how broader social 
reform occurs (Powell, 2007; see also Dietz et al. 2000).  For example on climate change, Miller 
(2000) argues that the primary input from the scientific community to policy discussions since the 
1990s are derived from international research and IPCC’s scientific assessments, which focused 
on prediction  of the  global  climate  and  centred  on GCM  modelling  results.   In this  context Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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understanding of – or ability to predict - regional climate change and its impacts is limited.  
However,  through  a  variety  of  other  disciplines  and  institutions,  such  as  meteorology  and 
climatology, there is significant institutional capacity and understanding of how human systems 
interact  with  the  climate  over time.  With  adaptation emerging  as  a  central  policy  priority  at 
different scales of governance, this interest may call for a different more local policy framing and 
hence  type  of  knowledge  network  to  inform  decision-making  than  that  found  in  the  global 
modelling  community  (Miller  2000).    Dealing  with  mitigation  at  regional  scales  may  also 
challenge the usefulness of a focus of global predictions alone and require a meaningful framing 
of mitigation issues in national or sub-national decision contexts.  
Given the multilevel governance dimensions of climate change as a policy problem, a central 
research challenge in this area is to understand how tension is resolved over contested meanings 
and frames for interpretation in any decision-making context (within and across scales) across a 
wide range of relevant actors and organisations. 
3.4.  Interpreting knowledge, constructing argument and social learning  
Consistent with the social-practice model, Rosa and Dietz (Rosa and Dietz 1998) highlight that 
one major strand of social research on climate change emphasises historical, political, cultural and 
social context as a means in itself to bring public recognition and scientific prominence to an issue  
(Carvalho and Burgess 2005; Hajer 1995; Hart and Victor 1993; Mazur and Lee 1993; Miller and 
Edwards  2001a).  With  respect  to  scientific  knowledge  and  information,  this  strand  is  not 
concerned with the relevance of scientific discovery but with how substantive endpoints come 
about and with what influence science, amongst other information and factors, has on these. This 
research  project  is  situated  within  this  conceptual  context,  focusing  in  particular  on  climate 
change decision-making and policy at the regional scale.  Interpretation and argumentation is 
central to any policy process on the global environment.  This section explores social research on 
how different types of information and knowledge are used in decision-making processes to frame 
the problem and its solutions, and when and how information and knowledge have influence. 
3.4.1.  Frames, storylines and narratives in the policy process 
Storylines and narratives in policy analysis underscore contextual understanding of physical and 
social  phenomena  that  are  being  addressed  through  policy  (Hajer  1985:  pp.70-72).  Policy 
narratives or storylines have beginnings, middles and ends and are especially relevant where the 
policy issue is characterised by uncertainty, complexity and polarised viewpoints (Roe 1994:2).  
In the area of environmental policy, Hajer highlights the use of storylines as well as metaphors or Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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metonyms  in  discursive  strategies  to  mobilise  actors  and  policy  discourse  around  these.
29 
Metaphors  and  metonyms  are  commonly  used  in  language  to  convey  understanding  of  our 
experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
30  
The notion of “policy frames” relates to narratives but goes further to suggest that there is a base 
of evidence that transforms the story from a simple storyline to a belief structure or worldview 
(Miller 2000; Schön  and Rein 1994).  Schön  and Rein (1994) define the notion of frames to refer 
to differences in underlying belief structures, whereas Miller (2000) broadens the term to refer to 
different “world views” amongst communities of people (see also Box 3.1). Roe (1994: 3) also 
notes  that  if  a  policy  narrative  is  in  the  form  of  arguments,  they  will  “have  premises  and 
conclusions”.  Further, the existence of competing narratives or policy frames suggests that there 
is  no  single,  correct  interpretation  of  the  “facts”  –  rather there  are  facts  upon  which  policy 
decisions will ultimately be constructed through careful argument and reasoning that, in the case 
of environmental policy, draws upon but is not limited to scientific assessment (Herrick 2004; 
Majone 1989).  While Hajer’s focus is on the argumentative approach and on the use of language 
and discourse in that process to shape interests over time, Schön and Rein’s use policy frames to 
suggest that they reflect a deeper meaning and belief structure (see Box 3.1).   
Box 3.1: Frames and Framing 
Frames:  Schön and Rein (1994: 23) define frames as: “Underlying structures of belief, perception and 
appreciation”; “policy positions rest upon these frames.”  
Miller (2000: 211) develops a slightly different definition of frames defining them as: “Perceptual lenses, 
worldviews  or  underlying  assumptions  that  guide  communal  interpretation  and  definition  of  particular 
issues.” 
Framing: A means to stabilise “frames of meaning” around otherwise uncertain, complex and polarised 
science-policy issues (Roe 1994; Miller 2000). 
In  particular,  Schön  and  Rein  (1994)  use  the  notion  of  “frames”  and  “frame  reflection”  to 
highlight  the  ability  to  shift  and  change  frames  over  time  in  the  policy  process,  such  that 
intractable policy controversies can be resolved.  They demonstrate how policy problems become 
intractable not only when there are varied or conflicting interests of different actors but when 
                                                         
29 For example, Hajer (1985) outlines emblems in environmental discourse over the last 150 yrs ranging 
from deforestation, destruction of wilderness (in the US) or of the countryside (in the UK) at the end of 
the 19
th century to the emergence of global environmental issues such as climate change and ozone in the 
1980s.  
30 Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 36) define a metaphor as “principally a means of understanding one thing in 
terms of another where its primary function is understanding”, whereas metonym serves a referential and 
understanding function, noting “it allows us to use one entity to stand in for another.”    Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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actors in the policy process have different frames. They see:  “….policy controversies as disputes 
in which the contending parties hold conflicting frames.  Such disputes are resistant to resolution 
by appeal to facts or reasoned argumentation because the parties’ conflicting frames determine 
what counts as a fact and what arguments are taken to be relevant and compelling.  … the frames 
that shape policy  positions  and  underlie  controversy are  usually tacit,  which  means  they  are 
exempt from conscious attention and reasoning” (Schön  and Rein 1994: 23). They argue that 
frame reflection is a means to break open deadlocked negotiations; it is a means for people “to 
reflect on and learn about the game of policymaking even as they play it” (Schön and Rein 
1994:37).   
In Schön and Rein’s view (1994) active frame reflection can lead to a reframing of the policy 
debate and argument so as to permit resolution of conflict. In the area of climate change, a variety 
of different frames exist ranging from a frame that presents climate change as a problem of global 
environmental degradation, where the world is broadly at risk from human activities, to one of 
local  disaster  management  where  there  is  increasing  ecological  risk  to  human  society  to  be 
managed over time (Miller 2000).  Another possible frame is the definition of climate change as 
an  energy  problem  where  technological  management  is  a  key  to  resolving  it  (Miller  2000; 
Lindseth 2004). Schön and Rein  have shown that changes in the framing of seemingly intractable 
and  contested  policy  problems  can  enable  policy  solutions  to  be  found,  despite  initial 
disagreement and controversy.  Miller (2000) and Schön and Rein (1994) show that the use of 
policy frames is a dynamic process that both interacts with and affects the interests of different 
stakeholder groups over time.  
While different in their emphases, Hajer (1995) and Schön and Rein’s (1994) approaches both 
aim to understand how and why change occurs in the policy process.  Both consider that shifts in 
argumentation about a policy issue interact with agency (i.e. different actors and organisations), 
with structure (i.e. what is “fixed” and what is not in an argument) and with interests to influence 
change over time (Hajer 1995; Schön and Rein 1994).    Also in each approach, interest or belief 
structures  are  not  immutable  but  can  change  over  time,  in  part  influenced  by  shifts  in  the 
argumentation that accompanies an issue. 
Majone’s (1989) work, though earlier, supports the view that the discursive process can influence 
beliefs and norms over time.  He highlights the central role of interpretation, argumentation and 
persuasion in “good” policy analysis.  Majone compares argument in policy process to the Greek 
concept of dialectic, stating that good policy analysis should provide the basis for public discourse 
and debate to arrive at good or acceptable policy outcomes as well as outcomes that will be 
implemented.    Using  the  notion  of  “evidence”  Majone  notes  that  rules  for  what  constitutes Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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allowable evidence will depend upon the audience and the policy context and that quantitative 
analysis must be complemented with persuasion and argument. In this view, “decisionism” or 
formal quantitative policy analysis, is of little use in the policy process on its own. Policy analysts 
use rhetorical and dialectical skills “to define a problem according to various points of view, to 
draw argument from many different sources, to adapt the argument to the audience and to educate 
public opinion” (Majone 1989: 13). Focusing on the policy process rather than on outcomes, it is 
possible to see the function of argument in the policy process as shifting the boundaries of what is 
possible, shaping values and attitudes about what is fair and acceptable (Majone 1989). Further, 
what is fair or acceptable is shaped by people’s attitudes and these attitudes are likely to shift 
based on dialogue, policy analysis and evidence over time. 
3.4.2.  How and why does change in policy occur? 
In addition, to argumentation and frame interpretation in the policy discourse, a number of other 
concepts are also useful to study how and why change occurs in the policy process. Hall (1993) 
and Kingdon (1984) highlight the role of ideas and the generation of policy alternatives, problem 
definition or agenda setting, identification of key agents of change such as “policy entrepreneurs” 
and  “visible  participants”  and  “policy  windows”,  each  of  which  are  briefly  outlined  here.  
Importantly, Hall (1993) shows that ideas are central to policymaking and to underlying policy 
paradigms thus debunking political theories that focus uniquely on political interests and their 
relationship to the state. He notes that new ideas are developed and promoted through deliberation 
(Hall  1993;  also  citing  Anderson  1978).    Anderson  relates  discourse  and deliberation to the 
evolution of ideas when he said: “deliberation takes place within the realm of discourse”; he also 
said that policies must be based on a “system of ideas and standards which is plausible and 
comprehensible to the actors involved” (Anderson 1978).  
Kingdon (1984) highlights the importance of two different yet parallel and intertwining parts of 
the policy process: agenda setting and the definition of policy alternatives.
31  As noted in Chapter 
1, problem definition, politics, and participants in the policy process are shown to be the most 
significant determinants of “agenda-setting”, which refers to why a particular problem is added to 
the agenda or not (Kingdon 1984).  Difficulties are only defined as a policy problem if something 
can be done about it, and as such there is a direct link to policy alternatives (Kingdon 1984; 
Wildavsky 1987).  More specifically Wildavsky states (1987: 42) that analysts “… understand 
                                                         
31 This is an expansion of the Cohen, March and Olsen “garbage can model” of organisational choice and 
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problems  only  through  tentative  solutions  that  take  on  the  character  of  programs  linking 
governmental resources with social objectives.”  
Yet there remains the question of why and how some problems are identified, advanced and dealt 
with in the policy process over others? Research suggests that reasons vary for the rise and fall of 
problems on the public agenda.  These include changes in the conditions that define the problem 
itself or in the way people respond to the condition (Kingdon 1984).  For example, people may 
become accustomed or accepting of the conditions, for example, if government fails in its attempt 
to deal with the problem. Also attention to any issue is likely to be cyclical and either wane or rise 
depending upon a range of confluent factors (Downs 1972; Kingdon 1984).   In the case of 
climate change, social and political processes have interacted with treatment in the media and a 
growing  and  increasingly  consensual  body  of  scientific  evidence  to  mediate  understanding, 
concern and the level of attention to climate change in the public sphere (Corfee-Morlot et al. 
2007). 
Both politics and participants have been shown to interact with problem definition to determine 
when and in what way a particular problem is advanced as part of the policy agenda (Kingdon 
1984; Grindle and Thomas 1991).   “Policy entrepreneurs” play a special role in bringing public 
attention to new issues (Kingdon 1984: 198; Hart and Victor, 1993).  Kingdon states that policy 
entrepreneurs “…invest considerable resources bringing their conception of problems to officials’ 
attention, and trying to convince them to see problems their way.” While Grindle and Thomas 
(1991) highlight the role of policy elites to frame issues, shape policy processes and guide policy 
change, Kingdon’s work also highlights that “visible participants” may be either political leaders 
in  government  or  in  influential  non-governmental  roles.  These  conclusion  is  consistent  with 
reviews that focus on how climate change emerged as a policy issue, where the promotion of 
climate change in the public sphere is shown to be closely linked to policy or issue entrepreneurs 
(Corfee-Morlot et al., 2007; Hart and Victor, 1993).  Perhaps a main difference in the climate 
change arena is that entrepreneurs have been drawn not only from the political arena but also from 
the scientific elite and shown to work closely with the mass media to generate political attention 
to the issue (e.g. see [Hart and Victor 1993; Mazur and Lee 1993]).  
After  Kingdon  (1984),  “policy  windows”  also  allow  the  unique  coupling  of  problems  with 
solutions to events either related to the problem or to the political stream.  On the problem side, 
there may be crisis or a media-worthy event that brings the problem to the centre of public 
attention.    An example  on  climate change  is  media attention to extreme  weather  events;  for 
example, the 2003 heat wave or Hurricane Katrina in 2005, raised media, public and political 
attention to links between a changing climate and the frequency and intensity of such events in the Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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future.  On the political or solutions side, a change in administration may bring about a shift in 
philosophy and a call for change from previous status quo policies.  Thus another example of this 
type  of  policy  window  is the  next  President  of  the United  States,  who -- joined by the  US 
Congress  –  is  expected  to  take  an  international  and  national  leadership  position  on  climate 
change.   
3.4.3.  Social learning in context: argument, interpretation and policy paradigm shifts  
Beyond understanding how argumentation is constructed and triggers of change occur, another 
important question in the study of the policy process is whether learning occurs and if so how? 
Some  research  highlights  that  in  any  environmental  policy  process,  discourse,  storylines  or 
“narratives” are part of a larger dynamic process of social learning (e.g. Hajer 1995; Rydin 2003).  
Peter Hall developed the notion of policy paradigms in the context of political science assessment 
of policy change (Hall 1993) and integrated it with an understanding of policymaking as part of a 
process of social learning.
32 Hall also investigates concepts of learning and social learning as a 
situation  where  change  is  a  function  of  past  experience;  he  defines  social  learning  as 
experience-based learning in the local context for policy (Hall 1993) (see Box 3.2).  
Hall’s work identifies three types of policy changes as relevant to understanding social learning, 
but  only the third type  is transformative.    First  order  changes or  adjustments  are  applied to 
existing policies; second order changes represent a shift in implementation strategy; and third 
order changes are characterised as a full shift in the policy paradigm (Hall 1993). The shift in 
policy paradigm change described by Hall is relevant to Schön and Rein’s (1994) frame analysis 
where  they  show  that  shifting  frames  can  lead  to  resolution  of  otherwise  intractable  policy 
controversies.  Table 3.2 relates Hall’s notion of change in policy paradigms to other literature 
reviewed here. 
The notion of policy paradigms can be used as an interpretive framework for understanding 
policy  change (see Box 3.2; Hall 1993).  Hall compares policy paradigms with Kuhn’s notion of 
scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1962), where a particular narrative becomes dominant (as opposed to 
a particular set of scientific practices based in a particular discipline). Policy paradigms are never 
fully commensurable, as Hall states: “Because each contains its own account of how the world 
facing policymakers operates and each account is different, it is often impossible for the advocates 
                                                         
32 The origin of policy as social learning is found in Heclo’s political science work on theories of the state 
as well as Argyris & Schön, and Nye’s work on organizational behaviour.  See: (Argyris and Schön 1978; 
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of different paradigms to agree on a common body of data against which a technical judgement in 
favour  of  one  paradigm  over  another  might  be  made”  (Hall 1993:280).    In  this  way  policy 
paradigms are similar to the frames that are described in the work of Schön and Rein as well as 
Miller (see above).  
Table 3.2: Shifts in the policy paradigm (adapted from Hall 1993 and other authors as cited) 
Description  Principal agents / means of 
change 
Relevant conceptual background 
Shifts in underlying goals and 
hierarchy of goals for policy – 
these  are  shifts  in  the 
fundamental  policy  paradigm, 
which is driven by: 
1) a  sociological  process  of 
shifting  balance  of  political 
interests; 
2) shift in locus of authority; 
3) necessarily entails changes 
across all dimensions of policy 
(goals, instrument choice, level 
and  scope  of  application  in 
instrument) 
Anomalies  in  the  policy 
experience  compared  to 
reigning  paradigm;  policy 
failures  or  external  events 
presenting  unforeseen 
challenges 
Power  of  new  ideas,  wide 
range  of  political  and  social 
forces  &  actors  (state  and 
non-state) influence outcomes, 
including the media. 
Socio-political  system  is  a 
directly  central  force  in 
mediating outcomes 
Hall,  1993:  policy  paradigm  shifts 
and  social  learning  as 
fundamentally  different  from 
state-centric models; emergence of 
new  “issue  network”  or  “policy 
network”  to  advocate  new  ideas 
(after Heclo 1974; Smith 1987). 
Hall, 1993; Kingdon, 1984: Puzzling 
&  powering  combine  - 
state-structural  approaches  where 
politics and social forces combine – 
non-state actors are important. 
Schön  & Rein, 1994; Majone, 1989: 
discourse/narratives,  argument, 
interpretation  and  persuasion  as 
powerful forces. 
Majone, 1989: policy change occurs 
through  persuasion  and  argument; 
interacts with ideas, shifts in public 
opinion 
Social learning is defined here as part of a dynamic process, involving an exchange between 
knowledge, discourse, goals and purposes where there is a deliberative attempt to adjust goals or 
techniques of a policy process to reflect past experiences (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998). This moves 
beyond Hall’s more narrow definition (see Box 3.2) (Hall 1993).  Further as Rydin states (Rydin 
2003): “Social learning does not necessarily mean consensus about framing the issues or about 
policy responses, but rather conscious effort to understand conflicting points of view and interest, 
to  build  trust  and  social  capital  to  continue  to  work  among  participants  towards  improved 
outcomes.”  
Given the complexity and the scientific uncertainty surrounding the issue of climate change, 
improved institutions to facilitate social learning might establish stronger co-constructions of the Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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problem,  greater  trust  and  understanding  about  it  amongst  a  wider  community  of  people, 
encompassing both scientists and lay-public groups (Jasanoff and Martello 2004a; Jasanoff and 
Wynne 1998). Jasanoff and Martello (2004b) argue that national or sub-national action on climate 
change offer the potential to create a dynamic process of social learning and increase “local” 
knowledge about the nature of the climate problem and how to deal with it in a variety of different 
contexts.   
Box 3.2: Learning, social learning and policy paradigms in policy processes 
Learning:  “Learning  is  conventionally  said  to  occur  when  individuals  assimilate  new  information, 
including that based on past experience, and apply it to their subsequent action.” (Hall 1993: 278). 
Social learning:  “a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past 
experience  and  new  information.  Learning  is  indicated  when  policy  changes  as  a  result  of  such  a 
process” (Hall 1993: 278).  
Policy paradigms: “…policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also 
the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing” (Hall 1993: 279).   
3.5.  Concluding remarks: an analytical framework 
This  research  is  situated  within  a  broad  conceptual  framework  that  is  anchored  on  the 
co-construction of knowledge and understanding that is encouraged through dialogue and open 
debate among a range of actors including the media and other non-governmental, lay actors. 
Further, argumentation and framing of expert information in combination with local insights and 
knowledge  helps  to  establish  meaningful  interpretations  of  science  at  more  local  scales  of 
decision-making.  It suggests that the active co-construction of common interpretive frameworks 
can guide decision-making on global environmental policies and social learning.  Another strand 
of  research  addresses  questions  about  how  and  why  decisions  are  made.    This  points  to  a 
“social-practice model” of global environmental governance, where culture, norms and habits are 
understood to be sources of behaviour (Young 2002). In this model, institutions are also central to 
channel interactions amongst diverse actors to ensure that democracy, competence and fairness 
prevail in policy decisions. A starting point is recognition that the emergence of climate change in 
the public sphere confirms the intimate relationship between science and society and the role of 
socially-mediated pathways to understand and use science in decision-making (Corfee-Morlot 
et al. 2007; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Redclift and Benton 1994).  
Chapter 1 highlighted the  four  drivers  of  change that  were  used  to structure the  interpretive 
analysis of interview data.  These are summarised in Table 3.3 and further developed here based 
on the foregoing conceptual literature.  Table 3.3 also identifies a range of research questions Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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associated with each of these drivers of change, highlighting issues of regional context and more 
generally issues of scale so as to flesh out relevant findings from the research.  
These drivers for policy change encompass the use of storylines, narratives or policy frames, the 
role of science and other expert knowledge, institutions and agency, and turning points in the 
policy process as parallel means of shaping change.  The drivers are “tested” in the research to 
assess if indeed they are important to understanding climate policy change as it has occurred in 
California. Assessment of these drivers should also help to inform answers to the main research 
questions that are raised in Chapter 1: What triggers policy action on global climate change at 
regional scale? What arguments and lines of evidence underlie the policy discourse at regional 
scale? How do “winning” arguments gain salience? does regional action make a difference to 
broader scale climate policy? 
Table 3.3: Analytical framework for research on regional climate policy processes 
Drivers of change  Supplementary research questions 
i)  Frames  and  agenda-setting 
to define problems 
What are the frames in use in regional climate policy processes to 
define the climate change problem and possible solutions, and how 
do these differ from those in use at larger scale (i.e. internationally 
and nationally)?  How do these frames represent different interests 
or objectives, how do they relate to each other and what do they 
imply for progress in policy implementation on climate change more 
generally? 
ii) Argument and evidence, the 
role  of  interpretation  of 
knowledge,  ideas  in  the 
policy-process  to  propose 
alternative solutions 
What role of argument and evidence and how does understanding 
of  these  circulate  through  governments,  elite  actors  and  the 
policymaking  process?  Particularly  important  is  the  “system  of 
ideas” that support change in policy paradigms; these are inevitably 
accompanied by different sets of evidence, shifting argumentation, 
and eventually different set of policy alternatives. What are they and 
are they context specific (i.e. local) or more generic in origin? 
iii) Focusing  events  or  policy 
windows 
What focusing events or policy windows have influenced the policy 
process or outcomes at regional scale? Who capitalises on these 
and how is this done to influence the policy process and outcomes?  
How do these policy windows connect to national and international 
scale policy developments? 
iv)  Agency,  structure  and 
institutional  design,  and 
interests 
What role and influence of different social actors and institutions 
(e.g. in  practice  of  law,  politics,  science  and  social  movement 
organisations or structure of formal decision-making processes) in 
establishing stable framings for climate change policy in regional 
context?  How do these agents of change and their interests at 
regional scale interact with and influence similar processes at other 
scales of governance?  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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4.  CALIFORNIA CONTEXT FOR CLIMATE POLICY 
4.1.  Introduction 
In late 2003, Governor Schwarzenegger’s won an extraordinary recall election over incumbent 
Gray Davis. A key election issue was California’s poor state of fiscal affairs, a situation that had 
been brought on in part by the electricity crisis a few years earlier.  Energy, environment, and 
climate  change  in  particular,  were  an  important  part  of  Arnold  Schwarzenegger’s  campaign 
platform.  Once elected, many expected the Governor to announce targets for greenhouse gas 
emission reductions within his first year in office (Alvord 2006i). He did eventually announce 
greenhouse gas emission targets but only on 1 June 2005 (California 2005a) and this was the 
beginning of a broad-based initiative to establish comprehensive state-wide policy.  
Shortly after the Governor’s Executive Order in 2005, the California legislature began work in 
earnest on the Global Warming Solutions Act (also known as Assembly Bill 32 or AB 32), which 
would codify the 2020 target to return greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.  The 
Global Warming Solutions Act passed in September 2006, establishing the basis for a broad and 
long-term framework for climate policy in California. 
Key questions for this research are: Why did California take these extraordinary measures?  Why 
would a state or other sub-national authority see it in their interest to move policy forward on a 
global environmental issue? 
This chapter provides the backdrop for the California climate policy case study.  It lays out the 
empirical  context  for  California’s  emergent  climate  change  policy,  starting  with  the  state’s 
geography and its economic backdrop for policy as well as the general political context for public 
policy decision-making. It moves on to review the principal sources and trends of California’s 
greenhouse gas emissions and the likely effects or impacts of climate change in California.  The 
latter part of the chapter briefly summarises recent developments, which mark the emergence of a 
clear, broad-based state-wide framework to address climate change. 
4.2.  Economic and geographic context 
California’s diverse large area, population and economy and its diverse geography, make the state 
somewhat unique in the United States. Its large economy and diverse population is founded upon 
a physically large and diverse land area with large discrepancies in access to freshwater.  Built Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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infrastructure has been essential to the development of the West.  California in particular has 
benefited from large public (Federal and state) investments in water supply and transportation 
infrastructure from the time of its statehood to today.  
4.2.1.  The people and the economy 
California was a frontier economy until 1848 when John Marshall accidentally discovered gold on 
the South fork of the American River (Bean 1968, p. 108).  The “Gold Rush” era marked the 
beginning of large movements of people and of economic development from the East to the West 
in the United States.   By 1870, California’s population is estimated to have more than tripled 
compared  to  several  decades  earlier  (Bean,  1968:  197).    This  demographic  and  economic 
expansion was accompanied by a successful push toward statehood when California became the 
31
st state in the Union in 1850. The state’s economy and population has continued to boom since 
this  time,  with  the  economy  quickly  diversifying  away  from  gold  to  become  the  largest 
agricultural economy in the US as well as the home of a vibrant “high-technology” industry, 
among other activities.   California has the largest population and economy of any US state
33,34 
and its economy ranks among the top 10 of the largest nation-states of the world (see Figure 4.1).  
Key historical events that led to this phenomenal growth include the opening of the West by the 
Federally  subsidised  transcontinental  railway,  a  project  that  was  completed  in  1869.    This 
connected California to the rest of the nation, but in particular to profitable markets in the then 
more heavily populated eastern U.S. (Bean 1968; Starr 2005). The following several decades saw 
the rapid growth of the economy, urban populations in the northern part of the state, as well as of 
excessive  political  power  and  corruption  yielded  by  “railroads,  corporations  and  large  land 
owners”  (Starr  2005:  129).    The  1870s  was  the  gilded  era  of  ultra-capitalist  expansion  in 
California, facilitated by Federally subsidised growth as well as graft.  
Eventually progressive reforms broke the power of the rail company and of large corporations in 
the early 1900s and  established greater transparency and the rule of law. Starting in the 1920s and 
throughout  the  1930s,  such  reforms  led  to  the  development  of  large  physical  infrastructure 
projects – including highways, bridges and major water projects (Starr 2005; Bean 1968).  New 
institutions also emerged in the early part of the 20
th century to guide progressive era of politics 
                                                         
33 U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006. Web: www.census.gov [accessed 15 May 2007]. 
34 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, News Release: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State, 2005 
(dated  26  October  2006);  Table  3.  GDP  by  State  in  Current  Dollars,  2005 
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across a wide range of social issues, ranging from worker’s rights and civil liberties, to natural 
resource management.    
 
 
In the 1930s, California experienced another wave of population growth as agricultural workers 
arrived from the Dustbowl states (such as Oklahoma - hence the term “Okies”) to compete for 
work in the still expanding California agricultural sector. In the 1940s, California became the 
home base for manufacturing industries related to the defence sector, notably shipbuilding and the 
aerospace  industries  along  with  various  associated  high-tech  industries.    These  fuelled  its 
economic growth through the 1960s,  (Didion 2003; Starr 2005). After World War II, another 
population surge occurred, comprising veterans and their families settling into civilian life (Starr 
2005).  Aerospace  industries  settled  into  southern  California,  transforming  the  landscape  to 
decentralised  middle-class  suburban communities,  where  affordable tract  housing became the 
model of development.  The social fabric of the region was inextricably linked to the local identity 
of these industries (Didion 2003). By the 1950s, California’s economy had a fundamentally new 
form,  dominated  by  technology  and  entertainment  industries.  Once  dominant,  the  agriculture 
share of the economy shrank in the face of this “new economy”, amounting to only about 1% of 
the California economy today (see Figure 4.2). In the 1970s, Silicon Valley emerged as a centre 
Figure 4.1: California’s World Economic Ranking 
 
Source: Author from: World Bank: World Development Indicators database, July 2006; 1) Excluding Hong Kong; 
2) California Gross State Product: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), June 6, 2006. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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of technical innovation for the electronics, telecom and computing industries. Referred to as a 
modern “gold rush,” these industries continue as an engine of economic growth today (CDOF 
2005a; Figure 4.2). 
Over the last four decades, the California service and technology economy has remained solid, 
even in the face of economic troubles.  The robust nature of economic growth in California is 
evident  from developments in the 1990s.    Economic  slumps,  for  example in  the  mid-1990s, 
marked the economic profile of the state as cut-backs in Federal military spending and personnel 
closed several large military bases as well as many manufacturing facilities throughout California.  
This came on top of a series of natural disasters, from earthquakes to fires to floods that occurred 
from  1989  to  1999  (CDOF,  2005a;  Starr  2005).    Nevertheless,  in  1999,  California’s  high 
technology  companies  alone  received  over  $16 Billion  in  venture  capital  demonstrating  their 
resilience in spite of difficulty elsewhere, and by 2000 venture capital had roughly doubled to 
$31 Billion.  About 80% of this went to Silicon Valley, making it one of the largest destinations 
for venture capital in the US  (CDOF, 2005a; Wilkinson et al. 2002). Temporary slumps aside, 
California’s economic growth has outpaced the nation since the end of the 1990s with the state’s 
economy growing about 4.5% per year since 1997 (CDOF 2005a). 
California  is  a  world-scale  economy.  In  2005,  gross  state  product  topped  $1.6 trillion, 
representing    more  than  one-eighth of the  US  economy.    Since 2001,  California  has  ranked 
between 5th and 8th among other world economies ranking 8th in 2005, just behind Italy, France 
and China, but ahead of Spain, Canada and Brazil (CDOF 2006) (Figure 4.1). California’s wealth 
is, however, unevenly distributed and in recent years the number of people living in poverty 
increased rather than decreased.  In 1999, roughly 14% of the population lived in poverty, up 
from 11% three decades earlier (i.e. in 1969) (CDOF 2005b). 
California’s ethnically diverse population today is a reflection of its past.  Of the approximately 
36 million inhabitants, about 26% are foreign-born and 40% speak a language other than English 
at home (USCB 2006).  Historian Kevin Starr (2005) traces this ethnic diversity to the state’s 
historic  tendency  to  bring  in  immigrant  labour  when  needed,  in  part  to  support  the  huge 
infrastructure  projects  built  over  the  last  century  and  a  half,  but  also  as  labourers  in  the 
agricultural sector. Today only about 40% of the population is Anglo-Saxon, whereas one-third is 
of Hispanic or Latino origin and another twelve percent Asian.  People of race are thus a majority 
in California, making it one of the most culturally and ethnically diverse states in the United 
States. 
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Figure 4.2: California’s Economic Profile – Gross State Product by Sector 
 
Source: California Statistical Abstract - Release January 2006. 
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4.2.2.  The land and its climate – the physical context 
California is large and geographically diverse. Comprising 158,693 square miles (411 012 km
2), it 
is roughly equivalent in area to the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark combined. Its population of 
36 million, represents more than 10% of the US population, nevertheless the population density 
remains relatively low at less than 227 persons per square mile (or about 90 persons per km
2; by 
comparison the UK has 244 persons per km
2) (USCB 2006). California’s geographic diversity 
combines  with  patterns  of  water  and  climate  to  create  a  unique  combination  of  eco-regions 
co-existing side by side, from the coastal sage and chaparral region in the Southwest to the Sierra 
Nevada  forests  found  in  the  interior  of  the  state  (Olson  et al.  2001).
35  The  earliest  Spanish 
explorers characterised California in maps as an island, and in many ways it remains a terrestrial 
island of sorts, as mountains establish its boundaries to the North and East and desert to the South 
and East, and of course to the West its dramatic coastline opens to the Pacific Ocean (Starr, 2005).  
California’s 1264-mile shoreline is more than half of that of the western continental United States, 
and  is  accompanied  by  a  dramatic  interplay  of  mountains  and  valleys.    The  Sierra  Nevada 
Mountain Range stretches 400 miles along the North-South axis.  Labelled by John Muir as the 
“Range of Light”, the Sierra Nevada feature some of the highest peaks in North America. The 
Sierra Nevada rise from grassy and then wooded foothills in the West, while in the East they drop 
dramatically off into the planes of the Great Basin (USCB 2006; Starr 2005).  
Historian Kevin Starr (2005) outlines four distinct geographic regions that shape California’s 
history and still define its character today.   These are: the Bay Area and the original mining 
districts in the Sierra foothills; the far North, which includes the Mount Shasta region and sparsely 
populated  areas  on  the  northern  coast  and  inland;  the  Central  Valley,  stretching  South  of 
Sacramento to Bakersfield; and southern California, which was originally known for its Mexican 
influence, large ranches and other agricultural activity.  At the time of its proposal for statehood, 
in 1849-50, California’s large size raised questions about whether it should be divided politically 
in two, especially given the strong Mexican and Spanish influences that distinguished southern 
parts of the state from the North.
36 
                                                         
35  See  also  WWF  definitions  and  descriptions  of  ecoregions  in  the  Nearctic  zone: 
http://www.worldwildlife.org/wildworld/profiles/ [accessed 6 June 2007]. 
36 There was also debate about whether California should be a free or a slave state.  It had applied to be a 
free state, but  this would alter the overall balance in  the  number of free  to slave states.  Ultimately 
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Much  of  California  has  a  distinctly  Mediterranean  climate since  large  areas  of the  state  are 
semi-arid desert, where the climate is generally dry and often hot. Mountain regions are more 
humid and temperate in climate over summer months. Two-thirds of the state’s precipitation falls 
in the northern third of the state, which is the least populated.  In a typical year, precipitation falls 
in the November to March winter months only, while May to September months are dry. 
4.2.3.  Water, agriculture and urban development 
Some  of  the  state’s  first  entrepreneurs  recognized  water  availability  as  a  factor  that  would 
constrain or enable the state’s economic development (Starr 2005; Bean 1968; Reisner 1986).  
Today the state is characterised by a large imbalance between the distribution of demand for 
water and its sources.
 37  California’s water resources in the form of precipitation and run-off are 
concentrated in the northern half of the state while roughly 80% of the demand for water is 
located South of Sacramento, corresponding to the larger share of population located in the South 
(Chung 2006i; Roos 2003). 
From the end of the 19
th century to this day, massive infrastructure projects move water from one 
basin  to  another,  within  and  across  state  boundaries,  so  as  to  support  agriculture,  economic 
development and the growing urban populations. Much of today’s basic infrastructure dates from 
the  end  of  the  19
th  to  the  beginning  of  the  20
th  century,  representing Billions  of  dollars  of 
investment.  This  infrastructure  investment  has  fundamentally  shaped  the  state’s  economy, 
including agricultural and urban development over time (Bean 1968; Reisner 1986; Starr 2005). 
Since  the  late  1800s,  massive  irrigation  projects  combined  with  water  storage  and  aqueduct 
projects to  “green”  entire valley  regions that  were  previously known  as desert land  (e.g. the 
Imperial Valley in southern California). In the northern and Central Valley regions, the principal 
agricultural crop was wheat to the end of the 19
th century, whereas the southern regions have been 
known largely for their citrus groves, as well as olive groves, vineyards and other specialty crops.   
Partly because of the early and large investment in water infrastructure, agriculture dominated 
California’s economy from the end of the 19
th to the middle of the 20
th century.  As Steve Shaffer, 
Director of the Office of Agriculture and Environmental Strategies of the California Department 
of Agriculture, put it California’s agriculture sector is large, both in national and international 
terms: “California the ‘number one’ farm state since World War II – and it’s fifty percent above 
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Texas, which is ‘number two.’ California agriculture produces about 50% of the nation’s fresh 
fruits and vegetables, nuts – nearly 25% of the dairy...”  
California is also a major exporter of fruits and vegetables and other farm products outside of the 
U.S. and the importance of the export market is growing rapidly.  In 2004, exports accounted for 
22% of its production, representing roughly a 50% increase since 1999 (CDFA 2005). Of course, 
as Steve Shaffer notes, the significance of this sector depends “upon how you measure economic 
significance.  Farm gate value is what the farmer receives at the edge of the field for their crop -- 
it’s about 32 Billion a year [in California], but then if you look at the trucking, the processing, 
you’re talking about a 100 Billion $ industry, and still, California is a trillion dollar economy… 
As a whole California agriculture is the 5
th most valuable agriculture in the world. Behind the U.S. 
as a whole, the EU, Brazil and China – we’re number five - and it’s because California has the 
high  value  specialty  crops.  We  are  the  2
nd  largest  rice  producer  in  the  country  –and  we’re 
probably about the 5
th largest in cotton”(see also CDFA 2005). Despite its size, the agricultural 
sector today is small relative to other economic activities in the state.  In 2004, with sector 
earnings of about $32 Billion, it represented only about 2% of gross state product (CDFA 2005); 
the relative share of the sector appears to have declined further to represent only 1% of the gross 
state product in 2006 (Figure 4.2). 
In the US, California remains the number one agricultural producer and is the unique producer of 
specialty  products  such  as  almonds  and  walnuts,  raisins  and  artichokes,  among  other  items.  
Today California boasts a broad diversity of different types of agricultural activities, with about 
two hundred different types of crops in any one year (CDFA 2005). The agro-business sector is 
also notable in terms of its political influence as it encompasses an influential set of political 
actors, comprised of large landowners or corporations, with interests in a wide variety of policy 
decisions ranging from immigration law to water infrastructure investment (see below – [EWG 
2004]). Despite the relatively small share of value added of agriculture, for historical reasons 
actors linked to the agricultural sector are a disproportionately influential and active part of the 
political fabric in California today.   
Agriculture in California is also characterised by two potentially problematic economic inputs, 
which have influenced the political agenda of the state over time.  The first is water that is heavily 
subsidised by the federal (and state) government.  The second is cheap seasonal labour, largely 
supplied by (sometimes illegal) immigrants.  Redressing the economic problems with either of 
these  would  be  costly  to  California’s  agricultural  sector.    For  example,  the  migrant  worker 
population continues to challenge the political and social institutions of California to provide 
affordable  housing  and  health  services,  among  other  services,  to  people  who  are  often Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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impoverished  (Starr  2005).    Federally  subsidised  water  has  received  perhaps  less  political 
attention in California than have the social problems of migrant workers.  However both issues 
are economically central to the vitality of the agricultural sector in California.   
Since the turn of the century, water and (hydro-) electricity infrastructure has been instrumental in 
California to support growing urban populations in major metropolitan regions.  By the 1920s, the 
Los Angeles Aqueduct was draining the Owens River and the Hetch-Hetchy reservoir on the 
Tuolumne  River  to  support  urban  growth  in  the  Los  Angeles  and  San  Francisco  regions 
respectively (Starr 2005). This, in turn allowed growth in urban areas to continue.  Population in 
Los Angeles area exploded in the first part of the 20
th century, with more than a ten-fold increase 
rising from only 100,000 people in 1900 to 1.2 million by 1930 (Starr 2005).  
The federal government financed and still operates two other major water projects that have 
subsidised growth in California (Figure 4.3).  First is the Hoover Dam (and other more minor 
dams) along the Colorado River, which feed water into the Colorado River Aqueduct, and since 
the 1940s has supplied water to southern California.  Second, in the North there is the Central 
Valley Project (CVP), consisting of a series of dams, reservoirs, canals, pumping and power 
stations, which began operation as an integrated system by the Federal Bureau of Reclamation in 
the 1950s.  The CVP supplies water to users in the Bay Area, the Sacramento Delta and the 
Central Valley areas of California. Aside from regulating river flows and providing for flood 
control, these massive projects provide large amounts of low-priced (Federally-subsidised) water 
to agricultural users as well as urban water districts (Bean 1968; Starr 2005). Combined these 
projects have reshaped the water and power sector infrastructure of the state and have continued 
to  stimulate  rapid  population  and  economic  growth.  The  three  largest  urban  areas  --  San 
Francisco/Oakland (and surroundings, known as the Bay Area), and Los Angeles/Long Beach as 
well as San Diego (also known as southern California) -- all depend upon water supplies that 
come from distant locations by artificial means (Bean 1968; Figure 4.3).   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 4.3: Major Federal, State and Local Water Infrastructure in California 
 
Source: California Department of Water Resources [CDWR], 2006 Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Shortly after completion of these federal projects, the state of California also became an active 
partner in managing and developing large-scale infrastructure to serve growing demand for water 
and power. The State Water Project (SWP) was initially drawn up and approved in the 1950s, 
however the Feather River facility, completed in 1973, was the first major infrastructure project 
completed under the SWP.  More than half of the water supplied from this project serves urban 
users  in  southern  California  (Corfee  1981).  The  SWP  also  grew  up  in  response  to  large 
agricultural interests in California. Since Federal law restricts the amounts of water to be sold 
from its projects to large landowners from the federal Central Valley project (i.e. there is a 160 
acre lot limit), the state’s engagement was in part to assuage large agricultural land-owners that 
they would have access to low-priced water.  Historically and still today there is a large price 
differential between  the  water  from state  and  from  Federal  projects.    Federal  water is  more 
heavily subsidised and lower priced with (CVP) prices roughly a quarter to a third of  SWP prices 
(Bean 1968;  Corfee 1981; EWG 2004).  A recent report estimates that rice and wheat farmers in 
California's Central Valley use a fifth of the state's water from the CVP and pay prices so low for 
the water that there is an implicit subsidy worth up to $416 million each year (EWG 2004). 
Neither Federal nor state funded water projects price their water at “full” cost, nor do they use 
competitive  markets  to  allocate  water.    Thus  both sources  remain heavily subsidized  by  the 
taxpaying public and lead to significant economic inefficiencies as well as environmental harm, 
especially in California’s water scarce climate (EWG 2004). 
4.5.  Political context: some contradictions and explanations 
Irrespective  of  its  well-earned  reputation  for  eccentric  individualism  and  dissent,  since  the 
beginning  of  this  century  the  mainstream  political  current  in  California  has  been  more 
conservative and anti-government, than it has been tree-hugging liberal.  Although the State is 
typically classified as a “blue-state” – that is voting Democratic rather than Republican in Federal 
and state  elections  –  it is  also the  state that has  delivered  several prominent  Republicans to 
Federal government in recent decades.  Notably, Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, as 
well as former Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren began their political careers in California.  Of 
course California is also the state that elected Governor Jerry Brown, also known as “Governor 
Moonbeam” for his visionary, or radical, policies depending on your political point of view.  And 
we  cannot  forget  Republican  Governor  Arnold  Schwarzenegger,  also  an  immigrant,  who  is 
becoming known as both a social conservative and an environmental activist.         
Despite the generally positive economic outlook for the Golden State, an increasing number of 
Californians today express concern about the ability to maintain a high quality of life in the face Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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of  rapid  population growth  and unfettered suburban  sprawl  (Diamond  2005).  This growth is 
accompanied by worsening traffic conditions, and until very recently no attention to possible 
long-term solutions such as public transit. In this regard, Starr (2005) notes that Californians have 
begun  to  recognise  their  environmental  limits  and,  increasingly,  vote  for  environmental 
protection.  This  view  is  supported  by  public  opinion  research  documenting  a  Californian 
preference for environmental protection (Baldassare 2000; Baldassare 2006) (see also Chapter 6).  
Compared to social issues, for example, environmental issues have been understood to be largely 
bipartisan and therefore perhaps less vulnerable to California’s past tendencies towards taxpayer 
revolt. This is not to say that solutions for major environmental problems are imminent, only that 
California has begun to actively seek such solutions and is learning as it acts.   
Despite strong policies to favour clean technology development, contradictions remain between 
the environmental preferences, on the one hand, and lifestyle choices and patterns of investment 
in infrastructure on the other, such as high investment in highways and parking lots versus public 
transportation systems throughout the state.  The Governor’s endorsement of a large government 
bond to support infrastructure development and maintenance is a good example of this type of 
contradiction (Russo 2006).  As Adrienne Alvord, legislative analyst, said: “…how can you have 
a climate policy if you're laying down all this cement and encouraging all this vehicle traffic?  
…lets  just  say,  [it’s]  not  coordinated  as  part  of  a  climate  policy.”    In  other  words,  public 
infrastructure and climate change policy, for the moment have not been conceived of together and 
are not necessarily going in compatible directions to reduce future greenhouse gas emissions. In 
an encouraging development, in 2007 the Attorney General’s Office, led by none other than 
former  Governor  Jerry  Brown,  has  begun  to  use  its  authority  over  environmental  impact 
assessment  of  new  development  to  require  local  authorities  and  private  entities  to  consider 
greenhouse gas emission implications of development plans.
38  To date a number of settlement 
agreements  have  been  reached  requiring  the  integration  of  greenhouse  gas  mitigation  into 
development plans (California 2007a; California 2007b; California 2007c). 
With respect to policy and the power to drive change, Starr (2005: 332) points out that much of 
the political power of state-centric government was moved over the last century to local and 
regional government, and to boards and districts that are “anonymous in composition”.  He credits 
                                                         
38 This authority exists under the California Environmental Quality Act, a law that was signed by former 
Governor Reagan in 1970.  Although the law does not explicitly address global warming or greenhouse 
gas emissions, it provides broad authority to ensure environmental impacts of new projects are identified 
and  mitigated.    For  more  information,  see  California  Office  of  Attorney  General,  California 
Environmental Quality Act, http://www.ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/ceqa.php [last accessed 14 June 2008].  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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this devolved institutional structure to a relatively immature, state-level political infrastructure and 
a general lack of interest by the citizens in the process of government, other than at local level.  
Beyond the weak state role in public transportation planning, another case in point is the difficulty 
of recent past that California has encountered at state-level to support its education system.  Joan 
Didion joins Kevin Starr to lament failings of public education for California’s young-people 
(K-12 and below), and the stark contrast with its sustained ability to create economic wealth.  As 
Starr (2005: 335) points out, by 1990 California was among the lowest of the nation in spending 
and performance of primary and secondary education. In 1993 California fourth graders were 
competing with Mississippi students for last place across the nation on basic reading skills.  By 
1996, voters had reauthorized more than $1 Billion in new spending and in 2006 California will 
be spending 40% of its state budget in its continuing effort to “catch up” on education (California 
2006c). This strange and relatively recent disengagement of California taxpayers from support for 
education at lower levels is due in part to “taxpayer revolt.” This stands in stark contrast to 
progressive reforms of the past.  Indeed in the 1950-60s progressive reforms created a world-class 
state university system in  California,  which  is the backbone of  the  research  community  and 
continues to be an engine for economic growth today (Starr 2005; CDOF 2005a). 
The next sections highlight some of the essential background for understanding how and why 
climate policy has developed as it has in California starting with the GHG emission profile today, 
moving on to impacts and to recent legislation. 
4.6.  Greenhouse gas emissions profile 
Emissions in California are relatively high as it is the second largest emitting state within the US, 
accounting for about 7% of total US emissions in 2003 and following only Texas (12%) (WRI 
2008, presented in multigas, CO2-eq unless otherwise noted).  Emission trends in California reflect 
its  economic  profile,  which  is  dominated  by  service  sectors  (including  government,  these 
represent roughly 45% of its GSP in 2004; Figure 4.2).  These sectors have low direct emissions, 
though they may have large indirect emissions stemming from emissions associated with electric 
power production or from transportation of employees to and from the workplace.  Residential 
and commercial buildings, office energy and home energy end-uses thus comprise a significant 
source of GHG emissions (9% without including emissions related to electricity use).  However, 
contrary to national trends and those in many other states, these sources have been on the decline 
since the 1990s in California, in large part due to heavy investment in energy efficiency in these 
sectors.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 4.4: Per capita Electricity Consumption 
 
Source: Energy Information Agency, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/_seds.html (accessed 
11 November 2007). 
Figure 4.5: Per Capita CO2 Emissions 
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In large part due to past policy efforts in the area of energy efficiency (Ch. 5 & 6),  California’s 
per capita electricity consumption is comparatively low and relatively stable (see comparison to 
average US and Texas trends in Figure 4.4).
39  This in turn has helped to drive moderate per 
capita CO2 emissions (Figure 4.5).   
Of course the trends towards low per capita emissions in California are driven in part by regional 
characteristics e.g. its mild climate, the relatively high share of hydropower and natural gas (as 
compared to coal or oil) in the power sector, and the absence of coal in its energy sector.  Also 
energy use per unit of gross state product is relatively low in California compared to other states 
(and regions of the world) as is the per capita energy use, reflecting the large share of the service 
economy of the state and the low share of economic activity from heavy industry.  On top of these 
factors, however, aggressive energy efficiency policies have played a role in moderating these 
trends (CEC 2005a; Chang 2006b; see Chapters 5 & 6).  Figure 4.6 presents California emissions 
by sector and shows for comparison purposes the state of Texas and the United States as a whole.  
This shows that in California transportation remains the largest source of emissions, accounting 
for more than half of emissions in 2005, followed by the industrial sector (17%) and the power 
sector (9%).  Since 1990, the power sector shows high growth (44%) while both the transport and 
industrial sectors grew only marginally.  Depending on the year, imported power accounts for 
one-quarter to one-third of the total power consumed in the state, however it accounts for over 
50% of the emissions from this sector (CARB 2008).  Including GHG emissions from imported 
power raises the share of emissions from this sector to nearly 20% of emissions (CEC 2005). 
                                                         
39 Texas (1) and California (2) are the two biggest state emitters in the United States.  Combined they 
represent nearly one-fifth of total emissions  in the United States  in 2003.  Source:  Climate Analysis 
Indicators Tool (CAIT US) Version 2.0. (Washington, DC:  World Resources Institute, 2007).  In this 
chapter, Texas is used as a point of comparison with California since it is comparable in terms of annual 
emissions of GHG.  Note the official California state data may vary slightly and are available from the 
state  website:  http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/inventory.htm  [last  accessed  15  Decmeber  2008].  
WRI-CAIT data were selected for presentation here for comparability purposes. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 4.6: California, Texas, and the US: greenhouse gas trends – by sector, 1990-2005, CO2eq 
   
   
   
Source: Author using Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT US) Version 3.0. (Washington, DC:  World Resources 
Institute, 2008).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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4.7. Projected climate change impacts in California
40 
California’s geography and its economic profile make it particularly sensitive and vulnerable to 
climate change across a broad range of future emission and climate scenarios (Luers et al. 2006; 
Schneider 2007).   
Figure 4.7: Water Supply and Demand Pattern in Northern California   
 
Source: CA Department of Water Resources as cited in (Roos 2003). 
The  water  sector  in  California  has long  been  identified  as  particularly  vulnerable to  climate 
change  since the late 1980s (Smith & Tirpak 1989; Gleick 1987a & b).  Although difficult to 
predict, hydrological effects of climate change have implications for both the availability and 
quality of water for agricultural, urban and in-stream uses.  With the onset of climate change more 
precipitation falls as rain rather than as snow.  Recent projections suggest that by the 2080s, snow 
pack in the Sierra Nevada will decline by about 60% (or 70-90% at higher emission levels) (Luers 
et al. 2006).  Roughly half of the storage of water in California is in the natural “reservoir” 
provided by this snow pack, and this loss will lead to a decline in stream flow, especially during 
summer months; by contrast warmer temperatures are likely to increase the agricultural and urban 
demand for water in the spring and summer (Roos 2006i; Luers et al. 2006) (Figure 4.7).  In the 
water scarce regions of California, such as southern California, water becomes an even scarcer 
                                                         
40 As outlined in Chapter 6, the literature on climate change impacts in California is large and growing 
quickly.  Interested readers should visit the California Climate Change Portal website, “climate research” 
page,  see:  http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/research/climate.html  [last  accessed  14  June  2008].    This 
section is based on recent overviews of this large body of work, such as Luers et al. 2006, California 2006 
and Schneider 2007.  This section is intended to give only a brief overview of key climate change impacts 
and vulnerabilities in California. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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and more precious resource in the face of climate change, which increases the risk of water 
shortages and competition between urban and agricultural users, especially during the dry summer 
months, and these users will also compete with in-river ecosystem water needs (see Table 4.1 for 
an overview of effects in the water sector (CDWR 2006; Luers et al. 2006).
41 
Table 4.1: Potential Effects of Climate Change on California's Water Resources and Expected 
Consequences 
Potential Water Resource 
Impact 
Expected Consequence 
Reduction of the state's average 
annual snowpack  
•  Potential loss of 5 million acre-feet or more of average annual 
water storage in the State's snowpack  
•  Increased challenges for reservoir management and balancing the 
competing concerns of flood protection and water supply  
Changes in the timing, intensity, 
location, amount, and variability 
of precipitation  
•  Potential increased storm intensity and increased potential for 
flooding   
•  Possible increased potential for droughts 
Long-term changes in 
watershed vegetation and 
increased incidence of wildfires  
•  Changes in the intensity and timing of runoff   
•  Possible increased incidence of flooding and increased 
sedimentation 
Sea level rise   •  Inundation of coastal marshes and estuaries  
•  Increased salinity intrusion into the Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
Delta    
•  Increased potential for Delta levee failure  
•  Increased potential for salinity intrusion into coastal aquifers 
(groundwater)    
•  Increased potential for flooding near the mouths of rivers due to 
backwater effects  
Increased water temperatures   •  Possible critical effects on listed and endangered aquatic species 
•  Increased environmental water demand for temperature control 
•  Possible increased problems with foreign invasive species in 
aquatic ecosystems  
•  Potential adverse changes in water quality, including the reduction 
of dissolved oxygen levels  
Changes in urban and 
agricultural water demand 
•  Changes in demand patterns and evapotranspiration rates 
Source:  CDWR, 2006.  
                                                         
41 A recent Owens River basin restoration project is an example here of that competition – see (Sahagun 
2006). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Increasing sea-levels and storm surge will increase the risk of coastal flooding which in turn 
will increase saltwater intrusion to 
further  exacerbate  diminishing 
freshwater  supplies  in  California 
(CDWR 2006; Luers et al. 2006). 
Because  some  of  California’s 
largest and wealthiest urban areas 
are located in coastal zones, large 
amounts  of  infrastructure  and 
people  will  also  be  particularly 
vulnerable to coastal flooding and 
growing  erosion  due  to  climate 
change.  
The  virtual  certitude  of  higher 
temperatures in  coming  decades  – 
even  with  aggressive  mitigation 
efforts – will exacerbate an already 
warm and dry climate in California 
(Figure 4.8). Even low to moderate 
temperature increases will  increase 
the  risk  to  human  health  and 
settlements due to higher incidence 
of  heat  waves  and  air  pollution 
events  (Drechsler  et al.  2006; 
Kleeman  and  Cayan  2005).  
Widespread  effects  from  a  12-day 
heat wave in July of 2006 – ranging 
from 130 human deaths to the loss 
of thousands of dairy cows  and skyrocketing demand for electricity – raised the awareness of 
residents, businesses and state officials alike about the risks of future climate change that will 
increase the incidence of such events (see Figures 4.8 and 4.9) (Bernstein and Covarrubias 2006; 
California 2006; Pomfret 2006; Williams 2006).   
There is some evidence that California is both more exposed (IPCC 2007a) and more sensitive to 
temperature change from global warming compared to other regions in the US (Basu and Ostro 
Figure 4.8: Incidence of Extreme Heat Days by Major 
City, 2070-2099 
 
Source: Chart from Luers et al. 2006; data from Drechsler et al. 
2006. The lower warming range corresponds to 3-5.5 oF; medium 
range 5.5-8 oF; higher range to 8-10.5 oF. 
Figure 4.9: Increased risk of days conducive to ozone 
formation in California regions, 2070-2099 
 
Source:  Chart  from  Luers  et al.  2006;  data  from  Kleeman  and 
Cayan 2005. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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2008; Zanobetti and Schwartz 2008).  Health risks associated with rising temperatures may also 
fall disproportionately on the poor (California 2006; RP 2006).  
Aside from direct health risks, rising temperatures (and lower precipitation) from climate change 
will have other impacts, notably in the energy sector and on fire risk. Rising temperatures will 
stretch hydropower capacity and lead to increasing electricity with demand for air conditioning, 
requiring costly additions to power generation capabilities (Franco and Sanstad 2006; Miller et al. 
2007; Smith and Mendelsohn 2007).  Fire risk in the western US has already seen a four-fold 
increase over the last thirty years (Westerling et al. 2006) and is expected to continue to increase 
as temperatures rise, to a great extent varying with somewhat uncertain changes in precipitation 
(Easterling et al. 2007; Luers et al. 2006).  Multiple and interacting stresses from changes in 
temperature, water supply and pests will also negatively affect the California agricultural sector, 
including the wine-grape industry (Luers et al. 2006). 
California is also the home to a large number of natural reserves, national and state parklands with 
unique “natural” ecosystems that are especially at risk of disruption from climate change.  This 
includes shifting forest and grassland areas, and local insect and animal populations, as well as 
changes in the California Sacramento San Joaquin River Delta fly-ways and deterioration of 
habitats for cold water fish such as trout and salmon (California 2006).  Marine habitats are also 
changing rapidly due  to warmer and more acidic ocean waters (Caldeira and Wickett 2003; Feely 
et al. 2006), threatening to alter the basic food chain as well as the distribution of marine fauna 
and flora in California (California 2006).  
4.8.  Overarching climate policy framework: 2005-2006 
On June 1, 2005, California’s Governor Schwarzenegger made headlines around the world when 
he announced state-wide GHG reduction targets for the medium and long-term.  Set out in an 
Executive  Order  (California  2005a),  these  targets  aim  to  reduce  GHG  emissions  to  2000 
emissions levels by 2010, to 1990 levels by 2020, and to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. In 
2006, California legislated the medium term (2020) goal for GHG reduction with the passage of 
Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), entitled California Global Warming Solutions Act (CA-Code 2006a). 
The law codified, and thus makes legally binding, the Governor’s 2020 target, which is to return 
emissions to 1990 levels.    
The  Global  Warming  Solutions  Act  (AB32)  is  significant  in  that  it  is  the  first  broad  based 
legislative effort to set out medium term reduction targets at a state-wide scale in the United 
States. It followed the landmark California legislation of 2002, known as the Pavley Bill, which Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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regulated CO2 from passenger vehicles (see Chapter 6).  By comparison with other near- or 
medium term targets at state or international scale,
42 California near-term targets may appear 
relatively modest, however, the long-term 2050 target is clearly aggressive (see Table 4.2 and 
Figure  4.10;  also  Chapter  2).  Expected  growth  in  emissions  in  California  is  relatively  low 
compared to other states that are setting similar or more stringent 2020 targets (e.g. Arizona) 
(ACCAG  2006).    Whatever  one  considers  to  be  the  nominal  strength  of  these  targets,  it  is 
important to consider both the size of the California economy (which is ranked amongst the top 
ten of the world’s economies), its rapid economic growth and the high levels of past emission 
reductions achieved through aggressive investment in energy efficiency over the past 20 years.  
Figure 4.10: California GHG emission by sector, 1990-2004 and forecast 2020
43 
 
Source: CARB 2008d, GHG Inventory Data Draft Forecast, [last accessed 15 December 2008] 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/forecast.htm  
The existence of pre-existing energy efficiency policies, and significant past achievements in this 
area at the time of taking on GHG targets, implies that the marginal costs of GHG abatement in 
California  could  be  high relative  to other  states or nations.  This is  precisely  because  energy 
efficiency policies target the achievement of “no regret” or “win-win” multiple environmental and 
                                                         
42 For example, the European Union has agreed to GHG emission reductions of -20% by 2020 compared 
to 1990 levels, and -30% should other comparable international efforts be forthcoming.  See Table 2.1. 
43 These data are from the State’s official GHG inventory and may not be directly comparable to the data 
presented from CAIT-WRI in Figure 4.6 Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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economic benefits and thus may have already exploited a significant share of the lowest cost (or 
most economically beneficial) mitigation options. Of course, the legally-binding nature of the 
goals in California is a also a significant departure from what were to this point largely hortatory 
actions in California and in other states. 
In 2006, a number of companion Bills also passed along with AB32 to extend the coverage of 
some of the CPUC climate change policies to all energy entities in the state – both regulated and 
un-regulated under the CPUC. The Perata Bill (CA-Code 2006b) codifies a CPUC ruling to 
establish a GHG standard for all baseload power procurement (or for any baseload power plants 
that might be built in California). Assemblyman Levine’s Bill, AB 2021 extends the CPUC’s 
aggressive approach to energy efficiency to also cover municipal utilities (CA-Code 2006c).
44  
The 2006 passage of these three laws – AB32, the Perata Bill and the Levine Bill -- combined 
with the earlier Pavley legislation, marks the establishment of a clear legal framework to begin to 
comprehensively address climate change in the State of California.  
California has a large and vibrant economy that is anchored in a culturally and politically diverse 
context. Landowners and agricultural interests wield disproportionate influence in state politics, 
especially given the declining share of the state’s economy generated by this sector.  But to ignore 
that influence would be to ignore California’s past, which is intimately linked to the power of 
large landowners and agri-business interests.  In part due to this history, where the politics in 
California is intimately connected to people’s relationship to the land, there is much attention to 
the  environment  and  a  strong  environmental  conservation  ethic  that  tends  to  support 
pro-environmental  action.    Yet  the  inevitable  clash  between  high  growth  and  environmental 
preservation is increasingly apparent.  
 
                                                         
44 AB 32 also covers the municipal utilities.  Municipal utilities are required to do a comparable RPS and 
invest in energy efficiency, following the CPUC policy for loading order preference towards clean energy 
sources, but are not required to use the GHG adder in procurement planning. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Table 4.2: States with GHG reduction targets: selected policies (updated 21 December 2006) 
State  GHG reduction target  Type of target  Transport  Power Sector 
AZ  2020 target: 2000 levels 
2040 target: 50 % below 2000 
levels 
Not legislated – through 
Executive Order (EO 
2006-13) 
Pavley standards 
(Executive order for 
2007) 
 
CA  2010: 2000 levels  
*2020: 1990 levels  
2050: 80 % below 1990 levels  
All GHG.   
*2020 target legislated 
(2006); other targets thru 
EO S-3-05 
Pavley Bill 
regulations, 
effective from 2009 
model 
Loading order GHG 
adder  
GHG perf std 
(regulations & state 
law) 
CT  NEG/ECP45 as follows: 
2010: 1990 levels;  
2020: 10 % below 1990 levels;  
long-term: 75-85% below 2001 
levels  
Regional goal;   
Connecticut  state action 
plan (SAP) 2005 
Pavley standards  RGGI (cap & trade) 
from 01/0946 
MA  NEG/ECP (see above, except 
75-85% below 1990 long-term) 
State Action Plan 2004  Pavley standards  Emissions cap w/ 
offsets -  (statute & 
regulations); 
To join RGGI47 
ME  NEG/ECP, (see above, except 
75-85% below 1990 long-term) 
2003 state law requires 
NEG/ECP targets  
Pavley standards  RGGI  
NH  NEG/ECP  NEG/ECP – 
recommendations 2001 
  Cap & trade from 
‘07; RGGI from 
01/09 
NJ  3.5 % below 1990 levels by 2005  Administrative order 2002 
SAP  
Pavley standards  RGGI 
NM  2012: 2000 levels 
2020: 10% below 2000 
2050: 75% below 2000  
EO – 05-033     
NY  2010: 5 % below 1990 levels 
2020: 10 % below 1990 
State Energy Plan 2002  Pavley standards  RGGI  
OR  2010: 1990 levels  
2020: 10 % below 1990  
2050: 75 % below 1990 
Oregon state strategy 2002 - 
recommendations 
Pavley standards  GHG perf std new 
facilities – w/ 
offsets; legislated 
power plant cap 
since 1997 
RI  2010: 1990 levels  
2020: 10 % below 1990  
State Action Plan 2002  Pavley standards  RGGI  
Source: author, based on Pew-Center 2006; Royden-Blum 2006 and source documents cited within these. 
                                                         
45 New England Governors/Eastern Canadian Premiers – these are not legally binding unless covered in 
legal statutes in individual states or provinces. 
46 RGGI is the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas initiative - it agrees to cap CO2 emissions in the 
power sector annually at 2009 levels until 2015 and to reduce emissions from this sector to 10% below 
2009 levels by 2019  (RGGI 2006a). 
47 Litz (2006) reported that MA and MD agreed to join RGGI in 2006. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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4.8  Conclusion 
Evidence from past actions suggest that Californians are at once both politically and socially 
conservative as well as environmentally pro-active. The political and economic contradictions are 
clear:  fiercely  independent  and  anti-government  (and  anti-tax)  political  sentiment  has  been 
coupled  with  a  historic  dependence  on  large  amounts  of  Federal  funding,  whether  it  be  for 
large-scale infrastructure projects or through the national military investments.  There is also at 
least a perception of a strong, socially-liberal contingent in California, but an uneven record with 
respect  to  funding  for  various  initiatives,  ranging  from  education  to  social  protection  for 
immigrant labourers. Overall such contradictions appear to go unnoticed in today’s economic and 
political environment, where the mood is optimistic about the future of California’s economy and 
society  (e.g. see  Schwarzenegger  2006).  By  comparison  with  many  of  these  apparent 
contradictions in the area of social policy, environmental issues appear to have remained “above 
the  fray”.    Public  and  political  support  for  environmental  action  is  consistently  high  and 
bipartisan.  
California’s GHG emission profile and its vulnerability to climate change may be somewhat 
unique within the US.  Emissions in California are relatively high as it is the second largest 
emitting state accounting for about 7% of total US emissions in 2005 (WRI 2008).  However on a 
per  capita  basis  emissions  are  relatively  low,  and  they  are  declining,  in  part  due  to  strong 
investment in clean and efficient energy systems (see Chapter 5).  Emissions in California are 
growing slowly at about 0.6% per year since 1990.  The main source of GHG emissions in 2005 
was transportation, followed by industry and the power sector. This emissions profile reflects the 
high share of the service sector in the economy, a lack of coal in the power sector (and an 
important share of imported power) and limited alternatives to gasoline-powered motor vehicles 
as a means of transport.  
In terms of vulnerability to climate change and impacts, there has long been an awareness within 
the US that California may be particularly exposed to climate change. This is due to its dry and 
already  warm  climate  and  its  long,  heavily  populated  coastline,  which  heightens  risks  from 
inevitable sea level rise and possible increases in storm surge.  The impacts of climate change are 
already evident on the state’s snow pack and the availability of freshwater supply in dry summer 
periods.  Also apparent today is an increase in the incidence of heat waves, higher incidence of 
forest fires and worsening air pollution, with consequent impacts on human health and property. 
As noted in Chapter 7, the growing risks of climate change to human and economic development 
in California are increasingly used in arguments intended to motivate action to protect the climate. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The passage of Assembly Bill 32 placed California at the forefront of both US and international 
climate policy.  This sends a clear signal to international energy and technology markets that 
greenhouse gas constraints will be part of the state’s environmental regulatory framework of the 
future.  Parallel California legislation also codified regulatory rules in the power sector to be 
extended not just to investor-owned utilities but to also include municipal and other operators in 
the power sector thus extending their scope and significance. By comparison with other states or 
even at the national level, California’s legal framework to regulate GHG emissions is significant 
in its scope, which is economy-wide, and its legally-binding character. Taken as a whole, the 
2006 legislation secured a basis for broad state-wide climate policy action.  The next chapters in 
this section explore the reasons why the State of California moved ahead when it did to tackle 
climate change. 
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5. AIR POLLUTION & ENERGY EFFICIENCY POLICY: 
FOUNDATION FOR CLIMATE ACTION 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter recounts key events in the history of air pollution and energy efficiency policy 
development, as both areas appear to provide an important source of experience and knowledge 
for climate policy in California.  Many of the elite policy actors interviewed noted that this past 
experience establishes a foundation upon which climate policy is being built today.  Per the “thick 
description” approach outlined in Chapter 1, the chapter focuses on several different dimensions 
of key events: the context for past policy actions in these areas; the intentions and meanings that 
organise the actions; the evolution of these actions; and an interpretation of their significance with 
respect to national policy developments as well as later in California with respect to climate 
change policy.  
Multilevel governance and the social-practice model of environmental governance are two key 
conceptual themes that run through this short historical account. Multilevel governance exists 
where authority to legislate and regulate at regional scale is nested and hierarchical as well as 
polycentric in nature (increasingly organised around issues).  Air pollution and energy efficiency 
policy  is  also  shown  to  be  driven  by  “grassroots”  action  or  from  the  “bottom  up,”  in  both 
instances instigated by non-state actors.  In the social practice model of governance, social and 
political environments shape organisations and decision-making through institutions in the form 
of rules, beliefs and conventions. These institutions are not fixed in time but rapidly evolving as 
the discourse that they help to shape evolves (see further discussion of these conceptual themes in 
Chapter 3.)  In the case of California, it appears that climate change policy has been shaped by 
these past developments, which in turn sheds light on possibilities for future change.  
The chapter begins with a review of statements by some of the policy elites in California about 
how and why climate policy in the state today is linked to past actions in other areas. It then traces 
developments in air pollution and energy policy (focusing on energy efficiency) in California. 
Finally, it offers some preliminary conclusions, looking across these contextual and conceptual 
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5.2  Energy and air pollution policy as a bridge to climate policy? 
Many of the elite participants in the California climate policy process pointed to air pollution and 
energy  efficiency  policies  as  historical  anchors  for  California’s  emerging  climate  policy 
framework. For example, a champion for clean air in the nation and in the State of California, 
senior regulator Mary Nichols
48 said: “In the whole period from 1970 to the present, there’s a 
history  of  California’s  regulatory  programs  having  led  the  way  in  pushing  or  pulling  new 
technologies into the market that then became nationwide in their application, but were pioneered 
first in California. So it makes it much more comfortable for the legislature and administration to 
envision taking on that type of role.”  
A lobbyist for clean energy companies, John White, had a similar view.  He said: “It’s important 
to understand how far back our work in this area goes.  California was the first governmental 
body in the world, certainly the first in the United States, to regulate tailpipe emissions.  We 
adopted standards and began regulating the emission levels from new cars before anybody else.” 
He added that in the State of California: “…climate policy is part and parcel of work to advance 
specific clean energy goals.”  Environmental and clean energy activist, Devra Bachrach Wang of 
NRDC, also pointed to the synergies between policies to address climate change and other key 
environmental  issues  when  she  said:    “Many  of  the  solutions  to  global  warming  have  been 
adopted and in place for many years because they also are solutions to other significant problems 
that California faces…”  
Anne Baker, the Deputy Secretary in charge of the Governor’s Climate Action Team, highlighted 
this:  “When I came in everybody here talked about climate like it was the mobile source reg. I’d 
go to Europe and it would all be about energy efficiency.    I came back and [thought]: 'So why 
aren’t we talking about what we’ve done, you know, what we’ve done as opposed to this next 
phase?'  ...so part of what I’ve gotten to do in the last year is to begin to say, 'We have … some 
rather significant building blocks in place and we need to start talking about this issue the same 
way the rest of the world does.'”  
 
                                                         
48 Mary Nichols is the former Secretary of the California Resources Agency and was the head of the 
Environment Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles at the time she was interviewed.  In 
2007 she has been appointed as the Chairman of the California Air Resources Board which is the state 
agency  mandated  in  the  2006  Assembly  Bill  32  to  design  and  implement  the  plan  to  achieve  2020 
greenhouse gas emission targets. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Table 5.1: California & US Air Pollution Control Legislative Actions -- Highlights and Other Key Events 
Year  California state action  US federal action & key events 
elsewhere 
1940- 
1950s 
1943: eye-burning smog events begin in Los Angeles, California 
1947: California Air Pollution Control Act grants authority for individual counties to 
regulate air pollution. Los Angeles County – the first county in the state to establish an 
air quality management district & the first location in the US to regulate air pollution 
rather than “smoke”; county regulates smokestack emissions.  
1955: Legislation requires the state Department of Public Health to establish air 
quality standards and controls for motor vehicle emissions. California Department of 
Public Health sets the nation’s first state-wide air quality standards for total suspended 
particulates, photochemical oxidants, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and carbon 
monoxide. 
1948: Donora, Pennsylvania smog event kills 20 people and leaves 6000 
people (43% of the local population) suffering from respiratory problems.  
1949 US Public Health Service study attributes event to a combination of 
air pollutants (PM and SOx) from industrial activity. Both the event and the 
study make national headlines in the New York Times and bring attention 
to health risks from air pollution (as distinct from smoke). 
1955: Air Pollution Control Act authorises funds for demonstration and for 
state & local air pollution control agencies & calls for federal research by 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
1960s  1961:  Vehicle technology standard established by the California Motor Vehicle State 
Bureau of Air Sanitation to control hydrocarbon emissions. Referred to as “Positive 
Crankcase Ventilation”, this was the first such control technology in the nation.  
1963: Original effective date for the crankcase technology standard – legislation 
rescinded (reinstated in 1966). 
1966: California Motor Vehicle Control Board adopts vehicle tailpipe emission 
standards adopted for HC and CO, the first of their kind in the nation. 
1967: Mulford-Carrell Act creates the California Air Resources Board (CARB) by 
merging the California Motor Vehicle Control Board and the Bureau of Air Sanitation 
and its Laboratory. 
1969: CARB set nation’s first ambient Air Quality Standards for TSP, photochemical 
oxidants, SO2, NO2, and CO. 
1963: First federal legislation on air pollution, the Federal Clean Air Act 
(CAA) of 1963. Provision of grants-in-aid to states for the implementation 
of air pollution controls.  
1965: Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act amends the CAA to establish 
air pollution regulatory authority at federal level and directs Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare to establish vehicle emission standards Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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1970s 
 
1971: CARB adopts first in the nation vehicle NOx standards  
1972: California submits state implementation plan to US EPA for “criteria pollutants” 
as regulated under the 1970 Clean Air Act.  Federal authorities reject submission. 
1975: the first two-way catalytic converters came into use as part of the CARB's Motor 
Vehicle Emission Control Program 
1976: CARB limits lead in gasoline 
Concerns over southern California air quality dominate state regulatory action through 
the 1980. 
1970: Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 strengthen federal authority to 
control air pollution & grant California the right to waive “pre-emption” 
requirement (see below). 
1971: US Environmental Protection Agency issues National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards for PM, photochemical oxidants (including O3), HC, 
SO2, NO2, and CO and new source performance standards (NSPS) for 
stationary facilities. 
1977: Clean Air Act Amendments strengthen federal emission standards 
for stationary and mobile sources; California waiver for pre-emption 
stands. Also require strengthening of National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards by 1980. 
1979:  Federal NSPS ratcheted down for new plants 
1980-
1990s 
1980: CARB adopts stringent NOx emission standard for power plants requiring all 
facilities to reduce emissions by 90% between 1988 and 1990, effectively requiring 
selective catalytic reduction technology. 
1988: California passes its own Clean Air Act requiring regional attainment plans 
strengthening control of pollution sources 
1989: SCAQMD sets stringent emission standards for power stations requiring post-
combustion technologies 
1990: California adopts Low and Zero Emission Vehicle standard which jumpstarted 
the electric vehicle, and for cleaner burning gasoline; other states follow 
1998: CARB identifies diesel as a toxic air contaminant; in 2000 launch requirement 
for low-sulphur diesel fuel and particulate standards for diesel engines.  
Scientists bring attention to acid rain effects of NOx and SOx.  
1990: CAA Amendments require EPA to issue federal regulations; 
establish national SO2 emission trading programme to apply to new and 
existing facilities effective from 1995 
 
Source: Based on Bachman 2007; CARB 2008b; Taylor 2006; Taylor et al 2005; Vogel 1995.   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Eric Heitz of the Energy Foundation also pointed to past achievements as the “building blocks” 
for climate policy to give California policymakers a sense of what can be accomplished through 
policy.  Consistent with the above discussion, Eric Heitz identified institutional capacity in the 
power  sector  as  a  key  platform  for  future  climate  action:  “…  both  energy  efficiency  and 
renewable energy were pulled into kind of the sights if you will of some of the leaders. The 
institutional strength that was set up at the California Energy Commission had a lot to do with it.  
…there were serious senior people thinking about that… analysts and others thinking about how 
to make that happen.  Then, at the same time, in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s in California and also 
in the East coast, you had the rise of the utility energy efficiency programs. So at the same time as 
you had the CEC beginning to… institutionalize this.”  A range of important institutional changes 
that reinforce the ability of the state government agencies to address climate related issues, such 
as energy efficiency, accompanied this leadership in the energy and power sector.  
Industry  analysts  also  appear  to  recognise  the  influence  of  this  history  in  the  emergence  of 
California leadership on climate change. In a recent report on energy security and climate change 
focusing on the implications for the vehicle industry, Merrill Lynch (2006) reported: “California 
has  a  long  history  of  setting  national  trends  on  environmental  legislation,  and  politicians, 
including Governor Schwarzenegger, appear to have taken on climate change as the next iteration 
of this leadership.”  As a whole such statements imply that the California policy community has 
made a direct link between climate policy on the one hand, and energy and air pollution policies 
on  the  other,  with  a  common  solution  being  clean  and  reliable  energy  supply  and  clean 
technology. 
The remaining sections of this chapter trace historical developments of this base of experience in 
the climate related regulatory areas of air pollution and energy efficiency policy.  Table 5.1 
highlights major developments both in California and at the federal level. 
5.3.  Urban air pollution and the motor vehicle  
Urbanisation across the United States and many other parts of the Western world grew up after 
the First World War, along with rapid industrialisation of economic activity. Urban populations 
expanded rapidly in California towards the end of the 19
th and into the 20
th century.  Economic 
development in California was largely facilitated by huge water infrastructure projects, which 
were planned and implemented during this period. In the first decade of the 20
th century most of 
the California population of about 2.3 million, was based in the northern half of the state.  Los 
Angeles  was  the  home  to  only  102,000  at  the  start  of  the  20
th  century,  however  its  urban 
population  had  grown  ten-fold  by  1930  to  total  roughly  1,238,000  (Figure 5.1;  see  also Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 5.1: Population, vehicles and VMT in California 
 
Source: author; data from CARB 2006. Starr 2005 and US Census 2006. 
Starr 2005).  This explosive growth exceeded even that of San Francisco and Sacramento at the 
time of the 19
th century Gold Rush and established southern California as a geo-political and 
economic force within the state (Starr 2005).   
Since  the  beginning  of  the  19
th  century,  transportation  systems  have  shaped  California’s 
development. Electric rail soon became an important feature of urban living, one that was more 
accessible  to  the  ordinary 
person  than  was  the 
personal  automobile.  By 
the  1920s,  virtually  every 
American  city  had  an 
electric  rail  system  with 
1200  inter-urban  rail 
systems  throughout  the 
U.S.  (Davis  2002;  Snell 
1974).  In  the  1920s,  Los 
Angeles  had  one  of  the 
largest electric rail systems 
in  the  US;  owned  by  the 
world’s largest rail company, Southern Pacific.  Known for its Red Car trolleys, the Los Angeles 
metropolitan area had 1500 miles of track, connecting major cities in the larger metropolitan area. 
Los Angeles also had more than 1000 yellow streetcars (Davis 2002: 59).   
Also at this time the U.S. auto industry was suffering financial losses and feared a saturated 
market for private vehicles.  This led to an organised effort to rid cities in the United States of 
their electric rail systems, including in Los Angeles, orchestrated through collusion between GM, 
parts of the oil industry and other corporations.
49 By the 1950s this strategic effort had largely 
succeeded with 900 out of 1200 electric railway systems either converted to bus systems or 
simply  sold  and  dismantled.  By  1953  the  public  transport  system  in  Los  Angeles  had  been 
destroyed.  A front company for General Motors – American City Lines – had acquired and 
                                                         
49 This is described in some depth in a 1974 report to the US Senate by Bradford Snell – main elements of 
which is online at: http://www.tompaine.com/Archive/scontent/4518.html; original material in "American 
Ground Transport," which is to be found in Part 4A of Hearings in S. 1167, The Industrial Reorganization 
Act, before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: 1974).  See also discussion in Davis (2002). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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destroyed many of the street cars and destroyed much of the heavy metal track that had facilitated 
rail travel but hindered vehicle traffic in the city area (Davis 2002). 
Devra Davis (2002: 59-60) notes: “the history of southern California cannot be separated from the 
history of the car. … southern California grew as the promised land, where everyone had a right 
and a need for a car.  Roads were built at a dizzying pace.  In 1947, nearly two out of every five 
workers used public transportation. Two decades later, fewer than one in ten did. Today the 
number is fewer than one in twenty nationwide.  From 1950 to 1970, the number of vehicles in 
southern California tripled, the population doubled, and the miles of road built grew more than 
fifty percent.” Heavy dependence on the personal vehicle was not unique to southern California 
but widespread throughout the state. Kevin Starr (2005) notes rapid development in California 
from  about  1910  on  of  large  highway  and  bridge  infrastructure  projects  of  the  1930s  that 
facilitated movement of people and vehicles across waterways and up and down the state. Urban 
electric rail was a historical artefact and inter-city rail service was increasingly abandoned, or 
dedicated to  transporting  freight  rather  than  people.   From  the  1930s  on,  California’s urban 
landscape and its economic development, as well as its cultural identity, was to be inextricably 
linked with the personal automobile.    
5.4  Air pollution regulatory law is born:  Los Angeles versus Detroit 
Interestingly the earliest efforts to curb air pollution in California provide a perfect example of 
grassroots environmental activism taking hold in the state (SCAQMD 1997).  Its first actions on 
air pollution control were taken at the scale of county and city authority, through the County and 
City of Los Angeles. As early as 1943, Los Angeles had experienced eye-burning smog events, 
which were unusual in that there was virtually no coal burning in the area (Bachman 2007).
50  In 
1945, following similar action in other localities across the nation (Bachman 2007), the County of 
Los Angeles banned the emission of “dense smoke” and the City of LA followed suit with a 
similar ban.  In 1946, an expert from St. Louis named Raymond Tucker was commissioned by the 
Los Angeles Times newspaper to report on the causes of air pollution. The results pointed to a 
wide range of sources, from industry to backyard burning of debris, and recommendations called 
                                                         
50 Bachman (2007) reports on many more early local efforts to control smoke across the US between 1880 
and 1930 mainly as a response to the aesthetic nuisance of smoke. Importantly the City of St. Louis 
commissioned  Washington  University  Professor  Raymond  Tucker’s  pioneering  work  on  cleaner 
combustion  of  coal  in  the  1930s.  Despite  even  earlier  work  in  1914  by  the  Mellon  Institute  in 
Pennsylvania on the health effects of smoke, a link in public policy between industrial air pollution and 
human health was not made definitively until the 1940s with the regulations in Los Angeles, CA. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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for a comprehensive approach to controlling the full range of pollution sources including from 
motor vehicles.  He also recommended centralizing authority for air pollution control at county 
level, in an agency that would design and enforce regulatory approaches.  
Tucker’s advice was heeded when, in 1947, California passed the nation’s first air pollution 
legislation, the Air Pollution Control Act (CARB 2003; Table 5.1). Its passage was in direct 
response to the problem of air pollution in southern California.  This law established the authority 
to create an Air Pollution Control District in every county of the state but the County of Los 
Angeles was the first to exercise that right.  In a review of the evidence and history of air pollution 
and health regulation of the United States, Devra Davis (2002:88) highlights the significance of 
the California’s early action to limit air pollution from vehicles noting: “Driven by the political 
demands, California became the first state 
on many fronts.  It was the first to have 
an air pollution control agency; the first 
to set up some form of program to test car 
engines  on  a  regular  basis;  the  first  to 
impose  automotive  emissions 
standards…; the first to set up a process 
for setting and changing the standards for 
key air pollutants.”
51  
 The  unique  geography  of  Los  Angeles 
basin  is  central  to  understanding  the 
demand  for  air  pollution  control  in  the 
region.    Mountains  surround  the  basin 
and sometimes-stagnant sea air combined 
with sunlight and warmth, create an air 
inversion, which traps warm polluted air 
close to the ground by layers of colder air 
above  it.  The  first  major  episodes  of 
smog in the LA basin occurred in 1943, during World War II, and at the time of extraordinary 
industrialisation and population growth in the region. The 1943 smog events, referred to as a “gas 
attack”, were initially (and wrongly) attributed to a butadiene plant in the region (SCAQMD 
                                                         
51 Note that Revesz (2001: 580) identifies Oregon in 1951as the first state in the nation to establish broad 
air pollution control authority, with California following in 1957. 
Figure 5.2: First recorded photo of smog, 
Los Angeles, 1943 
 
Source:  SCAQMD  1997.  Photo  courtesy  of  Los  Angeles 
Times Collection, Department of Special Collections, UCLA 
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1997).  When closure of the plant did not have a positive effect on smog, it was clear that the 
origin of the smog was elsewhere.   
Discoveries by a southern California scientist in the late 1940s and 1950s, Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit, 
eventually led to the understanding that the smog episodes were caused by ozone pollution, which 
was not emitted directly but rather formed in the lower atmosphere by other precursor pollutants 
combining with sunlight and warm air (CARB 2006). Eventually ozone pollution was linked 
directly to risks to human health and ecosystems (e.g. eye irritation, respiratory problems, heart 
disease and damage to materials and plants) (Davis 2002).  
Under the 1947 state legislation, Los Angeles (LA) County was the first in the state and in the 
nation to establish such an air pollution control district with health as a central objective of policy.  
Strongly supported in the California legislature, Governor Earl Warren signed the groundbreaking 
law “in spite of stiff opposition from oil companies and the Chamber of Commerce” (SCAQMD 
1997).  Shortly after this in 1948, a deadly air pollution episode in Donora, Pennsylvania, left 20 
people dead and about half the residents ill, while also killing a plethora of local animals (CARB 
2003; Davis 2002; Bachman 2007). In 1952-53 another deadly pollution event struck, this time in 
London. In 1955 residents of downtown LA suffered the highest exposure to ozone pollution ever 
recorded in LA at levels more than three times what it is today (Davis 2002; see Figure 5.4).   
Thus by the late 1940s, California had broken new ground within the U.S. and also worldwide, by 
placing air pollution on the public policy agenda and initiating efforts to monitor and control it 
(Table 5.1). Beyond the unique geography of the LA basin, political attention on the problem of 
air pollution in California was also driven by a number of factors:  its rapid economic growth; 
growth in population and number of vehicles; the lack of public transit options and long distances 
between communities – when combined with a large freeway network led to large increases in 
traffic and congestion (SCAQMB 1997; Melosi 2004; see also Figures 5.1 & 5.3).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Early in the history of California air pollution regulation, politicians had made the link between 
environmental protection and economic performance.  Governor Goodwin “Goodie” Knight led 
the initial fight against air pollution in the 1950s.  Devra Davis says of Governor Knight: “…his 
overriding  goal  was  to  keep  California’s  booming  economy  moving  and  thus  ensure  his 
re-election in 1954… Knight and his minions understood that the famous California lifestyle 
could fast become unattractive if people became fearful about the state’s air” (Davis 2002:79-80). 
The problem originated in Los Angeles (LA) and in some ways public understanding of the air 
pollution problem was propagated by LA’s dirty air image.  John White recounted: “In the 50s 
and early 60s …this plague …seemed to be uniquely Los Angeles. The political leaders, …the 
board  of  supervisors,  …were  instrumental  in  raising  the  issue  of  air  pollution  as  a  political 
priority.”  
Some of the earliest action against air pollution 
in California was led by local politician and LA 
County Supervisor Kenny Hahn,
52 much to the 
dismay  of  the  auto  and  oil  industry,  when  it 
became  clear  that  neither  the  automakers  nor 
federal regulation would move ahead quickly to 
control  emissions  (Melosi  2004).  There  was 
widespread recognition across the nation of LA’s 
dirty  air  –  for  example,  through  popular 
television.  John White said: “If you go back on 
the early days of the Tonight Show with Johnny 
Carson... they were making jokes about the smog 
in LA as if it was unique to LA.” Meanwhile 
southern California’s affluence and power within the state increased, with the growth in both 
manufacturing and the entertainment industries in this post-War period (Starr 2005).  
Perhaps more importantly, the political power of wealthy southern California residents, who were 
directly affected by the pollution, helped to promote solutions.  John White underscored this:  
“Who's downwind often has the most to do with the actual solutions.   In southern California in 
the 70s ...you had the eastern part of Los Angeles, Uplands, Redlands, Riverside, Palm Springs.  
                                                         
52  Kenny  Hahn  served  on  the  Los  Angeles  County  Board  of  Supervisors  from  1952  to 
1991(Los-Angeles-Almanac 2008). Although he was white, he was known as a champion for the black 
community and for his many initiatives to bring local development and amenities to the impoverished 
area of South Los Angeles (CE 2008; CLA 2008). 
Figure 5.3: Los Angeles traffic, 1950s 
 
Source: SCAQMD 1977; photo courtesy of CARB. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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...those areas of the basin became more smoggy with higher levels of ozone, higher levels of 
particulates than any other part of the LA basin and ...” From a political and economic perspective 
this was important: “their whole image was affected, their self-image and their economic image.  
[LA was] the smoggiest part of California...  so that community, even though very conservative 
compared to say the West side of Los Angeles or the Bay Area, was a source of political support 
for strong actions on air pollution” (White 2006i).
53  These upwind suburban communities were 
among  the  wealthiest  residents  in  the  Los  Angeles  air  basin  and  their  political  influence 
contributed to the state’s resolve to tackle the air quality problem. 
Smog does not respect political boundaries.  While Los Angeles County had been the first to 
establish an air quality management district to manage air pollution in 1947, by 1957 three more 
counties had followed suit to establish individual countywide districts within southern California  
(Orange, Riverside and San Bernadino Counties) (SCAQMD 1997). The westerly sea breezes of 
the Los Angeles coast concentrated the smog and the worst of its effects in some of the wealthiest 
inland areas in the metropolitan region.  Yet it is difficult to bring together decision-makers across 
county lines to tackle the problem of air pollution, in part because at the time links to human 
health were still only tentative (Davis 2002).  
Following the state’s initial decentralization of air pollution control authority to counties, the 
period from 1960-1977 was a critical moment that solidified knowledge and institutional capacity 
to combat air pollution.  According to John White:  “This [was a] unique political environment 
that was bipartisan, that was not liberal or conservative but southern California against Detroit…” 
Although the County of Los Angeles began controlling industrial smokestack emissions as early 
as 1947, California’s first pollution control standards for [add-on control technology for] vehicles 
came into force on 1963 models. When unfounded rumours of motor damage circulated, the 
regulations were temporarily rescinded by the legislature (SCAQMD 1997).   
Under the unwavering leadership of Governor Pat Brown (Jerry Brown’s father), the regulations 
were reinstated for 1966 models as California regulators persisted in implementing the nations’ 
first tailpipe standards (Davis 2002).
54 Institutional capacity in southern California was finally 
consolidated in 1976, after a five-year political battle and two vetoes under Governor Reagan, 
when  Governor  Jerry  Brown  signed  a  controversial  yet  powerful  law  that  joined  the  four 
                                                         
53 This notation (name – year i) is used to indicate information is derived directly from an interview. 
54 Note there is some disagreement in the literature about the date of initial entry into force of these 
regulations.  Some authors place the start date in 1965 (Percival et al. 2003; Revesz 2001). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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individual  county  districts  into  one,  more  powerful  agency  --  The  South  Coast  Air  Quality 
Management District  – effective 1 January 1977 (SCAQMD 1997).   
A more centralised institution, the California Air Resources Board,
 was created in 1967 with the 
passage of the Mulford-Carrell Act, provides overarching regulatory authority across the state 
(Table 5.1).  This linked across the activities of individual air quality management districts to 
control mobile and stationary sources (CARB 2006; Hershman 1970).
55  The CARB has as an 
overall mandate to protect human health, plant and animal life, and ecosystems from the harmful 
effects of air pollution and shortly began to issue state-wide standards (CARB 2006; see also 
Table 5.1).  
The Board of Supervisors in Los Angeles County played a large role in the early political fight 
against air pollution.  By the end of the 1960s, the Board included key personalities and people of 
influence in the region to lead the fight against air pollution to favour cleaner and healthier cities. 
This  included  Gladys  Meade,  the  esteemed  Dr.  Haagen-Smit  of  the  California  Institute  of 
Technology and well-known local politician Kenny Hahn
56 (White 2006i).  For example, John 
White said:  “Kenny Hahn personally wrote these letters to the Detroit executives saying you have 
got to clean up your cars, you're causing all this smog and they just sort of laughed. Then he made 
a campaign with the LA board of supervisors and the community of LA backing him.” 
Several years later in 1970, the US Congress revised the Clean Air Act (CAA)
57 to provide the 
statutory basis for controlling air pollution across the U.S.  The passage of this legislation was 
accompanied by a fierce battle between federal and California lawmakers.  California wanted to 
                                                         
55 The Act combined the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Board with the Bureau of Air Sanitation – both 
of which were under the Department of Health at the time.  The CARB is comprised of an eleven-member 
board that is appointed by the governor.   
56 This includes the “legendary” Los Angeles County Supervisor Kenneth Hahn (see above) as well as to 
Gladys Meade and Dr. Arie Haagen-Smit, whom are known for their political leadership in the local fight 
against air pollution. Gladys Meade was a leader in the American Lung Association and the Women’s 
League of Voters; she also served on the Boards of the South Coast Air Quality Management District and 
the  California  Air  Resources  Board;  she  remains  active  today,  see:  (Rose-Foundation  2008).  Dr. 
Haagen-Smit was a California professor who discovered the atmospheric photochemical conversion of air 
pollutants that leads to smog; ozone was later shown to be a significant health hazard (Davis, 2002).  
Haagen-Smit became a champion of air pollution control policy in California.  
57 This act replaced the considerably weaker Clean Air Act of 1963.  It followed earlier, more partial 
efforts  to  regulate  air  pollution.    Significantly  the  1963  Act  provided  grants-in-aid  to  states  that 
implemented air pollution controls; by 1969 the number of states with such regulations had risen from 11 
to 50. Federal legislation in 1967 (the 1967 Air Quality Act) was the first to recognise and provide an 
exceptional exemption for California’s pre-existing and more stringent state-wide regulations.  Although 
opposed  by  the  auto  industry  from  the  start,  this  exemption  survived  the  more  comprehensive  1970 
legislation and was later extended to cover additional source categories in the 1977 Amendments (Revesz 
2001: 585). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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maintain its authority to manage air quality locally.  John White recounts: “The Clean Air Act 
[Amendments] didn't pass till 1970 and the whole reason that we are even around to do this is that 
we fought in the Congress with none other than George Murphy
58 leading the fight, the Senator 
from Hollywood, the song and dance man, a friend of [Governor] Ronald Reagan
59 who was a 
one-term Senator.  He led the fight against [Congressman] John Dingle
60 of Michigan to try to 
protect California's authority when the Clean Air Act was passed.”  Joined by the California 
House Delegation, Murphy fought the federal attempt to take away California’s authority.  
California  won the  battle  over  federal  authority  with  the  passage  of the  1970  Amendments, 
gaining specific exemptions from the law to provide it with authority to regulate air pollution in 
California.  The Clean Air Act (section 209[b]) gives the EPA administrator authority to waive 
pre-emption for states that controlled auto emissions “prior to March 30, 1966”, making only 
California eligible to receive a waiver.
61 Other states also eventually gained the option to adopt 
the stricter California standards in lieu of the (weaker) federal standards (Carlson 2003; Revesz 
2001).
62  
California’s aggressive regulatory efforts to control air pollution continue to this day with striking 
results (see Figure 5.4). Gladys Meade said (SCAQMD 1997): “Air quality has improved because 
of government regulation pushing a reluctant industry to comply with each issue.” Jim Boyd, who 
served as chief executive officer of California Air Resources Board from 1981 to 1996 and who is 
now an Energy Commissioner in California, said: “In the beginning, they said it could not be 
done. They said the technology was impossible.  That it was incredibly expensive” (SCAQMD 
1997).  Yet this was shown not to be the case.   
California’s results to improve air quality are unequivocal showing a reduction in peak ozone 
concentrations between 1955 and 1970 in downtown Los Angeles from 0.68 to 0.58 parts per 
                                                         
58 George Murphy was a Republican US Senator from California from 1965 to 1971. He was also an 
accomplished actor having made numerous motion pictures (US-Congress 2008). 
59 Ronald Reagan was Governor of California at the time that this federal legislation was passed; however 
he was known in California more for his vetoes of legislation to combat air pollution than for his support.    
60 Congressman John Dingell is in the US House of Representatives from the State of Michigan, home to 
the city of Detroit and seat of much of the US automobile industry.  He is a Democrat and is currently the 
longest serving member of the House.     
61 CAA 42 U.S.C. §§7543(a), 7543(b)(1) as cited in (Carlson 2003). 
62 The authority to extend California standards to other states was initially done through the 1977 CAA 
Amendments and then reconfirmed in the 1990 Amendments. The caveat is that this can be done only in 
the event that the states have local areas that do not achieve federal air quality standards, i.e. they have 
“non-attainment” areas. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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million (ppm) (see Figure 5.4).  Concentrations continued to fall in the 1990s due to pollution 
control efforts, with 1996 figures for downtown LA standing at 0.24 ppm and for 2006 the 8-hour 
average peak estimate is less than 0.10 ppm (SCAQMD 2007).  Unfortunately the air pollution 
problem in California and in particular in the South coast air basin remains. In spite of remarkable 
improvements in the last decades, air quality in the South coast metropolitan region is still among 
the worst in the nation today (SCAQMD 2008). 
Perhaps because of the ongoing challenge of local air pollution, the institutional and technical 
competence in California is recognised by experts to be amongst the highest and most respected 
in  the  nation  (Hanemann 
2008;  Heitz 2006i).    Eric 
Heitz  of  the  Energy 
Foundation explained how 
the  opening  in  the  Clean 
Air Act opened a window 
of  opportunity  for 
California  to  assert 
leadership  on  clean 
vehicle technologies in the 
transportation  sector.    He 
said:    “On  the 
transportation  side, 
California’s  sense  of 
leadership really grew out 
of the Clean Air Act and 
the  recognition  that  Los 
Angeles  was  so  much 
worse than anywhere else 
that… and that fact, … got 
encoded into the Clean Air 
Act, allowing California to 
go  beyond  what  other 
states were doing.” In his view, these circumstances, combined with policy decisions to build a 
strong  “institutional  apparatus  and  centre  of  excellence  in  California  on  air  quality  and 
transportation issues.” In particular, Eric Heitz said of these years: “…a tremendous apparatus 
Figure 5.4: Peak Ozone Levels, Los Angeles Metropolitan Area 
 
Source: SCAQMD 1997. 
Figure 5.5: Los Angeles area: “still …the worst air quality in the 
nation” 
Source: SCAQMD 1997; Photo courtesy of California Air Resources Board.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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was built beginning with California Resources Board, but also with the South Coast Quality Air 
Management District.  Alan Lloyd was the chief scientist, Jim Lents was the head of it.  …you 
had the worst air in the world by far, and a mandate to push and clean that up and no constraints 
by the federal government. And you had a popular sentiment that it was very bad…”.  Thus the 
regulatory and institutional capacity built by the state government to address air pollution was 
driven to a great extent by broad popular demand and political support for public interventions to 
improve California’s air quality and local environments. 
The  California  programme  for  air  pollution  control,  and  in  particular,  particulate  and  NOx 
regulation  of  the  vehicle  sector,  is  widely  regarded  to  have  brought  major  technological 
breakthroughs to the sector, altering vehicle emission performance worldwide.  Making use of the 
waiver  right  to  exempt  it  from  federal  regulations  on  approximately  50  occasions 
(California 2008c).  Carlson  (2002)  cites  relevant  vehicle  technology  breakthroughs  to  have 
included catalytic converters (for control of NOx), unleaded gasoline and low-emission vehicles 
among others.  These innovations have been broadly diffused in the world today, suggesting what 
Vogel (1995) has described as a “race to the top” or the “California effect” in the literature on 
trade and environmental policy interfaces. There is also evidence that at least for conventional air 
pollutants,  strong  environmental  performance  in  the  form  of  declining  emissions  can  go 
hand-in-hand with strong economic performance (Bachman 2007). 
Mary Nichols noted also the value of the experiential knowledge that grew out of the vehicles 
programme in California, which in her view had a clear influence on how the state was dealing 
with global climate change. Pointing to the international and national implications of the 2004 
Pavley Law (see Chapter 6), she said: “…the fact that California has its own vehicle program is 
very central to our sense of our ability to act on an issue of national and international significance 
at the state level.”  As noted above, Mary Nichols highlighted that California was in a unique 
position of influence and latitude to act on CO2 emissions from vehicles given the provisions of 
the Clean Air Act to allow California to regulate air pollution from vehicles.
63  
There is some evidence that California’s aggressive air pollution regulation has benefited local 
business. For example, Taylor et al. (2006) show that where California has front-runner policy it 
has  it  has  captured  a  significantly  higher  share  of  intellectual  property  rights  for  relevant 
                                                         
63 Background for California’s 2002 legislation regulating CO2 from motor vehicles, commonly known as 
the Pavley Law, makes an explicit link between air pollution, CO2 and energy.  One of the principal legal 
arguments being used by the State of California to defend the law against various legal challenges is that 
it is necessary to improve energy efficiency to achieve significant improvements in the CO2 emission 
performance of vehicles  (see Chapter 5). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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technologies than on average across the patent system as a whole in the US. Further Carlson 
(2003) identifies significant business activity in California in motor vehicle engine innovation. 
64 
This suggests that California business, including venture capital investors in which Silicon Valley 
California  is  an  important  worldwide  centre,  stands  to  profit  economically  from  technology 
innovations (Mullins 2008) even when the clean technology innovations is manufactured out of 
state or by foreign companies. Furthermore, even if environmental or clean energy technologies 
are  not  “home  grown”  (i.e.  made in  China or  elsewhere),  an important  service industry  and 
technical,  regulatory  know-how  has  emerged  in  the  state  from  the  air  pollution  regulatory 
experience.  This would suggest that California’s early and aggressive regulatory efforts might 
have yielded important competitive advantages to local businesses in what are increasingly global 
markets for these services.  
5.5.  Energy policy emerges  
While past experience with air pollution control policy may be part of the explanation for bold, 
early action in California to address climate change, many participants also saw action on climate 
change as linked to California’s experience and experimentation with clean energy policies and 
technologies.  The onset of the first oil embargos of the 1970s turned world attention to energy as 
a new domain of public policy (EPPFF 1974; Lovins 1976; Table 5.2).   In the United States and 
elsewhere this became an important source of environmental policy innovation (see for example 
Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007; Mazur and Lee 1993).  
In the 1970s, developments in California paralleled Federal efforts to move energy to the top of 
the policy agenda. Two prominent strands of early energy policy emerged: efforts to increase 
energy efficiency and to boost the supply of renewable energy.  These initiatives targeted the 
same  end-point:  a  clean  supply  of  energy  to  fuel  growth  in  California’s  population  and  its 
economy.  Policies emerged in response to the energy crises of 1973 and 1979 as well as the 
nuclear crisis of Three Mile Island in 1979 (Lovins 1976; Roe 1984); as such they were not 
explicitly targeting environmental goals, rather they were aiming to avoid the risks of large-scale 
investment in nuclear power and of security risks of oil dependence.  
                                                         
64 In an analysis of the legal history of environmental regulations in the vehicle sector, Carlson attributes 
important environmental  innovations in the vehicle sector, such as the  catalytic  converter and hybrid 
vehicles, to California air pollution regulations. She argues that this is a form of “modified federalism” in 
the  environmental  arena  that  encourages  experimentation  at  one  level  through  the  unique  waiver  for 
California  (granted  on  the  basis  of  its  large  size  and  ability  to  manage  the  problem),  while  also 
maintaining a large amount of federal control for regulatory policy. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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By  the  time  of  nationwide  and  California  the  push  for  energy  policy  in  the  late  1970s,  air 
pollution was already a well-established policy problem and it was not automatically clear that the 
two agendas were connected. As noted by John White:  “…the air pollution fight was ongoing 
and it was not especially an energy fight although there were energy issues.” Energy policy in 
California was begun as a separate area of policy and on a separate trajectory from air pollution 
policy.  Over time the two agendas became increasingly intertwined. 
Clean energy policy in California can be traced to the early 1970s, with the creation of the 
California Energy Commission. Eric Heitz underscored California’s energy policy experience as 
part of the explanation for why it had chosen to lead early action on climate change (Heitz 2006i). 
On the origin of the state’s energy policy he said: “That largely grew out of the apparatus that was 
built post-OPEC [embargos], when California built the California Energy Commission, which 
was a major institution saying that California needs to head in a different direction… That started 
the process off of California having a set of thinkers and an idea that it could do better on energy 
across the board.”  
Energy policy quickly moved to the top of the policy agenda in California in 1975 when Jerry 
Brown was elected Governor.  John White said: “… [In] those years … we launched our solar 
programs.   [The] solar and the wind industry both began in California with tax credits that were 
passed by the legislature and articulated by his administration.  The independent power movement 
away from central station nuclear and coal plants began during that same time… so that first wave 
of energy technology of the green sort began during those years.” The search for alternatives to 
petroleum and Jerry Brown’s administration in the 1970-1980s may also have been a turning 
point when air policy began to connect to energy policy in the state.   
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Table 5.2: Highlights of Key Early Energy Policy Developments: California and United States 
Year  California state action  US federal action & key events elsewhere 
1970s 
 
1968: PG&E begins construction of Diablo Canyon Nuclear 
Power Plant (2200 MW) 
1973: Warren-Alquist Act passed but Governor Reagan later 
vetoed it.  
1974: Warren-Alquist Act (revised) passes to establish the 
California Energy Commission (CEC) and regulatory authority 
over: energy facility siting; energy forecasting, planning and 
policy; energy efficiency programmes, standards (appliances 
and buildings), information & education; and technology 
research and development.  
1975: CPUC decision to regulate electric utility investment 
decisions thus creating policy lever to require investment in 
energy efficiency. 
1977: First California efficiency standards go into effect. 
1979: PG&E completes Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant 
but it is several Billion $ over original budget. 
1973:” October – OPEC declares the first world oil embargo following the Yom Kippur War. President Nixon 
calls for equivalent of a “Manhattan Project” effort to free US of dependence on foreign oil.  
1974: Federal Administration Act of 1974 replaces the Federal Energy Office with the Federal Energy 
Administration. 
1975: US Energy Policy and Conservation Act includes extension of oil price controls and mandates 
automobile fuel economy standards; creates strategic petroleum reserve. 
1977: President Carter announces National Energy Plan – calls for establishment of energy department.  
1978: National Energy Act, includes: National Energy Conservation Policy Act; the Power Plant and Industrial 
Fuel Use Act, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, the Energy Tax Act, and the Natural Gas Policy Act. 
First CAFE (national vehicle fuel efficiency) standards take effect. 
1979: January – 2nd oil crisis occurs when the Shah flees Iran.  Three Mile Island nuclear power plant 
accident (March). President Carter announces programme to increase national use of solar energy. 
1980s  1983: Diablo Canyon begins operation 
1980 &1981: PG&E and SCE cancel plans to build new power 
facilities (coal and nuclear) and invest instead in a range of 
alternatives notably energy efficiency 
Mid- to late-1980s: UNEP, WMO and ICSU organise a series of international conferences, first in Villach then 
in Belagio, to bring policymakers’ attention to climate change 
1986: Oil prices collapse and accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant (USSR) 
1987: US Energy Appliance Energy Conservation Act mandates federal energy efficiency standards for 
common appliances. 
1988: UNEP & WMO create the IPCC; Toronto conference “The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for 
Global Security” issues (non-binding) declaration by governments to work towards emission reductions  
1990s  1996: Energy Industry Deregulation Law passes. Beyond 
broad restructuring of CA electricity market, it establishes 
public goods charge and ability to fund energy-related 
research under CEC Public Interest Energy Research 
programme (PIER). 
1997: CEC Renewable Energy Programme established 
through law (Senate Bill 90) 
1992: President Bush signs the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to requires integrated resource planning at state 
level; also providing resources to help states comply.  The Act also enables electricity market deregulation by 
expanding access to transmission through federal regulatory authority. 
1992-94: Earth Summit ’92 including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – entry 
into force in 1994. President Clinton and Vice President Gore unveil the US The Climate Change Action Plan, 
emphasizing voluntary measures to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in 1993.  
Sources:  Various sources: ASE 2008; CEC 2008; Dasovich 1993; Hanemann 2008; USDOE 2008; see also Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Referring to the second oil embargo in 1979, John White remembered that: “The movement 
towards alternative fuels was launched in that Jerry Brown period.  … In '79, we got hit harder 
than the rest of the country in terms of mobility and gas lines and …so there was an emphasis on 
alternatives to petroleum.  …That emphasis got harmonized with the clean air struggles and we 
began to look at how to use alternative fuels to get another chunk of air pollution.  That debate 
then begat the electric vehicle, the fuel cell and [eventually] the hybrid. …That [energy] platform 
…built in the late 70s and early 80s combined with the infrastructure …built for air pollution 
control -- those two rivers of policy, if you will, both putting us ahead of the nation on the very 
things that would become important.” Thus by the middle of the 1980s the two agendas, air 
pollution policy and energy policy, had begun to converge, and these agendas have provided a 
source of knowledge drawn from experience to support the earliest of the state’s efforts to shape 
climate policy.  California’s climate policy elite has also repeatedly pointed to a strong link 
between climate change and its experience on energy efficiency if not other areas of energy and 
environmental policy. As Devra Wang, of NRDC, noted: “On energy efficiency… California has 
really  led the  country  and led the  world  for 25 years.”  Many of those  championing  climate 
policies today in California see it through the lens of past experience with energy policy. 
5.5.1.  The Warren-Alquist Act and the Energy Commission 
In 1973, the California legislature passed the Warren-Alquist Act (CA-Code 1973) to establish 
what was to become a stable, long-term framework to guide energy efficiency investment in 
California. The legislation was eventually signed into law following the OPEC oil embargo and 
widespread perception of an “energy crisis”.  In the face of widespread national attention to the 
issue of energy security, Governor Reagan reversed his original position to ultimately sign the 
Warren-Alquist Act in 1973 (Rosenfeld 1999).  
The Warren-Alquist Act has a number of features that were extremely innovative at the time. It 
firmly  institutionalised  energy  efficiency  as  a  policy  objective,  along  side  of  alternative 
(renewable) energy objectives and pre-existing air pollution policies. Specifically the law aims: 
“to  improve  the  environment  and  to  encourage  the  diversity  of  energy  sources  through 
improvements in  energy  efficiency  and development of  renewable  energy  resources, such  as 
wind, solar, and geothermal energy” (25000.1 [a]).   On energy efficiency it establishes: “the 
policy of the state and the intent of the Legislature to employ a range of measures to reduce 
wasteful, uneconomical, and unnecessary uses of energy, thereby reducing the rate of growth of 
energy consumption, prudently conserve energy resources, and assure state-wide environmental, 
public  safety,  and  land  use  goals”  (25007).  Over  time  the  law  permitted  a  new  way  of Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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understanding energy supply to also include the notion of “supplying energy through greater 
efficiency” (Meier 1982; Meier et al. 1983). 
As  one  of  the  primary  strategies  demonstrating  California’s  leadership  in  this  area,  energy 
efficiency standards were first pioneered by California under the Warren-Alquist Act, leading the 
way for federal action, which came only later.
65 Dr. Arthur Rosenfeld and the Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory  have  played  a  prominent  role  in  shaping the design  and  implementation  of  both 
California and federal policies in this area (Box 5.1). 
Box 5.1: Art Rosenfeld and his energy efficiency legacy in California 
Part of California’s prescient record on energy efficiency may be attributed to institutional legacies 
established through visionary leadership of a few people.  Art Rosenfeld is undoubtedly one of these 
leaders.  An internationally recognized physicist, Art Rosenfeld has dedicated more than thirty years of his 
life to championing investment in energy efficiency (Roe 1984; Rosenfeld 1999).  He has been an effective 
advocate of policy reforms, both across the nation and within the state of California.  Policy attention to 
energy efficiency grew in part from the recognition by scientists that wasted energy was a valuable and 
relatively cheap resource, especially when compared to the cost of developing new energy sources. The 
“energy efficiency movement” in the United States grew out of a 1974 Princeton summer study, organised 
by the American Physical Society, on energy and environment; this event gathered some of the nation’s 
most innovative and brilliant physicists on energy efficiency issues (Rosenfeld 1999). Rosenfeld was part 
of the group and remembers the profound conclusion that: “by the end of the first week, we realized that 
we were discovering (or had blundered into) a huge oil and gas field buried in our cities (buildings), 
factories,  and  roads  (cars),  which  could  be  ‘extracted’  at  pennies  per  gallon  of  gasoline  equivalent” 
(Rosenfeld 1999).   
Since the 1970s, Art Rosenfeld has provided leadership within the energy and environment group 
at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) helping it to become a major centre of expertise to support the 
Californian state government and the federal government to better understand energy efficiency potentials 
and to develop technical specifications for appliance and building energy efficiency standards. LBL has 
also partnered with companies and other non-governmental partners, such as Pacific Gas and Electric 
and the construction industry, to advance policies and practices that promote energy efficiency in the 
buildings, lighting and appliance sectors (Rosenfeld 1999). LBL and Art Rosenfeld in particular, have 
championed the role of energy efficiency and challenged conventional wisdom that  “more is better” – 
eventually helping to avoid the cost of new power facilities in the state of California (and more widely in the 
United  States) saving  consumers  Billions  of  dollars  (Roe  1984).  (See  also  Figures 5.3;  Chang  2006; 
CPUC 2005a). 
The Warren-Alquist Act requires an economical approach to rule-making, identifying “lifecycle 
costs” as one of the criteria for assessing the cost of alternative resources, including investment in 
energy conservation (25008).  Interestingly, it also formally calls for the integration of energy 
                                                         
65 Known as “Title 24 building standards” and “Title 20 appliance standards”  (Public Resources Code 
25402), these are revised at the discretion of the Energy Commission, but generally on a three-year cycle.  
Interim  years  are  used  to  assess  new  technologies  and  develop  the  next  generation  of  standards  in 
consultation with stakeholders.  The next update for building standards will be effective January 2008 and 
for appliances in January 2009.  See CAT 2005, State Agency Work Plans, December 8, 2005.   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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with air pollution policy objectives:  “In calculating the cost effectiveness of energy resources, 
including conservation and load management options, the commission shall include a value for 
any  costs  and  benefits  to  the  environment,  including  air  quality”  (25000.1.c).  Thus  formal 
recognition in California of the need for an integrated approach between energy efficiency and air 
pollution occurred as early as 1973.  
The 1973 Warren-Alquist Act, the first of its type in the nation, had put California on the forefront 
of energy and environmental policy in the US. It enabled a prioritisation of investment in energy 
efficiency as well as in renewable sources of energy as alternatives to fossil fuel and nuclear 
energy  supply  investments.  The  Act  institutionalised  public  authority  to  ensure  that  energy 
efficiency is considered an important “source of energy” alongside of other, presumably more 
expensive and polluting sources such as coal, oil or natural gas. In a landmark move, the Act 
empowered the state to set minimum energy efficiency standards for buildings and appliances 
sold in California so as to conserve energy, setting California out as a world leader in this area 
(Box  5.2).    It  also  established  the  State  Energy  Resources  Conservation  and  Development 
Commission, also known as the California Energy Commission (CEC), as the lead institution to 
oversee energy policy in the state. 
Box 5.2: Federal versus state environmental regulatory authority 
Despite the early action of the State of California on these issues, and the potential effectiveness of 
state  action,  the  extent  of  state  authority  to  regulate  the  environment  is  contentious  and  remains  a 
complicated area of environmental law (e.g. see Revesz 2001; Carlson 2003).  There is an ongoing back 
and forth between state and federal authorities on these issues, with industry often pushing for the federal 
government to intervene to  “level  the playing  field” among states.   The extent to  which  states have 
authority to regulate reflect a balance of different interests i.e. for example the tension between whether 
economies of  scale of production be harmed by different product  standards  versus whether different 
standards promote better outcomes with respect to the goals of the law, such as air quality or energy 
efficiency. The latest example of this tug-of-war is in the area of motor vehicles where California’s request 
to regulate CO2 in this sector under the Clean Air Act was denied by US EPA.66 The basis for the denial 
was on the grounds that the action regulated energy efficiency of vehicles, which is an area pre-empted by 
federal law. 
…continued on following page 
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Box 5.2 continued… 
Another example where California differs from other parts of the US is in the area of water use and 
its Where the federal government has asserted authority, the state may be required to maintain uniformity 
with federal standards, and is thus pre-empted from action that is more (or less) stringent than what has 
been laid down at national level. This is the case for vehicle energy efficiency standards, for example.  
Revesz (2001) notes that this varies from the more typical approach in US law, which allows states with 
more stringent standards to exceed federal regulations. The Clean Air Act is an unusual case where a 
specific exception was made for California alone, to allow it an exemption from the federal standards. 
Under certain conditions, other states may also choose to adopt the California emission standards. At 
least for vehicles, this has led to a situation where a dual set of standards is in play in the US, the more 
stringent California emission standard versus the less stringent federal standard. 
The case of federal and state appliance standards differs but also demonstrates the influence of 
industry calls for uniform standards.  Some of the nation’s earliest appliance standards were first adopted 
in California in 1977, with Florida, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and other states also adopting 
these.67  Federal authority to set appliance efficiency standards became effective in 1987, thus their timing 
lagged about ten years behind that of California on household appliances. Once adopted, these were 
implemented uniformly across the US. In this case the California standards became the model for federal 
standards.  Federal authority to regulate buildings was debated but never approved by Congress, leaving 
states to fend for themselves and firmly establishing California as a leader in this area (Rosenfeld 1999). 
Where the law permits the possibility for a waiver, California may request and receive a waiver from 
the federal government to exceed federal standards and this may also occur for appliance standards. For 
example, Devra Wang noted a recent exchange concerning air conditioners: “California has a …very hot 
and dry climate [compared to] the rest of the country and so the types of air conditioners that are efficient 
here are not necessarily the same [as elsewhere].  So the metric that the federal standard uses does not 
necessarily denote high efficiency for California's climate.”  Thus from a technical standpoint it can and 
has been in some cases successfully argued that California should set its own energy efficiency appliance 
standards in certain instances.  
Another example where California differs from other parts of the US is in the area of water use and 
its interaction with energy.  Taking into account the extensive water storage and transport infrastructure in 
California, which moves massive amounts of water from the North to the South of the state, as well as 
heating  and  wastewater  treatment,  the  use  of  water  is  estimated  to  account  for  20%  of  the  state’s 
electricity use and 30% of its natural gas use (Cohen et al. 2004a). As a result there is growing interest to 
save water to save energy. Devra Wang reports: “There are a lot of potential synergies between the 
energy  and  water  efficiency  programs  and  there  are  huge  potential  savings  that  are  both  very 
cost-effective  from  an  energy  and  greenhouse  gas  perspective.    ...Water  is  an  extremely  valuable 
resource in California.” Accordingly the California Energy Commission is also beginning to establish water 
efficiency standards for household appliances, such as clothes washers, in part because of the embedded 
energy savings that can be achieved (Wang 2006i).  The federal government currently does not regulate 
water use of equipment or appliances, thus the area is open for state action. 
Although it had not used the terminology of “integrated resource planning,” the Warren-Alquist 
Act in California was path breaking in its call for just that.  Integrated resource planning requires 
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energy conservation and management to be considered alongside of energy supply investments 
and this was also to become federal policy, but only two decades later with the passage of the 
(federal) Energy Policy Act of 1992 (see Table 5.2).  
5.5.2.  Tapping into the supply curve of energy efficiency 
Another innovative idea embodied by the Warren-Alquist Act was to insert regulatory review into 
a previously un-trodden area for state oversight – that of electricity demand forecasts.  The reason 
to do this was to consider whether all proposed investments in new facilities were warranted, or 
alternatively, to test whether some might not better be avoided by investment in energy efficiency 
(Roe 1984). John White said: “One of the controversies at the time was how is the state going to 
permit and site all the new power facilities?  So the idea was that we should have a single permit 
at the state level - an one-stop shop as they came to call it -- where you would be able to get a 
state siting certification for new power plants.  At the time we were looking at nuclear plants and 
coal plants and gas plants.  All of them big scale, so the idea [was that] in exchange for siting 
authority, …the state needed to have a forecast of what the energy needs would be.”  
The CEC was given the authority to generate electricity demand forecasts.  In the words of David 
Roe (1984: 38), the purpose of this new reform was “to cure the overestimates of the utilities.” 
Embedded in an agency with little regulatory authority and without a history of public advocacy, 
some  environmental  advocates  questioned  whether  this  change  would  make  a  difference  to 
investment decisions of the utilities, even though it was one of the principal reforms brought 
about by the law (Roe 1984).  Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) was one of the environmental 
advocacy groups  to  participate in  California’s  regulatory processes  concerning  the  electricity 
sector in the 1970s. In their view, the real action was going to be on the financial issues through 
the regulatory proceedings of the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).  The CPUC 
had authority to set electricity tariffs or rates for electricity, based on their actual and planned 
investments, or costs of business to be recovered (Roe 1984; Dasovich et al. 1993).  
Tom Graff had helped to open the California office of EDF in 1971 (Graff 2006i).  He was also 
one of the lead lawyers in an initial series of regulatory proceedings that opened the way to ensure 
that energy efficiency was embedded in the investment plans of the electric utilities (Graff 2006i). 
In the mid-1970s, EDF collaborated with technical experts from Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 
(LBL), notably with Art Rosenfeld, to argue in rate cases before the CPUC that it would be 
possible to meet a given demand at remarkably lower cost.  They advanced the argument that 
required investment costs in new power generating facilities could be less than half of what utility Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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forecasts suggested.  These lower cost energy scenarios could be made possible by aggressive 
investment in energy efficiency and other alternatives.  
An initial breakthrough occurred in 1975 when the CPUC exerted its authority to review utility 
investment  plans  (Dasovich  et  al.  1993;  Graff  2006i).  Tom  Graff  remembers:  “…  it  was  a 
proceeding… a standard rate case where the question was: … ‘were PG&E’s expenditures’ you 
know, ‘appropriate’ so that they could be approved and then a greater return could be applied to 
that?  And we questioned their expenditures, and we were way the hell out.  I mean we were just 
trying stuff that was just way beyond and [PG&E lawyers] were objecting at every moment.  And 
Lenny Ross who had just been appointed by Jerry Brown as a [C]PUC commissioner a couple 
months earlier, in early 1975, took that proceeding and wrote… [he] added a page in which he 
said: ‘based on blahblahblahblah… from henceforth utilities projected investment plans should be 
up for [C]PUC review.’” This meant utility investment plans would be subject to scrutiny by a 
range of technically savvy environmental and consumer advocacy groups as well as by regulators. 
Tom Graff tells the story about how they initially accessed details of utility investments plans, 
which at this point were not in the public domain: “Zack Willie and I went over to PG&E’s 
document room and asked for the investment plans.  And somebody at PG&E… unbeknownst to 
us who it was, whether it was a mole or it was someone who was not knowing what he or she was 
doing or it was in fact someone saying: ‘well we were asked for this, here it is’… they gave us 
their investment plans, which were just stunningly outrageous.  I mean there was like Billions of 
dollars of investment in big new plants with no [justification]… Nobody had ever asked for this 
stuff  before.    So  we  just  went  in  there  and…  we  did  a  fishing  expedition  and  we  caught 
something. … It was interesting because … there was a footnote.  You know, why do they have a 
little footnote on one of those pages that said: ‘…and this assumes rate increases every year for 
the next 20 years?’ ” 
68 
The 1975 CPUC decision is considered to have been a turning point in California policy, where 
utility  investment  decisions  became  routinely  scrutinized  through  open,  deliberative  CPUC 
regulatory proceedings (Dasovich et al. 1993; Graff 2006i; Roe 1984).  Dasovich et al. (2003: 47) 
report that it was in this (September 19975) decision that the CPUC first articulated its position on 
energy conservation, in stating: 
"We  regard  conservation  [as]  the  most  important  task  facing  utilities  today. 
Continued growth of energy consumption at the rates we have known in the past 
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would  mean  even  higher  rates  for  customers,  multi-Billion  dollar  capital 
requirements  for  utilities,  and  unchecked  proliferation  of  power  plants.  Energy 
growth of these proportions is simply not sustainable. Reducing energy growth in 
an orderly, intelligent manner is the only long-term solution to the energy crisis.”
69 
Institutional capacity thus developed on several fronts to question the authority and assumptions 
of utilities as they developed investment plans and, eventually, to re-direct these plans towards 
lowest cost, energy efficiency strategies. 
Working alongside of the environmental advocacy community, LBL was a central driving force 
(see also Box 5.1). As Ralph Cavanagh, Energy Program Co-Director of the Natural Resources 
Defence  Council,  said:  “…[it was]  the  place  that  probably  mattered  the  most  in  terms  of 
actually doing the groundwork, laying the groundwork for that.  Some of it was also done in 
the environmental community at places like NRDC, but LBL under Rosenfeld is going to 
figure very prominently in any history of that period”. The critical players were of course the 
utilities, but also the environmental advocacy community including EDF but also NRDC and 
others, and the regulatory institutions of the state (CPUC and CEC).  
At the core of the peripheral non-governmental activity however, there was a small but growing 
epistemic network centring on the Rosenfeld group on Energy Efficient Buildings at LBL.  In 
1973,  the  same  year  as  the  passage  of  the  Warren-Alquist  Act,  University  of  California  at 
Berkeley established one of the nation’s first interdisciplinary graduate programmes on energy, 
known as the Energy and Resources Group (ERG) (ERG 2008). This university based research 
group extended the network of policy-relevant scholarly work, which would, over time, support 
decision-making in California. 
In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, EDF actively participated in the CPUC regulatory arena, 
focusing its expert interventions not on the level of forecasted demand, but on cost of supply.  
They modelled alternatives for supplying electricity, for a given increase in demand, agreeing 
with the utilities that there would be growing demand for electricity in California (Roe 1984). 
EDF’s efforts led to landmark victories in 1980 and 1981 in which two of California largest utility 
companies – PG&E and SCE – shelved plans to build new power facilities (coal and nuclear) and 
invested  instead  in  a  range  of  alternatives  (Emshwiller  1981;  Jones  1986).  John  White 
underscored this history and the force of the voice of environmental advocacy organisations, such 
as EDF and NRDC, in shaping of energy efficiency policy of the state:  “…[they] have continued 
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to really articulate that vision and that’s part of what the energy efficiency programs are based on.  
The legacy is still from those rate cases, of creating incentives, getting the utilities some money to 
try to get them to do the right thing.” 
5.5.3   Rethinking electricity supply 
Although nuclear power and the oil crisis was the initial concern that opened up the debate across 
the United States the mid- to late-1970s, the innovate regulatory approach taken by the CPUC and 
other regulatory authorities in the US -- to subject utility investment plans to public scrutiny -- had 
broad implications for the electricity supply industry generally (Dasovich et al. 1993). John White 
summarised: “And there became an ethos that the state should make conservation at least part of 
the consideration when deciding how many new plants to allow you to build.”  The results were 
striking; as Art Rosenfeld (1999) pointed out: “it is improved efficiency that has been the largest 
single generator of new electric services for California’s growing economy.”   Interestingly, the 
CPUC still monitors its achievements in reducing energy demand in terms of avoided power 
plants (see section 5.7 below). 
By the late 1970s, Federal laws were establishing national policies to limit the vulnerability of the 
nation to foreign oil supply shortages and price hikes.  Two different national laws converged 
with the state laws in California to shift incentives to favour investment and grow markets for 
alternative fuels and energy efficiency.  First was the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, of 
1975, which led eventually to national energy efficiency standards for vehicles (USC 1975) (see 
Table 5.2).  A second wave of legislation was shuttled in by the Carter administration in the late 
1970s and focused on energy alternatives, including the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 
1978 (PURPA; USC 1978). Finally in 1986, US Congress passed the Energy Appliance Energy 
Conservation Act, which mandates federal energy efficiency standards for common appliances 
(e.g. refrigerator, air conditioners and natural gas furnaces) (Nadel 2002).  As shown in Figure 
5.6,  the  combined  impact  of  state  and  federal  standards  on  average  energy  efficiency  of 
appliances was striking, leading to significant savings in energy, reductions in air pollution and in 
GHG (CEC 2005a; see also Chang 2006; Berstein et al. 2000; Rosenfeld 2008 and Sanstad et al. 
2006).  
The  PURPA  effectively  ended the  monopoly that  electric utilities  exercised  over  supply  and 
forced them to buy power from third-party power producers at their “avoided cost.” In California, 
the  CPUC  interpreted  avoided  costs  to  be  the  marginal  cost  of  new  power  additions  for 
investor-owned utilities, a cost that was based on what could be built economically at the margin 
at large-scale (e.g. natural gas).  Thus a relatively high price was guaranteed for third-party power Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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producers, which in turn stimulated significant new investment in alternative power sources, such 
as co-generation and wind, in California.  The US Energy Policy Act of 1992 further opened the 
electricity market (see Table 5.2).  
These shifts in federal and state legislation changed energy policy of the nation and in California 
to favour clean energy alternatives, including energy efficiency among supply options.  It also 
began the change in structure of the industry, a preview of what would be even greater change in 
the future.  In particular it marked the beginning of the power sector’s transition from large-scale 
to small-scale, modular power generating facilities along side of investment in energy efficiency, 
a change that was driven by both changes in regulatory regimes as well as in technology.   
In the past, the large scale of technology had led utilities to build and to own their own facilities.  
By the early 1990s, there had been significant improvements in natural gas turbine technology, 
building  on  military  research  for  aircraft gas  turbines,  that permitted  modular, on-site  power 
generation and co-generation (production of heat and power simultaneously) (Wald 1990; White 
2006i). This led to a different scale of investment activity to adapt power investments to smaller 
increments of demand, and a different ownership structure in the power sector.  As John White 
said: “…the need for the monopoly was diminished in part because the financing of the projects 
was less burdensome.  If you were building a 1500 megawatt coal or nuclear plant then you had 
all those [risks of] cost overruns”.    
In the heyday of nuclear power construction, cost overruns could and did occur in California and 
elsewhere (Dasovich et al. 2003). For example, in the case of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Facility, 
which was built by PG&E in the 1970s, the facility was several Billion dollars over-budget when 
finally completed in 1979, in part due to unanticipated engineering challenges.70  However in the 
new world of small-scale, modular natural gas or other alternative (e.g. co-generating) energy 
facilities, the financial requirements and risk profile of the sector had significantly shifted. This 
shift made investments in large-scale nuclear (or coal) facilities increasingly less profitable and 
less competitive in the new market context. 
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Figure 5.6: Impact of Standards on Three Appliances 1977 to 2001 
Source: Nadel 2003 (as cited in Rosenfeld 2008) and Nadel 2002  
 
The changes in market and technical structure of the power industry eventually opened the way to 
partial  deregulation  of the  U.S.  market.    An  important  feature  of this  new  market  structure, 
inspired in part by federal regulations, was the growing presence of independent power producers.  
However this market development was linked to technology change which meant that there was 
more system flexibility in building smaller modular units for power production, units which had 
shorter  lead  time  for  investors  and  less  regulatory  uncertainty.    In  turn  these  developments 
fostered the idea of deregulation, where, as John White put it: “…the utility wasn't the only 
builder and not even the optimum builder.”  
The theory behind the deregulatory effort sweeping the US in the late 1980s was that electricity 
markets  would be like  the other  deregulated  monopolies e.g. telecom  and  natural  gas,  where 
markets had been successful deregulation starting.  Yet John White pointed out: “It turned out to 
be different…electricity is a much different commodity to deregulate: unlike natural gas you can't 
store it, so you have to make it in real-time and use it in real-time.  Also the capital requirements 
of the industry are significant, even with decentralized technology.  And then we have market 
manipulation… and Enron… and a bunch of things that happened… so then we ended up with 
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5.5.4  Energy industry deregulation (1998) and the electricity crisis (2000-2001) 
In the late 1990s, many states acted to deregulate their electric power industry. In California, 
legislation known as the Electric Industry Deregulation Law was signed in 1996 and became 
effective in 1998.
71 The aim of the legislation was to liberalise the power market in California and 
restructure the industry such that it was divested of its largest capital assets and leave the selling 
and the purchase of power to the new “competitive” market.  However the law also reorganised 
the way that environmental policy was to interface with the energy market and private sector 
players.  By March 1998, the California market was open to competition under the new rules set 
out by the CPUC (USDOE 2003).   
Prior to deregulation, three vertically integrated investor-owned utilities dominated the market, 
each with their own power generation, transmission and distribution facilities.  The companies 
remain today the principal players in the California market: Pacific, Gas and Electric; southern 
California Edison; and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E). In the restructured market, the 
companies were allowed to sell off most of their major capital investments, with the exception of 
nuclear and hydropower capacity. They thus became “load-serving entities” (LSEs), which shifted 
both the structure of the companies and their management objectives. John White recalled: “…in 
their mind they weren't going to be in the procurement business [i.e. procuring electricity].  They 
were  going  to  be  in  a  poles  and  wires  business  with  the  captive  distribution  customers 
…everybody originally envisioned that the procurement would be done by individual customers 
and suppliers in an open market that would be liquid and deep ….it never showed up.”  
The market operated under the emerging set of rules without major disruptions until the summer 
of 2000.  At this time, California’s electricity market experienced a “tight” supply market due to a 
dry  summer,  high  demand  (though  not  at  historically  peak  levels)  and  low  availability  of 
hydropower in the region. A number of conditions in the newly deregulated market for power led 
to dramatic hikes in the cost of purchased power and eventually shortages – electricity blackouts – 
in California.  This electricity crisis, which began summer 2000 and lasted through the winter of 
2001, raised alarm throughout the West, and indeed the US, about the future of deregulation in the 
power sector (Peace 2000; USDOE 2003; Wolak 2003).  
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Box 5.3: Public Goods Charge Established in the Electricity Sector 
In a prescient manner, the law that deregulated the electricity sector in California also established a 
visionary charge, which aimed to provide “public good” benefits that would not otherwise derive from the 
market (CA-Code 1996).  It established a non-bypassable public goods charge on electricity sales and a 
mechanism to dedicate revenues from this charge to four key purposes: energy efficiency; renewable 
energy; research and development; and low-income assistance. The basic tenets of the law remain in 
place today. It is a small surcharge on electricity (3.5 to 4.7 mills/kwh) collected by investor owned utilities 
(IOUs).  Although  the  exact  amount  varies  by  year,  it  funds  several  hundred  million  USD  for  energy 
efficiency  per  year,  and  about  half  this  amount  for  renewable  energy,  as  well  as    $62.5 million  for 
research, development and demonstration programmes (2002-2011) (CA-Code 2006d).72 The CEC and 
the CPUC work together to disburse this funding.  
With  respect  to  the  funds  for  energy  efficiency,  these  are  returned  to  IOUs  to  implement 
programmes  and  goals  mandated  by  the  CPUC  (CEC  2005a;  see  Figure  5.7  below).  The  strong 
environmental and economic performance of this investment in energy efficiency is well documented (CEC 
2005; Chang 2006; Berstein et al. 2000 and Roland-Holst 2008).  
The research funds are administered by the CEC to support the Public Interest Energy Research 
(PIER) programme.
73 The mission of PIER, as originally set out in 1997, gives a prominent place to 
environmental objectives (CEC 1997): “…to conduct public interest energy research that seeks to improve 
the quality of life for California citizens by providing environmentally sound, safe, reliable and affordable 
energy  services  and  products.  Public  Interest  Energy  Research  includes  the  full  range  of  research, 
development,  and  demonstration  activities  that  will  advance  science  or  technology  not  adequately 
provided by competitive and regulated markets.”  PIER has six different programme areas and while most 
of the funding goes to energy efficiency or renewable energy technology (or technical process) research, 
demonstration and development, since 1999, the programme has supported climate change science and 
policy research. Funding for this activity began at about $2 million and now fluctuates at about $5 to 
$6 million per year.
74  There are two main lines of the climate research programme:  regional climate 
change monitoring and modelling and economics of mitigation and adaptation policies (CEC 2003a).  A 
recent independent review of the PIER programme confirmed its role in keeping California in the forefront 
of energy and environmental RD&D and noted the unique role of PIER to conduct research in the area 
that is specific to the California context (CCST 2005; see also Chapter 8). 
The  electricity  crisis  was  also a  financial  crisis  for  the  State of  California  and  its  electricity 
companies.  By early 2001, one of the three large utilities had filed for bankruptcy (PG&E), 
another was close to bankruptcy (SC&E) and the new power exchange (PX) entity, which had 
been created to mediate the sales of power from wholesale to the retail companies, also declared 
bankruptcy (Wolak 2003).    All had suffered under state rules that had capped retail prices of 
electricity, while wholesale power prices had risen astronomically. John White said:  “… the 
irony was we thought we were freezing rates to keep them from falling so we froze the rates in 
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order to guarantee the utilities the revenue to pay off their stranded cost. …Nobody imagined that 
the rates would need to go up. … The question was how far will they fall and could we freeze 
them so the utilities could pay off their debts.  We froze them and then the generators figured out 
how to game the market and raise prices.  We got a shortage, we had a hot summer, we had a 
natural gas shortage….  Suddenly the wholesale market is above what the rates were.” 
Expectations, fed by economic analysis, were for electricity prices to decline due to increased 
competition in a deregulated market. Thus the intention of the state pricing mechanism was to 
protect the companies from falling prices.  In the end, this problem never arose and the intended 
solution  had  become  the  source  of  a  different,  unanticipated  problem  that  would  lead  to 
insolvency in the retail business. 
Analysts of the electricity crisis point to a number of critical factors that led to these market 
conditions  and the  failure  of the  deregulated  market to  deliver  low  cost power to  California 
consumers (O'Donnell 2002; Wolak 2003).  Largely divested of power generating facilities, the 
LSEs (i.e. the utility companies) were focused on retail operations, including the purchase of 
power to supply retail customers. An important strategic error of the LSEs was failure to forward 
contract for an important share of their retail area power needs.
75 Instead, over-dependence on the 
newly established spot market for power, with lower import availability in 2000, combined to 
make the California retail market particularly vulnerable to a limited number of wholesale energy 
companies wielding an increasing amount of market power.  
Acting more rapidly and comprehensively than many other states in the U.S., California embraced 
the notion that  a liberalised  power  market  could  benefit  consumers  and  companies  alike.  In 
retrospect, some analysts argue that the attempt at deregulation did not address the right type of 
details. For example, important issues were the respective roles of federal versus state regulatory 
authorities to intervene in the case of market power, or other extreme situations, on the use of spot 
markets as opposed to a more reasoned approach to the use of spot markets as part of a mix of 
instruments  that  also  includes  long-term  contracts  for  power  to  fulfil  demand  (Wolak  2003; 
O’Donnell 2002). These and other conditions and oversight arrangements in California led to 
market manipulation that resulted in prices that were 10 to 12 times higher than wholesale energy 
price increases in the rest of the western U.S. in this period (Peace 2000; Wolak 2003).  
                                                         
75 One could also have expected a requirement for this type of contracting to have been laid out in the 
restructuring law or the CPUC rules on how to implement that law, as was done in other states.  See 
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Most observers agree that a main reason for price hikes and power shortages in California was 
failure  in  regulatory  oversight  at  the  federal  level,  operating  through  the  Federal  Energy 
Regulatory  Commission  (FERC).  The  FERC  has  the  authority  to  oversee  wholesale  power 
markets, among other inter-state energy transactions, and had led the way towards deregulation 
across the US (Wolak 2003; Peace 2000).  It is responsible for ensuring “just and reasonable” 
pricing in this wholesale market. One of its main functions is to prevent companies from exerting 
market power that would keep prices of power unnecessarily high and limit the consumer benefits 
of competitive, deregulated market.  Operating in this new market, the FERC has much greater 
influence than it did previously over how the market develops and operates. The early years of 
deregulated  power  markets  revealed  how  unprepared  the  FERC  had  been  for  some  of  the 
developments that occurred (Wolak 2003). 
Wolak  (2003)  joins  others  (e.g. O’Donnell  2002)  to  argue that  the  FERC  was  dysfunctional 
during  the  California  crisis.    The  state  senator  responsible  for  the  original  legislation  that 
deregulated the industry in California, Steve Peace (2000), wrote to the Chairman of the FERC in 
2000:  “At its core, the Commission’s responsibility is to assure that wholesale rates are just and 
reasonable.  FERC – without explicit Congressional approval – chose to turn to the market in an 
effort to meet that mandate.  When it did so, the Commission assumed the responsibility to assure 
that people did not profit by manipulating either the market rules or the market itself.  In this case, 
parties have clearly done both. And, they are easy to find.  They are the ones with the money.  
Your job is to make sure they don’t get to keep it.”  Eventually FERC acted to require rebates of 
the companies that had unfairly profited from the situation in California.  However significant 
damage had been done to the hopes and expectations of Californians about what such deregulated 
markets could deliver. 
California’s attempt to deregulate the power industry in the U.S. is widely viewed by experts and 
the  public  alike  as  a  failure.  While  it  is  outside  of  the  scope  of  this  research  to  assess  the 
conditions  of  failed  deregulation  in  the  power  sector,  it  is  important  to  note  here  that  the 
electricity crisis of 2000-01 looms large in the minds of elite policy actors and of the citizens of 
the state.  There remains a fundamental worry about the role of the market in the power sector, 
which is undeniably linked to this recent experience.  In turn this explains at least in part the 
strength of regulatory institutions and of the regulatory culture in the energy sector that exists 
today in California. 
Many of the existing institutional mechanisms for environment and energy policy in California 
were reshaped during this restructuring period.  A main outcome of the crisis was a pulling away 
from  deregulation  in  this  sector,  which  in  turn  altered  once  again  the  opportunities  and Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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mechanisms that could be used to address environmental concerns of the energy sector.  After an 
interim period of crisis management (roughly from 2001 to 2002), the state legislature eventually 
passed legislation re-instating some of the key features of the previous, regulated market.  This 
included putting the electric utilities back in charge of long-term power procurement under the 
regulatory eye of the CPUC (CA-Code 2006a). This regulatory authority is currently one of the 
key policy levers for early action on climate change in the power sector of California.  
5.6.  Learning from the electricity crisis 
Following  the  2000-2001  electricity  crisis,  California’s  Energy  Commission  (CEC)  and  the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) strengthened collaboration to lead the design and 
implementation  of  the  State’s  energy  policy  in  an  environmentally  and  economically  sound 
manner.    Increasingly  climate  change  has  figured  among  the  priority  objectives  of  the  two 
agencies in executing their regulatory authority.  
The failure of electricity deregulation provided an important window of opportunity for energy 
and environmental policy. As Devra Wang explained:  “California pioneered these policies in the 
early 80s, got rid of them when they moved to restructuring. …What the state tried to do before 
the crisis …was just leave everything up to the market – ‘we'll buy everything on a short-term 
basis.’  [In that case] no one is looking ahead and making those long-term investments.”  
Working quickly to respond to the electricity crisis of 2000-2001, California lawmakers passed 
legislation in 2001 and 2002 (CA-Code 2001a; CA-Code 2002b) to re-establish an aggressive 
policy  framework  for  energy  efficiency  in  the  power  sector  (Bachrach  et al.  2003).    This 
framework includes broad electric power procurement authority for the electric utilities to oversee 
resource procurement to serve their customers, including investment not just in supply but also in 
demand  side  resources  (e.g. through  energy  efficiency  investments).    The  2002  legislation 
explicitly  instructed  utilities  to  exploit  “all  practicable  and  cost  effective”  conservation  and 
efficiency improvements (Bachrach 2003). Another law passed in 2001 (CA-Code 2001a) and 
directed the CPUC to establish a “decoupling” policy separating the level of allowable electricity 
rates from the level of capital investments undertaken by the utility (Bachrach 2003; Bachrach 
et al. 2004).  Devra Wang explains that the establishment of the logic to “decouple” the allowable 
rate  to  be  charged  for  electricity  and  the  investment  in  new  power  generation  changed  the 
financial calculus for the utilities.  She said: “…they [the utilities] were no longer hurt financially 
by selling less or encouraging energy efficiency and they could no longer profit by trying to sell 
more.  So that removed one of the key barriers to energy efficiency.” She notes the strength of this Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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framework is:  “…putting the utilities back in charge of making the long-term investments and 
looking at the integrated portfolio, including both energy efficiency and other resources...”.   
5.6.1.  CEC and CPUC collaboration 2002 - 2005  
In a later development, the role of the CEC was strengthened following the electricity crisis with 
the passage of new legislation in 2002 (SB 1389) (CA-Code 2002). This legislation required the 
CEC to "conduct assessments and forecasts of all aspects of energy industry supply, production, 
transportation, delivery and distribution, demand, and prices.” The law further stipulated that: 
“The Energy Commission shall use these assessments and forecasts to develop energy policies 
that conserve resources, protect the environment, ensure energy reliability, enhance the state's 
economy, and protect public health and safety."  Also at this time, California’s principal energy 
agencies  -- the CPUC and the CEC -- collaborated to develop the state’s Energy Action Plan, first 
in 2003 and updated in 2005 (California 2003; California 2005e).  
The Energy Action Plan (EAP) aims to deliver reliable, affordable and environmentally sound 
energy  to  Californians,  including  the  recognition  of  climate  change  as  a  central  part  of  the 
challenge.  CPUC President Michael Peevey said in the press release for the first report: "The 
Energy Action Plan is a very progressive program for California. It recognizes the severe threat 
global warming presents and adopts an environmentally sensitive, green agenda. The agenda 
emphasizes reducing per capita electrical use and relying on renewable energy sources such as 
solar, wind, and biomass, along with greater emphasis on energy efficiency programs to meet 
California's future energy needs" (CPUC 2003). According to Devra Wang: “the Energy Action 
Plan …said that ‘energy efficiency is top priority.’” Thus from the start in the post-restructuring 
period, California’s elite energy policymakers flagged climate change as a key policy issue and 
aimed to set out energy policies to address it with a notable emphasis on energy efficiency. 
Beyond strengthening energy efficiency (and renewable energy) policies, the CEC and the CPUC 
have  more  recently  begun  to  work  through the  Energy  Action  Plan to champion policies to 
directly mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.  Practical implementation of these policies occurs 
through regulatory decisions of the CPUC in power sector and more recently through the CEC for 
the municipal power sector (see Chapter 4).  
5.7.  CPUC leadership: power sector greenhouse gas policies 2004-2007 
Beyond the general policy guidance issued by the CEC and the CPUC (California 2003 and 
2005),  and  the  regulatory  authority  of  the  CEC  to  issue  and  uphold  appliance  and  building Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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standards, the CPUC has regulatory authority over the investor-owned power companies, which 
can affect GHG performance across the state.  The CEC supports the CPUC as it is responsible 
for working with utilities to gather data and monitors the performance of these utility investments 
in energy efficiency, load management and renewable energy.  In this way, the CEC provides 
critical input to the CPUC to support the evaluation and adjustment of regulatory policy over 
time.  
The  remainder  of  this  section  focuses on  CPUC  efforts to  integrate  climate  policies  into its 
regulatory action.  Three climate change related decisions of the CPUC in the power sector are 
highlighted here as examples of this broad regulatory authority:  1) the loading order requirement; 
2) the establishment of a GHG adder; 3) the GHG performance standard for base load power 
(Bachrach 2003; Wang 2006i). All of these work in the same direction and they largely pre-date 
the current Schwarzenegger administration’s high-profile climate change initiative. Rather than 
bold, ambitious and long-term, these policies are practical, clear first steps to address climate 
change in one important sector.  They do not require new legislative authority but work through 
existing regulatory authority to send a clear set of signals to all players operating in the California 
market for power. 
5.7.1.  Loading order – energy efficiency and renewables first  
As noted above, the 2003 Energy Action Plan established both a loading order preference for 
utility procurement planning and accelerates the renewable portfolio standard previously set by 
state law. Also the Energy Commission’s 2003 Integrated Energy Policy Report used the loading 
order as the foundation for its recommended energy policies and decisions (CEC 2003b). The 
loading order policy states a preference for, first, investment in energy efficiency and demand 
management,  as  far  as  possible  to  avoid  the  need  for  new  generation.  Second,  where  new 
generation is needed, it prioritises renewable energy and distributed generation. This is to be 
followed by clean, fossil fuel, centralised generation (California 2003; CEC 2003b; CEC 2005a). 
Devra  Wang,  of  NRDC,  points  to  the  importance  of  these  rules  for  energy  efficiency  in 
California:  “…we've  basically  laid  the  whole  policy  foundation  in  California,  for  a  very 
aggressive, energy efficiency effort. …In January of this year [2006] the investor in utilities and 
the state launched the most aggressive energy efficiency program in history.”  
In the pursuit of this loading order preference policy, in 2005 the CPUC set out aggressive targets 
for energy efficiency requiring investor-owned utilities to invest in energy efficiency whenever it 
is cheaper than adding new resources and directing the investor-owned utilities to invest roughly 
$2 Billion in energy efficiency over the over the period 2006-2008 (CEC 2005a; Chang 2006a; Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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CPUC 2005a; CPUC 2005c; CPUC 2005d). The programme is estimated to avoid investment 
costs from power generation, transmission and distribution of more than $5 Billion, and to yield 
significant net savings to consumers of about $2.7 Billion over the lifetime of the investments 
(CPUC 2005a).  This series of decisions succeeds earlier decisions that set out more modest 
investment requirements in energy efficiency (CPUC 2004a; CPUC 2004c) (see also Figure 5.7). 
Thus the  CPUC  began  requiring investor-owned  utilities to take  responsibility  for integrated 
energy portfolio management to bring demand side resources together with supply side resources 
to find the least-cost portfolio of investments across both types of resources.  Devra Wang noted: 
“…what we had seen for a number of years after the public goods charge was created -- it was 
viewed as a limit on the amount that could be invested in energy efficiency.  But of course we 
weren't getting all the cost-effective savings with it.  The [C]PUC adopted a number of policies 
that directed them to go beyond that.” As investment for energy efficiency continues to rise, an 
increasingly small share of this investment in financed by revenues from the public goods charge 
with the difference coming from utilities’ own investment (CPUC 2005a). 
Combined, utility investment programmes and efficiency standards have helped to lock in the 
savings and limit energy use and emissions per capita in California (Wang 2006i; Chang 2006a; 
see Figures 4.4 and 4.5).   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Figure 5.7: Investor Owned Utility Investment in Energy Efficiency, California 1976-2012 (actual & 
forecast) 
 
Source: Rosenfeld 2008b 
Figure 5.8: Energy Efficiency Savings in the Electricity Sector, California: 1975-2003 
 
Appliance 
Standards
Building Standards
Utility Efficiency 
Programs
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
G
W
h
/
y
e
a
r
~ 15% of 
Annual 
Electricity 
Use in 
California 
in 2003
   
Source:  CEC 2005a / Chang 2006b. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  144 
As shown in Figure 5.8, the estimated energy efficiency savings in California are estimated to be 
about 15% of annual electricity use in California. A recent CPUC (2006e) report summarises 
results from three decades of investment in energy efficiency:  
“These  efforts  are  now  annually  saving  more  than  40,000  gigawatt-hours 
(GWh) of electricity and 12,000 megawatts (MW) of peak demand — avoiding 
the need to build 24 large (i.e., 500 MW) power plants, and equal to the annual 
power needs of more than 5 million California homes.”   
In  an  economic  analysis,  Bernstein  et  al  (2000)  estimate  the  net  benefits  of  California’s 
investment in energy efficiency to be equivalent to about 3% of Gross State Product in 1995 (see 
Chapter 8). 
5.7.2.  GHG adder or the financial risk policy 
A second climate change policy implemented by the CPUC with respect to regulated electric 
utilities is to require them to consider the risk of GHG regulatory costs when considering new 
resource investments (CPUC 2005b). This policy takes into account that within normal resource 
planning procedures, utilities forecast costs to consider the life cycle costs of their investments 
(Bokenkamp  et al.  2005).   This  cost  was  first  recognised in  the  Energy  Commission’s  2003 
Integrated  Energy  Policy  Report,  which  stated:  “the  state  should…account  for  the  cost  of 
greenhouse gas emission reductions in utility resource procurement decisions” (CEC 2003b).  In 
April 2005, a CPUC decision established the value of the “adder” for use in procurement planning 
(of  regulated  utilities)  (CPUC  2005b).  The term  “adder”  refers to  an  additional  cost of  CO2 
emissions  to  be  considered  when  evaluating  the  cost  of  power  (cents  per  kilowatt-hour) 
performance  of  power  generation  alternatives  (i.e. natural  gas  versus  coal-fired  combustion 
options).  This adder thus increases the estimated cost of power and thus creates a financial 
penalty for carbon-intensive options compared to less carbon-intensive options. 
76  
The adder was set initially to $8 per tonne of CO2 and it is to escalate by 5% for each following 
year. The effect of such an adder in the California regulatory context will play out differently 
depending  upon  the  type  of  fuel  powering  electricity  production.  It  will  only  apply  to 
investor-owned utilities – i.e. those that are regulated by the CPUC.  For a conventional coal-fired 
power plant, NRDC estimates that this policy adds $8 per MWh more to the cost of power for 
                                                         
76 The GHG adder is not actually a charge or a tax on operations but it is a planning tool for evaluation 
and comparison of cost-effectiveness across alternative investment options.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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such a facility whereas for a gas-fired power plant it would be $4 per MWh more expensive 
(Wang 2006i).  This is because it is necessary to pay for the cost of carbon emissions by taking 
the “adder” into account. Devra Wang explains:  “So it’s a small adjustment but it will help level 
the playing field there to recognize that there are going to be these costs that aren't currently 
factored into the price, but that you are going to have to bear and therefore need to be taken into 
account  when  making  your  investment  decision.”  The  GHG  adder  helps  to  guide  utility 
investment  towards  lower  emitting  sources  by  factoring  in  the  cost  of  carbon  into  financial 
assessment of the facility before it is built. 
Over time, it is likely that the GHG adder will become redundant.  Devra Wang explained: “In 
some ways it’s a stepping-stone to these other policies. …[It] is something that's needed in the 
interim before there's a cap on emissions.” It recognizes there will be a cap or some type of policy 
on emissions and that there is a value to those emissions that needs to be recognized today, as 
Devra notes: “…once there is a cap or something else in place that actually puts some type of 
value on those emissions you would be automatically forecasting for those costs.”  
5.7.3.  GHG standard for baseload power  
A third strand of CPUC policy is the most radical to emerge to date in California.  This is a cap on 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  baseload  power  –  initially  to  be  implemented  through  a 
performance standard -- to be applied to all baseload delivered power in the state.  The CPUC first 
initiated  a  rulemaking  proceeding  in  2004  and  consultations  with  stakeholders  about  such  a 
standard  early  in  2005  (CPUC  2004b;  CPUC  2005e).  In  2005,  the  CPUC  issued  a  policy 
statement (CPUC 2005f) outlining the broad lines of its policy.  This administrative decision was 
taken as a means to implement the broad climate protection goals that had been set out in the 
Energy Action Plan of 2003, which is a collaborative policy statement between the CEC and the 
CPUC (California 2003). The CPUC 2005 decision directed staff to develop an investor-owned 
utility greenhouse gas performance standard “that is no higher than the greenhouse gas emission 
levels of a combined-cycle natural gas turbine” for all procurement contracts longer than three 
years (CPUC 2005f). In the case of coal-fired generation, such a standard implies capture and 
storage of carbon dioxide. 
By 2005, these actions – both the Governor’s Executive Order and the CPUC and CEC policies – 
had combined to send strong signals to the business community in California that greenhouse 
gases were increasingly regulated in a comprehensive manner.  The Governor’s action further Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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empowered the CPUC to continue down the regulatory pathway that it had begun a few years 
earlier.
77 
In January 2007, the CPUC modified its original 2006 CPUC decision to make it an interim 
emissions performance standard for baseload power generation.  (CPUC 2006b; CPUC 2007). 
The ruling describes this as “a minimum performance requirement for any long-term financial 
commitment  for  baseload  generation  that  will  be  supplying  power  to  California  ratepayers” 
(CPUC 2007). Since much of the baseload power in California is procured from outside of the 
state, this ruling therefore reaches beyond state boundaries to improve emissions performance. In 
recognition  of  the  emerging  policy  framework  for  regulation  of  GHG  emissions  across  all 
economic activities in the state, the ruling also states that the (CPUC 2007):  
“…emissions performance standard or “EPS” is intended to serve as a near-term 
bridge until an enforceable GHG emissions limit applicable to LSEs is established 
and in operation.”  
The latter is a reference to the expectation that a sector wide, or broader, cap on power emissions 
will emerge under the Global Warming Solutions Act (CA-Code 2006a) through the California 
Air Resources Board as it coordinates state-wide emission reductions. Interestingly the Perata 
Law also requires a GHG emission standard to be established by the CEC for municipal utilities 
(i.e. in addition to the investor owned utilities that are regulated by the CPUC).  
When asked about the origin of the policy to promote a GHG standard in the power sector, 
Commissioner Boyd of the CEC recalled that the idea first surfaced in the stakeholder process 
soliciting input on the first Integrated Energy Policy Report, which was published in 2003 (Boyd 
2006i) (CEC 2003b). Attention to the issue grew and in the second report, in 2005, it was flagged 
directly  (CEC  2005b).    In  the  same  year,  non-governmental  environmental  advocacy 
organisations collaborated to prepare a timely report outlining the need for policy in this area: 
“Clearing California’s Coal Shadow from the American West” (Milford et al. 2005).  Its title 
alone alludes to the need for a policy response to limit the “hidden” out of state emissions from 
power supplied to California from across the border to satisfy its rapidly-growing thirst for power.   
                                                         
77 In the Energy Action Plan of 2003, the CEC and CPUC committed to ensure that energy supplies in the 
state limit climate change impacts (California 2003) and, more recently, they committed to be consistent 
with the Governor’s climate change goals (California 2005e). The CEC, in its 2005 Integrated Energy 
Report, also specifically committed to working with the CPUC to implement the GHG standard through 
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Nancy  Ryan,  who  was  CPUC  President  Peevey’s  special  assistant  in  2006,  spoke  about  the 
decision  to  cap  baseload  power  emissions  and  the  role  of  non-governmental  environmental 
advocates in promoting the idea. In a previous position with Environmental Defense, she was one 
of the authors of the “coal shadows” report (Milford et al. 2005). She commented on its origins: 
“I think it was two strands that came together that really reflected the geographic scope of the 
group of people that worked on that report.  One was from the folks in Colorado looking around 
them and seeing this huge number of new coal plants proposed, in their state and surrounding 
states.  Frequently there would be public statements by the developers that they anticipated selling 
into California, and that they see California as the big growth engine in the West, and so the 
perception that these plants would be built with California as the “anchor tenants,” borrowing the 
language of shopping malls.  Then the other piece of it was that California has this ‘activist’ 
commission here [i.e. the CPUC], the Governor’s process underway, and just this perception that 
we’re on the cusp of doing this long term procurement for utilities in this state.  And the question 
is what’s the baseload recourse going to be? Are we going to go with liquefied natural gas, or are 
we going to go with coal?  And how much renewable [energy] and energy efficiency can we 
really get? So a lot of issues teed up in California, giving this perception that you could write a 
report that would be relevant, that would be addressing an issue that’s important to decision 
makers in California right now. It’s informing them on a piece of the puzzle.”  
A legitimate question is why choose to regulate this one piece of the larger GHG footprint that 
belongs to California.  Nancy Ryan pointed out that this part of the footprint is particularly 
significant.  She said:  “It’s often overlooked. I find when I talk to people in California …they’re 
totally surprised to find out how much coal-fired power California gets --- and appalled in many 
instances.  Not always, but often.  So, I guess that would be a third piece of what that report was 
intended to do.  It was to just make people aware that this is going on, that the state’s spending all 
this money, taking steps to address global warming and yet, there’s this big back door leakage 
that, if the state doesn’t do something about it, is going to completely vitiate the actions being 
taken in the State.”  
Another  of  the  report’s  authors,  John  White,  highlighted  the  context  and  regional  scope  of 
influence for the GHG cap.  He said:  “If we’re gong to be the ones whose money builds the next 
generation of coal plants, we have a right to say how that money is spent.  That’s a revolutionary 
idea, but very consistent for us.” 
A recent ex ante economic analysis suggests that the standard compares favourably to alternative 
GHG policies; it arguing that a performance standard will out perform alternatives (i.e. a scaled-Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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up adder or accelerated Renewable 
Portfolio Standards), both in terms 
of quantity of reductions achieved 
and  cost-effectiveness  (Kamins 
2006).  
Yet the broad reach of this policy 
to tackle the carbon “embedded” in 
the  power  consumed  by 
Californians, begs the question of 
consistency  with  other  climate 
policies.  As  Pierre  duVair  (CEC) 
said of his discussions with electric 
utility representatives, the question 
arises: “Why do we just look at one 
imported  good?  Why  just 
electricity.  And  coming  from  an 
electricity  company  you  can 
understand the point of view – well 
wait a minute – we import a lot of 
things that have an upstream GHG footprint.  And I just [say]… ‘Well it’s a big source; it’s an 
easily  identifiable  point  source.  You  need  to  start  somewhere.  We  may  as  well  start  with 
electricity.’  But  it’s  a  legitimate  question,  if  California  is  concerned  about  GHG  emissions 
associated with consumption of goods and services, why just focus on electricity?”  Beyond this 
“fairness” issue is one of legal authority.  There is some concern that the California standard may 
be challenged by the wholesale power industry and possibly even neighbouring coal states as a 
hindrance to interstate commerce (Callison 2006a; Callison 2006b). Such a legal challenge could 
arise now that the interim rules for implementation of the procurement standard are in place 
(CPUC 2007). However, as with the legal battle over the Pavley vehicle regulations (see Chapter 
6), even if the rule is challenged the power industry will inevitably position to implement the 
standard should the standard be allowed to stand. 
5.7.4.   Discussion: a paradigm shift? 
Changes in legislation (e.g. the Warren-Alquist Act) combined with the policy guidance of the 
state energy agencies and the technical, regulatory decisions of the CEC and the CPUC have led 
Figure 5.9: The Navajo Generating Station, Arizona 
 
Note from Source: In the heart of the American Southwest, supplies 
coal-fired electricity to the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power and is one of the nation’s single largest sources of global 
warming pollution. 
Source:  Milford  et al.  2005;  reprinted  here  courtesy  of    Michael 
Collier (aerial photographer) and the Grand Canyon Trust. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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the way to what Hall (1993) refers to as a shift in policy paradigm.  The end result is a move away 
from centralised energy supply and power generation sources in favour of more decentralised 
power  generation  sources  and  energy  services  such  as  energy  efficiency  and  demand  side 
management.  Referred to as integrated resource planning, this policy approach recognises the 
need for policy intervention to acknowledge and value the public good benefits of conservation, 
energy efficiency and other alternative energy options.  
At least in the energy sector, California’s policy framework sets out to meet the three main goals 
of affordability, reliability and environmental sensitivity. These energy policy goals cut across 
environmental, economic and social challenges. The framework does not focus on climate change 
(or any other environmental problem) per se however climate change is recognised an important 
environmental problem (California 2003; California 2005). The shift in policy to specifically 
address climate change is only recent and builds on the prior set of policy objectives that frame 
the issues in a different, yet largely compatible way.  Devra Wang confirmed this when she said: 
“For the most part these policies …all arose without regard …to the greenhouse gas implications.  
…It’s  only  recently  that  it  has  been  tied  together  in  the  framework  of  ...a  global  warming 
perspective.” However a range of newer policies, largely originating in the CEC and CPUC, are 
specifically designed to reduce greenhouse gases.   
The progress made in integrating climate change into the long-established framework for energy 
policy  firmly  demonstrates  the  start  of  a  paradigm  shift  away  from  policy  that  promotes 
conventional fossil fuel towards new and cleaner technologies and fuels throughout the state, and 
beyond, given the coverage of imported power. As Lainie Motamedi, of the CPUC, said: “ the 
Energy Action Plan... sets the loading order for looking at energy efficiency first, renewable 
second and then other types of more traditional generation resources. But [it] really focused this 
agency, as well as the Energy Commission on looking at efficiency and clean resources rather 
than typical carbon-based generation. ... That created a pathway for a number of different policies 
...energy efficiency goals that are essentially double to what are statutorily mandated and we’ve 
accelerated the Renewable Portfolio Standard beyond what was statutorily mandated.”   In this 
view climate policy has helped to build collaborative effort between the CEC and the CPUC to 
drive  bolder  and  stronger  clean  energy  initiatives  that  in  turn  shape  the  shift  away  from 
conventional fossil fuel energy systems. 
Evidence of fundamental change in the direction of policy as a result of climate change is clear in 
the  power  sector.    Here  the  combined  effects  of  climate  change  policies  with  previous 
environmental initiatives have begun to shift investment decisions in long-lived infrastructure 
toward low-GHG options. John White provided an example of the influence of GHG policy over Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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the coal sector: “….the coal guys think that they should inherit the Earth.  They think for all the 
reasons I described that they’re the answer and in their states, they control the politics. But that's 
why  the  [power]  generation  [GHG]  performance  standard  in  California  was  ..like  the  
knuckle-ball, because it's like, ok well you guys get to build whatever you want but we're not 
financing it with our money.  So you all go finance that 2 Billion dollars worth on your own 
customers.” John White attributed this to California’s policies; he said: “…the existence of the 
carbon  adder, the  generation  procurement policy,  the  loading order, the  RPS,  all  of that has 
slowed the coal guys down.  We haven't stopped them cold.  But we are starting to see projects go 
away.”   
A particular case in point is the recent cancellation of a planned investment in a large coal-fired 
power facility, known as “Granite Fox” by the company Sempra (Voyles 2006).  Sempra was to 
build this $2 Billion, 1200 MW, facility in Nevada, but by 2006, it had indefinitely shelved the 
project (White 2006i).  This was largely as a result of California policies that would not allow its 
utilities to purchase power from the facility without investment in carbon capture and storage 
technology.  The project also encountered local opposition on environmental grounds (Voyles 
2006).  California’s policies have thus begun to change the economics of large-scale investments 
in coal.  
According to some experts, these policy reforms will lead to significantly different outcomes in 
the power sector than would have occurred in their absence and signal an overall shift in the 
direction of policy.  John White says that “…directionally what we have done is to accelerate the 
introduction of clean coal technology as much as we accelerated the introduction of low emission 
technologies on motor vehicles.  To me it’s a very similar kind of policy. Now there may be 
efforts to end-run it and weasel out of it and get exceptions to the rule, but so far I think this has 
been a very important shift and hopefully we will be able to sustain it.”  He continued to assert the 
fundamental  nature  of  this  shift:  “…of  all  the  things  we're  doing  this  year,  the  generation 
performance standard, the climate adder… the chilling of enthusiasm, official enthusiasm for new 
long-term commitments to 20
th Century coal technology as opposed to 21
st century state of the art 
[carbon] sequestration --  I think that's a sea change.  I think it has affected the whole western 
regional power market.” 
President Peevey of the CPUC is leading the charge to make the GHG standard and clean energy 
in the power sector a reality. He sees the standard as a way to limit the long-term environmental 
and financial risk of new investments in the power sector.  He said: “We use coal in California; 
we bring it in by wire. What we’re saying simply is ok, if there’s going to be a future for this 
[coal-fired  power],  it’s  going  to  have  to  be  as  clean  as  CCGT  [combined-cycle  natural  gas Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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turbine] or even cleaner.  We’d be a market for this great resource the United States has, but it has 
to be on an environmentally acceptable basis.  It is folly to build pulverized coal plants that have 
50-year lives, knowing what we know about the science of global warming.”  Thus California, 
through the CPUC and now state law, has begun to transform GHG-performance of the power 
sector.  Given the size of the California market and its rapid growth, there is reason to believe that 
the California regulations will pull clean coal technology, or alternatives to coal, forward in time. 
5.8.  Conclusion 
In  tracing  the  history  of  key  developments  in  California’s  environmental  regulation,  a  story 
emerges about how and why climate policy could move quickly in the absence of Federal action.  
It  is  a  story  that  connects  climate  policy  developments  to  California’s  past  experience  and 
institutional  competence  in  related  policy  areas.  This  interpretation  derives  from  looking 
“inside-out”  at  the  policy  process.  That  is,  the  story  originates  from  the  perceptions  and 
recollections of actors that are directly engaged in climate policy decision-making in California 
today, one that sees climate change policy as a natural evolution of previous action in related 
areas: air pollution regulation and energy and environmental policies.  As Hall (1993) suggests, it 
tells a story about social learning that builds on past experience to derive lessons for the future to 
shape policies on the relatively new yet related issue of climate change.  
The chapter highlights two examples of California’s past pro-environmental policies in the areas 
of air pollution and energy efficiency.  Air pollution law in California has developed over more 
than  half  a  century  and  is  intimately  connected  to  both  the  emergence  of  energy  efficiency 
policies and the more recent Pavley legislation to regulate CO2 emissions from vehicles (see 
Chapter 6).  Energy efficiency (and  alternative energy) policy in California goes back about three 
decades and has served as an institutional platform for climate change mitigation policy today 
under the CEC and the CPUC.  
The chapter has set policy developments in California in the context of national and international 
events that shape the context for decision-making over time (Tables 5. 1 and 5.2).  This timeline 
demonstrates  that  in  each  of  these  areas,  action  in  California  was  partially  in  response  to 
discoveries and events occurring beyond its boundaries. For example, the discovery in the late 
1940s that air pollution from vehicles led to photochemical smog and is harmful to human health, 
or in the case of energy efficiency, concern in the 1970s about the spread of nuclear power 
combined with oil security issues due to OPEC embargos.  However the timelines also show that 
action in California was generally swifter and more aggressive than federal action to address these 
problems, eventually leading the nation with regulatory solutions.    Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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On the issue of climate change, the chapter shows that CPUC and CEC regulatory policies to limit 
GHG emissions pre-date the creation of the state’s 2005-06 policy framework. Operating under 
existing regulatory authority, these institutions have worked together to advance mitigation in the 
energy sector.    This  action  has  grown in an organic  manner out of pre-existing institutional 
authority and regulatory competence, incited in part by leadership of the policy elites from within 
each of these institutions and from the non-governmental community that interacts with it.  
The examples developed here demonstrate that active participation in the policy process by well-
organised non-governmental actors has made a difference to policy outcomes.  On the issue of air 
pollution, affected stakeholders became a grass-roots force to call for change and force action to 
improve the local environment in southern California, a call that eventually influenced state-wide 
action and institutional capacity.  In the case of energy efficiency, the non-governmental force 
came from an epistemic community, comprised of a local network of expert representatives from 
environmental  non-governmental  organisations  working  closely  with  academics  and  their 
research institutions.  In both instances, the openness of the California policy process provided 
ample opportunity for ideas from the non-governmental community to influence decisions at the 
core of government, first on air pollution, then on energy, and more recently on climate change. 
These examples support the Habermasian notion of deliberative democracy and the potentially 
powerful role that actors in the “outer periphery” have to influence policy decisions (see Chapter 
3). 
Beyond the issue of agency and representation of different types of interests in policy decision-
making,  these  cases  show  that  the  polycentricism  of  California’s  environmental  governance 
structure is a force for innovation.  Indeed as Starr (2005) suggested, California has a tendency to 
devolve authority and to govern through the establishment of issue- or location-specific boards 
and commissions (see Chapter 4).  While authority is overlapping (i.e. for energy policy between 
the  CEC and the CPUC), it is also relatively independent of the more centralised and more 
lethargic state-wide political process.  The independence of these institutions created a window of 
opportunity for leaders to move climate policy forward in spite of the lack of a formal policy 
framework at the centre of state or federal government.  
Finally  past  achievements  of  regulatory  actions  to  curb  air  pollution  and  enhance  energy 
efficiency  in  California  have  helped  to  create  a  sense  of  technological  optimism  and 
understanding that environmental performance can go hand in hand with a strong economy. Past 
actions have also delivered a strong green technology business presence that, in turn, has shifted 
the politics of the climate change issue (see Chapters 8 and 9).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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These examples demonstrate at once a multilevel, social-practice model of governance and a 
political economy perspective that acknowledges that role of policy elites as drivers of policy 
change (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Kingdon 1984). Practices in both the CPUC and CEC have 
evolved over time in response to external social and political forces. In turn policy elites in each 
have shaped “policy spaces” through which they are moulding new conventions and beliefs to 
respond to climate change.  The policies outlined here are small first steps but they demonstrate 
leadership and ongoing commitment to integrate the new issue of climate change into a pre-
existing energy and environmental regulatory framework. 
The next chapter revisits some of these conceptual themes as it completes the review of early 
climate change policies in the State of California. It also highlights the organisational changes that 
were brought about with the 2005-06 policy changes swept in by Schwarzenegger administration. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  154 
 
6.  OTHER KEY ELEMENTS: THE REGISTRY, 
TRANSPORTATION AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
6.1.  Introduction 
This  chapter  describes  remaining  key  elements  in  the  current  climate  policy  framework  in 
California.  These complete what is emerging as a comprehensive framework to manage and limit 
GHG emissions (Box 6.1).  The early elements include the first piece of 1988 climate change 
legislation and later in 2000 the establishment of the California Climate Action Registry.  The 
chapter also highlights the landmark Pavley (vehicle) Bill, which passed in 2002 and is intimately 
connected to the history of air pollution regulatory law in California (Chapter 5). Finally the 
chapter comments on organisational issues and the transition from fragmented strands of sectoral 
actions to an overarching state-wide policy framework.  
Both  the  Registry  and  the  Pavley  Bill  provide  interesting  examples  of  forces  of  multilevel 
governance at work in California. Both take shape through issue-based institutional structures, 
providing significant autonomy for decision-makers within each to move ahead more quickly and 
independently of broader based state or federal frameworks.  Yet developments in each area are 
also intimately linked to national trends and activities with a common force being the intention to 
influence activities not just within the State of California but also more broadly across the United 
States.    
6.2.  Early climate change legislation 
California legislative action on climate change began in 1988 (see Box 6.1), through the passage 
of a Bill sponsored by State Senator Byron Sher (CA-Code 1988). Byron Sher is a well known 
political  leader  for the  environment  in  the  state  --  or  as  Diane  Wittenberg,  President of  the 
California Climate Action Registry, put it, he is “…the dean of environmental legislation” in 
California.
78  
                                                         
78 Sher was a member of the California State Assembly from 1980-1996, and a member of the California 
State Senate from 1996 through 2004. Aside from leading passage of this initial GHG legislation, Byron Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Box 6.1:  California Climate Policy - Timeline of Key Historical Events 
1957 – California passes the Air Pollution Control Act authorizing each county to establish an air pollution 
district 
1963  –  First California tailpipe air pollution control measures take effect  
1973  –  Warren-Alquist Act establishes energy conservation as a resource; provides authority to establish 
state-wide appliance and building energy efficiency standards; authority to forecast energy requirements 
as part of energy facility permitting process. 
1988  –  Sher legislation (1):  CEC to study climate change impacts, develop policy recommendations 
1991 – 1997 – The CEC studies the problem, prepares state-wide GHG inventories and issues several 
reports with policy recommendations. 
1998 – California deregulates electricity sector, establishes public goods charge on electricity 
2000  –  Sher legislation (2):  Voluntary registry for entity-level GHG emission inventories 
2000-2001 – California electricity crisis, blackouts occur 
2002  –  Pavley legislation: requires control of CO2 from motor vehicles 
2003-2005 – Collaboration between CEC and CPUC expands: Joint Energy Action Plans, energy policy 
with attention to climate change (e.g. through CEC Integrated Energy Policy Report), electricity sector 
regulations (CPUC): 
•  Aggressive energy efficiency targets;  integrated  resource  planning – loading order preference, 
decoupling policies 
•  Accelerated renewable portfolio standard; million solar roofs programme 
•  “Leakage” policies – GHG adder; GHG procurement standard  
2004  –  Pavley regulations issued, effective from 2009, aiming to reduce tailpipe emissions of CO2 by 
about 30% in 2015 timeframe  
2005  –  Governor Schwarzenegger issues Executive Order establishes GHG targets for 2010, 2010 and 
2050 (June); automakers sue state of California over Pavley regulations (December) 
2006    –    California  legislature  passes  several  laws  on  climate  change  (and  related  issues):  Global 
Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) codifies 2020 targets; Perata Bill mandates GHG procurement standard 
for in and out-of-state baseload power delivered in California; Levine Bill requires energy efficiency targets 
for municipal utilities. 
Source: author, based on Chapters  4, 5 and 6. 
The 1988 law mandated the CEC to evaluate and report on the effects that climate change would 
have on California, for example on water supply and the agricultural sectors. In October 1990, the 
state published its first greenhouse gas inventory of emissions and sinks (Brown 2005b; CEC 
1990).  Interestingly this inventory includes emissions from imported electricity, an issue that 
received policy  attention only  much later.  Under  the  new  legislative  mandate, the  CEC  also 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Sher  also  championed  the  successful  legislation  on  GHG  registries,  renewable  energy  and  energy 
efficiency during his time in the state legislature. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  156 
organised a symposium on the topic of climate change that reviewed the scientific aspects of the 
problem and developed a number of recommendations for strategies to deal with it (CEC 1991a; 
CEC 1991b). 
According to Pierre duVair, Senior Climate Policy Analyst of the CEC, there was then: “a lull in 
the mid-90’s…” He noted that this timing related to international developments, that is “after the 
Kyoto Protocol in the late 90’s, [it] heated up again.” In 1997, the California state government 
and, in particular, the CEC began again to look in earnest at the question of what to do about 
climate change. As part of a partnership with USEPA, the State of California issued a 1997 report 
that  focused  on  possible  response  strategies;  it  recommended  expanding  energy  efficiency 
programmes and other energy policy responses (e.g. promotion of renewables and alternative fuel 
vehicles) (CEC 1998).  Between 1999 and 2000, the CEC organised two different conferences; 
Pierre duVair, who had helped organise the conferences explained: “We held workshops on the 
status of the climate science and on early actors from the business and corporate sector - who’s 
taking action and why.”   
These  events  led  to  voluminous  conference  proceedings,  documenting  the  latest  science, 
including the implications of climate change for California (CEC 1999b; CEC 2000). On the 
policy side, the documents provided insights from a number of multinational and other large 
business players in California about their early efforts to mitigate emissions.  They also report on 
an exchange of views amongst key stakeholders about what role if any California should play in 
specific policy responses to climate change.  The summary of the “science” workshop concludes 
that the State has some responsibility to act, in particular to better understand the risks associated 
with potential impacts; to provide public information and education materials in collaboration 
with  the  scientific,  environmental  and  business  communities;  to  monitor  climate  change;  to 
contribute to scientific consensus; and to developing a consensus for action among stakeholders 
(CEC 1999b).  
In the view of the CEC, and the stakeholders that it convened, the role of the state at that time 
should be largely confined to research, information and education. Thus the states’ role with 
respect  to  direct  policy  responses  in  the  period  1999-2000  was  much  more  ambiguous  and 
indirect than it is today, with little constituency for direct political intervention at the state level on 
the issue of climate change.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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6.3.  The California Climate Action Registry  
In 2000, Governor Gray Davis signed the first major piece of California legislation on climate 
change into law (CA-Code 2000) focusing on establishing a registry for the reporting and tracking 
of entity-level GHG emissions in the state.
79  Again, led by State Senator Sher, the legislation 
became known as the “Sher legislation.” In addition to establishing the California Registry, the 
legislation also required the Energy Commission to update the state’s inventory in consultation 
with other agencies by January 2002 and every five years thereafter (Brown 2005).   
Although  Governor  Davis  had  signed  the  2000  Sher  legislation,  its  provisions  had  been 
contentious. Some industry and business associations had lobbied hard for the Governor to veto 
the Bill, and environmental organisations were divided in their support for it (Olsen 2003). The 
legislation raised issues of how to establish a credible record to allow “credit for early action” for 
businesses operating in California, in the face of unlikely progress on this issue nationally.  A key 
issue was whether a system established in California alone could be protected and eventually 
validated once national action was taken. Although the initial legislation had support from more 
than  a  dozen  large  corporations  in  California,  other  businesses  and  industry  groups  were 
concerned about state-level action on climate change.  Environmental groups, most of which have 
nation-wide operations, were also concerned about the risk of fragmentation through state-level 
action (Olsen 2003). 
Pierre duVair explained that at the time of the Governor’s signature “…Governor Davis had said: 
‘Go back and work with industry’. This was: “… because he had heard they weren’t happy with 
the last minute process to develop this voluntary greenhouse gas reporting legislation” (duVair 
2006i).    Senator  Sher  subsequently  led  a  working  group,  comprised  of  those  opposing  and 
supporting  the  Bill,  including  business  and  industry  groups  and  environmental  organisations 
among  others,  to  hammer  out  the  details  of  the  clean-up  legislation.  After  nine  months  of 
intensive work, the group arrived at a number of significant compromises that altered original 
provisions for the registry. In 2001 a clean-up Bill passed with no opposition (CA-Code 2001b;  
Olsen 2003).  
The 2000-2001 “Sher legislation” created the California Climate Action Registry (CCAR) as a 
not-for-profit private/public partnership – or a voluntary greenhouse gas registry. In the words of 
Diane  Wittenberg,  President  of  the  CCAR:  “We  work  primarily  on  helping  companies  and 
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agencies  and  others,  …inventory  their  greenhouse gas  footprint  according to specific  carbon 
accounting protocols.” The CEC was established as the main institutional liaison within the state 
for the Registry.  
The establishment of a Registry in California was at least partially a response to requests from 
business leadership, anxious to prepare in a timely way to deal with the issue of climate change. 
Energy Commissioner Jim Boyd underscored the role of business in advancing the timing of the 
legislation: “it was people in the business sector, who …provided the impetus for the legislation 
that created the Registry, and it frankly got done as a result of that involvement, probably a couple 
of years before it would have through the logical process we were going through in the state…” 
Similarly, Diane Wittenberg recalls that the law was  “at the request of some CEOs to Senator 
Byron Sher.”  She said: “…they had gone to Washington first, had gotten a cold reception, came 
to California and said, ‘We would like a way to protect early reductions’ and he [Senator Sher] 
basically said, ‘Well, California would like to encourage early reductions, so I think we have a 
meeting of the minds’ and the Registry legislation then was created.”  The legislation encourages 
California  authorities  to  give  “appropriate  consideration”  to  emissions  (e.g. reductions) 
documented through the Registry process in any future regulations (Brown 2005b).  
In an analysis of the history of the California Registry, David Olsen (2003) also traces successful 
passage of the legislation to the failure of the federal government to act.  He shows that the initial 
corporate champions for the “Sher legislation” had mounted their initial campaign for “Early 
Action Crediting” at national level, working through a U.S. coalition of companies known as the 
“CEO Coalition to Advance Sustainable Technologies.” Unsuccessful, they turned to the states, 
and in particular to California.
80  
Diane Wittenberg explained the main challenge in establishing the system: “It had to be rigorous 
enough that California would stand behind the data, that really led it to become a standards 
organization to a certain extent. I think the success of the Registry is partly because it does have 
high and rigorous standards, many of which are prescriptive -- it’s very prescriptive legislation.  
California tends to have two kinds of Bills; ...[either] it’s a 3 paragraph Bill or a 20 or 30 page Bill 
that lays it all out... this was the latter.”  The final piece of legislation establishing this system had 
been elaborated in some detail in the follow-up process.  The high level of detail was necessary to 
                                                         
80  The  initial  coalition  of  business  leaders  in  California  included  some  of  the  leaders  nationwide, 
including: BP; CH2M Hill; Science Applications International.  Other early supporters were new to the 
California initiative e.g.:  Calpine; Dole Foods; Kinko’s; Los Angeles Department of Water and Power; 
Gap,  Inc.;  Patagonia;  SeaWest  Windpower;  Shaklee;  Silicon  Energy.    See  discussion  of  the  early 
nationwide coalition, and its links to developments in California in Olsen 2003. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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assuage  concerns  of  various  partners  that  the  CCAR  would  provide  a  verifiable  record  of 
accomplishments for California participants. 
6.3.1.  Governance of CCAR: a public-private partnership 
The  CCAR  received  seed  funding  from  the  state  for  its  first  year  of  operation.  But  Diane 
Wittenberg explained there have been shifts in support from the state for the operation of the 
registry with initial funding sufficient to fully fund the activity:  “The state initially contributed 
a million dollars to get the registry off the ground. It carried us through a couple of years...   It 
funded  all  the  software  development.  The  state  subsequently  funded  us  at  the  rate of  about 
$200,000 per year for a few years.  Now we are funded primarily through member fees, contracts 
and conference revenues.”  In the years to follow, funding came in annual allocations from the 
state budget; the amount of funding declined steadily from about a quarter of a million per year to 
zero allocation at all from the state budget in 2005 and 2006.  Diane Wittenberg explained that the 
state authorities intended to support the Registry but in the end ran into some political problems, 
which blocked the allocation; thus the Registry was forced to become self-supporting at least for 
this period.  She said: “…now we’re funded primarily from earned income and private foundation 
grants.  [Earned income is from] Membership fees, conference sponsorships, some contracts. …I 
think we’ll be funded in the future by the State.  …It’s not a permanent decision [that] the 
Registry must be self-funded.  I don’t think there have been any decisions like that, but we’ve 
evolved into being more self supportive.”  
In  spite  of  the  essentially  privately  funded  operation  of  the  Registry  in  recent  years,  Diane 
Wittenberg notes important differences from a purely private enterprise.  She said:  “…it still has 
kind of quasi-agency status in the sense that all of our Board is appointed by the legislature and 
we work closely with [State] Agencies.  [The Registry has] unofficial status in the sense that the 
State supports the Registry data and protects it.” No other states at this time (2006) had this type 
of public/private partnership to promote voluntary GHG reporting and registration. There is thus 
an expectation on the part of the Registry’s management that the State will continue to play an 
important role in the Registry both in terms of future funding and ongoing management oversight. 
Diane Wittenberg explained how the public-private organisational structure links to the bottom-up 
nature of climate policy as it is emerging in California.  She said:  “there isn’t anything else like it.  
It is kind of a whole different animal… the Registry is a kind of infrastructure that will support 
various policy options. Normally you put a policy in place, like Kyoto is very top down, right? 
Under Kyoto, there’s no call for a Registry function like California’s.    We operate with, if you 
want to call it that, the luxury of no [federal] policy.  So we started from the bottom up and… so Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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what California is doing is moving from this voluntary reporting that is rigorous to mandatory 
reporting, which will then become the basis for caps and then probably move to trading.  [That 
would be] …a natural progression.  That policy decision hasn’t been made yet, but along with… a 
portfolio of solutions, of standards, efficiency standards and things like that.”
81 
6.3.2.  Scope of CCAR reporting protocols, reporting and certification  
In spite of its “bottom-up” nature, the California Registry is designed with an eye to compatibility 
with federal regulation of GHG, whenever it may come.  Diane Wittenberg explained this: “We 
work very proactively with other states and with USEPA.  USEPA … aren’t supposed to be 
working on this.  But we make sure we’re aligned because, …USEPA is the ultimate end game 
within the US.  You don’t want to go on some tangent that the USEPA staff thinks is crazy…”  
She explained that they also work “very closely with WRI, whose protocols we’re based on and 
WBCSD,  and  ISO.”  By  comparison  to  the  WRI/WBCSD  GHG  reporting  protocols 
(WRI/WBCSD  2004),  which  were  developed  to  provide  an  international  benchmark  for 
companies choosing to report voluntarily, she said:   “Those are global standards -- that’s at 
50,000 feet and we operationalise them and they’re at 10,000 feet; so where they offer choices we 
might pick a choice, but it would be within their universe.” 
More  specifically  CCAR  protocols  or  reporting  standards  have  begun  to  reach  beyond  state 
boundaries to influence reporting of GHG emissions by company operations elsewhere in the U.S. 
and in the world.   In particular Diane points out “the standards have become so well accepted that 
people feel that’s a good way to protect their baseline no matter where they are.  In fact, we have 
companies that say,  ‘Well,  we’re  not  members  of  the  Registry, but  we  use  your  accounting 
protocols.’ The Registry protocols are available on the Registry Website to anyone and the idea is 
to promulgate these standards.”   Interestingly, some companies use the reporting standards for 
their own comprehensive reporting purposes, challenging the system to adapt also to their needs, 
which extend beyond the interests of the State of California.  Diane Wittenberg highlights:    “We 
had to change the rules to allow international [reporting] … Eastman Kodak and Dow report 
                                                         
81 This statement was true at the time of the interview, however since this time, the policy decision was 
taken  to  codify  2020  greenhouse  emission  reduction  targets  in  California  (AB32,  2006).    In  that 
legislation,  corporations  and  other  large  emitting  entities  are  strongly  encouraged  to  begin  voluntary 
reporting  through  the  CCAR  before  they  are  mandated  to  develop  greenhouse  gas  emission  reports 
through state regulations to be issued under the law. AB32 thus has implications for the Membership and 
importance of the CCAR and the Bill commits to use CCAR protocols and its standard data as far as 
possible. The law requires all major emitters to report 2008 emissions; reporting is scheduled to begin in 
2009 and a draft rule was under consideration at the time of writing (CARB 2008). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  161 
internationally.  And about half of our Members’ facilities are outside the state of California and 
some of our [Members] have no emissions within the State of California at all.  So none of those 
things  were  really  anticipated  because  we  expected  everyone  to  have  at  least  operations  in 
California.” 
Once  you  voluntarily join the  Registry  then  reporting  companies  must inventory  their  GHG 
footprint according to the Registry’s protocols.  It also must have the inventory certified by a 
third-party certifier chosen from a list of certifiers approved by CCAR and CEC.  The reporting 
company  hires  those  certifiers;  CCAR  and  the  CEC  can  also  choose  to  participate  in  that 
certification  process  to  perform  spot-checking.  The  final  product,  in  certified  form,  is  made 
available to the public.  The certification procedures resemble those of financial accounting audits 
where the accredited certification company attests to the accuracy of the information.  Once the 
company inventory has been certified, aggregate emission totals are posted to a public website 
(Wittenberg 2006i).
82  
Working  with  third  party  certifiers  often  from  multinational  consulting  firms  provides  other 
benefits that include diffusion of the CCAR protocols to other locations and regions outside of 
California.  Diane Wittenberg explained how this works:  “…our network of certifiers … seem to 
have been one of the best ways to bring our protocols to many other venues around the world 
because they’re international certifiers and say, ‘Well, here are some good protocols.’  But they 
also bring back to us ways to make our protocols better and I think convergence on general 
reporting is happening.” 
6.3.3.  Future challenges and cross-scale linkages 
As of 2006, the CCAR had identified four different areas of continued development for its work 
on reporting protocols (Wittenberg 2006i):  
i)  entity-wide protocols, focusing on new areas such as forestry, agriculture;  
ii)  project reduction protocols where the Registry is looking at performance based 
standards by project, including in project areas not otherwise covered through 
regulatory issues;  
                                                         
82  Certified  inventory  reports  from  participating  companies  can  be  downloaded  from 
http://www.climateregistry.org/CARROT/public/reports.aspx  [accessed  22  May  2008];    one  of  the 
contentious issues and challenges in moving from a voluntary to a mandatory reporting system is the need 
for information and scrutiny of facility level emissions trends; as of 2008 only aggregate emission totals 
for  each  reporting  company  were  publicly  available  on  the  website,  however  new  regulations  were 
advancing to require facility level reporting. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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iii)  city/local reporting protocols; and  
iv)  creation of a multi-states registry.    
Needs related to forestry and agriculture protocols and to project based credits related to the 
recent evolution of California climate policy to develop a comprehensive set of policies to reduce 
GHGs significantly in coming decades.  Another driver is the emerging voluntary market both 
within the state and nationally. The interest in city-scale measurement and reporting protocols and 
in the multi-states registry as well as in the offset measurement for the voluntary market derives 
from  national  and  transnational  climate  change  actions  rather than  those  that  are  specific to 
California.    
On  measurement  protocols  for  cities  for  example,  Diane  Wittenberg  pointed  to  the  multiple 
applications  of  progress  in  this  area.  ICLEI
83  has  successfully  promoted  action  on  GHG 
mitigation in the US at city-level.   Diane Wittenberg said: “We’re working on that with the State 
… that’s in the Climate Action Plan.  Then we’ve been working with ICLEI.  We have a couple 
of cities who are going to be the first … you look at all those cities and then you look a little 
closer and they don’t report consistently. The hardest part is boundaries, what’s in and what’s 
out… some of them are reporting [individual] buildings in the city, and others are skipping things 
like the airport.  And you’ve got everything in between. …So we’re looking forward to tightening 
up the way that cities are reporting. ICLEI …would try and push this to other cities outside of 
California and let those states kind of take the ball with their own cities.”
84 
Regarding the multi-states registry, the complexity and magnitude of the challenge is magnified in 
the absence of federal action.  In particular, New England states have been aggressively working 
together to achieve GHG reduction targets (Regional GHG Initiative known as RGGI) and are 
developing a registry system to monitor progress (RGGI 2006a; RGGI 2006b).  Diane Wittenberg 
highlighted  the  challenge  of  synchronising  these  state  or  regional  systems:      “We’re  really 
working hard to coordinate better…  Again, you don’t want discounting between regimes and so 
this is how you ensure that even if you have different superstructures, the content is the same. The 
companies are the biggest pushers of all this because they’re petrified… their view of hell would 
                                                         
83 ICLEI  is the International  Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, which now also operates a 
Cities  for  Climate  Protection  Campaign.    See  http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=800  [accessed  12 
November 2007]. 
84 Since the time of the interview, the City of San Francisco announced its successful completion of a 
CCAR approved GHG report: (CCAR 2006). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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be different states with different measurement protocols, which is not impossible.  So they’ve 
really been pushing for this consistency.”  
Looking across these latest strategic directions of the CCAR, there is a clear targeting of activities 
that  establish  coherence  between  California  measurement  and  reporting  approaches  through 
CCAR and those emerging in other contexts.  These contexts span activities in other states as well 
as in other countries, i.e. through voluntary markets.  CCAR’s management is thus directing its 
activities to areas that will have international and transnational influence, e.g. by working with 
ICLEI in developing standardised approaches to monitor emissions from cities.  At the time of 
writing, this strategy had already begun to bear fruit. For example, in 2007 and as anticipated by 
the CCAR a multi-state registry was agreed and launched (Registry 2007), while in 2008, the 
CCAR  launched  a  voluntary  markets  certification  procedure  (CCAR  2008).    Such  examples 
demonstrate strategic organisational behaviour to extend local successes more broadly to similar 
activities nationally and internationally as well as the value of early action. 
6.4.  Transportation: Pavley Bill and vehicle regulations, 2002-2004 
In 2002, the State of California passed landmark legislation that added CO2 to its previously 
established regulatory framework for air pollution. Known as the Pavley Bill (CA-Code 2002a), 
the  legislation  was  sponsored  by  then  junior  Assembly  member  Fran  Pavley,  a  former 
schoolteacher  from  Santa  Monica,  in  southern  California.    The  Bill  was  approved  by  the 
legislature with no votes to spare, and signed into law in 2002, by Governor Gray Davis.   
This landmark event in US climate change policy occurred in the same year that the California 
legislature was scrambling to address the electricity crisis. The Pavley Bill was the first law in the 
nation, to regulate CO2 emissions from motor vehicles. As noted by Commissioner Jim Boyd:   
“The Pavley Bill has become world famous… it was a CO2 tailpipe standard Bill.  I mean, the first 
Bill to really …control something.  And it picked on automobiles, which made great [sense] …if 
you look at our inventory, that was ….the biggest contributor.”  Although the debate leading up to 
its  passage  was  sharply divided  along  partisan  lines (Rabe  2005),  and the law  preceded  his 
election in late 2003, Governor Schwarzenegger has been a staunch supporter of the law since he 
came to office.  The passage of the Pavley Bill may have been a sign of the times, part of an 
overwhelming reaction of the California legislature to pro-actively position the state on energy 
issues and to make a statement about the need to avoid the costs of inaction to a long-term yet 
important environmental problem.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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In the contentious regulatory process that followed the Bill’s passage, the State approved motor 
vehicle CO2 regulations in 2004, effective for model year 2009 vehicles.  When fully phased in, 
standards are estimated to result in about a 22 percent reduction as compared to the 2002 fleet in 
the 2009-2012 period and about a 30 percent reduction over 2013-2016 (CARB 2004).  Through 
their manufacturer associations, automakers promptly challenged the regulations in federal court, 
contending that California was addressing GHG emissions through fuel efficiency making the law 
inconsistent with federal legal objectives in the sector, which are achieved through the federal 
CAFE standards. By law only the federal government can regulate fuel efficiency; the state is 
pre-empted from action in this area. The automakers’ suit also claims that EPA is precluded from 
granting a waiver under the Clean Air Act because Congress did not authorise EPA to regulate 
greenhouse gases under the Act.  
Legal challenges are thus central to how these vehicle regulations will play out in California and 
in the US (Merrill Lynch and WRI 2006). A recent ruling by the Supreme Court of the US is a 
key development, which found that the US EPA does have the authority under the Clean Air Act 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions (US 2007).  If US EPA chose not to regulate it must justify 
this position under the law, i.e. through arguments that climate change does not affect the health 
and wellbeing of the US population.  The Supreme Court ruling also effectively required the US 
EPA to rule on California’s request for a waiver to implement its new vehicle regulations. In late 
2007, the US EPA Administrator, Stephen Johnson, denied the 2005 California request for a 
waiver on the grounds that such action was superseded by passage of recent US federal vehicle 
efficiency standards (Johnson 2007; Witherspoon 2005).
85 This decision was promptly challenged 
by the state in federal court, a challenge that is awaiting decision (State of California 2008b).  
Also in 2008, the California Attorney General’s office, led by none other than former Governor 
Jerry Brown, was pursuing the federal government to turn over relevant documents that were used 
to construct the arguments in the US EPA decision (California 2008c). 
Were  the  Pavley  vehicle  regulations  to  be  allowed  to  stand  in  California,  they  would  have 
far-reaching  effects  across  North  America.    To  date,  twelve  other  states  and  Canada  have 
announced their intention to adopt the California vehicle regulations (California 2008a), which 
                                                         
85 There are several other relevant suits.  First is the suit brought by auto manufacturers in federal court, a 
challenge, which was overturned by the Court’s ruling that, were the waiver to be approved, the State 
indeed had the right to regulate (California 2008a).  Second, the state of California brought suit against 
several  major  U.S.  and  Japanese  automakers,  arguing  that  CO2  emissions  from  their  vehicles  have 
harmed  human  health  and  the  environment  in  California,  claiming  compensation  for  these  damages 
(IHT, 2006). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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would extend market coverage from California’s one-tenth of the U.S. market to one-third of the 
North American vehicle market (Merrill Lynch and WRI, 2006).
86 If the past is a reflection of the 
future, the regulations and the technologies they engender could also be diffused widely outside 
of the United States.    
One of the State’s main lines of legal defence of the Pavley vehicle rules is that California has a 
state  interest  to  control  climate  change  and  that  interest  intertwines  with  responsibility  and 
authority to control air pollution, in particular in the vehicle sector.  As John White points out, the 
pre-emption for states to regulate vehicles relates to fuel economy alone and not to emissions.  
Pertaining to the suit brought by vehicle manufacturers, he said: “The car companies say ‘CO2 
equals fuel economy we’re done,’ but part of the difference in our emphasis is it’s not just CO2.  
We have nitrous oxide, we have methane, we have the chlorofluorocarbons and potentially more 
pollutants beyond the Kyoto-six.  We argue that this is fundamentally on air pollution authority.” 
Indeed a central part of the legal argument to let the Pavley Bill and subsequent rules stand is 
based on the evidence that California is directly impacted by climate change and more vulnerable 
than  other  parts  of  the  US,  therefore  action  to  mitigate  climate  change  is  in  the  interest  of 
protecting the health and welfare of its citizens.
87 John White further explained the argument with 
the use of local climate impact examples:  “[Also]…because air pollution will be made worse by 
climate change because of higher temperatures.... and because the water supply, the snow pack 
and water delivery systems are all affected, …we have a compelling state interest in reducing 
climate change emissions across the board. And we have the authority based on the work that 
we've already done [on air pollution].” 
According to most observers, the Pavley Bill was a watershed for climate policy in the state. 
Steve Schneider, a renowned climate expert and Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental 
Studies  at  Stanford  University,  commented:  “The  Pavley  Bill  (Clean  Car  Regulations  AB 
1493)…  …  started  out  relatively  innocently,  but  when  it  got  publicity  because  Detroit 
spent millions of dollars trying to …black list this school teacher and California State Assembly 
Representative from the Santa Monica area, that got publicity.  ... California is a state where 
outside corporate money fighting state environmental interests will typically create a backlash and 
fail.  So in Detroit, that’s the only thing they have left, are the courts.  They lost the political battle 
                                                         
86 The following states have adopted or will adopt California vehicle regulations for CO2:  Arizona; 
Connecticut;  Maine;  Massachusetts;  New  Jersey;  New  York;  Oregon;  Pennsylvania;  Rhode  Island; 
Vermont; Washington (Pavley 2006; Arizona 2006). 
87 Based on interviews with Michael Hanemann and John White on this issue. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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in California, even though they dramatically outspent Fran Pavley.”  Thus the passage of the 
Pavley Bill was consistent with past experience and understanding that state regulators had the 
power and determination to trounce automakers when clean air was at stake.  History was simply 
repeating itself. For the second time in a fifty-year interval, California had voted for clean air over 
objections from the auto industry. 
At least some observers believe that the Pavley Bill was an important turning point in the way the 
State of California is approaching climate change with international implications.  For example, 
John White said:  “I think the Pavley law [2002] really gave us a sense of our power. Bill Clinton 
called the speaker of the assembly to congratulate him on passing the Bill.   It passed with no 
votes to spare.  Hard fought, street fight with the oil and the auto industry and we beat them.  
Around the world in Australia and London and Germany, Tokyo there were headlines: ‘California 
Acts.’” Even industry analysts are taking the California law very seriously, in spite of the legal 
challenges.    Merrill  Lynch  (2006)  reported:  “While  it  remains  unclear  how  CARB  will 
specifically implement the various GHG requirements that have been signed into law, what is 
clear is that these requirements are, in fact, law. Lawsuits or not, the auto industry will likely be 
impacted  by  this  regulatory  trend.”    Though  the  legal  battles  continue,  the  Pavley  law  is 
challenging the world’s automakers to take climate change seriously and requiring them to build 
greenhouse gas performance into its business plans.  
Mary  Nichols  clearly  linked  the  success  of  the  passage  of  the  Pavley  Bill  and  subsequent 
regulatory action to prior experience with both air pollution and energy efficiency policy.  She 
said: “I don’t believe there’s any other state that would’ve even considered doing what we did… 
no other state would have anything like the claim to legitimacy that we have because of our 
historic role under the Clean Air Act. …Other states, after years of advocating, got the right to 
adopt California’s standards, but nothing other than California standards in the 1990 amendments.  
…Energy efficiency later on also has been an area where California was willing to set stricter 
standards.”  
The US EPA Administrator, Stephen Johnson, joined others to acknowledge California’s role in 
leading the US in innovative environmental action when he closed the letter denying California’s 
request for a waiver for the Pavley vehicle regulations with the following words (Johnson 2007): 
“Finally, I want to acknowledge the leadership, that you and your state have shown to increase 
vehicle fuel economy, to address energy security, and to reduce greenhouse gases. I agree that 
increased vehicle standards can be a win-win for the environment and the economy. I have no Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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doubt that the national standards Congress adopted and the President signed into law this week 
were enacted, in part, because of your efforts.”
88 
6.5.  Organisational change leads policy reform  
A number of organisational changes accompanied the movement of climate policy to a priority 
place on the California public agenda in the 2004-6 timeframe. This included shifting power and 
coordinating authority away from the CEC and towards the CalEPA beginning in 2004 and then 
eventually  the  California  Air  Resources  Board  in  2006.  Participants  in  the  policy  process 
highlighted the significance of the Governor’s initial decision to shift authority to coordinate 
state-wide  climate  policy  away  from  the  CEC  to  CalEPA.    In  practical terms,  this occurred 
through a legislative decision on the state budget shifting authority and funding away from the 
Energy Commission to CalEPA (CA-Code 2004).  The budget Bill that states (CA-Code 2004):   
“Under  existing  law,  the  State  Air  Resources  Board,  the  State  Energy  Resources 
Conservation  and  Development  Commission  (CEC),  and  the  California  Climate 
Action Registry all have responsibilities with respect to the control of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  This  Bill  would  require  the  Secretary  for  Environmental  Protection  to 
coordinate greenhouse gas emission reductions and climate change activity in state 
government.” 
Adrienne Alvord, the special assistant to Assemblywoman Fran Pavley, outlined possible reasons 
for this decision: “That was not an administration-level initiative, but it did come from within the 
administration.    The  legislature  kind  of  fronted  it.  I  think  that  there  were  people  that  the 
administration brought in over at CalEPA who were deeply interested in doing very aggressive 
climate policy and they wanted to take the reigns.” Adrienne Alvord was most likely referring to 
Terry Tamminen, who had managed the Governor’s environmental platform during the election 
campaign and who was named as Secretary of CalEPA shortly after his election (see also Chapter 
9).   
In  2005,  the  Governor’s  Executive  Order  called  for  the  California  Environmental  Protection 
Agency  (CalEPA)  to  establish  and  lead  the  Climate  Action  Team  (CAT).    The  CAT  is  a 
multi-agency effort tasked with a two-fold responsibility: i) analysis of the impacts of climate 
change  on  California;  ii)  development  of  strategies  to  achieve  the  targets  and 
                                                         
88 The legal battle over the California standards continues as of December 2008.  However the Obama 
administration is expected to reverse the EPA denial of the waiver request once in office, as it was part of 
the set of campaign pledges to do so (as with his opponent as well, Senator McCain). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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mitigation/adaptation plans for the state.  The duality of the assignment is important because it 
placed impact science alongside of policy development as two parallel and equally important 
activities  for  attention  in  the  state  policy  process.  The  2006  budget  Bill  further  shifted  the 
authority and funding away from the CEC to CARB for the preparation of the state-wide GHG 
inventory, a decision signed into law in July 2006 (i.e. prior to passage of AB32) and effective as 
of 1 January 2008 (CA-Code 2006f).  The 2006 budget Bill thus anticipated the shift of authority 
away from the CEC as a central feature of Assembly Bill 32 of 2006, which was signed in 
September 2006. 
Whatever the original reasons for the change, the shifting of authority initially to CalEPA and 
later  to  CARB  had  numerous  effects  on  the  policy  process.    Importantly,  it  removed  any 
constraints that might have existed due to past activities. CalEPA was well placed to bring all 
relevant players to the table with some authority, including those responsible for emissions in 
non-energy sectors (e.g. forestry, industry, waste) as well as the energy sectors (see Box 6.2). Yet 
CalEPA is a relatively small “umbrella” organisation. It has limited manpower and organisational 
complexity  since  it  has  an  executive  management  structure  rather  than  a  more  independent 
commission/board.
89 As a small institution it is likely to be more manoeuvrable on a politically 
difficult issue.
 It was thus easier to envisage CalEPA driving policy innovation and change in 
close  collaboration  with  the  Governor  and  his  appointees,  than  to  work  through  the  more 
structured, larger CEC (or another such institution in the state).  Clearly the Governor, and his 
principal agent on this issue, Cal EPA Secretary Terry Tamminen, were hoping to move climate 
policy  forward  during  their  tenure  and  were  not  interested  to  work  through  the  complex 
management structure of the CEC or any other “Board” or “Commission”.  As a state agency 
CalEPA is directly answerable to the Governor.  
                                                         
89 For example, CalEPA budget in 2002-3 showed only 45 full-time staff positions, while the California 
Air Resources Board had more -- roughly 1000.  All combined the various boards and agencies under the 
coordinating authority of  CalEPA have staffs roughly one hundred times greater  in size  than  that of 
CalEPA  (CalEPA  2003).    By  comparison,  the  Energy  Commission  had  roughly  500  full-time  staff 
positions funded in its latest budget year (2006-7) (CEC 2006).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Box 6.2: Key institutions and main functions related to climate policy in California --  
members of the Climate Action Team90 
 
California Environmental Protection Agency (reporting to the Governor) 
  •  Environmental and air pollution policy 
  •  Oversees specialised agencies including the Air Resources Board and the Waste Management 
Board 
•  Convener of the Climate Action Team (which includes all of the institutions noted below)  
Air Resources Board (under oversight of Cal EPA)  
  •  Oversight and coordination of GHG emission reductions to meet state goals (from 2006) 
  •  State GHG inventory (from 2006) 
  •  Air pollution regulations, including emissions from stationary sources and vehicles 
Energy Commission  
  •  State GHG inventory (1988 - 2006) 
  •  Climate change research through oversight of the Public Interest Energy Research programme  
  •  Integrated  energy  planning  and  policy  (supply  and  demand);  energy  facility  siting  including 
transmission facilities 
  •  Energy policy (joint with CPUC), including establishment of energy and environmental goals 
  •  Regulate appliance and building energy efficiency (through standard setting) 
  •  Monitoring energy efficiency and renewable portfolio performance 
Public Utilities Commission  
  •  Energy policy (joint with CEC), including energy and environmental goals 
  •  Power procurement investment oversight, including energy efficiency, renewable portfolio, and 
greenhouse gas performance 
Resources Agency and its Departments91  
  •  Natural resources management policy 
  •  Department of Water Resources: water resources management, planning 
  •  Department of Parks and Recreation and Department of Fish and Game 
•  Department of Forestry and Fire Prevention: forest land management and fire protection. 
Department of Food and Agriculture 
Business, Transportation and Housing Agency92 
 
                                                         
90 The Governor’s 2005 Executive Order states that the Secretary of CalEPA “shall” coordinate work to 
implement the climate goals with the Secretary of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency; 
Secretary of the Department of Food and Agriculture; Secretary of the Resources Agency; Chairperson of 
the Air Resources Board; Chairperson of the Energy Commission; and President of the Public Utilities 
Commission – or their representatives.  In practice, senior representatives of these different agencies are 
members  of  the  Climate  Action  Team.    See  the  latest  composition  of  the  team: 
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/climate_action_team/members.html [last accessed 12 December 2008]; 
latest Scoping Plan for AB32 cites a slightly larger set of agencies as part of the CAT, see CARB 2008c. 
91 The Resource Agency is a large umbrella agency with a broad mandate; its mission statement is:  “To 
restore, protect and manage the state's natural, historical and cultural resources for current and future Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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As Schwarzenegger’s election coincided with the intensive effort of rulemaking to implement the 
Pavley Bill, it was not an unreasonable to centralise the co-ordination of all climate activities 
under CalEPA, which already oversaw the CARB and thus indirectly the Pavley regulations. As 
John White pointed out:  “….about 30% of the reductions needed are coming from that [Pavley] 
law.” There was an interest by the Governor to ensure that it was people in his administration that 
would lead the charge on climate policy.  Adrienne Alvord said: “I'm not sure if Schwarzenegger 
had a particularly strong feeling about where the program should be, I think he just wanted to tap 
people in this administration.”  
Both the Governor’s 2005 Executive Order and the 2006 Assembly Bill 32 leave implementation 
details in the hands of senior civil servants.  As noted, the Governor’s Executive Order and his 
budget Bill in 2005 charged the California Environmental Protection Agency (CalEPA) with the 
coordination of recommendations and implementation of greenhouse gas mitigation strategies. 
CalEPA was to coordinate recommendations through a joint agency process, referred to as the 
Climate Action Team (see Box 6.2).  However, Assembly Bill 32 made an important change in 
who had the direct authority to implement the law. It acknowledged the role of the CalEPA and 
reaffirmed the role of the Climate Action Team under its guidance to continue in an advisory 
capacity, but it places the central coordinating role in the hands of the California Air Resources 
Board  (CA-Code 2006a).  The  law  also  sets  out  more  explicitly  a  wide  range  of  tasks  and 
functions and an explicit timeline for the implementation of the 2020 emission reduction targets. 
Thus  in  2006  the  California  Legislature  shifted  the  main  authority  for  coordination  and 
implementation of AB 32 to the CARB (and explicitly one-step away from CalEPA). The CARB 
would be responsible for designing and seeking agreement on a plan of implementation, and for 
enforcement and coordination amongst other state agencies and stakeholders to achieve the 2020 
GHG  target  (CA-Code  2006a).    Given  the  occasionally  tense  relationship  between  the 
Schwarzenegger  administration  and  the  Democratically  controlled  legislature,  this  shift  in 
authority  may  have  been  intended  to  ensure  the  regulatory  independence  of  rule-making  to 
implement climate policy.  Indeed, given differences between the legislature and the Governor in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
generations using creative approaches and solutions based on science, collaboration and respect for all the 
communities and interests involved.” In practice decision-making authority is devolved across 8 different 
Departments, 17 different Boards or Commissions and 9 different Conservancies – each with specific 
mandates  ranging  from  water  supply  and  nature  preservation  to  rule-making  concerning  hunting  and 
fishing and use of off-road vehicles.  Only the principal departmental actors are listed here. 
92 This includes most notably California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), which is responsible 
for California transportation planning and infrastructure. Caltrans is an active member of the CAT – see 
http://www.dot.ca.gov/climateaction.htm [last accessed 12 December 2008] . Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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the  preparation  of  the  Bill  (see  below),  this  organisational  shift  may  have  been  intended  to 
distance the rulemaking under the new law from direct control of the Governor’s office. 
In this “new” leadership role, the CARB is expected to demonstrate an ability to act swiftly and 
with authority to advance GHG mitigation policies across all sectors of the economy. The earliest 
actions taken by the CARB in 2007 demonstrate clear political tensions between the Governor’s 
office and the CARB regulators, who are now legally “in charge” of state-wide decision-making 
under the AB 32(Wilson 2007a; Wilson 2007b)(see Box 6.3).
93 An optimistic view is that these 
are growing pains and that CARB will be successful in providing the necessary leadership to 
bring about timely reforms. 
Although a number of those interviewed questioned the original decision to shift the locus of 
power away from the CEC, there was broad support and high enthusiasm amongst many policy 
elites and stakeholders about the Governor’s leadership on climate change. As Commissioner 
Boyd of the CEC put it: “we’re playing with politics here with a small ‘p.’  You have to strike 
while the iron is hot, you have to do what you can… when you have leadership as high as a 
governor or a state like this constantly willing to stand out there and push it, you push wherever 
you can.”  Amy Luers (UCS) also noted: “… Schwarzenegger has been incredible on climate 
issues… it’s really wonderful for the climate cause to have him be so vocal, not just here, not just 
for California, but also from an international perspective.”  Adrienne Alvord, legislative specialist 
in  Fran  Pavley’s  office,  offered  a  similar  view:  “…because  he's  a  Republican,  because  he's 
Schwarzenegger  and  world  famous  it  would  be  a  huge  step  forward  for  climate  policy  if 
Schwarzenegger took a strong position.”  The Governor’s leadership was thus seen as the critical 
element for change.  Once the leadership was established however, the legislature wanted to 
ensure that a politically independent body was in charge of rulemaking. 
                                                         
93 Evidence of this came in 2007, when Governor Schwarzenegger fired the Chairman of the California 
Air Resources Board, Bob Sawyer, immediately after a vote on “early actions” to move the state toward 
achievement of the 2020 GHG target (Wilson 2007a).  The Chairman voted in the minority against the 
slate of only three early action items, arguing that the decision was not strong enough.  Environmental 
organisations and some of the media agreed with the Chairman’s vote, criticising the Board’s first official 
GHG mitigation decision as weak (Mercury-News 2007). A senior official of CARB also resigned in 
protest,  citing  interference from the Schwarzenegger  administration with  the  Board’s decisions.   The 
administration is said to have lobbied Board members to support the slate of only three early actions 
(Wilson 2007b).  Mary Nichols was appointed by the Governor as Chairman of CARB in 2007; she is a 
respected regulator having served in various senior positions in the California government and with US 
EPA  as  Assistant  Administrator  under  the  Clinton  Administration,  where  she  had  responsibility  for 
implementation of the Clean Air Act, including the SO2 emission trading program.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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6.6.  Managing the transition -  early stages of aggressive mitigation policy 
Climate change policy thus began to emerge nearly two decades before the recent passage of 
AB32, with the first legislation in California focused on climate change passing in 1988.  Initial 
policy was focused on study of the issue of climate change, aiming to understand the risks it 
presented to California’s economy and its people, the range of causes and possible responses.  
However it was only later that policies moved forward to mitigate GHG, first through a separate 
law in 2002 to control vehicle emissions and then in 2003-2005 though regulatory decisions 
within the domain of energy policy. These early mitigation actions were further empowered by 
Governor  Schwarzenegger’s  leadership  which  emerged  clearly  in  June  2005  with  his 
announcement of climate mitigation goals to guide action in the State of California.  
The legislative action to codify state-wide mitigation goals for 2020, which came in 2006 with the 
passage of the AB-32 (see Chapter 4), responded to the concern that without a statute to make the 
targets legally-binding, little real policy reform would have followed the Executive Order of 
2005.  As Adrienne Alvord said: “if his [Governor Schwarzenegger’s] administration lost interest 
or he didn't feel like [pursuing] it anymore that we would lose whatever gain we might make 
through …programs.”  This translated into interest in the legislature to codify the Governor’s 
targets through law. It also served to provide an overarching policy framework for the wide range 
of sectoral initiatives. 
As noted in Chapter 4, in 2006 accompanying legislation also codified and broadened regulatory 
policies to cover all electric power operators, municipal and investor-owned utilities. Both the 
Perata and the Levine Bills built upon policies that were previously set out in the Joint Energy 
Action Plans (California 2003 and 2005), which were jointly developed by the CEC and the 
CPUC.    These  policies  were  later  elaborated  by  the  CPUC  through  its  regulation  of 
investor-owned electric utilities. This move demonstrates that the CEC and CPUC have been a 
testing ground for new ideas to move toward clean energy solutions that limit GHG emissions. 
They  also  show  the  value  of  early  leadership  in  regulatory  institutions  where  smaller  scale 
regulatory decisions were initially hammered out by the CEC and the CPUC in more narrow 
regulatory  contexts.  Interestingly,  these  ideas  have  become  regulatory  action  which  have 
eventually worked their way into law, and thus become a stable part of the long-term policy 
framework to address climate change in California.  These examples and others (see Box 6.3) 
demonstrate a back-and-forth relationship between different centres of authority in California, 
with ideas, experience and drivers of policy change at state-wide level often emanating from 
issue-based  decision-making  and  institutions  forming  a  web  of  polycentric  governance 
mechanisms. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Box 6.3: Moving climate-related policy forward: executive, legislative and administrative authority 
A  number  of  examples  demonstrate  the  back-and-forth  relationship  between  the  California 
Legislature, the Governor, and the leaders of state regulatory institutions to act with resolve on energy and 
environmental issues.  Even if an initiative fails legislatively there may be an opportunity to move it forward 
through  an  Executive  Order  of  the  Governor’s  Office  or  through  regulatory  decisions  under  existing 
authority in either the CPUC or the CEC in the power and energy sector. Two prominent examples are:  
  •  Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) was initially established in 2002 through state legislation 
setting out the requirement for 20% of the state’s electrical energy requirements to be met by 
renewable energy by 2017 (CA-Code 2002c). The CEC was authorised to implement the RPS.  
In 2003 the Energy Action Plan accelerated the RPS target year up to 2010, in part to address 
the  issue  of  climate  change  (CEC  2003b).  The  CPUC  is  advancing  this  target  through  its 
authority in the investor-owned utility sector (CPUC 2006c).   
  •  California Solar Initiative: Governor Schwarzenegger first announced this in his State of the 
State speech (California 2004a).  Working with the legislature, the Governor sponsored draft 
legislation  in 2005 to “encourage installation of  solar panel systems on one million new and 
existing homes over the next 13 years” (to 2017) (California 2004b), but this legislation did not 
pass immediately.  Meanwhile the Governor announced the intention to advance the programme 
(despite legislative delay) in February 2005 (California 2005g), and issued an Executive Order to 
this extent.  The CPUC and the CEC issued their Energy Action Plan II in 2005 (California 
2005e), supporting the programme, and the CPUC advanced work on the initiative, through its 
authority in the investor owned utilities sector, aiming to spend $2.8 Billion on solar photovoltaic 
technology for California rooftops over an 11-year period (2006-2016) (CPUC 2004d) (CPUC 
2006d).  As the CPUC was moving into final decision-making for the initiative, 2006 legislation 
passed to codify the initiative (CA-Code 2006e). The CPUC’s interim decisions on the initiative 
were adapted to conform to the law, including lowering slightly (to $2.1 Billion) the amount of 
spending associated with the CPUC part of the Initiative. The CPUC and CEC now actively work 
together to implement the initiative.  
Particularly  in  the  power  sector,  CPUC  decisions  have  led  state  legislative  action  with 
administrative  decisions  often  preceding  legislative  action;  the  latter  have  the  unique  advantage  of 
generalising the scope and broadening the applicability of the policy change. 
 
One of the points of contention in the legislative battle over Assembly Bill 32 was whether it 
would require GHG emission trading as a mandatory part of the implementation plan to achieve 
state-wide emission reductions. Although original drafts of the Act contained provisions requiring 
an emissions trading system, the final version did not. The Democratically dominated legislature 
opposed the requirement for emission trading while the Governor and “progressive” business (see 
Chapter 9) strongly supported it and this is still the case.  The law as adopted only requires CARB 
to consider emission trading as one of the options for implementation.  Interestingly, the Governor 
signed  Assembly  Bill  32  (AB32)  despite  opposition  from  much  of  the  Republican  business 
community. However, the Governor’s commitment to a cap and trade system is clear as stated in 
a more recent Executive Order (California 2006b), which states the Governor’s intent to establish 
an emission trading system, even though AB32 put the CARB in charge of such decisions (see Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  174 
Box 6.4). The Executive Order directs CalEPA to design such a cap and trade system with an eye 
to making the system compatible with other regional and international trading systems, i.e. in the 
EU and in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of the North-eastern states. In spite of this 
action, the Governor does not have the legal authority to require that the CARB to adopt an 
emission trading system as part of the implementation plan (see Box 6.4).
94 
6.7. Conclusion 
The early stages of climate policy in California follow a pattern that is familiar at national scale, 
one that begins with study of the nature of the climate problem, moving on to document and 
inventory emissions, finally to assess mitigation solutions, set goals and design and implement 
policies.  Early policy actions to address climate change began modestly to build institutional 
capacity in this area by targeting research, dialogue, inventorying through the CEC and entity-
level voluntary reporting through the public private partnership of the CCAR.  This was followed 
by more aggressive mitigation policy which is firmly anchored in prior regulatory capacity to 
control air pollution from motor vehicles and to steer investments in the energy sector towards 
clean energy systems, including energy efficiency (see Chapter 5; also Box 6.1).  
More recently California legislation has established a broad-based state-wide policy framework to 
address climate change and this has been accompanied by a number of organisational changes to 
shift power and authority into “new” locations within state government.  With climate change 
clearly on the  policy  agenda, the nature  of  decision-making  needed  to  transition  away  from 
consultation and awareness raising -- the main prior approach within the CEC -- to more active 
regulatory decision-making to implement new and reformed policies and programmes to limit 
emissions.    Moving  from  consultation  to  policymaking,  the  regulatory  orientation  of  CARB 
combined with the convening authority of Cal EPA, offered an opportunity for leadership under 
Governor Schwarzenegger to take hold and move policy forward on climate change in a timely 
manner.  
                                                         
94 In December 2008 the CARB adopted the “implementation plan” for AB 32.  Interestingly it does 
foresee a cap and trade system, phased in to cover roughly 85% of California’s total emissions by 2020 
(CARB 2008c). It outlines this system as part of a broader multi-state effort to establish a regional cap 
and trade programme – through the Western Climate Initiative – where California commits to work with 
other  western  states  and  Canadian  provinces  to  limit  emissions  by  15%  (compared  to  2005  levels) 
(WRCAI 2007; see also http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ [last accessed 12 December 2008]).    Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Box 6.4: To trade or not to trade?  Early action to implement AB 32  
Implementation of AB 32 has only  just begun and the initial  year following  the Act’s passage 
indicates the nature of the unprecedented challenges before the CARB, which has lead responsibility.  A 
central issue and point of tension between the Governor’s Office and the legislature in the passage of the 
Act was: what role for GHG emission trading? The language of the Act favours a regulatory approach and 
although not inconsistent with emission trading, it relegates trading to a subsidiary and optional role within 
the broader mix of instruments.95  Ultimately the Act establishes regulatory authority under the CARB to do 
the rulemaking that will decide the mix of instruments to be used to implement the target.   
The Governor seemed to defy the California legislature, and the language of the Act, when he 
issued  an  Executive  Order  shortly  after  its  passage,  calling  for  a  “comprehensive  market-based 
compliance” programme and permit trading between California and other regional partners (e.g. Europe 
and RGGI) and establishing a clearer role for administration (through the Secretary of CalEPA) in the 
decision-making  process  for  implementation  of  the  Act  (California  2006b).  Two  prominent  legislative 
leaders, Senate President Pro Tem Don Perata and the Speaker of the House (and co-author of AB 32) 
Fabio Nunez, immediately challenged the validity of this Executive Order (Perata 2006).  This exchange 
on implementation of the Act became even more contentious and public in July 2007 when the Governor 
fired Chair of the Board (CARB), Bob Sawyer, following the first round of decision-making to implement 
the act.  This led to the resignation of CARB chief of staff Catherine Witherspoon.  Both Sawyer and 
Witherspoon publicly accused the Governor’s Office of interfering with the decisions of CARB and of trying 
to control outcomes of the “independent” Board, which has a long history of independent regulatory action.   
Emission trading in California is controversial due to active opposition from the environmental 
justice (EJ) community and past experience with this market mechanism.  The EJ community has argued 
that trading may lead to a delay in clean-up of the state’s most polluting facilities, which are often nearest 
the  most  poor  and  vulnerable  of  the  population.  Also,  past  experience  with  market  mechanisms  in 
California has  led to some notable policy  failures and made regulators wary of over-reliance on  the 
markets to control emissions (e.g. 2000-01 electricity crisis and NOx emission trading) (see Dwyer 1993 on 
the latter).   
Central  to  this  dispute  is  the  role  of  market-based  versus  more  traditional  regulatory 
approaches in the implementation of Assembly Bill 32.  Moreover there is a legitimate question about the 
balance of powers between the Governor and his office and the legislature.  While it is the legislature that 
represents the citizens of California in passage of such a law, the implementation language remains 
relatively open.  In conferring authority to implement to an “independent” regulatory body, the CARB, the 
legislature  intended  to  limit  the  influence  of  the  Governor’s  Office  in  those  decisions.  However  the 
Governor still has the power to appoint (and terminate appointments) to the Board, calling into question 
the independence of the Board itself (Wilson 2007a; Wilson 2007b). 
Through  these  early  actions  states  and  their  institutions  are  positioning  with  knowledge  and 
experience that will inevitably influence the shape of federal action to come. There is already 
some evidence, for example from the California Climate Action Registry, that early action to 
develop tools and advance institutional innovation can be transferred more broadly to other states 
                                                         
95 It is important to note that earlier versions of the language of the Bill contained a requirement for the 
use of emission trading as a central instrument for implementation.  Although supported by the Governor, 
this version failed to pass the California legislature. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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and help  to join  states  in  common  action.  Similarly there is an  expectation that  California’s 
vehicle CO2 emission rules will be ultimately approved and have an important influence across 
the US, despite the delay caused opposition from the Bush administration. These examples show 
that the issue of scale has become an important source of political argument in favour of action at 
sub-national state level. In this way, scale considerations are shaping the way that leaders and 
organisations are  addressing  climate  change  in  California  and  elsewhere in the  US  (see  also 
Chapter 9). 
Finally, the chapter shows clear evidence of a back-and-forth relationship between institutional, 
administrative rulemaking under pre-existing administrative authority in areas of energy policy 
and air pollution control, on the one hand, and new state legislation on the other (see Box 6.3).  
This derives in part  in the issue-based  governance  that  exists in  California,  where  relatively 
independent institutions exist to govern different aspects of the problem, e.g. for entity-level 
voluntary reporting in the California Climate Action Registry, the California Air Resources Board 
overseeing the vehicle sector and air pollution more generally, the California Energy Commission 
overseeing the regulation of energy efficiency through its appliance and building standards, and 
the California Public Utilities Commission regulating the investor-owned utilities.  Interestingly 
this polycentric governance structure has allowed innovative, sector- or issue-based policy to 
emerge relatively quickly – within existing regulatory authority -- to design and test innovative 
policy solutions in advance of more complex and comprehensive state-wide policy packages.  
Climate change policy in California is taking shape but it is relatively new. As John White said, it 
is “…a fragile policy, it’s not a robust policy yet.” The preceding discussion suggests that the 
early start on climate policy in California is intimately linked to its previous pro-active socio-
environmental history, to its past successes, experimentation and social learning in policy arenas, 
which in turn connected to polycentric, multilevel governance in areas related to climate change, 
notably on air pollution, and energy efficiency.  
This short history leaves open many questions about whether and how “California is different” in 
the way it is approaching climate change policy. The next two chapters explore the climate policy 
discourse in California in some depth looking at the interface between policy decision-making 
and expert knowledge is further explored in-depth.  These chapters focus in particular on co-
construction of the arguments for policy change.  In particular, they consider how the climate 
change problem and policy solutions are framed in the policy debate, what argument and evidence 
is drawn upon to support state policy decisions, and on the range of actors and interests supporting 
these arguments.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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7.  FRAMING THE CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM AS 
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
7.1.  Introduction  
This chapter outlines one of two dominant framings of climate change in the mitigation policy 
discourse in California: a policy frame that defines the problem of climate change as one of local 
environmental risk.  This frame focuses on climate change impacts in California.  It is coupled 
with a second policy frame, which is explored in-depth in the next chapter, focusing on “win-win” 
policy  solutions  where  mitigation  policies  are  presented  as  having  both  environmental  and 
economic benefits.  
Acting to limit climate change will rely at least in part upon the ability to construct persuasive 
arguments and compile compelling evidence about the nature of the threat of climate change and 
about the belief that policy will make a difference. Of course there are competing narratives or 
policy frames and no single, correct interpretation of the “facts” (Majone 1984; Hawkesworth 
1988; Schön and Rein 1994).  Particularly with the multilevel governance dimensions of climate 
change, a central research challenge is to understand how tension is resolved over contested 
meanings and frames for interpretation in any decision-making context (within and across scales) 
across a wide range of relevant actors and organisations (Chapter 3).  Also, it is important to 
consider carefully the context for climate decision-making, along side of the scientific information 
relevant to the problem (Chapter 1).  However, what counts as relevant in the policy process is 
determined to some extent by the policy frames that are used or, as Miller (2000: 211) states, the 
“perceptual lenses, worldviews or underlying assumptions that guide communal interpretation and 
definition of particular issues.”  
This analysis focuses on the evidence and argument used to co-construct the local environmental 
risk policy frame in California. Thus it situates the discussion in a co-constructionist conceptual 
framework that combines the strengths of realist, scientific discovery on one hand with contextual 
insights and lay knowledge on the other.  In this conceptual framework, social processes mediate 
meanings of global warming to interpret scientific and expert knowledge in a political context for 
decision-making (Jasanoff 1990; Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Woodgate and Redclift 1998).  This 
occurs in culturally specific ways to shape understandings of climate change in the policy process 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The  analysis  also  aims  to  build  on  the  previous  chapters  to  understand  how  knowledge, 
preferences and social norms are shifting over time to respond to climate change to consider 
opportunities for social learning.  In addition to the role of different types of knowledge, it looks 
at networks of influence and power across different types of actors, sub-politics and the possibility 
for meaningful action to emerge from the “bottom up” on the basis of co-constructed meanings of 
climate change.   The chapter explores in particular science-policy interactions and an emerging 
epistemic network that supports decision-making in California, drawing expertise and political 
support from non-governmental actors as well as the expert community. 
The chapter begins with a general review of historical arguments for climate policy starting with 
developments in the US and internationally in the 1980s to provide a contextual backdrop for 
similar yet more localised action in California.  This is followed by an in-depth discussion of the 
local environmental risk policy frame and a discussion of the types of knowledge and evidence 
used  to  construct  this  frame  in  California.  The  chapter  traces  the  development  of  expert 
knowledge on climate change impacts in the California context as the evidentiary basis for claims 
about  climate  change  as  local  environmental  risk.    It  also  assesses  the  role  of  experiential 
knowledge, or local context, in interpreting this expert knowledge in California, both within the 
climate policy process and more broadly across lay publics.  In this way I explore additional 
cultural and contextual factors in California that have helped to shape climate change policy in the 
public sphere.  These themes are further developed in Chapter 8 with respect to the second policy 
frame  – win-win policy responses. 
7.2. Climate change as environmental risk: early developments 
The 1980-90s in the US marked a period when a number of scientific, political, institutional and 
media trends converged to propel climate change clearly into the public sphere from its previous 
status as a largely scientific issue (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007; Table 7.1).  First, science was 
increasingly being designed and used for policy purposes, on issues of global environmental 
change, and particularly in the area of climate change (Agrawala 1999). For example, in 1983, 
two  US  government  sponsored  science  reports  were  issued  however  each  had  conflicting 
conclusions about the need for policy action to address global warming.  A US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) (1983) report stressed the urgency of dealing with global warming 
problems, while a National Academy of Sciences report saw no need for immediate steps despite 
concern about the issue (NAS 1983).   These initially conflicting viewpoints eventually converged 
in increasingly consensual science-policy recommendations to support policymaking in the US 
(Hart and Victor 1993; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007). Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Second, significant US policy action on climate change advanced in this period. By 1988 the 
United States Congress was debating details of legislation to address climate change through the 
window of energy policy; by 1992, The National Energy Policy Act was signed into law by 
President  Bush  (Sr)  (Hecht  and  Tirpak  1995).      This  followed  earlier  US  legislation 
acknowledging climate change as a policy problem (i.e. the US National Climate Act of 1978 set 
up the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - NOAA).  
Third, the 1980s brought important scientific discoveries that clearly linked human activity to 
global environmental wellbeing (e.g. in addition to climate change, acid rain and stratospheric 
ozone) (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007). This decade ushered in a new set of concerns grounded in 
scientific knowledge about global environmental issues, and these were the subject of increasing 
press  coverage  (Mazur  1988;  Mazur  and  Lee  1993)  and  attention  from  non-governmental 
environmental organisations (Liverman 1999). This was also a period of rapid expansion of the 
membership and influence of environmental organisations in leading OECD countries (Brulle 
2000).  
Fourth, international attention also began to turn to the issue of climate change in the 1980s.  A 
series  of landmark international  scientific  conferences  were  organised  by  UNEP,  WMO  and 
ICSU in Villach, Austria and Belagio, Italy between 1980 and 1987.  These meetings brought 
policymakers together with scientists to debate the policy implications of climate change. In 1988, 
another turning point came in the Canadian-hosted international conference on the “Changing 
Atmosphere:  Implications  for  Global  Security”  concluded  with  a  non-binding  statement  of 
government participants to work towards a 20% reduction in CO2 emission reduction by 2005 
compared to 1988 (WMO/OMM 1988). This was a significant political development as it was the 
first international meeting of western governments to call for restrictions on greenhouse emissions 
(Hecht and Tirpak 1995). It was the first of what was to become a series of inter-governmental 
meetings to call for international action to mitigate climate change (e.g. Noordwijk, Netherlands 
1989; 2
nd World Climate Conference 1990). As noted in Chapter 2, the IPCC was created in 1988 
by the UNEP and WMO to lead international scientific cooperation on climate change and in 
particular to conduct coordinated assessment of impacts and response strategies (Agrawala 1998; 
Bodansky 1994). 
Finally, tracing developments from Stockholm in 1972 to Rio de Janeiro in 1992, indicates a shift 
in  environmental  attention  from  local  and  regional  issues  to  global  issues,  which  was  also 
accompanied by a broadening of the environmental debate to include participation in international 
negotiations from a range of previously unheard voices (Liverman 1999; Shabecoff 1996).  These 
voices  extended  beyond  business  and  scientific  communities  to  include  environmental  non-Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  180 
governmental organisations, women and local communities as well as social scientists. Shabecoff 
(1996) highlights the end of the 1980s as a turning point where there was a fundamental shift in 
the appreciation for the inter-linkages between economic wellbeing and the environment. Rio was 
a landmark event as it confirmed a shift in understanding amongst developing and developed 
nations alike that local and global environmental issues were central to international relations, 
security and development. 
In the California context, by the late 1980s the first climate change legislation had passed and the 
CEC  had  begun  to  develop  climate  change  projections  and  assess  impacts  in  the  California 
context (see Chapter 6).  A number of publications also brought attention to the potential risks of 
climate change for the California economy pointing in particular to vulnerability in the water 
sector as well as to increased risk of forest fires and sea level rise (Gleick 1987a; Gleick 1987b; 
Smith and Tirpak 1989).  These included prominent attention to California’s vulnerability in the 
first US national assessment of climate change impacts (Smith and Tirpak 1989) as well as more 
focused academic research on particular issues, such as in the area of water resources (Gleick 
1987a; Gleick 1987b). 
By the mid 1990s, the US federal agency – the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
-- had established a Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (RISA) programme and set up 
a regional centre in California to support state of the art scientific assessment (NOAA CPO 
2008).
96    This  was  located  at  the  well-known  Scripps  Institution  of  Oceanography  of  the 
University of California at San Diego.
97  Later in the mid-2000s, research funding from the State 
of California PIER programme for the California Climate Change Centre, was combined with 
federal research funding from NOAA for the RISA centre – known as the California Applications 
Program (CAP) -- to create an even stronger research capacity in the state for regional climate 
assessment. The 2006 annual report from the CAP reports on the aim of the research (Cayan 
2006): 
The  California  Applications  Program  (CAP)  and  the 
California Climate Change Center (CCCC) aim to develop and provide 
                                                         
96 Franco et al. (2008) also note that other federal research funding was available in this period, notably 
from US DOE for decade-to-century scale climate projections in the western US region. 
97 It is important to note that Scripps has historically been and remains today a powerhouse in scientific 
research circles on climate change. Some of the earliest scientific research on climate change emerged 
from Scripps led by scientist Roger Revelle; Revelle was one of the leaders in the scientific community 
that advanced tools to track climate change over time, starting in the 1950s, and later to suggest that it 
might be a policy-relevant problem. See Hart & Victor 1993; Weart 2003; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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better  climate  information  and  forecasts  for  decision  makers  in 
California and the surrounding region. Applications addressed include 
problems involving water resources, wildfire, and human health. Time 
scales of interest range from seasonal to secular changes associated 
with natural and anthropogenic influences. By working directly with 
users  and  practitioners,  CAP  and  CCCC  are  working  to  evaluate 
climate information needs and utility from the user perspective. 
This research platform has provided the State of California (and other regional decision-makers) 
with timely, region-specific scientific impact assessment, which, in turn, has become an important 
source of argument and evidence in the policy debate in California.   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Table 7.1: Key international and national developments in climate change across 
scientific, political, media and environmental movement domains: 1980-2000 
  Late 1970s/1980s  1990s 
Science  Ozone hole discovered (85) 
Concern about abrupt climate change emerges 
from paleoclimatology 
Observed GMT data show rapid global warming. 
Contested nature of climate science emerges.  
IPCC 1988 report establishes 
scientific basis for policy concern. 
IPCC second scientific assessment 
confirms human fingerprint on the 
Earth’s climate (1998).  
Political debate about the “hockey 
stick” millennium trend in GMT 
(1998 ongoing…). 
Leadership & 
key political 
events, 
institutional 
developments 
1979: OPEC oil embargo 
Early 80s: Science-policy advice split about the 
need for immediate climate policy action 
1980-87: Villach and Belagio Conferences. 
1987: Montreal Protocol on stratospheric ozone 
[check] 
Late 80s: scientific-policy advice converges on 
the gravity of global warming problem and 
need for policy attention. 
1988: Toronto statement – governments pledge 
to achieve CO2 emission reductions 
1988: WMO/UNEP (governments) create IPCC 
1990: UNGA resolution begins international 
negotiations on climate change  
2nd World Climate Conference 
calls for a Convention 
1992 Framework Convention: 
enters into force 1994.  
1997 Kyoto Protocol: entry into 
force 2005.  
Policy gap widens: scientific 
consensus on scale and 
magnitude of problem, & need to 
respond vs. limited levels and 
types of policy action.  
Media coverage  Political construction of climate change as a risk 
problem and as part of broader set of global 
environmental changes 
Climate change linked to energy (e.g. follow on 
from 1970s energy crises).  
1981: Hansen in NYT links observed warming 
trends and extremes to human causes. 
High level of media attention 
returns – focusing on sense of 
urgency, problem-solving 
Climate change increasingly linked 
to extreme events (heat waves, 
fires, drought) 
Environmental 
social 
movement 
Massive growth in the environmental movement 
Acid rain, ozone, global climate change become 
emblematic issues 
Recognition of global environmental risks and 
rise in multilateral environmental cooperation 
Progressive business goes “green.” 
Environmental movement 
increasingly institutionalized, 
politically fractured and weak. 
Action on climate change 
characterised by 
transnational/international action, 
working from within policy 
institutional processes. 
US policy 
developments 
1978, US National Climate Act passed, 
establishes National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 
1983, two US government-sponsored science 
reports have conflicting conclusions about the 
need for climate policy action global warming 
1988 the United States Congress debates 
legislation to address climate change through 
the window of energy policy 
1992 – National Energy Policy Act 
signed into law 
Mid-1990s – NOAA establishes 
Regional Integrated Sciences and 
Assessments programme 
California policy 
developments 
1988 Sher legislation on climate change  1998 deregulation of the electricity 
industry 
2000 – CCAR established 
 
Source: adapted from Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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7.3.  Climate change problem as regional environmental risk 
The  political  debate  on  climate  change  in  California  has  drawn  upon  extensive  research  on 
regional impact, using this as a source of evidence in the construction of argument on the need to 
act.  In anticipation of the 2006 legislative debate to come, the Governor’s 2005 Executive Order 
called for a new comprehensive report on the science of climate change.  This report argued that 
California was particularly vulnerable to climate change in many ways and this, in turn, became a 
foundation for arguments that California’s particular exposure and vulnerability to climate change 
called for state level action, particularly given the void of federal action to address the problem. 
In the documents that accompany and support the policy debate in California, including the media 
of this period, climate change is often represented as a threat to human well-being and to natural 
systems    (e.g. see  (Bustillo  2004;  Luers  et al.  2006).  This  framing  is  apparent  in  Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s initial announcement of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, when he 
said: “I say the debate is over.  We know the science.  We see the threat and the time for action is 
now”(California 2005b). In this view, climate change is associated with already observable and 
predicted impacts, both in California, across the United States and abroad.  
The active framing of climate change as a regional environmental risk problem by California 
policymakers is apparent in the language used to support recent policy initiatives.  This includes 
the Governor’s Executive Order (California 2005a), however, a similar framing is set out in recent 
state climate change legislation, notably in the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 
(GWSA)  (CA-Code  2006a).    In  particular,  the  AB  32  includes  a  passage  of  “findings  and 
declarations” that highlights the threat of global warming to California.  Table 7.2 highlights the 
language used in each of these areas to frame the argument that climate change is a problem of 
environmental risk in California.   
The science of environmental issues is frequently contested, and this has certainly been part of the 
public debate about climate change in the United States and elsewhere (see Chapter 2). The 
impacts of climate change play out through complex interactions between human and natural 
systems. It is broadly recognised within the scientific community that there will be a mix of 
impacts of climate change, some positive and some negative.  This is particularly the case if 
cost-effective adaptation measures are taken to ensure that potential benefits from climate change, 
for example in the agriculture sector, are captured (Field et al. 1999; Hayhoe et al. 2004; Smith 
and Mendelsohn 2007; Wilson et al. 2003).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Table 7.2: Climate Policy Discourse in California: Climate Change as an Environmental 
Risk Problem 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order 
(S-3-05) (California 2005a) - Excerpts 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (CA-Code 
2006a) – Excerpts 
Policy-Relevant Conclusions 
California  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  the 
impacts of climate change 
Mitigation efforts will be necessary to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation efforts 
will be necessary to prepare Californians for the 
consequences of global warming 
Global  warming  poses  a  serious  threat  to  the 
economic  well-being,  public  health,  natural 
resources, and the environment of California.  
National and international actions are necessary 
to  fully  address  the  issue  of  global  warming. 
However,  action  taken  by  California  to  reduce 
emissions  of  greenhouse  gases  will  have 
far-reaching effects by encouraging other states, the 
federal government, and other countries to act. 
Impacts Evidence: Climate Change Risk in California 
Increased temperatures threaten to greatly reduce 
the  Sierra  snowpack,  one  of  the  State’s  primary 
sources of water 
Increased  temperatures  also  threaten  to  further 
exacerbate  California’s  air  quality  problems  and 
adversely  impact  human  health  by  increasing  heat 
stress and related deaths, the incidence of infectious 
disease, and the risk of asthma, respiratory and other 
health problems 
Rising sea levels threaten California’s 1,100 miles 
of valuable coastal real estate and natural habitats 
The  combined  effects  of  an  increase  in 
temperatures and diminished water supply and quality 
threaten to alter micro-climates within the state, affect 
the  abundance  and  distribution  of  pests  and 
pathogens, and result in variations in crop quality and 
yield. 
The  potential  adverse  impacts  of  global 
warming include the exacerbation of air quality 
problems, a reduction in the quality and supply 
of water to the state from the Sierra snowpack, 
a  rise  in  sea  levels  resulting  in  the 
displacement  of  thousands  of  coastal 
businesses and residences, damage to marine 
ecosystems and the natural environment, and 
an  increase  in  the  incidences  of  infectious 
diseases,  asthma,  and  other  human 
health-related problems. 
On an issue like climate change, where science findings will always be characterised by some 
degree of uncertainty and ambiguity about distant outcomes, political leadership is necessary to 
make the issue tractable.  Policy will need to move ahead despite inevitable uncertainties. As 
Terry Tamminen noted:  “Sometimes that’s what it takes... for some leader to stand up and say: ‘I 
know you, the vast majority of the public, have other things on your mind.  I’m telling you I’ve 
looked at this, and the debate is over.  We’ve got to act.  There’s a real threat.’”  Jeffrey Calliston, 
host of a public radio programme on policy in California, underscored his general understanding Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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of climate change and the debate about science: “I have posed the question several times when 
we’ve had guests, scientific guests....every scientist I’ve ever spoken to has said the consensus 
among scientists is that it’s caused by humans. … and that’s basically California’s position: that 
it’s human-caused.”  
These statements suggest that there was great value in leadership from the Governor, especially in 
the face of contested-science of climate change. They also suggest that local environmental risk 
framing helped to cut through the ambiguity about what climate change would mean to the future 
of the state and its people.  It defined climate change as a “threat” that required a preventive, risk 
management response.  
The State of California has demonstrated a relatively long-standing interest in research on climate 
change and its impacts as well as on clean energy technologies and practices (such as energy 
conservation and demand management) dating back in policy terms to the original 1988 Sher 
legislation.  For example, climate expert and Staff Scientist at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 
Norm Miller said  “…there’s been a lot of research through the California Energy Commission, 
which has had its own research program for years now, and historically California has set a 
precedent at least nationwide if not internationally on progressing certain attitudes and change.” 
This in-state research capacity, part of which is funded federally, and base of expert knowledge 
appears  to  have  contributed  to  widespread  media  coverage  and  public  understanding  of  the 
potential  for  climate  change  to  have  serious  physical  and  economic  impacts  in  the  State  of 
California.  Also through the epistemic network that surrounds and supports expert knowledge 
development on climate change, state government support for policy-relevant research may also 
have helped to deliver bipartisan political support for policy action to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
7.4.  California mobilises impact science as evidence  
The Governor’s Executive Order had called for a new scientific report on the nature of climate 
change and its impacts in California, also to be coordinated by the Secretary of CalEPA under the 
oversight of the Climate Action Team (CAT) and it was this report which would become an 
important piece of empirical evidence in the lead up to the legislative debate in 2006.  The report 
was to be delivered in the same timeframe as the policy recommendations – by January 2006.  
The Executive Order required (California 2005b): “…That the Secretary shall also report to the 
Governor and the State Legislature by January 2006 and biannually thereafter on the impacts to 
California of global warming, including impacts to water supply, public health, agriculture, the Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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coastline, and forestry, and shall prepare and report on mitigation and adaptation plans to combat 
these impacts.”  
In addition to announcing GHG targets as part of a new policy initiative on climate change, the 
Governor’s Executive Order thus also called for an assessment of climate change impacts in 
California.  Terry Tamminen, the Governor’s energy and environmental advisor, explained why. 
In his view the Governor’s Executive Order was intimately linked to a view about the “threat” of 
climate change.  He said:  “I do think you’ve got to tell people why you should care about this. 
And  if there  is going  to be some short-term  economic pain  -  a tax  or  a reduction  of  doing 
something you’re currently doing – why are we asking you to do that?  I think it’s incumbent on 
government  to  explain  that  and  be  accountable  for  it.”  Michael  Hanemann,  a  UC  Berkeley 
Professor  and  one of the principal  researchers  responsible  for  delivery  of  the  new  evidence, 
confirmed this view. The impact report was necessary to the policy process because  “…[it] is 
important to emphasize why these emissions targets make sense.” Accordingly the Governor used 
the Executive Order to both call for action and for “new” evidence about why firm action was 
needed.   
The Governor’s Executive Order had the effect of putting regional impact science research at the 
centre of the policy process. Suddenly this research was needed to offer concrete evidence to 
support the Governor’s bolder climate policy direction and emission reduction targets at the state 
level. In practice, delivering a new scientific impact assessment for the Governor’s initiative was 
a significant challenge. Since the beginning at least the mid-1990s, the local scientific research 
community had been slowly contributing to the growing body of evidence about how climate 
change was affecting California and would likely play out in the future. Up until this point, most 
of the large research community working on different dimensions of regional climate impact 
assessment in California had been working at arm’s length from the political process and they 
were not necessarily working in concerted manner.   
Professor Michael Hanemann was part of a three-person team to coordinate the impact assessment 
that was to feed into the 2005-2006 policy process under the Governor’s Executive Order. He 
commented on how difficult newly agreed short-term deadlines were to satisfy.  The deadlines 
met with significant opposition from the academic community that was expected to deliver on 
them. Michael Hanemann said: “... everybody sort of freaked out and said, ‘This is 6 months and 
there’s no way we can do this.’ So [we] worked to calm people and we persuaded them that, you 
know, it’s worth the effort.”   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Michael Hanemann reflected on the reasons to deliver “new” evidence of climate change impacts 
in the California context in a very compressed timeline.  He said: “Of course, everybody said: ‘So 
why the end of January?  What’s wrong with the end of February?  What’s magic about January?’  
And there were two answers.  One answer was the Governor said the end of January and the 
Governor is not going to change.  Only wimps miss deadlines.  But why did the Governor say the 
end of January?  Well, the answer is the legislature was assembling around then and so I think, 
it’s part of this, the Governor wanted to turn it over to the legislature and then let them deal with it 
and so he didn’t want to be running into the legislative session.”   
Thus it seems that the Governor’s eye may have been not only on gathering political support for 
his own targets and on specific plans to implement them, but also on the legislative session that 
was about to feature debate and voting on a number of important pieces of new legislation relating 
to climate change.
98  Most important among these was the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 
32), which was signed into law in September 2006 (see Box 6.1 and Chapter 5). Also at this time, 
the California legislature was debating other proposals that would, if passed, affect greenhouse 
gas emissions from the electricity and transport sectors, covering issues ranging from investment 
in energy efficiency to cleaner power plants and biofuels. The Governor’s interest in expanding 
and updating the evidence about the impacts of climate change would provide scientific evidence 
to  support  his  call  for  targets,  but  would  also  potentially  bolster  support  for  the  proposed 
legislative action on climate change.   
7.4.1.  Bringing in the impact science 
How  did  a  regional  environmental  risk  framing  become  a  dominant  element  of  the  policy 
discourse and process in California?  To understand the answer to this question it is important to 
trace  the  construction  of  scientific  knowledge  and  evidence  on  climate  change  impacts  in 
California, identify who has supported this research and why, and how the research been used in 
the  policy  process  over  time.    Expert  knowledge  about  regional  climate  change  impacts  in 
California appears to be particularly strong compared to other regions of the United States and 
beyond.  It derives from not just one or two studies, but from a series of in-depth regional impact 
assessments that  began  in  the late  1990s.    It  also  emerges  from  a  continuous  investment  in 
scientific research by the state government.   
                                                         
98 As outlined in Chapter 6, it was well known that Fran Pavley would co-sponsor legislation to address 
the issue of statewide targets to reduce GHG emissions; early drafts of such legislation were delayed to 
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Since the late 1990s, at least five distinct and different full assessments have been carried out, 
each with a slightly different cast of authors and with slightly different objectives and audiences 
in mind (Table 7.3).  Of course, each assessment has built on previous work, and this layering of 
assessments, with cross-over in authors and research institutions appears to have facilitated a 
learning  process  that  has  improved  both  the  technical  quality  of  the  research  and  its 
policy-relevance over time. Governor Schwarzenegger’s call for “new” evidence must be seen in 
the context of prior attention by the state government, and in particular by the CEC’s Public 
Interest Energy Research programme, as well as by the environmental advocacy community in 
California to climate impact assessment. 
Climate  change  impact  assessment  at  regional  scale  is  technically  complex,  expensive  and 
time-consuming to carry out.  This is in part because it requires significant resources to support 
climate change modelling as input to structure the analysis.  Another factor that raises the cost and 
complexity of impact assessment is that it is data-intensive and requires modelling capacity to 
integrate  local  and  regional  socio-economic,  demographic  and  environmental  data  and 
projections.  There  is  thus  a  need  to  gather  local  data  and  develop  predictions  about 
socio-economic factors that determine patterns of local development and demand for resources 
that will be affected by climate change e.g. historical and predicted water demands, agricultural 
and urban development trends, and land use.  A full assessment of climate change impacts in any 
region  requires  the  integration  of  many  different  types  of  knowledge  and  expertise,  several 
different types of models, ranging from atmospheric and oceanic science to regional ecology 
assessments,  geographic  analysis  and  economic  modelling  (Parson  and  Fisher-Vanden  1997; 
Shackley and Wynne 1995). Coordination of climate impact assessment in any regional context is 
a large and complex undertaking.  It is a relatively new area of environmental research that 
requires the construction of new visions or scenarios of the future or socio-economic scenarios. 
The timeframe to perform such a climate change impact assessment is necessarily longer than 
what would be typical for a “policy analysis” exercise.  The long-time frames for assessment also 
mean that it is difficult to use off-the-shelf predictions or economic forecasts to support other 
types of decision-making. 
California regional science and impact assessments have benefited in recent years from public 
funding  from  the  state  government,  with  this  funding  layering  into  a  strong  base  of  federal 
research funding (see section 7.2). In large part this has occurred through the Public Interest 
Energy  Research  (PIER)  programme.  PIER  climate  change  research  has  two  main  strands: 
climate  change  modelling  and  impacts;  and  climate  change  policy  analysis  and  economic 
modelling (Franco et al. 2003). PIER funding is gathered through an earmarked public goods Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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surcharge on electricity and a share of the revenues are administered by the CEC to support 
climate change research.  Over the last few years this programme has funded climate change 
research at a level of about $4-6 million per year (see discussion Chapter 5).
99  
In a first comprehensive review by an independent review panel, the Panel noted the importance 
of the PIER research in contributing to California’s policymaking process (CCST 2005): “The 
promise of the PIER program is that it can cast its activities in the context of California’s unique 
environmental, economic, and demographic forces.” 
Another important factor in accumulating evidence about climate change impacts in California is 
the availability of significant expertise and capacity in various institutions across the state.  This 
includes California’s world-class public university system (University of California with its 10 
separate campuses across the state), at least three other world-renowned private universities (the 
California  Institute  of  Technology,  Stanford  University  and  the  University  of  Southern 
California).    It  also  includes  significant  expertise  and  applied  research  capacity  within  the 
government institutions of the state (e.g. on air pollution, energy water and agriculture impacts) 
and  other  specialised  scientific  research  institutions  (e.g. Lawrence  Berkeley  and  Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratories).  
Table 7.3 shows that the reports issued under the Governor’s Executive Order are part of a longer 
series of reports on impacts in California. Further these reports draw on a base of scientific 
literature and some earlier national assessments, most of which was federally-funded scientific 
research on climate change in the western US (Guido et al. 2008; NOAA CAP 2008; Smith and 
Tirpak 1989). Thus this recent work adds a new layer of information to prior work in this area and 
focuses it specifically on California impacts.  All reports have served a role to communicate 
information on the risks of climate change.  Aside from documenting the nature of predicted 
impacts  associated  with  climate  change,  they  have  provided  opportunities  for  more  active 
exchange between authors and other members of the scientific community on the one hand, and 
the  state  officials  and  other  members  of  the  policy  community  on  the  other,  as  a  principal 
audience for the assessments.  Norm Miller explained the “communication” function that began 
with the earliest assessments in 1999. When asked how the findings of the assessments were 
communicated to policymakers, he responded:  “We have scheduled meetings with legislators and 
their aides. We talk to them about specific topics related to our findings.  When the ’99 paper 
                                                         
99 As noted in Chapter 5, the PIER programme covers more than just climate change, extending also to 
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came out, Christ and I and Pam Matsen spent two days going all over the place – and when the 
’01 paper
100 came out, we did it again and when the ’04 with Hayhoe came out, we did it again.”   
Many of the senior policymakers interviewed for this project referred to these briefings on climate 
change impacts by scientists as a turning point for their understanding of climate change as a 
policy-relevant issue. The briefings offered an interactive exchange in a small, intimate setting 
between  scientists  and  policymakers.  The  recognition  of  these  briefings  among  policy  elite 
demonstrates the power of a recursive, analytic-deliberative exchange to enhance understanding 
and influence policymaking (Stern and Fineberg 1996).  The briefings provided the opportunity 
for scientists and experts to interact in small groups and to discuss and exchange views at key 
moments in a decision-making process. 
To understand the influence of scientific impact assessment, it is valuable to fully explore how 
expert  knowledge  was  constructed  in  the  California  region,  and  where  and  how 
deliberative-analytic outreach occurred over time to communicate and build understanding of the 
results. 
7.4.2.  1999 UCS study -- gets the attention of decision-makers 
The  first  assessment  of  climate  change  impacts  in  California  was  released  in  1999.    The 
assessment emerged from an innovative partnership between the Ecological Society of America 
(ESA) and the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) study.
101  Christ Field, a Stanford University 
professor, and several other California academics authored the study (Field et al. 1999).  He and 
others of the California-based authors of the study have contributed to subsequent assessments in 
California  and  are  actively  engaged  in  climate  change  research  internationally.  They  could 
                                                         
100 Referring here to the Wilkinson study, which was not finally released until 2002. 
101 According to the “blurbs” available on the 1999 report: 
The UCS “is an independent, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing responsible public policies 
in areas where science and technology play a critical role.”  For more information about UCS today see: 
http://www.ucsusa.org. 
The ESA is a “scientific, non-profit organization with more than 7,000* professional members. … ESA 
seeks  to  promote  the  responsible  application  of  ecological  data  and  principles  to  the    solution  of 
environmental problems.” For more information about ESA today see: http://www.esa.org/aboutesa/  * 
Note their membership is larger today.   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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therefore be characterised as part of what would become a powerful “epistemic network” of 
scientists active on the issue of climate change in California.
102 
The ESA/UCS partnership provided a platform for cooperation and assured that the study would 
not remain purely a scientific study. Given the policy specific mission of UCS, once completed 
the study was accompanied by an active outreach effort. According to Cole and Watrous (2007), 
the ESA/UCS partnership was “the brainchild of UCS’s Peter Frumhoff, Director of the Global 
Environmental Programme.”  This successful partnership continued through 2003, to support two 
more regional climate impact assessments in the United States; one in the Gulf Coast/Gulf of 
Mexico  region  (Twilley  et al.  2001)  and  another  in  the  Great  Lakes  (Kling  et al.  2003).  A 
principal aim of all of these studies was to raise awareness amongst the general public as well as 
amongst decision-makers about the regional risks of unmitigated, human-induced climate change. 
The 1999 ESA/UCS assessment was the first of its type for the California region (and perhaps in 
the nation).    It built upon  state-of-the-art  regional  climate  scenarios  and  modelling  to  assess 
impacts on ecosystems, as well as the essential services that California ecosystems provide to 
society, such as pollination services from insects and animals in crop-growing regions (Field et al. 
1999, p. 40).  It was the first study to point out the broad types of climate changes that could be 
expected in California with global warming: more rain and less snow, greater winter runoff and 
less flow in summer streams, more frequent and possibly more intense El Niños (Field et al. 1999, 
p. 10).   
The study was successful in drawing attention to the issue of climate change amongst Californian 
policymakers.  As Mary Nichols,
103 former Secretary for Resources in California (under the Gray 
Davis administration) said of the 1999 study: “…..that study’s certainly had a dramatic effect on 
getting the attention of political leadership.” Cole and Watrous (2007) (2007) also highlight the 
study’s political influence in California.  Not only was this study innovative from a scientific 
perspective in that it brought the issue of global warming and its impacts down to regional scale 
for the first time in California, but it also provided a vehicle for communicating the issue of 
climate change to regional and local decision-makers. 
                                                         
102  Note  Norm  Miller  is  another  co-author  of  this  study.  Norm  Miller  and  Christ  Field  were  both 
co-authors of the Hayhoe et al. 2004 study (see below) and are authors in the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  
103 Mary Nichols was the head of the Environment Institute at the University of California at Los Angeles 
at the time she was interviewed. She was formerly the Secretary of the California Resources Agency 
under Governor Gray Davis (1999-2003).  In 2007 she was named the Chairwoman of the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB).  CARB is the state agency that was mandated in the 2006 Assembly Bill 32 to 
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Table 7.3:  Overview of Recent California Regional Impact Assessments 1999-2006 
Year & 
Reference  Type of Publication: Title  Lead Coordinating 
Institutions: Authors  Sponsor  Main 
Audience 
2006 
(UCS 2006) 
UCS Brochures & Internet Website: 
California – Climate Choices 
Glossy summary brochures & 
internet website  
Union of Concerned 
Scientists based on 
Our Changing Climate 
Union of Concerned 
Scientists - 
ClimateChoices.org  
Public and 
policymaker 
2006 
(Luers et al. 
2006) 
Government report - glossy: Our 
Changing Climate: Assessing the 
Risks to California 
California Climate 
Change Center: Luers, 
Cayan, Franco, 
Hanemann, Croes  
California Public 
Interest Energy 
Research 
Programme 
Public and 
policymaker 
2006 
(Cayan et al. 
2006) 
Government report – technical: 
Scenarios of Climate Change in 
California: an Overview 
Dan Cayan, Amy 
Luers, Michael 
Hanemann, Guido 
Franco, Bart Croes 
California Public 
Interest Energy 
Research 
Programme 
Policymaker
s and 
scientific 
2006 
(Supporting 
material: 
appendices 
to the 2006 
PIER 
report)104 
Government reports – web 
documents: These are technical 
appendices to the Cayan et al. 
2006 “PIER report” (above), which 
was one of several parts of the CAT 
report to the Governor 
77 different authors 
including leading 
academics and experts 
within the state civil 
service 
California Public 
Interest Energy 
Research 
Programme 
Scientific 
2004 
 
UCS Brochures & Internet Website 
– companion documents for 
communication purposes on 
Hayhoe et al article findings: 
“Climate Change in California: 
Choosing our Future” Includes 
separate flyers on 
Prepared by the Union 
of Concerned 
Scientists based on or 
in cooperation with 
Katherine Hayhoe and 
18 other co-authors. 
Energy Foundation 
and various others 
that support The 
Union of Concerned 
Scientists 
Public and 
policymaker 
(Sacto 
briefings) 
2004 
(Hayhoe 
et al. 2004) 
Scientific journal – Proceedings of 
the National Academy of the 
Sciences (PNAS):  “Emission 
pathways, climate change, and 
impacts on California” 
Katherine Hayhoe 
et al. – 17 other 
authors  
The Union of 
Concerned Scientists 
for Hayhoe only plus 
various research 
sponsors  
Scientific 
2003 
(Hanemann 
and Torn 
2003) 
Government report/web-document 
–review of EPRI study with 
research recommendations: A 
Review of the Report: Global 
Climate Change and California 
Michael Hanemann of 
UC Berkley and 
Margaret Torn 
Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory 
California Public 
Interest Energy 
Research 
Programme 
Scientific, 
Research 
Community 
(including 
government 
sponsors) 
2003 
(Wilson et al. 
2003) and 
(Smith and 
Mendelsohn 
2007) 
Government 
report/web-documents; Global 
Climate Change and California: 
Potential Implication for 
Ecosystems, Health and the 
Economy (also a book in 2007) 
EPRI: Wilson, Williams 
Stratus Consulting: 
Smith 
Yale University: 
Mendelsohn 
California Public 
Interest Energy 
Research 
Programme 
Scientific 
2001  
(Wilkinson 
2002) 
Government report – web 
document: California 
US National 
Assessment Team – 
Regional report  
US Government  Public and 
scientific 
1999 
(Field et al. 
1999) 
NGO report – glossy:  Confronting 
Climate Change in California: 
Ecological Impacts on the Golden 
State  
UCS: Field, Daily, 
Davis, Gaines, Matsen, 
Melack, Miller  
The Union of 
Concerned Scientists 
and the Ecological 
Society of America 
Public & 
policymaker 
Source: author based on sources cited in the first column. 
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Interestingly, Mary Nichols remembers the influence that the ESA/UCS study had on people’s 
perceptions of climate change with respect to the emblematic issue of water in California.  Mary 
Nichols said it was “…some of the first work that really caught the public’s attention.  …[It] 
showed that based on currently observed patterns of changes in rainfall and temperature and so 
forth, so that our freshwater system wasn’t going to work...” Policymakers became attentive to the 
climate change issue once it became clear that climate change would affect the elaborate yet 
delicate balance between supply and demand for freshwater in different parts of the state.    
As head of the Resources Agency in 1999, Mary Nichols and her Deputy Secretary, James Boyd 
(now  an  Energy  Commissioner)  took  on  the  role  of  assisting  UCS  to  disseminate  the  key 
messages of the study.  They provided the entry point for UCS to explain and discuss the work 
with government decision-makers.  With respect to initial efforts to use the study to educate staff 
in State government, Mary Nichols said: “I was part of helping to get it out. ...I was at the 
Resources  Agency  and  I  invited  them  to  come  in  and  do  a  presentation  for  …  all  of  my 
department directors and …helped them get an audience in other places, too.  …of course, they 
were doing a very good job on their own, but [the] timing was perfect...  There have been two 
[other] reports, but the first one kind of got the ball rolling.” James Boyd specifically referred to 
the 1999 publication (Field et al. 1999) as “…one of the watershed documents in California.” He 
said: “When I was Deputy Secretary and this document came out, we had all the scientists come 
in to Mary’s staff meeting and present this report to us.  We wanted to understand it.  And it so 
moved and affected people, that we chose this as the vehicle for getting other state agencies 
[engaged],  so  we  went  around  and  briefed  every  major  agency  in  the  state.    I  went  to  the 
Secretary
105 of CAL EPA, who was a little sceptical, and asked him …have a staff meeting of all 
his  department  heads  …and  we  did  that  with  the,  I  call  them,  so-called  super  agencies  in 
California.”  In this way, this earliest of impacts studies became a vehicle for communication with 
elite policymakers about what the issue of climate change would mean to the State of California.  
7.4.3.  2000-2003:  EPRI-led study and US National Assessment  
Shortly after the ESA/UCS study, two more climate change assessments began which were to add 
to the breadth and depth of scientific literature on the regional impacts of climate change in 
                                                         
105 This was Winston Hickox, the person who was in 2006, at the time of the interviews, spearheading 
climate  change  responses  within  the  California  state  employees  pension  fund  (CALPERS)  “green 
initiative”.  Winston Hickox was also interviewed for this research and he also remembered the use of the 
ESA/UCS  study  as  the  basis  for  outreach  and  communication  on  climate  change  among  the  upper 
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California.   One was part of a US National Assessment, launched in 1997, and completed in 2000 
(NAST 2000). The approach taken to this federally-funded effort was particularly innovative 
because it engaged regional teams of researchers and included a stakeholder assessment process 
to consider how climate change would intertwine with and influence future development (Moser 
2005).   However the benefits of this national “bottom-up” assessment were cut short and final 
results delayed or obscured by politics as a change in administration at the federal level, shifting 
from  President  Clinton to  President  Bush  in the  White  House,  occurred  at the  end of 2000.   
California was large enough to be considered a region and assigned a separate part of the US 
assessment.  In part because of the political wrangling in Washington, and a concerted effort from 
interest groups opposed to action on climate change to delay release of the full assessment, the 
final  California  report  was  never  properly  published,  however  it  was  made  available  on  the 
internet (Wilkinson 2002).  
The diminishing role of the federal government on climate policy and impact assessment under 
the Bush administration from 2001 meant that the US National Assessment had little political 
influence or connection to policy.  However the assessment was successful in contributing lessons 
on how to approach the issue of regional impact assessment in the area of climate change (Moser 
2005).
106  The  California  report  resulted  in  a  400-page  document,  widely  accessible  on  the 
internet,  but  it  lacked  concrete  policy  recommendations  (Wilkinson  2002).    It  derived  from 
numerous workshops and expert contributions, thus a relatively open and deliberative process of 
preparation. Quantitative climate change scenarios underlying the impact assessment reflect a 
single emission scenario run with two different climate models.   While it was innovative in terms 
of the consultative process that encompassed its production, the report appears to have had no 
direct influence on policy. Indirectly the California part of the national assessment may have 
contributed to the establishment of an epistemic community around the issue of regional climate 
modelling and impact assessment in California.  Of course it also added to emerging research on 
regional  climate  change,  contributing  to  a  knowledge  base  and  epistemic  network  that  has 
continued to support California’s own PIER climate change programme.   
The earliest point at which state funding went towards climate change impact research appears to 
be in 1999, when a contract for $2.1 million was issued to the Electric Power Research Institute 
[EPRI] to study the impact of climate change on California’s ecosystems, human health and the 
economy. As a first exploratory attempt to consider climate change under PIER, this work was 
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given low profile. This was because it was unclear whether the Governor(s) at the time would be 
supportive of work that might propel climate change onto the California policy agenda (Anon2 
2006i).  The  relevant governors  were  Pete  Wilson (R),  who  held the office  from 1991-1999, 
followed by Gray Davis (D), in office from 2000-2003. In this period, there was only weak 
political support for action on climate change, and the government mandate at the time was 
largely limited to one of research and greenhouse inventory efforts.  These were first mandated in 
1988 with the Sher Bill.  A more recent mandate for a registry effort had also just begun in this 
area in 2002 (see Chapter 6; also Box 6.1). 
The EPRI study was a multi-year effort and was not published until 2003.  It differs from the 
other main assessments in California in its focus on the economics of climate change impacts.  It 
also made a serious attempt to integrate a view on adaptation into estimates of the damage costs 
of climate change. However the study was considered by some experts to be overly optimistic 
about the costs of climate change in California (Franco 2006i; Hanemann 2006i) (Hanemann and 
Torn 2003). In particular, the study assumes that adaptation is successfully implemented in all 
market sectors of the economy and that a variety of actors, from farming and forestry operations 
to water resource managers, have the foresight and the ability to respond in a timely way to a 
changing climate.  Despite large benefits in some sectors of the economy (e.g. forestry), the study 
foresaw a need to mitigate in part due to very high economic losses associated with growing 
demand for power and due to higher temperatures and an associated increase in air conditioning 
needs (Smith and Mendelsohn 2007; Wilson et al. 2003).    
Thus,  at  least  some  of  the  climate  change  research  originally  sponsored  by  the  state  drew 
conclusions that differ from recent interpretations suggesting that the impacts of global warming 
in California are only detrimental (Smith and Mendelsohn 2007; Wilson et al. 2003). Smith and 
Mendelsohn  (2007) in  particular  highlight  a  combination  of  negative  and  positive  effects  of 
climate change on the agriculture sector. They also tend to be very optimistic about the potential 
for adaptation to offset many potentially negative impacts. In another recent example, a survey of 
agricultural impacts by Baldocchi and Wong (Baldocchi and Wong 2006) states: “Our survey of 
the pertinent literature reveals a combination of positive and negative effects of warming and 
elevated CO2 on crop production.” Despite ambiguity about positive versus negative impacts in 
some sectors,  even  Smith  and  Mendelsohn  (2007)  conclude  that  the  risks  of  future negative 
effects of climate change in California are significant enough to warrant mitigation action today. 
In an apparent effort to distance itself from the results of the EPRI study, the PIER program also 
funded a review of the study which was released later in the same year (Hanemann and Torn 
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given that there is still broad uncertainty about the underlying physical impacts of climate change.  
It recommends a broader research programme and a more standardised approach to structuring 
regional research in this area such that robust and comparable results can be developed across 
different sectors of the state.
 107 Guido Franco, the CEC staffer who manages the PIER climate 
change research programme, explained this view with respect to the PIER 2003 climate change 
research plan (Franco et al. 2003): “Our plan was to first develop the tools – to do the impacts and 
then to do the economics because we realized in some cases, I mean, we can jump ahead to do the 
economics and adaptations but one of the problems that we faced was that we don’t have the tools 
to estimate the physical impacts.”   Without the tools and confidence in the physical impact 
estimates it was impossible to believe in the economic estimates of climate change impacts.   
Thus in parallel with the completion of the EPRI report and the National Assessment, the CEC 
had also begun to sketch out a long-term research plan on regional climate change.  This research 
roadmap was released in 2003 at the same time as the EPRI final report (Franco et al. 2003).
108  
As Guido Franco, the chief architect of the PIER climate programme, explained there was “a 
two-way exchange of information” between the National Assessment (regional California study) 
and the emerging research effort within the state government to design and produce regional 
climate research that would support a regional policy process.  Guido Franco explained: “Bob 
Wilkinson
109 …was a member of my team, the team that developed the PIER climate change 
research plan.  So actually it was a two-way exchange of information: we got information from 
him and he also inserted in his assessment report the discussion about research.”  The team 
preparing the research plan also built upon the work of EPRI, which had focused on the economic 
implications of impacts.  As Guido said, as a starting point “we took a look at the [National] 
Assessment report and the work that we had done with EPRI….”   Thus although both studies 
were considered by the expert community to have serious flaws, they provided a basis for learning 
about what to do differently in any further research. The research plan that Guido refers to was 
not published until 2003, (Franco et al. 2003), however inputs to the plan were solicited in parallel 
with these earlier assessments on climate change impacts in California. 
                                                         
107 This finding is consistent with a recent review of the literature on the global costs of climate change 
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A side benefit of the early assessments was to focus attention on the need for a more serious 
research effort devoted to the issue of climate change, and this dovetailed with growing interest 
from the state energy and environmental policy community.  The EPRI contract demonstrates that 
CEC leadership had begun to orient a portion of its annual research funding to climate change 
impact assessment even before there was strong leadership on this issue in the Governor’s Office. 
This early work was “under the political radar screen.”  That research on climate change emerged 
at all in the PIER programme in this period was clearly due to policy entrepreneurship of CEC 
staff, and possibly due to the interest of a single Commissioner.  However by 2003, the PIER 
climate change research programme had secured a legitimate place in the wider programme, with 
about $4 million of the $62.5 million available annually being dedicated to climate change (see 
Chapter 5).      
As with the National Assessment, the EPRI study received little attention in California’s policy 
circles.  However it did stimulate further thinking and agreement about the need for an “in-house” 
or “captive think-tank”
110 on policy-relevant climate change research in California.  Although the 
attention to climate change in the policy process was still limited, the research community had 
begun to anticipate that these issues would become important in the coming years (Franco et al. 
2003) and promoted a research plan to develop useable knowledge for the policy process as a first 
step in this direction. 
As the EPRI study was being completed in late 2002 and early 2003, an idea emerged for the 
creation of a California Climate Change Center.  In part this idea grew out of the EPRI study and 
the  fact  that  the  work  had  been  largely  out-sourced  to  experts  outside  of  the  state.    Not 
surprisingly for a first effort of its type, the study had raised many legitimate questions that 
required further research.  Yet those who knew the most about the study itself were not part of the 
large pool of talented researchers located in “in-state”  institutions. As Michael Hanemann recalls: 
“I was approached in the late spring of 2002… Kelly
111 and Guido had made the decision that the 
next time around they wanted to have some sort of …captive think tank, which was the idea of 
creating the California Climate Change Center. They were torn between Scripps and Berkeley and 
in the end they decided to do both ...”  Thus the California Climate Change Center was born, 
which was a collaborative effort led by University of California at Berkeley and the Scripps 
Institute of Oceanography out of UC San Diego.
112 The Center was intended to spearhead and 
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integrate the growing range and depth of PIER policy-relevant research on climate change in 
California. 
The research plan was a carefully designed document intended to guide funding for public interest 
research on climate change, with a focus on impacts. Its aim was to yield significant new results 
within a five to ten year period (Franco et al. 2003). Guido Franco explained that it would take 
this amount of time to conduct the research needed to better estimate first physical and then 
economic impacts of climate change in a regional context.  He said:  “…in two years we will have 
more, but you have to wait for four or six years to have a better picture.  Just to give you an 
example, [regarding] the sea level rise and how our shoreline will change in the future, we will be 
working  with  Scripps  and  U  of  Florida  to  develop  new  models  that  will  more  realistically 
simulate how our shorelines may change in the future.  That’s a prerequisite before we try to 
estimate the economic impacts….  but developing the model will take two to three years.  I mean 
there are things that could be done now but …this issue is going to be with us…”   
Guido Franco also highlighted the overall goal of the PIER climate research programme: “Our 
goal is to minimize the negative impacts of climate change on California. So what we’re trying to 
do is bring together economists and physical scientists, and it has not been easy to do, and see if 
together they can come up with more realistic estimations of economic impacts.”   He explained 
that the programme would cover various dimensions of climate change research, from climate 
change modelling at regional scale, to physical impact assessment to the economics of impacts 
and policy, including both mitigation and adaptation policy. 
Having been kicked off in 2004, the California Climate Change Center was just establishing itself 
when Governor Schwarzenegger was turning his attention to climate change.  The California 
PIER research plan on climate change had been approved and launched as a basis for the Centre’s 
work (Franco et al. 2003).  However, the Governor’s initiative on climate change created a new 
set of more pressing political demands that would require engagement of that same research 
community.  In particular, the Governor’s Executive Order in June 2005 called for a report on 
impacts as well as a report on mitigation policy recommendations by January 2006, roughly six 
months away.  As Guido Franco said: “…because of the Executive Order, we had to accelerate 
our work.”  
As with most political agendas, the shift of climate policy from the back to the front of the policy 
agenda in California, created new demands on the expert research community.  Just as relevant to 
the  policy  process  as  the  impact  assessment  was  macro-economic  analysis  of  the  cost  of 
mitigation  policies  to  achieve  the  Governor’s  ambitious  targets  for  state-wide  emission Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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reductions. Thus a macro-economic assessment of mitigation policies was quickly layered into the 
new Centre’s work for 2005 and 2006 (see below).  
7.4.4.  2004-2005: ‘Let’s motivate mitigation’ 
The policy frame used by Governor Schwarzenegger and his administration to promote climate 
change is based on a “cost of inaction” discourse as a means to say “let’s motivate mitigation” 
(Luers 2006i). The discourse draws on evidence of the impacts and risks of climate change to 
argue that policy to mitigate climate change is necessary.  This suggests the need to closely couple 
research on climate change impacts with policy proposals to limit emissions of greenhouse gases.    
Amy Luers, a California scientist with the non-governmental organisation Union of Concerned 
Scientists’ Berkeley office,
113 described this framing as a way to: “…help get more focus on 
defining a plan of action for managing [climate change], what we can avoid -- because some of 
the impacts we can’t avoid.”  The risk framing was central to the Governor’s announcement of 
targets and follow-up effort to move policy forward. It sets out to persuade the public and relevant 
decision-makers about the need for mitigation efforts on the basis of unacceptably high costs of 
inaction.   
Evidence on environmental risks of a rapidly changing climate necessarily draws upon regional 
climate impact assessments in a particular way so as to frame near-term decisions as part of a 
long-term environmental problem (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2005).  This can be done by: 
•  focusing the impact assessment on the long-term, i.e. on 50-100 year timeframes 
and the risk to socio-economic and natural systems as Californian’s currently know 
them.  
•  bracketing  the  full  range  of  uncertainty  of  possible physical  impacts  of  climate 
change,  rather  than  attempting  to  do  a  specific  economic  valuation  of  damages 
linked  to  impacts.  In  this  way  the  assessment  accepts  that  uncertainties  in 
understanding and characterising physical impacts are still great and that more time 
will be required to do credible costing work.  
•  downplaying the role of adaptation to mitigate risks of climate change.  There is no 
explicit modelling of adaptation (even though it is widely acknowledged by policy 
elites and by the scientific community that adaptation will play an important role 
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and should be part of any policy response); rather the focus is on the aggregate 
physical effects of climate change.  
One of the first studies to explicitly use and refine such an approach was released within the first 
year that Arnold Schwarzenegger was in office.  It was led by Katherine Hayhoe, an out-of-state 
researcher who was joined by 18 co-authors (Hayhoe et al. 2004) (referred to here as the “Hayhoe 
study”). This assessment contained an important innovation in the way that uncertainties were 
characterised.    A  decision  was  made  early  on  amongst  experts  to  handle  this  difficult  issue 
through the selection of  emission scenarios.  One of the authors, Norman Miller – a climate 
modeller from Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, explained this in the following way:  “There’s a 
twist in that study compared to previous ones we’ve done.  The distinction is important in that up 
until that paper everyone used one emission scenario. And now a set of emission scenarios were 
used to throw out the idea that these outcomes are partly behavioural – whether or not you go up 
the Cheney fossil-intensive path or an information technology path. That was really the distinction 
of that work. But that was the only difference – everything was just re-running the models.” 
Policy choice, or uncertainty about the future of mitigation policy was designed into the scenario 
analysis of the Hayhoe study.   
Perhaps the trademark of this study was therefore the way in which it bracketed uncertainty about 
the future.  It did this by using high and low emission scenarios to draw out robust findings across 
a range of key areas of risk, looking in particular at how risks shift with lower emission pathways 
in the future.  It considered several areas of risk that are emblematic for Californians, including 
impacts on agriculture (in particular the wine producing industry), snowpack and water supply, 
human health from increases in number of extreme heat events or air pollution events, and risk of 
fire.   
A renowned Stanford scientist and co-author of the Hayhoe study, Steve Schneider explained 
some of the reasoning behind the methods used in the study:  “The study was very cautious, also 
it  did  not  give  you the  ‘full  answer,’  rather,  it  had high  and  low  projections.    It  compared 
alternative scenarios, using two different climate models, and as a result it was pretty credible. …I 
put a lot of pressure on the other authors not to come up with the single best guess answer that 
politicians like to get but rather to bracket uncertainty and show that even that even a relatively 
mild case is not trivial problem.” This study avoided complicated technical explanations about the 
uncertainty underlying the impact assessment literature and was thus constrained to a discussion 
of low and high scenarios, corresponding to emissions resulting from a future with and without 
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climate policy.  It set up the question of social choice.  In other words, which future would 
Californians rather work towards and strive to achieve?   
The Hayhoe study preceded Governor Schwarzenegger’s climate change initiative.  Work for it 
began in 2003, led initially by the Union of Concerned Scientists, who initiated the study by 
soliciting interest in it among scientists.  UCS also hired a part-time study coordinator (Katherine 
Hayhoe) and scientific author who would eventually lead the author team (Cole and Watrous 
2007). It was designed to provide timely evidence of the “costs of inaction” to strengthen political 
will amongst key decision-makers as the State proceeded to design and implement regulations 
under  the  Pavley  “vehicle”  Bill.    Following  passage of  the  Bill in  2002, the  first important 
regulatory decision on greenhouse gases was still to come. In the rulemaking process, overseen by 
the California Air Resources Board, state recommendations for the new rules were meeting stiff 
opposition from the car manufacturers who were threatening to sue if they were not weakened to 
the point of being symbolic rather than environmentally meaningful (Cole and Watrous 2007). 
Importantly  there  was  political  uncertainty  given  the  latest  twist  in  California  politics: 
Schwarzenegger had been elected in an extraordinary recall election in late 2003. The state had a 
new  Republican  governor  and  the  question  on  everyone’s  mind  was  whether  Governor 
Schwarzenegger would hold true to his election pledge and support the rulemaking to carry out 
this legislation.  
Passage of tough vehicle regulations targeting CO2 under the Pavley Bill would be one of the first 
‘tests’ of the Governor’s commitment to climate change as he came into office.  The Hayhoe 
study was designed to provide strong evidence about the risk of climate change in California, and 
highlights the implications for the Californian “way of life” (Hanemann 2006i).  If it could do so, 
it would likely bolster political will to stand tough against the automobile industry and require 
significant technological innovation to respond to climate change.  Looking back, another of the 
co-authors, Dr Michael Hanemann, recalls that the report was timed from the outset to influence 
public and stakeholder opinions in this critical period: “…the fall of 2004 was an important time 
because  the  Air  Board  would  be  considering  regulations  for  implementing  the  Pavley  Bill 
…essentially UCS was looking at this a year, 15 months before then in the summer of 2003 
wanting to influence the Air Board’s adoption of regulations under the Pavley Bill.”  
The Hayhoe study involved collaboration largely amongst expert authors from throughout the 
state.   While the collaboration across multiple institutions and disciplines was not an easy task, it 
was clearly worthwhile in forcing some convergence on robust policy-relevant conclusions across 
two different climate models and two different scenarios.  Co-author Dr. Michael Hanemann 
commented on the significant scientific value of that collaboration: “…it was just better science if Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  202 
you’re forced to work with other people, where normally you would be separate teams.  And it’s 
the same sort of thing a little bit with this, you know. You sort of benefit from interacting with 
people who are substitutes for you in a sense, but who have slightly different perspectives, so it’s 
that benefit as well as the inter-disciplinary [benefit].  It’s getting other points of view, in a sense, 
from the same discipline.”  
Steve Schneider, another co-author, pointed out one advantage of the all-star line up of authors 
was  that  there  was  a  great  deal  of  internal  review,  which  strengthened  the  product  prior  to 
finalisation.  He said: “This was the most peer reviewed paper I’ve ever co-authored except for 
IPCC chapters.  Because every single one of us in the 19-person team were all sticklers with 
opinions, and we were peer reviewing everybody else’s section, it was really a hard job to pull 
that together, into the lowest common denominator form that satisfied everybody.  No wonder it 
had zero trouble in [peer-] review, because it was super reviewed before it was even submitted.”   
The  study  was  released  in  August  2004,  published  in  a  prestigious  scientific  journal  –  the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS) -- and received significant coverage 
from the media.  Steve Schneider attributes much of the media attention to the high calibre of the 
scientists contributing to the study: “They [Hayhoe, working on behalf of UCS] just basically 
…went out into the state from top to bottom of the state and pulled together many of the good 
people.  And there are so many. The paper really had a major, a major impact, beyond what I 
would have expected because most of the authors were respected California experts.” In his view, 
the  all-star  line  up  of  the  authors  for  the  study,  their  impeccable  scientific  credentials,  lent 
credibility to it and may also have helped to get media attention.  The Hayhoe et al. study was 
covered in  “more than  fifty  print  and  online  newspapers  the  week of its  release”  (Cole  and 
Watrous, 2007). 
Once  the  scientific  study  was  complete,  UCS  ran  a  sophisticated  outreach  campaign  to 
accompany its release.  The campaign consisted of the production of material for internet pages 
and colourful and short (4 page) handouts destined for the general public.  These included two 
handouts  on  main  impact  sectors  (snowpack  and  water,  heat  and  human  health)  as  well  as 
separate flyers on “solutions” and another, reflecting the analytical structure of the report, entitled 
“Choosing Our Future.” As with the earlier 1999 study, UCS also organised a series of briefings 
in Sacramento, to discuss the report’s findings with legislators, state government officials and 
other influential decision-makers in the State’s Capitol.  
Michael Hanemann, who participated in these briefings, remembers: “That was a tremendously 
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little PowerPoint presentation, but then answering any questions about the study.”  Beyond the 
one-on-one contact, which brought the experts to the decision-makers for question and answers 
about their work, was the broad scope of the briefings. Cole and Watrous (2007) note that “good 
press coverage opens doors.” During the late summer and early Fall, study authors collaborated 
with UCS staff to meet more than 75 individuals across more than 30 California state and federal 
agencies as well as industry groups, community and faith groups.   The briefings were targeted to 
explain findings relating to their specific sectors (Cole and Watrous, 2007).   
These briefings included a large range of decision-makers throughout the government and in 
influential stakeholder groups. Michael Hanemann explained: “We talked to Alan Lloyd (then 
Secretary  of  CalEPA  ….the  Energy  Commissioners,  PUC  Commissioners  and  the  State,  the 
Public Health Office, the…Air Board, Secretary of Resources and some of what’s called the 
“Horseshoe”,  which  is  the  Governor’s  inner-office.    Also  insurance  companies,  Sacramento 
Municipal Utility District, …[Also] CalPERS [California state employees pension fund], …so we 
met with Winston Hickox, who was the former secretary of CalEPA, who was advising CalPERS 
on environmentally-responsible investing. And the Council of Churches in Sacramento.…so it 
was  maybe  a  dozen  briefings.”  The  extent  of  the  briefings,  combined  with  the  timing  was 
designed to secure an environmentally strong outcome in the Pavley regulatory battle.  
In the face of strong opposition from the automakers industry, in September 2004 the California 
Air Resources Board approved the Pavley regulations (California 2005f). Evidence of climate 
change and its impacts on California were cited in official documents as part of the background 
and rationale for the law and the new vehicle standards.  For example the CARB notice of change 
in regulations provides the following as background to its decision on the vehicle regulations for 
CO2 (CARB 2005a): “In 2002, recognizing that global warming would impose compelling and 
extraordinary impacts on California, the legislature adopted and the Governor signed Chapter 200, 
Statutes of 2002 (AB 1493, Pavley).  Chapter 200 directs the Board to adopt regulations that 
achieve the maximum feasible and cost effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 
motor vehicles.” More specifically, the Hayhoe study is cited by CARB as one of the many 
scientific studies on the science of climate change comprising relevant supporting information for 
the new vehicle regulations (CARB 2005b; CARB 2005c).
114  
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Regarding the political influence and media coverage of the study and the UCS campaign that 
followed, some participants attributed success to the all-star line-up of authors. Commenting on 
the UCS outreach campaign, Steve Schneider commented: “… that’s not what got the publicity.  
In fact it was a little controversial.  Some people on the team who were primarily academics 
thought that the affiliation with UCS would be damaging because the other side without reading it 
[would] say oh it’s just an environmental …blog, which it wasn’t, you don’t get a blog into 
PNAS.  …so they [UCS] did its outreach separately -- offline from the study -- but I saw very 
little publicity from that.  Almost all the publicity came … from the press conferences of the 
authors on the peer-reviewed paper, it was the scientists’ credibility that sold this work.”  In this 
view, most of the attention in the media derived from the credibility of the scientist authors 
themselves, rather than from the necessarily more plain language based and politically oriented 
outreach campaign organised by UCS.   
As noted above, the Hayhoe study was widely covered in the media. Steve Schneider reiterated 
the strength of the work and its relationship to the line up of authors: “This study, 19 scientists 
from  across  the  state,  from  every  institution  --  it  was  about  as  blue-blooded  as  any  study 
anywhere.    More  blue  blooded  than  IPCC  chapters  which  typically  have  fewer  authors  per 
chapter….it was very difficult to attack it.”  Whether it was this study or a combination of studies 
combined  with  strong  attention  in  the  media,  there  is  no  question  that  many  of  the 
decision-makers interviewed in the course of this research had absorbed and spoke about key 
messages of this study and its 1999 predecessor. 
The  one-on-one  briefings  between  scientists  and  policymakers  appear  to  be  a  particularly 
effective way to stimulate thinking and understanding amongst key decision-makers.  Michael 
Hanemann provided a concrete example: “We made a presentation to [Terry Tamminen, special 
advisor to the Governor] and 2 hours later he was having lunch with the Governor.  We made a 
presentation from 10:00 to 10:30 except it ran on to 11:00 because he was so interested.  We were 
going to have lunch and it turned out to be the restaurant in the Capitol where Terry and Arnold 
were having lunch and at the next table no less.  And the Governor came late… and Terry walked 
Arnold over to us and said, ‘These people are doing important work for California and you should 
meet them’ and introduced us.”  Eric Heitz, President of the Energy Foundation and one of the 
main organisations funding the study, noted that the study has had an effect on the Governor’s 
thinking and is often used in his presentations on the climate issue: “I’ve heard him mention it on 
several different public occasions.  He really internalized that.” 
Looking  across the  experience  with  impact  assessment  and  outreach  and  media  coverage of 
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organisation (Gieryn 1999; Gieryn 1983b; Jasanoff 1990), that is, actively working to bridge the 
boundaries between science and policy.  Amy Luers of UCS explicitly outlined this function in 
her description of the organisation’s goals: “…we see one of our roles as …a group that tries to be 
a liaison between the scientific community and policy community, and general public.  One of the 
ways we do that is to try to potentially help work with these different communities to say... ‘not 
only how can we most effectively frame and translate this to a broader audience, but also what 
kind of questions might we want to ask? …or… can we answer that in the scientific community 
so that it will be policy relevant?’ So that it’ll be easier to translate, easier to just tell a story?”  
Despite its positioning as a boundary organisation, the UCS role was viewed by some of the 
Hayhoe study authors as potentially controversial, and possibly even harmful to the message by 
tainting the “scientific” work with political motivations.  This demonstrates the difficulty of the 
boundary organisation function: how to do the bridging and yet continue to be perceived as 
politically objective and maintain credibility both within the scientific community that produces 
the findings. And how to at the same time maintain credibility with the policymaker audience that 
will use the findings in political discussion? 
If boundary organisations are mistrusted by the scientific community that they claim to represent, 
who  are  the  most  important  and  appropriate  actors  to  disseminate  policy-relevant  scientific 
findings?  Norm Miller, a co-author of the study, shared his thoughts on this question: “…the 
most important actors are those people who can clearly, concisely translate the findings of the 
scientists  to  the  understandings  that  are  perceived  by  the  policy  makers,  and  the  scientists 
themselves are the ones that do it, because they’re the ones that understand it. So I would say: a 
scientist that can teach the information to a non-scientist who’s intelligent in a way that they can 
understand it objectively and walk away with their own thoughts, probably will provide the most 
important impact on how that transcends from pure research to policy.”  When asked who in 
California was playing such a role, he noted: “Schneider is one person who does that well; Mike 
McCracken, he’s in Washington; Dan Cayan; ….Michael Hanemann is one person who’s done a 
lot  from  the  economic  perspective…;  Christ  Field,  he’s  done  that  too.”  In  Norm  Miller’s 
terminology, scientific experts are among the only agents that have the power and the authority to 
cross the boundaries between science and politics; they need to have scientific or other expert 
credentials  as  well  as  have  the  ability  to  translate  findings  into  lay-person  or  “non-expert” 
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The  Hayhoe  study  also provides  an  example of  a  wave of impact  “science  for  policy”
115  in 
California.  That is, from the start, the study was designed to connect to the policy process, to 
provide evidence of climate change and climate impacts at regional scale.  It brought global 
climate change down to a politically meaningful scale, and supported the argument that climate 
change provided a unique set of risks to California and a compelling case for the need to respond 
with preventive action. The Energy Foundation financially supported UCS involvement in the 
Hayhoe  et  al.  study  and  associated  outreach  efforts.  Eric  Heitz,  President  of  the  Energy 
Foundation, commented regarding its connection to the emergent climate policy: “It was part of a 
plan insofar as there was momentum in California, there was interest on the part of lead policy 
makers, there was attention going to this in the press. …we then began to ask the question of,  
well, ‘what are the ways we could get the public and the decision makers primarily focused  [on 
the need for action]?’  …one of them is to show that unless we do [something], these kinds of 
impacts are going to happen.” 
7.4.5.  2006: ‘Let’s motivate mitigation’ – second take 
As noted above, in the lead up to the passage of the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB32), the 
Governor’s climate initiative had called for a “new” round of impact assessment and a report to 
the CAT by January 2006.  This request stemmed from the need to provide evidence and the basis 
for a legal argument on the need to limit global emissions and the regional dangers of climate 
change.   
Beyond wanting to make a stronger political argument for action, another more specific motive 
was that the state wanted to “own” the work on impacts which had such a strong communicative 
value. Michael Hanemann recalled: “Terry Tamminen had observed the publicity associated with 
the PNAS paper
116 and the outreach which the Union of Concerned Scientists had done and they 
were impressed with it and, I think, a little jealous of it.  So they wanted to have something like 
the PNAS paper that they owned… I think, that was partly the seeds of the idea for this report.”   
                                                         
115This refers to the role of science in the policy process and the distinction between “policy for science”  
on the one hand, and “science for policy” on the other. The history of climate change as a public sphere 
issue shows that it began largely as a “policy for science” issue where the aim of climate policy was to 
ensure that relevant scientific research moved ahead in a coherent manner to better understand the nature 
of the climate change problem.  More recently, climate policy can be said to focus more on policy design 
and implementation questions to shape solutions or responses to the problem of climate change; in this 
context “science for policy” has emerged to inform decisions about public policy.  For a discussion see: 
(Agrawala 1999b; Brooks 1964; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2007). 
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Anne Baker, Deputy Secretary for External Affairs at CalEPA, highlighted the additional layering 
of impacts research upon what was already going on.  She said:  “So there’s actually been a thing 
called  a  ‘virtual’  climate  centre  here  among  our  universities  coordinated  by  the  Energy 
Commission through a pot of funding that was doing a five-year [assessment] process on what are 
the  impacts  on  California  and  they  were  about  half-way  through.    So  we  raised  about  a 
half million dollars and said, ‘We want you to stop where you are, …keep doing your work along 
with your schedule for two years from now, but give us - in five major areas - what the impacts 
are on the state.’  And, you know, it’s funny.  Every time they do that they discover things, 
…differently  or  more so than  they thought  they  were  going  to…  I  think  some of  the  most 
important stuff in the [CAT] report is actually the scenario planning that came from the scientific 
community.”  Here Anne Baker is referring to the final CAT report, which was delivered to the 
Governor in early 2006 as well as the overview report on the scenarios of climate change in 
California (CAT 2006) (Cayan et al. 2006). The latter summarises an extensive set of impact 
science reports.  This voluminous set of documents on climate change impacts in California 
accompanied the much shorter key policy volume, containing recommendations on how to best 
implement the Governor’s targets.  
Anne Baker also highlighted another reason that the California government became interested to 
use the impacts angle to communicate the urgency for policy to address climate change.  She said: 
“[that] actually came from the Secretary [Terry Tamminen] at the time and myself going to 
Europe and looking at some of the documents in the UK about how does this impact.”  Anne 
Baker is referring to their visit to Europe at the start of their tenure where they discovered the UK 
government’s on-going efforts to fund scientific research, regional impact assessment in the UK 
and related outreach to communicate with the general public about impacts of climate change 
(e.g.  UKCIP 2002 on London). 
The latest round of climate change scenario and impact assessment in California culminated in 
2006.  It included hundreds of pages of detailed reports as well as a short and colourful glossy 
report (Luers et al. 2006) (see Table 7.3).  The latter was jointly issued by the California Climate 
Change  Center  and  the  Union  of  Concerned  Scientists.    Interestingly,  as  with  the  start  of 
California’s efforts to assess regional impacts through EPRI, the state government had once again 
turned to a non-governmental organisation to help advance its work on climate change.  However 
this time it was to perform a new task: communicating climate change to the public.   Just as 
working with EPRI, an industry think-tank, had been somewhat controversial at the outset of the 
PIER climate change research effort, working with UCS was also a concern to at least some of Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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those interviewed.  Would the scientific authority of the new report be questioned because of the 
direct involvement in its preparation of an environmental advocacy organization?  
Figure 7.1: Selection of photographs from Our Changing Climate: Assessing the Risks to 
California (Luers et al. 2006) 
 
 
 
Note:  Captions  associated  with  photos  (Luers  et al.  2006)  from  top  to  bottom:  a)  If  global  warming 
emissions continue unabated, Sierra Nevada snowpack could decline 70 to 90 percent, with cascading 
effects on winter recreation, water supply, and natural ecosystems; b) Rising temperatures, potentially 
exacerbated  by  decreasing  precipitation,  could  increase  the  risk  of  water  shortages  in  urban  and 
agricultural sectors; c)  Rising  sea levels and  more  intense  storm surges could  increase  the risk  for 
coastal flooding. [Credit for c): Robert Epplett/CA Governor’s Office of Emergency Services] Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Interestingly  the  state  government  also  seems  to  be  venturing  into  the  important  area  of 
communicating climate change to lay publics as well as to decision-makers.  The most recent state 
report on impacts in California, was issued in July 2006 just prior to the legislative session and as 
a final 2006 report under the CAT as called for in the Governor’s Executive Order.  The report’s 
format and presentation also followed the example set out by the Union of Concerned Scientists – 
an environmental advocacy organisation -- in previous assessments to make extensive use of 
images to convey key messages (Luers et al. 2006) (see Figure 7.1). 
7.5.  Wither adaptation? 
Officially adaptation is part of the policy discourse. The preamble of the Governor’s Executive 
Order on climate change notes: “Mitigation efforts will be necessary to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and adaptation efforts will be necessary to prepare Californians for the consequences of 
global warming.” This statement recognises that both mitigation and adaptation are needed in a 
comprehensive  policy  response  to  climate  change  since  impacts  are  already  occurring  in 
California. Yet, this concern and recognition of the need for adaptation has been much slower to 
take  hold  in  concrete  state-wide  policy  action.  While  expert  reports  highlight  the  need  for 
adaptation to accompany mitigation policy (i.e. [Hayhoe et al. 2004]) and there is some indication 
of  recognition  of  climate  change  in  targeted  areas  of  government  planning  and  investment 
behaviour, as discussed below, there was as of 2006 no broad policy framework or legal basis for 
adaptation in state policy or legislation. A concrete example of the lack of priority or urgency 
attached to adaptation as a policy issue is found in the notable absence of mention of adaptation in 
the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (CA-Code 2006a).  
In practice, serious attention or debate on adaptation has been sidelined in state-wide climate 
policy,  which  is  focusing  on  implementation  of  the  mitigation  target  mandated  through  the 
Assembly Bill 32. Lainie Motamedi recognised this when she said: “It’s been sort of organic, for 
lack of a better word, a process that’s come from a lot of different directions.  We recognize that 
adaptation is an issue, but …the first order has been to figure out how we can reduce.”  Although 
the state government has heavily invested in research to better understand the potential impacts of 
climate change in the California (regional) context, this strong base of scientific knowledge has, 
first and foremost, helped to provide a platform of public support for climate change mitigation 
policy  rather  than to support  action  or  policy  on  adaptation.    As  the  climate policy process 
matures,  this  regional  science  knowledge  base  will  undoubtedly  prove  useful  to  adaptation 
planning and assessment (Luers et al. 2006; Luers and Moser 2006).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Amy Luers, scientist with UCS, pointed to the inevitability of attention to adaptation at least in 
the science for policy research commissioned by the state, if not in the policy process itself.  She 
said: “…there’s a call for research every two years as part of the Executive Order… it’s going to 
be inevitable in the next stage of this research that ... the focus is on...what kind of changes are 
unavoidable and how do we need to adjust to those.  I think that there will be a real division 
and/or a… shift in the focus on the next report. …there’s a fairly strong agreement that that’s the 
natural next step for the focus.”  Steve Schneider also commented on this when he said: “I think 
adaptation will be part of the story.  …I don’t see any effort yet, in California and not much in the 
world either, although there’s talk about it.” 
Today’s focus on mitigation in the policy debate was not always the case.  Adaptation featured 
prominently in early policy discussions led by the CEC beginning in 2000, where it was an 
important part of the intra-governmental and stakeholder dialogue and a key part of early policy 
recommendations  developed  by  state  agencies  through  a  CEC  consultative  process  in  2002 
(Joint-Agency-Climate-Team 2001).  These recommendations were forwarded to Governor Gray 
Davis in late 2001, in the hopes that they would be endorsed by the Governor and eventually 
featured in his State of the State Address planned for January 2002. However, Governor Davis 
chose to ignore these recommendations, despite the debate brewing over the proposed Pavley Bill 
on vehicle CO2 emissions, and neither the adaptation nor the mitigation policy recommendations 
were ever publicly released. It is interesting to note that this set of recommendations was perhaps 
more comprehensive and bold on adaptation than on mitigation.  This may have been at least 
partly due to a lack of leadership at the top of the state – i.e. in the Governor’s office – for bold 
action at state level on climate change mitigation. 
The  combined  emphasis  on  adaptation  and  mitigation  apparent  in  the  early  CEC  led  policy 
discussion on adaptation and mitigation withered away as the political profile of climate policy 
grew under Governor Schwarzenegger’s leadership in 2005.  The rise of climate change on the 
political agenda was also accompanied by a shift in power on the climate change issues away 
from the CEC toward CalEPA and eventually the CARB (see Chapter 5). The push on policy 
under Governor Schwarzenegger was clearly focused on avoiding or limiting climate change 
impacts through emission reduction in large part by establishing world leadership and a “way 
forward” on mitigation.  The Governor’s Executive Order sets out a high level of ambition for 
mitigation by setting mitigation targets that are time bound and quantitative.  Thus although the 
need for adaptation is acknowledged in the formal documentation, achievement of the mitigation 
targets  is  the  focus  of  all  the  available  “policy  space”  on  climate  change  under  the 
Schwarzenegger administration, at least for the time being. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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There are a number of possible explanations for the limited attention to adaptation in state policy.  
With the 2006 legislation, the focus of the state government clearly shifted to develop concrete 
plans, policies and regulations to cut state-wide emissions, an effort that will undoubtedly require 
significant changes in investment patterns and behaviour.  In this context, there was perhaps a 
perception amongst policymakers that attention to adaptation could make it difficult to advance 
mitigation responses (Luers 2006i). While many experts recognise adaptation as an essential part 
of the policy response to climate change, they also see it as a difficult starting point for climate 
policy.  Despite  the  lack  of  comprehensive,  state-wide  policy,  pockets  of  relevant  activity  to 
integrate adaptation into existing mandates for policy implementation can be identified. 
In particular, certain natural resource management institutions within the state are attentive to 
adaptation and the risks of climate change.  Notably the Department of Water Resources, the 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, and the Department of Food and Agriculture are 
already paying close attention to climate change and have begun to develop adaptive management 
strategies in their areas. As Ralph Cavanagh of NRDC noted: …where it [adaptation] really is 
starting to show up is in water resource planning and management.  I think that people are looking 
seriously at the implications of warming for water storage.   That’s leading to a very serious 
discussion of the efficiency of water use, whether we need to begin investing more in desalting 
plants along the coast, whether there are storage options available that do not involve giant new 
dam  construction  projects.”    But  as  of  2006,  these  efforts  were  relatively  autonomous  and 
unlinked, focussing narrowly on sector-specific risk management activities where the mandates 
are to protect natural resources or economic activities from climatic extremes or changes. 
Dealing with climate change through adaptation in the water sector is a natural extension of the 
state  government’s  resources  management  mandate.  Francis  Chung,  one  of  the  state’s  lead 
engineers  overseeing  water  resource  management  in  the  Department  of  Water  Resources, 
explained:  “climate  change  is  a  natural  extension  of  what  we’ve  been  doing…”.      He  also 
underscored the need to look over the long-term, to see climate change as part of the future 
development problem. He said: “Climate change is all about the future; it needs to be put in 
context of …[other changes], for example, population, urbanization of agricultural land.”   Francis 
Chung confirmed that climate change was increasingly being integrated into the regular practice 
of water resources management and planning in California, however he also cautioned that the 
long-term nature of the problem combined with uncertainty of predictions was difficult to come to 
terms with.  
Francis Chung cited two areas as key problems in California’s water resources management. He 
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term water supply [or] sustainable water supply for the state’s economy” including long-term 
storage to satisfy municipal, industry and agricultural needs; and “short term events management, 
for example, floods.” The latter problem of events management refers to changes in extreme 
climatic events, which accompany climate change, including not just the risk of flooding but also 
of drought.  The challenges of dealing with climate change in a water management planning 
context stems in part from the fact that changes in variability – or extremes -- are expected to be 
much greater than changes in the mean temperature and precipitation patterns over time.  In 
addition, given the wide scatter of results from different general circulation models (also known 
as global climate models), Francis Chung also underscored the difficulty in using such results in a 
policy process, in his words: “…what to do with these wide ranges of results?”  For example, 
some models are wetter and some are drier.  He said: “the notion of  ‘just prepare for the worst’  - 
that is not how we live our lives…”. He highlighted the need for risk analysis or probabilistic 
assessment to look at the expected values or expected benefits of alternative investments in water 
supply and protection strategies.  
As Francis Chung put it, until full probabilistic analysis becomes available, the main option is “to 
look for robust results across the models with respect to temperature and precipitation.”  While 
Francis Chung noted his own belief in long-term research he also highlighted the difficulty of 
selling research with relatively long time frames to policymakers.  He said: “the researchers’ 
reaction – ‘see you in 3 years’ -- I will be fired if I tell State legislators that…” Thus the need to 
guide research so that it is “more usable today” (Dettinger 2006).   
The former Chief Water Engineer for the California Department of Water Resources, Maurice 
Roos, noted the strong dependence of state water managers on academic research capacity to 
access and use relevant predictions of climate change.  He said: “We do rely quite a bit on the 
university sector for input.  We don’t run these models ourselves.  We just take their output and 
they’re, they’re trying to develop products that we can use.”  However even more pragmatic 
approaches to using available climate predictions to plan for the future have met with some 
difficulty and scepticism in the political process. While there is, according to Francis Chung, 
“gradual interest from the public and from politicians” the integration of very long-term climate 
change predictions of 50-100 years into the State Water Plan is not without controversy. 
Francis Chung explained that the State Water Plan is approved in California on a biennial basis 
and funding approved for its implementation. However, at the time of the interview (in 2006), 
approval  and  funding  for  the  Plan  had  been  delayed  because  of  a  court  battle  over  water 
availability and the implications for real estate development. Referring to a state law that requires 
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development  of  500  [housing]  units  or  more  have  to  show  water  supply  availability.”  The 
availability  of  water  supply  to  support  a  growing  population  and  urban  development  risks 
becoming even more complex to assess and more frequent with time and with the additional 
stresses  imposed  by  climate  change  (CDWR  2006;  Schoch  2008).    Francis  Chung  further 
explained that in 2006: “…‘new’ funding was still pending…” for the State Water Plan, in part 
due  to  reluctance  from  the  fiscal  conservatives  in  the  government  to  approve  spending  for 
proposed water projects.  With respect to climate change, he said: “It is very tough sell to talk 
about 100 years from now....How much money will be required to secure water for flood control? 
…How much are you willing to pay?”   
Maurice Roos discussed how he had encountered similar difficulties in discussing the influence of 
climate change in water planning.  In referring to his preparation of a priority list of climate 
change  and  water  resources  management  research  priorities  for  the  PIER  programme  (Roos 
2003), Maurice Roos said:  “I talked to quite a few folks here in the Department, and also some of 
the water agencies, to try to get their ideas.  … most of them… were worried about taking care of 
this year’s problems.  … this far out stuff doesn’t have a lot of appeal.”  This suggests that a 
fundamental barrier to integrating adaptation to climate change into routine decision-making in 
the area of natural resources, is the need to consider the very long-term as a priority amongst 
other,  more  pressing  near-term  concerns.    Further,  the  rise  in  interest  in  climate  change  by 
decision-makers may not translate into concrete action until knowledge about impacts becomes 
more  useable,  for  example,  including  practical  decision-making  tools  to  allow  working  with 
existing knowledge across a full range of possible outcomes in the form of risk assessment and 
management approaches (Anderson et al. 2006; Dettinger 2006). 
7.6.  Understanding climate change in a California cultural context  
Any successful framing of the climate change issue will resonate with public opinion. It will need 
to remain technically and scientifically credible by building upon expert knowledge but it will 
also need to recognise public understanding of the issues which could be expected to more closely 
link to experiential knowledge (see also Chapter 7).  
7.6.1.  Public opinion, the environment and climate change  
Public opinion surveys, and indeed the behaviour of politicians, as well as the actions of the state 
government  suggest  that  environmental  issues  have  become  an  important  political  force  in 
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surveys note that a bipartisan majority of the public support policy action to address climate 
change (see below).  
Many of those interviewed pointed to climate change as an issue of growing political force, one 
that links closely to the long-standing environmental ethic that is found amongst Californians. 
Deputy Secretary of CalEPA, Anne Baker, considered action on climate change to stem from the 
“social culture” in support of the environment.  She said: “we’ve always been out front on the 
environment.  I think when we poll we find that 86, 90% of our voters support the mobile source 
reg of Fran Pavley’s.  They support doing something about climate change.  We have a long 
history  of  doing  that.    We  have  a long  history  of  a  commitment to  cleaning up  our  air,  in 
particular, and this follows in that same vein.  I think that’s just a part of the social culture here.” 
An independent energy expert and consultant, Steve Schiller, believes however that there has 
been a fundamental shift in public attitudes on climate change in California in recent years. Prior 
to the Governor’s initiative, he did not believe that climate change would influence elections or 
voting activity. Steve Schiller said about the public: “They care about jobs, they care about crime, 
they care about the economy, you know?  Things like that, but climate …it’s not the kind of thing 
someone  makes  a  vote  on.”    However,  he  believed  that  things  may  have  changed  course 
sometime in 2005.  He continued: “if you look at the polls [and media] that came out after the 
Governor’s original [announcement], and the Climate Action Team’s Report, they got all this 
press.  It’s a big issue.” He continued: “…I think there’s a tipping point in public opinion…  I 
know there was a tipping point for me, where… I said yeah, this is significant, it’s significant 
enough so that it’s important for us to engage.   And so will there be a tipping point in public 
opinion?  I think some of the leadership in the state has reached that tipping point.  And their 
motivation for that, is altruism, trying to be a good leader, thinking that it has political value.”  
Others interviewed also indicated that some type of tipping point had been reached where the 
state was compelled to act.  Lainie Motamedi of the CPUC placed that time about mid-2004 when 
she said: “A year and a half ago working on climate change, the initial kinds of reaction that we 
would get was, ‘Well, you know, we’re just a state.  What can we really do?’  …the call to action 
was unclear.”  However shortly after this, the CPUC began working closely with the CEC to 
mount an aggressive campaign to recognise climate change as a main motivation to accelerate and 
expand required investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy. Lainie Motamedi also 
underscored the role of the environmental community in communicating the risks of climate 
change in the California context and the influence that this effort had on perceptions about the 
issues.  She said: “having the Union of Concerned Scientists [put]the IPCC report into layperson’s 
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through a California specific lens: impact on the ski industry, impact on wineries, impact on 
agriculture, health risks.  All those kinds of things did elevate awareness about California’s role.”   
Climate change expert Dr. Steve Schneider pointed to the strength of the epistemic network of 
researchers and experts on climate change as one of the reasons for this change in public policy 
priorities in California.  In his view expert knowledge and expert actors have influenced both 
public opinion, for example through the media, and political attention to the issue of climate 
change.  In addition to contributing to ongoing climate change research and impact assessments 
(see above), this community has been active in communicating about the risks of climate change 
in  the  Californian  context  with  policymakers  (Cole  and  Watrous  2007).  Steve  Schneider 
concluded of this evidence and of the influence of the large epistemic network in California: “So 
it makes it very difficult for anyone in politics to try and step around and pretend the issue doesn’t 
exist, or to take the Bush Administration’s attitude.  It would be the kiss of death in California.  
It’s a deep ‘blue’ state.  And therefore you know, they’re doing well by doing good.  They’re 
helping their political future and at the same time dealing with a common interest.” Politically the 
scientific, expert base of knowledge about California impacts has provided a solid base for action. 
The fact that climate change became a priority policy issue in California from 2005 on set it apart 
from US federal policy, or lack of policy, over the same period. Public opinion research in the US 
covering the period leading up to 2005 also suggests that California politics were well ahead of 
US public opinion and support for action on climate change.  Leiserowitz’s (Leiserowitz 2005) 
survey of US public opinion showed climate change to be recognised as important but that it is 
viewed as a geographically and temporally distant problem. This suggests that climate change has 
not become a priority US policy issue at least in part because the public did not see it as a problem 
would affect “me and my neighbours” but rather one that would affect other people, people living 
in distant places or in poorer countries, and only over time horizons of several decades of more 
(Leiserowitz  2006;  Leiserowitz  2006).  Leiserowitz  concludes  that  although  the  US  public 
recognises climate change as important and real, they attach little sense of urgency to it as a 
policy priority.  This conclusion suggests that the void in US federal action has been permitted 
politically at least in part because the US public has been indifferent at best to whether action in 
the US is taken. 
Evidence from research in California, including that presented here, suggests that the weight of 
California public opinion is quite different from that of US public opinion more generally.   At 
least since 2005, climate change has been treated with a sense of urgency in California politics.  
When  asked  why  California  is  different,  Adrienne  Alvord,  legislative  staff  for  Senator  Fran 
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important and that's an intangible.  You can look at polling information, but the strength of public 
opinion has really changed over the last year or so.  [Hurricane] Katrina was a very large factor 
and also just increasing the volume on the reality of this problem from many sources. And then 
you have things like the Al Gore movie.”  In referring to the legislative initiatives in California on 
climate change, she concluded:  “All these things play a part in the creation of the climate that 
makes something  like this  possible to  consider,  etc.”  In other  words public opinion  and the 
California context led to a clear coalescence of political opinion that the state needed to take 
aggressive mitigation action to limit emissions of greenhouse gases, paving the way for a safer 
climate.   
7.6.2.  Bipartisan political support  
Part of the  unique political  climate in  California  on climate change  at  the time  of the  2006 
legislative  debate,  was  the  bipartisan  support  that  the  issue  had  garnered.  CPUC  President 
Michael Peevey echoed this view.  He said: “I won’t go so far as to say it’s a total political 
consensus, but I think ...the majority of Californians believe in strong environmental programs.  
Poll after poll after poll shows that.  Now, why are Californians more sensitive than people in 
Arizona or Nevada?  I can’t answer that question.”  The expert community in California also 
reiterated this view.  When asked about ‘Why California? Why now on climate change?’ Steve 
Schneider commented: “California has a strong environmental constituency and you’re rarely 
going  to  be  hurt  [politically]  by  at  least  having  the  appearance  of  being  environmentally 
protective.  I think that’s part of the explanation for the bipartisanship that we’ve had... By and 
large  it’s  pretty  mainstream.”  The  existence  of  broad  bipartisan  support  for  environmental 
protection appears to be widely understood among California’s climate policy elite. 
Ralph Cavanagh of the NRDC offered a slightly different perspective, cautioning that bipartisan 
support is not automatic but that it needs to be actively cultivated.  He said : “There’s a very 
strong base of public support that crosses some of the traditional lines in California.  So you’ve 
got strong business support for many of the policies.  Utilities in general have been very good, 
they’ve been very positive in terms of their views as to their willingness to support efficiency, 
renewables, their willingness to support statutory mandates addressing these issues.”  But he also 
said: “…it isn’t that there aren’t potential conflicts.  A lot of people, including NRDC, put a lot of 
effort into trying to work these issues out in advance, trying to build a consensus.” In his view, 
bipartisan support is something that can be garnered but requires concerted effort and attention, 
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In an election year, securing such bipartisan support may be particularly difficult and this was the 
case in 2006. The Governor was up for re-election in November and this was clearly creating a 
different set of political dynamics between the legislature and the governor on the issue of climate 
change amongst others. Steve Schiller noted: “... it’s an interesting dynamic in terms of whether 
[climate change] legislation will be successful or not. We have an election year and that screws up 
everything.    ...the  Legislature,  which  is  Democratic,  doesn’t  want  to  do  things  to  make  the 
Republican Governor look better.  And the Republican Governor doesn’t want to do things to 
make the Democrats look better.”   
However, there was a sense from several observers that the tides of public opinion were with the 
Governor on climate change and that 2006 legislative action of some sort on climate change was 
inevitable. As Steve Schiller said: “…this will be a good feather in the Governor’s cap if it gets 
through.  It will be, it will be important for him.  And on the flip side, he’s going to have his 
business  community,  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  …the  conservative  business  community 
representation saying this is bad for California’s economy.” From the Governor’s perspective the 
passage of GHG legislation in 2006 would reflect well on him, but it was not without some risk of 
alienating a core part of his political base that he moved ahead on climate change.   
7.6.3.  California cultural metaphors, the environment and climate change 
California’s unique geography and history has created a number of familiar cultural metaphors for 
well-being and the environment, which also played into public understanding of climate change.  
Among these is the healthy winter snow-pack on the beloved high Sierra mountains; this emblem 
has been romanticised by John Muir among others (Muir 1905).  Secondly, and linked to the 
snowpack, is water.  Large parts of California are semi-arid desert with a Mediterranean-like 
climate.  This  makes  water  a  precious  commodity  and  dependent  on  an  elaborate  set  of 
infrastructure to move it from remote areas where it flows plentifully to urban and agricultural 
areas where it is needed.  Thirdly, California’s climate and its geography have also elevated 
political attention to flood and fire prevention as key issues in natural disaster risk management. 
Fourthly,  is  clean  air  or  blue  skies,  especially  given the significance of the  fight  against  air 
pollution  in  the  state’s  socio-environmental  history.    A  final  cultural  metaphor  is  the  long, 
beautiful and carefully protected coastline that forms the entire western border of the state. All of 
these environmental and policy areas are important in instrumental terms, as they relate to the 
economic  development  and  well-being  of  people  in  California.    However  they  are  equally 
important  in  symbolic  and  metaphorical  terms  as  they  relate  to  the  understanding  of  what 
California represents, and what it means to be Californian. Each of these environmental areas Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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provides  a  range  of  amenities  or  services  that  contribute  directly  to  the  quality  of  life  of 
Californians.  However beyond their instrumental value, these environmental objects also carry 
what is referred to as “affect imagery” –  where images of the environmental objects elicit strong 
emotional responses from people throughout the state (Leiserowitz 2006).   
Climate change risks are present in each of these areas in California (Cayan et al. 2006).  As 
noted in Chapter 4, a major decline in snowpack is likely to accompany even mild levels of 
climate  change  over  the  coming  century,  with  large  repercussions  for  water  supply  and 
availability,  in  urban  areas  and  the  agriculture sector.  Climate  change  will  also  increase  the 
frequency of summer heat waves, aggravate air pollution problems and raise the risk of more 
frequent and intense brush and forest fires across the state, such as those experienced in October 
2007 in southern California (see Figure 7.2) (Cayan et al. 2006). Finally coastal flooding and 
erosion will increase as sea level rises and along with an increase in heavy precipitation events. 
Combined with earlier run-off from the mountains, these extreme events will test the elaborate 
system of levees in the state to protect against floods.  
Figure 7.2: Fire-fighting in Poway, California, 2007 
 
Note from Source: Fire fighter Jason Falarski battles to save a house in Poway on Monday. For 
many in San Diego County, the scene was reminiscent of the deadly 2003 Cedar fire. Several 
hundred thousand people evacuated their homes as wildfires flared across the county, but the 
size of the exodus made escape impossible for some. 
Source:  LA  Times,  October  22,  2007;    Photo:  Wally  Skalij  /  Los  Angeles  Times);    see: 
http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-fires-photogalleries,0,3419712.gallery. 
Interestingly the risks of climate change in key areas in California are widely understood amongst 
the policy elite, and these are repeatedly recognised in the interviews with elite decision-makers 
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6).  Understanding  of these  risks is  based  on  scientific  knowledge  about  climate  change  and 
derives  notably  from  the  impact  assessments  outlined  above.  In  addition,  decision-makers 
consider this knowledge about climate change impacts – at least in these emblematic areas -- to be 
widely understood by the public.   
This public understanding  of  the  risks of  climate  change  was suggested by several of  those 
interviewed as one of the reasons for widespread public and political support for climate change 
action.  Adrienne Alvord, the chief legislative staffer for Assemblywoman Fran Pavley said:  
“Global warming will hit California particularly hard.”  She mentioned sea-level rise as a main 
concern  for  California  as  a  coastal  state,  and  the  risk  of  more  severe  seasonal  fires  given 
California’s  hot  and  dry  summers.  She  also  explicitly  linked  climate  change  and  increased 
temperatures  to  air  pollution  when  she  said:  “Increased  temperatures  of  course.    Everybody 
knows that it creates more severe problems with air quality. And air quality is the number one 
environmental concern in the state and we have terrible air quality despite continuing efforts to try 
and clean it up, so that's a big problem.  That coupled with a historic consciousness about the 
environment, which I think has been a part of the culture of the state for many decades, ...combine 
to make people very interested in this issue.”   
Others interviewed also echoed the sentiment about the cultural bias of Californians in favour of 
environmental protection, and the link to vulnerability to climate change in key areas that are 
meaningful to people.  For example Steve Schneider said: “…the air pollution in LA… has been a 
consciousness raiser in California, which led to California getting ahead of the EPA, nationally 
(and [that] stood up in court). … the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley fire and the more recent southern 
California fires also raised awareness …so people in California are a little worried about air 
pollution and worried about fires and worried about water.”  
Mary  Nichols  discussed  past  experience  in  California  with  flood  and  drought  disaster 
management and the links to climate change. She said: “[floods and droughts] are issues that 
Californians have a long history of having had to cope with and they’re pretty dramatic... people 
are very motivated to try to take action that could prevent that from happening because they know 
how much we spend on flood control and prevention and on water and ports and so on.” Mary 
Nichols also stated that climate change impacts were another reason for California to step out on 
the issue of climate change, especially in the face of federal inaction:  “…[CA will be] more 
adversely affected than other parts of the United States and that forms part of the reason why 
California has been willing to take action….” Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Coastal zones in California are particularly vulnerable to climate change, especially where they 
are heavily populated and contain protected natural ecosystems.  As expert Steve Schneider said 
of the San Francisco Bay Area (and analogue regions): “Are we going to build a barrier under the 
Golden Gate Bridge?  Like the Thames?  Or the one that’s going to shut off the Venice Lagoon, 
which people are considering now as absolutely essential to the survival of the historical city?  
The trouble is, when you shut off the lagoon, you kill the wetlands.  Not only that, but what do 
you do in a super heavy rain …now you’ve got the dam blocking water from running in and out 
…so if you close the barrages to avoid getting flooded by salt water in the storms and their surges, 
you might then get swamped  by fresh water in the heavy rain storms coming from upstream.  So, 
you just don’t want to go there with that terrible set of trade-offs and management nightmares.  
But we’re going there, and we’re going there fast.  And that’s why California is trying to set an 
example for mitigation to lower this set of risks.”  In this view, mitigative action is a chief 
response to climate change.  Of course many experts would also argue that adaptation is equally 
or more important. Yet by 2006, California had yet to set state-wide priorities in this area.  
The strong set of public preferences to protect the environment in California is coupled with 
extraordinarily rapid population and economic growth. Several interviewees referred specifically 
to the context of rapid growth to situate the challenge of dealing with climate change. Jeffrey 
Callison, a public radio talk show host said: “the population is growing so fast in California and 
we’ve had terrible air quality problems in the past... we bump into environmental limits more 
often here than in some other states. Huge parts of California are all but uninhabited…If you take 
away the desert and the mountains and so on, a lot of habitable California is relatively densely 
populated.  So the shortage of water in some places, [combined] with the air quality issues, with 
the farmland being consumed at great pace... anyone who has their eyes open can see that there 
are finite resources.  They may disagree in how finite they are and what are appropriate measures 
to take to manage this finite resources, but you can’t live in urban California and ignore the fact 
that there’s only so much water, [and] the air turns  brown in the summer and so on. So I think 
those factors combine to make California environmentally-friendly.”  
Adrienne Alvord also highlighted this link when she said: “As the population has increased I 
think  people  are  more  and  more  conscious  of  the  need  to  …take  action  to  preserve  those 
environmental values whether [it’s an] open space, clean water, clear air or [a] related issue.”  
7.7.  Conclusion 
This chapter focuses on how expert knowledge is used to help support the California climate 
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assessments of  regional  climate impacts to  advance arguments  for  mitigation policy  and co-
construct meanings of the climate policy problem in their own context. 
The framing of climate change as an issue of regional environmental risk is a prominent feature of 
the policy discourse in California.  Largely dependent upon expert information and knowledge in 
the area of regional impact science, the environmental risk framing establishes climate change as 
a  problem  of  regional  or  local  “environmental  risk.”  Highlighting  the  unique  exposure  and 
vulnerability in California to climate changes, from the risk of greater extremes of flooding, heat 
waves and forest fires, to the interaction with episodic air pollution and the more gradual sea level 
risk and coastal zone erosion, the “regional environmental risk” framing brings the issue of global 
change down to local scale and provides a vehicle for communication about climate change, in a 
way that is meaningful in a local context and conveys a sense of urgency.  
The  chapter  also  outlines  the  emergence  of  an  active  epistemic  network,  comprised  of 
representatives  of  non-governmental  organisations  and  the  scientific  research  community, 
working together to support policy change. To some extent, this epistemic community has grown 
up around the issue of climate modelling and impact science and has been facilitated by the active 
research programme in California; however it has also benefited from on-going federal research 
funding on regional climate science.  The non-governmental community is directly engaged in 
working with scientists, and indeed forms part of the scientific elite, working to produce research 
and to re-package it for communication to a lay audience.  In particular, this California case 
shows that at least one environmental non-governmental organisation (ENGO) – the Union of 
Concerned Scientists -- has usefully played the role of a “boundary” organisation, thus bridging 
the  boundaries  between  science  and  policy  (Gieryn  1999;  Gieryn  1983b;  Jasanoff  1990). 
However having an ENGO play this boundary role is not without controversy;  some members of 
the scientific community worry that affiliation with an ENGO could taint the credibility and 
usefulness of their research findings.  Nevertheless UCS is shown to play a critical role to enhance 
dialogue between policy elites and the scientific community and strengthen understanding of 
climate change science at critical junctures in the policy process. Beyond demonstrating the role 
of  boundary  organisations  in  the  policy  process,  the  case  reveals  the  power  of  recursive, 
analytic-deliberative exchange to support policy decision-making (Stern and Fineberg 1996).     
Another theme explored in this chapter is the cultural context for policy action in California. 
Public opinion polls suggest that some of the explanation for policy change may lie in the cultural 
beliefs of Californians, who enjoy a particular respect for the environment and support strong 
environmental action.  This typically translates into bipartisan support for environmental policy.  
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policies of the government to the issue of individual consumption.  One only has to look at the 
explosive growth in vehicle use in the state to understand these contradictions (see also Chapter 
4). Nevertheless, the state may also be particularly vulnerable to climate change in areas that are 
emblematic or have strong cultural value as well as economic value. The use of photography and 
other images has helped to communicate to the layperson the meaning of climate change risk.  For 
example,  snow  pack  in  the  sierra  and  water  are  environmental  cultural  metaphors that  have 
become central in communication and understanding of climate change.  Further, interviews with 
policy elites revealed the resonance of images and messaging connecting weather and extreme 
events to climate change.  That is, California’s long-standing vulnerability to fires, heat waves and 
water shortages, which will only worsen with climate change, is a filter through which ordinary 
people  and  policymakers  alike  have  come  to  understand  the  climate  change  problem.  This 
understanding has been shaped in part by the popularisation of climate change impact science.  In 
turn popularisation of the impact science is shown to be undertaken by politically-savvy ENGOs 
and, increasingly, by the state government itself.   
One  interesting  conclusion  is  that  adaptation  was  sidelined  in  the  2005-06  climate  policy 
framework, despite the large and growing body of research on climate change impacts.  This goes 
against growing levels of attention to adaptation in OECD nations and regions (Gagnon-Lebrun 
and Agrawala 2008).  Instead as a policy issue adaptation appears to have withered away in this 
period to make room for mitigation.  Several observers are confident that adaptation will move 
front  and  centre in the near future  as  the  climate  policy process  matures;
117  yet in  this area 
California  would  appear  to  lack  leadership.    Could  it  be  that  the  political  interests  driving 
mitigation as the key agenda on climate change stand to gain from a more narrow focus?  Or it 
may be part of a generic problem with adaptation, where those who stand to gain the most may be 
amongst the poorest and least politically powerful.  By contrast, the champions for mitigation 
policies include an increasingly powerful green business lobby working in tandem with well-
resourced and knowledgeable ENGOs.  These issues are explored in more depth in the next 
chapter and in Chapter 9. 
Interestingly, California’s use of regional environmental risk as a policy frame for mitigation 
varies significantly from the approach that has been institutionalised by the IPCC.  Since 2001, 
                                                         
117 This appears to be the case today.  On 14 November 2008, the Governor issued an Executive Order 
calling for preparation of a: “statewide climate change adaptation strategy that will assess the state's 
expected climate change impacts, identify where California is most vulnerable and recommend climate 
adaptation  policies  by  early  2009.”    See  California  (2008)  and  the  Governor’s  Press  Release: 
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the IPCC’s comprehensive assessment of the climate change literature has been structured in three 
separate  volumes:  science;  impacts,  vulnerability  and  adaptation;  and  mitigation  (e.g.  IPCC 
2007a, b, and c). Yet the separation of impacts information from discussion of mitigation policy 
runs the risk of weakening the argument for action.  It does not answer the question: why should 
we mitigate? The California policy elites appear to have anticipated this problem and structured 
their arguments to pro-actively respond to this simple question.  In the words of one policymaker: 
“…you’ve got to tell people why you should care about this”  (Tamminen 2006i). 
Focusing on regional impact science and the characterisation of global climate change as regional 
environmental risk, this chapter addresses some of the “contested, multilevel aspects” (Powell 
2007) of the policy debate. It shows how more local framing of the climate problem has been 
used as a source of argument for mitigation action in California. This California example shows 
that dealing with mitigation at sub-national or local scales may benefit from the use of regional 
projections and regional climate impact science to communicate the meaning of climate change in 
a regional context.   
In summary, a large variety of factors combine to strengthen a bipartisan consensus and the 
resolve of the policy elite in California about the need for political action to address climate 
change. This includes understanding about the impacts of climate change, which is linked to 
availability  of  impact  science  and  extensive  efforts  by  the  expert  and  the  non-governmental 
(environmental advocacy) community to communicate these results to the lay public and to policy 
elites.  Media attention has also helped to diffuse information and garner attention to the issues. 
This reinforces the view that impact science has become a boundary object in the policy process 
in California, that co-construction of climate as regional environmental risk is an active part of the 
policy  discourse  and  that  this has been  successful to  bring  about  change in  part through an 
analytic-deliberative process that is facilitated by non-governmental actors.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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8.  FRAMING CALIFORNIA CLIMATE POLICY AS 
WIN-WIN 
8.1.  Introduction 
This chapter builds on the previous one to again focus on policy frames and the process of 
constructing such  frames.  The  chapter  aims to  elucidate  a  second dominant  policy  frame  in 
California that presents mitigation as a ‘win-win’ policy solution. This discourse argues that as far 
as possible climate change impacts should be avoided through preventive measures, that is, by 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. It focuses on possible strategies and concrete policy options 
to reduce GHG emissions to argue that they will bring positive outcomes for both the economy 
and the environment (i.e. there will be no net costs to society). The chapter traces the development 
of this policy frame and the evidence for it. 
The core principles for the policy frame are based on expert knowledge on the economics of 
mitigation  where  there  is  a  continuum  of  possibilities  that  could  characterise  the  cost-
effectiveness or economic outcomes for any given mitigation strategy.
118  These range from the 
extremes of  either economically disastrous or economically beneficial,  win-win outcomes where 
there are gains for both the environment and the economy.  In between these two extremes are a 
variety  of  other  outcomes  ranging  from  costly  or    ‘much  too  high  to  bear’  strategies,  to 
‘affordable’ strategies, where there will be some (net) costs but where these are judged to be 
affordable  given  preferences  for  the  environmental  outcomes  they  will  bring.    While  those 
interviewed expressed a range of views across this spectrum, an overwhelmingly dominant view, 
especially  from  governmental  representatives  and  environmental  NGOs,  was  that  mitigation 
policies would be win-win.   This perspective is also embedded in recent official documents 
including the Governor’s Executive Order and the AB 32 legislation. 
                                                         
118 This continuum describes outcomes along different measures of cost-effectiveness for a given climate 
change or emissions target.  This is because the policy process in California began with a politically-
determined emissions target rather than raising the more fundamental economic question of optimality, 
i.e. what would be the economically optimal policy target for the State of California, where marginal cost 
of mitigation is equal to the marginal (avoided impact) benefit.   Also in the interviews of policy elites 
and other non-governmental actors engaged in the policy process, no one raised the question of what 
would be the optimal target.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The  conceptual  framework  for  this  discussion  is  the  same  as  that  in  Chapter  7:  a  co-
constructionist perspective that shows policy decisions to be inevitably driven by a mix of “facts” 
and “values” as decision-makers selectively choose facts to construct arguments to frame policy 
decisions (Majone 1984; Hawkesworth 1988; Schön and Rein 1994).   Also, given the range of 
contested meanings of climate change, and the multilevel governance context for decisions, the 
analysis attempts to understand why a particular policy frame for mitigation has come to dominate 
in California and in whose interest is the dominant framing.  
The  chapter  shows  that  evidence  and  argument  advanced  by  policy  elites  with  respect  to 
mitigation  as  ‘win-win’  relies  upon  experiential  knowledge  and  social  learning  from  past 
experience with energy and environmental policy, as outlined in Chapters 5 and 6.  It also draws 
on business perspectives such as financial risk deriving from investments in carbon-intensive 
infrastructure and, to a more limited extent, on expert knowledge about the macro-economic 
effects of policy.  
8.2.  Mitigation policy as ‘win-win’: the discourse 
California’s win-win policy discourse presents mitigation as necessary to transform the economy 
towards  cleaner  energy  systems,  clean  technologies  and  practices  that  in  turn  will  deliver 
improved  local  environmental  protection,  social  and  economic  opportunities  for  California 
businesses, employment and local communities.  This discourse is commonly used in recent 
California legislative and policy documents (Table 8.1), noting that due to past policy actions in 
related areas California businesses are in the forefront of clean technology and practices and their 
diffusion; arguments are also made that the markets for such technologies and services are said to 
be  growth  markets  that  these  will  be  stimulated  through  mitigation  policies.    In  short,  this 
discourse derives from California’s historical experience with energy and environmental policy 
(see key examples highlighted in Chapters 5 and 6; see also discussion below in section 8.4).  
The “win-win” policy frame features a call for significant mitigation action in the “medium term” 
i.e. the 2050 timeframe and before, suggesting that significant reductions of greenhouse gases will 
deliver both economic and environment benefits to Californians.  It also suggests a need to begin 
today to limit emissions so as to lead the way for global emitters to act to avoid the worst of 
long-term impacts.  Despite recognition of inevitable, nearer-term climate change impacts and 
thus  the  need  for  adaptation,  the  focus  of  this  policy  frame  is  nevertheless  on  near  to 
medium-term reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Governor Schwarzenegger underscored the ‘win-win’ framing of action on climate change when 
he announced his Executive Order in 2005 (California 2005b): “By working together we can meet Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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the  needs  of  both  our  economy  and  environment.  Together  we  can  continue  California’s 
environmental  heritage  and  legacy  of  leadership  in  innovation  in  cutting  edge  technology.”  
Similar language appears in the preamble of the Executive Order itself (see Table 8.1).  Assembly 
Bill 32 (AB32) of 2006 also draws on a similar type of language to introduce its strategic medium 
term emission target of 2020. 
Table 8.1: Climate Policy Discourse in California: Climate Change Solutions as Win-Win 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s 
Executive Order (S-3-05) 
Assembly Bill 32 of 2006 
Solutions Evidence: Mitigation as a “Win-Win” Policy Choice 
California  has  taken  a  leadership  role  in 
reducing  greenhouse  gas  emissions  by: 
implementing  the  California  Air  Resources  Board 
motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission reduction 
regulations; implementing the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard  that  the  Governor  accelerated;  and 
implementing  the  most  effective  building  and 
appliance efficiency standards in the world. 
California-based  companies  and  companies 
with  significant  activities  in  California  have  taken 
leadership  roles  by  reducing  greenhouse  gas 
(GHG)  emissions,  including  carbon  dioxide, 
methane,  nitrous  oxide  and  hydrofluorocarbons, 
related to their operations and developing products 
that will reduce GHG emissions. 
Companies that have reduced GHG emissions 
by 25 percent to 70 percent have lowered operating 
costs and increased profits by Billions of dollars. 
Technologies  that  reduce  greenhouse  gas 
emissions  are  increasingly  in  demand  in  the 
worldwide  marketplace,  and  California  companies 
investing in these technologies are well-positioned 
to  profit  from  this  demand,  thereby  boosting 
California’s  economy,  creating  more  jobs  and 
providing increased tax revenue. 
Many  of  the  technologies  that  reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions also generate operating 
cost savings to consumers who spend a portion of 
the  savings  across  a  variety  of  sectors  of  the 
economy; this increased spending creates jobs and 
an overall benefit to the state-wide economy. 
…exercising  a  global  leadership  role, 
California  will  also  position  its  economy, 
technology  centers,  financial  institutions,  and 
businesses  to  benefit  from  national  and 
international  efforts  to  reduce  emissions  of 
greenhouse gases.  
…investing  in  the  development  of  innovative 
and pioneering technologies will assist California 
in  achieving  the  2020  state-wide  limit  on 
emissions  of  greenhouse  gases  established  by 
this division and will provide an opportunity for the 
state to take a global economic and technological 
leadership  role  in  reducing  emissions  of 
greenhouse gases. 
California  has  long  been  a  national  and 
international  leader  on  energy  conservation  and 
environmental  stewardship  efforts,  including  the 
areas of air quality protections, energy efficiency 
requirements,  renewable  energy  standards, 
natural  resource  conservation,  and  greenhouse 
gas  emission  standards  for  passenger  vehicles. 
The  program  established  by  this  division  will 
continue this tradition of environmental leadership 
by  placing  California  at  the  forefront  of  national 
and  international  efforts  to  reduce  emissions  of 
greenhouse gases. 
What is the structure of the argument for the framing of mitigation policy solutions as “win-win” 
with benefits for both the Californian environment and the economy? Since California alone Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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cannot deliver sufficient emission reductions to make a difference to the rate and magnitude of 
global warming,  mitigation policy can only be argued to have benefits to the California economy 
if there  are local  (economic  and non-climate  environmental  change) benefits stemming  from 
GHG reductions.  Elite policy actors recognise that mitigation action in California alone will not 
be sufficient to avoid the impacts of global warming. The key to the “win-win” argument is 
therefore to seek local  economic  competitiveness in new  clean  energy  and  other technology 
markets that emerge with the creation of GHG constraints.  Gaining market share and position 
through early mitigation action is one of the principal arguments and thus is an aim of policy 
under this framing.   
The evidence for this “win-win” framing is largely drawing on experiential knowledge from 
California’s  regulatory  history,  as  traced in  Chapters  5  and 6,  on  air pollution  regulation  of 
vehicles and energy efficiency regulation.  The expectation embedded in this “win-win” policy 
argument for California is the historical ability to pull markets towards clean technology, growing 
the economy while improving air quality, energy efficiency and environmental performance in 
parallel. This vision of the future would include not only cleaner vehicle technologies but also 
future generations of cleaner power and other industrial technologies, more sustainable farming 
and forestry practices as well as commercial and residential energy use and consumer habits.  
There is an inevitable economic bottom-line in California’s official policy discourse.  As Anne 
Baker, Deputy Secretary of CalEPA said: “We are a Republican administration.  We are pro-jobs, 
pro-business.  ...the Governor spends great time telling people we don’t have to pick between the 
economy or the environmental protection.  I give him credit for the places he goes and says that to 
the business community and others.  ...I also believe there are a lot of people on both sides of that 
equation who believe they’ve had to pick politically...  So it’s hard ...to keep that discussion 
moving; ...we spend a lot of time talking with venture capitalists and other people here about how 
do you see this really providing incentives for jobs... that kind of thing.”  Yet the challenge of 
climate  change  is  the  breadth  of  change  required  in  the  economy  to  clean  up  the  emission 
problem.  Climate change is driven by a vast range of human and economic activities, from 
energy production and use to industry, forestry and farming practices.  Addressing climate change 
in a meaningful way also requires global – not just national or regional – emission reductions.  
Can a regional (i.e. state) government, such as California, lead other parts of the US or of the 
world by demonstrating that a climate-friendly future is compatible with a healthy economy?      Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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8.3.  What are the win-win solutions for the environment and the economy? 
If one accepts the “win-win” argument then key questions are: what types of policy solutions 
deliver these “win-win” benefits in the area of climate change? How will California deliver on its 
vision of a climate-friendly future and a strong economy?  Interviews with elite policy actors 
indicated broad agreement on several strategic elements of the emerging policy framework in 
California,  including  clear  greenhouse  gas  emission  targets  to  guide  further  action.  Strong, 
standardised monitoring and reporting protocols are also required to monitor progress by ensuring 
a consistent accounting of emissions across sources within the state and evaluation of progress 
with respect to the targets.  
Mary Nichols, former head of the California Resources Agency,
119 explained why targets are 
needed: “… a target is essential if we’re going to actually make any progress, …in the near 
term… the level of awareness and consensus, at least among people in leadership positions, that 
this is a genuine problem worthy of taking some serious measures to address is very widespread. 
And yet our emissions in California, in the country and in the world as a whole are going in the 
wrong direction. So when you search around for what to do to galvanize action the easiest way to 
think about it is to say, ‘Okay.  You know what’s an acceptable level and what can we do starting 
now to get us towards that goal?’” In this view there is a need to outline the goals in a concrete 
way and to orient subsequent policy decisions to meet the overarching emission target. 
In 2006 legislation – the Assembly Bill 32 – the state legislature accomplished just this.  It 
codified a 2020 emission target for the State of California, requiring the California Air Resources 
Board (CARB) to oversee development of specific policies and regulation to implement the target 
according to an agreed timeframe (see Table 8.2). Consistent with this, the Act also sets out the 
requirement for monitoring and reporting of GHG emissions in the state.  By January 2008, 
CARB was to establish a quantitative 1990 baseline for state-wide emissions so as to firmly 
establish the magnitude of the emission cap in 2020 and to allow monitoring of progress in this 
direction.  It  was  also  to  adopt,  for  the  first  time,  regulations  for  mandatory  greenhouse  gas 
emissions reporting by entities across the state. 
Not all actors in the policy process, however, believe that California is on a “win-win” pathway to 
mitigate GHG emissions. K.C. Bishop the California lobbyist for Chevron corporation agreed that 
the way forward was through long-lived capital infrastructure and improving the environmental 
performance of these investments. K.C. Bishop questioned the “win-win” discourse when he said: 
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“If you put California in a deep recession that isn’t going to be the kind of leadership the world is 
going to follow.” Unlike many of the policy elite in California K.C. Bishop felt strongly that the 
technology pathway could not be forced by California acting in isolation of broader federal or 
worldwide action, or at least not without great risk of harm to the California economy. 
Table 8.2: Timeline - California Assembly Bill 32 of 2006 
By July 1, 2007: The State Air Resources Board (CARB) forms Environmental Justice and Economic & 
Technology Advancement advisory committees. 
By  July  1,  2007:  CARB  adopts  list  of  discrete  early  action  measures  that  can  be  adopted  and 
implemented before January 1, 2010. 
By  Jan  1,  2008:120  CARB  adopts  regulations  for  mandatory  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions 
reporting.  ARB  defines  1990  emissions  baseline  for  California  (including  emissions  from  imported 
power) and adopts that as the 2020 state-wide cap. 
By Jan 1, 2009: CARB adopts plan indicating how emission reductions will be achieved from significant 
sources of GHGs via regulations, market mechanisms and other actions. During 2009 ARB staff drafts 
rule language to implement its plan and holds a series of public workshop on each measure (including 
market mechanisms). 
By Jan 1, 2010:  Early action measures take effect. During 2010 ARB conducts series of rulemakings, 
after  workshops  and  public  hearings,  to  adopt  GHG  regulations  including  rules  governing  market 
mechanisms. 
By Jan 1, 2011: CARB completes major rulemakings for reducing GHGs including market mechanisms. 
ARB may revise the rules and adopt new ones after 1/1/2011 in furtherance of the 2020 cap. 
By Jan 1, 2012: GHG rules and market mechanisms adopted by ARB take effect and are legally 
enforceable. 
Dec 31, 2020:  Deadline for achieving 2020 GHG emissions cap. 
Source:  California  Air  Resources  Board,  25  September  2006,  available  online  [accessed  19  Jan  2008]:  
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/ab32timeline.pdf  
Yet the overwhelming view of California legislators, and apparently the Governor, was that it 
would be possible to reconcile economic growth and GHG mitigation in California.  The passage 
of Assembly Bill 32 in 2006 provides ample evidence of belief in this view.  Had legislators 
believed, to the contrary, that mitigation of GHG  would cripple the economy, the legislation 
surely would have failed.  That said, the true test will be whether the state government is able to 
successfully  implement  the  targets.    Early  experience  (see  Chapter 6)  suggests  that 
implementation will be more difficult than was agreement on the goals.  
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8.4.  Experiential knowledge, social learning & the win-win discourse 
This strand of California’s policy discourse is intimately intertwined with California’s past efforts 
to  address  energy  and  environmental  and  air  pollution  policy  issues.    According  to  many 
observers, California’s past leadership on environmental issues has led to cleaner technologies 
that raise the quality of life in the state and deliver a range of local economic benefits, while also 
changing the face of technology on a world-scale.  As John White said:  “  It isn't just to manage 
our own emissions it’s to transform global technology.”  In his view, California has already 
transformed the vehicle industry.  He said:  “…. if you look around the world, all of the stuff that 
we did in that 60s, 70s and 80s, all that technology transferred out.  The Europeans followed us: 
they followed us on lead, they followed us on sulphur they followed us on [NOx control] catalysts 
and we've driven the whole global technology.  So when people wonder about ‘why are you guys 
doing climate change, you're only the 12th largest source?’ and ‘suppose California does stuff on 
climate change, it isn't going to make a bit of difference compared to China and India.’  We forget 
the whole other part of the reason we're doing it.”  
This technical and policy competence in California is widely understood to convey an economic 
dynamic or force to orient California industry toward high-growth emerging markets worldwide 
for clean technology (Doerr 2007; Mullins 2008).  As John White said:  “It’s to the point where if 
you talk to the executives of the auto industry in Germany and Japan as well as Detroit, they will 
tell you that the global pace for technology forcing regulations on clean air and clean fuel is still 
California.” The argument that California has the potential to shape global markets is not new.  In 
addressing a workshop in 2000, (then) Senator Byron Sher stated:  “California already leads the 
country, and much of the rest of the world, in the development and use of renewable energy and 
energy efficient technologies.  It also is an international leader in demanding the cleanest cars and 
fuel in the world” (Sher 2000).  He concluded:   “The bottom line is that California cannot afford 
to ignore global warming for the sake of its environment, and it should not ignore global warming 
from the standpoint of the economic opportunity it presents” (Sher 2000).    
Beyond leadership through policy however, there is another dimension of California’s leadership 
that underscores the “win-win” arguments of solutions to climate change.  It is located in the 
venture capital industry in Silicon Valley, California.  This branch of the California business 
community advocates the need for policy leadership at the state level (as well as nationally and 
worldwide).  While on the one hand motivations are altruistic, generated by true concern about 
the problem, on the other hand this community of actors is positioning to profit from investing in Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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clean technology.  Their explicit aim is to create and to exploit the commercial opportunities to be 
found in leading a wave of revolutionary change in the world energy market.  As John Doerr, an 
influential California venture capitalist said:  “Energy is a $6 trillion business worldwide. It is the 
mother of all markets… Remember the internet? Going green is bigger than the internet.  It could 
be the biggest economic opportunity of the 21
st century.”  He also recognised the need for a 
transformation in the way society approaches the issues when he said: “We’ve got to make this 
economic, so that all people and all nations make the right outcome the profitable outcome, and 
therefore the likely outcome” (Doerr 2007). 
Mary Nichols also noted the potential to access and influence global markets for new technologies 
as well as other local benefits of aggressive action on climate change. She pointed to co-benefits 
of policies to address climate change, or those non-climate environmental and economic benefits 
of going green.  She said: “It’s just always a question of what are you getting for the money that 
you’re spending … most people believe that measures that reduce greenhouse gas emissions have 
other benefits in terms of reduction in fossil fuels, pioneering of new technologies that are going 
to be useful on a global scale.” 
K.C.  Bishop,  Chevron’s  environmental  lobbyist  in  Sacramento  raised  a  more  pessimistic 
counterpoint. As noted above, California’s previous experience, particularly in the regulation of 
air pollution to achieve air quality goals, suggests that goal setting and regulation of industry can 
force  technology  (Carlson  2003;  Taylor  2006;  Taylor  et  al.  2006).  On  technology  change, 
however, K.C. Bishop suggested that it was key to focus on the need for improvements in the 
power sector in places distant to California or the US.  He said: “…China’s out there building 
1000 megawatts a week of coal-fired power plants at 25% efficiency because it costs too much to 
build the 40% efficiency plants.  They got out of their natural gas contracts, basically because ...it 
was too expensive.  Gas got expensive, so they went back to coal.  So... if China keeps on that 
path there’s nothing that we do that matters really.” 
Yet many of the policy elite, and at least a part of the business community, believe there will be 
industrial competitiveness and environmental benefits to be derived from early mitigation action 
in California and that these may eventually reach global markets. For example, Devra Wang said: 
“California has a little bit of a head start, because we've done a lot of these types of programs in 
the past, but we don’t have enough of it to secure a leadership position in that marketplace.  There 
are potential economic benefits to getting ahead of that market so … economic competitiveness is 
another problem that these [climate change] policies are looking to provide a solution for.” Terry 
Tamminen also advanced a view about California’s ability to drive new technologies into global 
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helped to create markets for new, clean technology by being among the first to act on a sometimes 
controversial issue: “…air quality, water quality regulation.  I mean, we’re the first state in the 
nation to actively enforce the Clean Water Act provisions about storm water pollution. Looking at 
all kinds of different issues…technology, look at our stem cell initiative that, again, that came 
from citizens.  It wasn’t even the government, although our governor supported it.  But it was 
citizens saying hey, you know, the federal government is behind the curve on this and we need to 
do this research.  It can save lives.  It can be great for the economy, you know, much like the high 
tech boom of the ‘80s and ‘90s.  And so we’re going to put $3 billion on the table of taxpayer 
money and find a way to spend it wisely and try to jump start this industry and these medical 
breakthroughs.  California has always I think looked for ways to do that.”  
Despite  a  few  pessimistic  business  voices,  Californian  decisionmakers  have  accumulated 
sufficient in a variety of areas and appear to have a cultural bias in favour of environmental action 
and, more specifically, in favour of technology-forcing regulatory action.   John White referred to 
this when he said:  “That's the other thing that we have is a cultural… we have a technological 
optimism that is based on years of experience.  If we set a standard and we provide enough lead 
time and if we make it absolutely clear that the standards are going to take place then it was cause 
for  technology  to  evolve  to  meet  it.”  Even  voices  from  the  more  “conservative”  business 
community seem to agree, as Dominic Dimare of the California Chamber of Commerce said: “the 
principles that guide us are maintaining a balance between the economic vitality of the state and 
protecting the environment.  And we don’t think the two are mutually exclusive, and in fact we 
think  they’re  inextricably  entwined...  we  like  to  really  throw  a  lot  of  protection  around 
environmental resources and values here in California. The reason we can do that is because we 
have a very dynamic economy.  That in a large part is predicated our on international trade and 
innovation and creativity.  And so we can afford the environmental protection that we want 
because we have the economy that generates the economic wherewithal or wealth to do it.”  In 
this view, climate change policy is affordable if it builds on and adds to the trade opportunities to 
grow the economy. 
Over and above the view that California might gain economically from early action on climate 
change, another view that is altruistic also emerges from key policymakers interviewed for this 
project.    This  perspective  identifies  Californian  leadership  on  climate  change  as  the  “right” 
environmental  policy  course,  especially  given  the  strong  preferences  of  Californians  for 
environmental protection.  Or as Michael Peevey, said: “it’s a … very strong sentiment in this 
state to be environmentally attuned... Admittedly, it’s a fiercer challenge than some of the other 
things that we’ve faced.  And what California can do is relatively small given it’s a worldwide Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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problem, but we can provide some leadership. And that’s what we’ve tried to do at the [C]PUC 
and the Energy Commission, to provide some leadership and help others point the way while 
we’re trying to work even beyond California with other western states and even with others.  
We’ve signed an agreement with a Province in China to help them with energy efficiency.  All 
that concerns global warming, frankly, and just more efficient use of resources.”   
California’s leadership, internationally and domestically, is a key element of the “win-win” policy 
discourse.    If  California,  as  an  economic  powerhouse,  can  promote  new  GHG  regulatory 
approaches elsewhere in the world, it will also enhance the size and pace of growth of clean 
energy  markets.    In turn  this  may  favour  California businesses,  which  are  already  servicing 
emerging markets in state and to provide innovative clean technology and know-how for similar 
markets elsewhere. The CPUC memorandum of understanding with Jiangsu Province in China, 
and a recent initiative of cooperation amongst western states in the US are examples of how 
California is collaborating with other regions to share its experience and knowledge (CPUC 2005; 
WRCAI 2007).  The influence of successful policy experiments can escalate quickly in a world 
where markets for clean technology and expertise in this area are increasingly open and linked 
through global trade (Vogel 1995).  But what evidence exists for business success from past 
California regulations? 
In recent reviews, both Roland-Holst (2008) and Taylor et al. (2006) draw on ex post assessments 
to conclude that California’s technology forcing environmental policies have positioned it to reap 
market  gains.  Taylor  cautions  that  it  is  difficult  to  disentangle  the  innovation  effects  of 
environmental policies in part because there are two market failures co-mingling – environmental 
externalities and the tendency for firms to under-invest in technology innovation (Taylor 2008; 
Taylor et al. 2005).  However in a series of interdisciplinary case studies including assessment of 
patent  data  against  policy  action,  construction  of  technology  learning  curves  and  interviews 
among market participants, Taylor et al. (2006)  also show that where California has had front-
runner regulatory policy, it has captured a significantly higher share of intellectual property rights 
than on average across the patent system as a whole (Taylor et al. 2006). She also finds that 
contrary to standard economic analysis, regulations may have stronger innovation effects than do 
cap  and  trade  and  that  regulatory  policies  can  have  dynamic  innovation  effects  if  they  are 
regularly updated (Taylor et al. 2006).  
There is also some evidence that in the context of global markets, national regulations – and in 
this case regional regulations – establish a “race to the top” where regions and nations aim to lead 
the way to greater environmental and economic performance, creating market pull for new, clean 
technologies through clear regulatory policies (Vogel 1995; Vogel 2003; Vogel et al. 2006).  This Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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counters  the  view  that  environmental  regulations  harm  business  competitiveness  creating 
incentives for a “race to the bottom” where policies that are intentionally weak to attract more 
business investment.  Indeed, historical evidence, as documented by Dr. Vogel, at UC Berkeley, 
shows a “California effect” where California environmental regulations have led the way for 
national policy and transformed the regulatory landscape for markets far beyond California’s 
borders.  However the  broader value  of  environmental  innovation  found  in  federalism,  where 
much of the regulatory power may be decentralized, derives from an uptake of more stringent 
standards by central government.   In a comparison of EU and US environmental regulatory 
trends he notes that individual states (US states and EU nation-states) can be an important source 
of innovation that drives change elsewhere, however this is only the case if the state regulations 
are more broadly diffused.  He concludes: “the most important role played by state standards is to 
prompt more stringent central ones. Unless this dynamic comes into play, the effectiveness of 
state environmental regulations remains limited”  (Vogel et al. 2006: 273).  As noted in Chapter 5, 
in  the  notable  cases  of  vehicle  air  pollution  regulation  and  of  appliance  energy  efficiency 
standards, California has effectively led the way to stronger regulations at national level. 
8.5.  Climate change risk as financial risk: a business perspective 
Another interesting development in California’s policy discourse is the recognition of climate 
change as a source of financial or regulatory risk for companies and their shareholders.  The 
argument goes that climate change is an inevitable part of the regulatory landscape of the future. 
Even though today there are few if any regulations in the United States that constrain markets in a 
carbon-friendly  way,  if  one  assumes  that  regulations  are  forthcoming,  carbon  and  other 
greenhouse gas emissions will eventually carry a real cost this should affect business decisions 
given  the implications  for  future  earnings and  profitability.    Thus the  recognition of  climate 
change as a public policy issue requires recognition of climate change as a source of financial risk 
for business operation.   
In California, “climate change as financial risk” is one of the principal arguments used in the 
regulation of publicly owned utility companies by the CPUC. In 2005, the CPUC established a  
“greenhouse gas adder” requiring public utilities to add a cost of carbon into analyses of the costs 
of power for the purpose of evaluating cost-effectiveness of alternative power supply investments 
(CPUC 2005a; CPUC 2005b) (see also Chapter 5). Devra Wang of NRDC noted that the CPUC’s 
“GHG adder” reflects the cost of GHG regulation for utilities:  “[it] was one cost that they had not 
been  forecasting…  this  [adder]  now  requires  that  they  do  forecasts.  So…it  makes 
carbon-intensive resources look less attractive and cleaner resources look more attractive.” Prior Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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to the CPUC decision, the NRDC had partnered with PG&E and others to document this financial 
risk and how it is being dealt with by companies and in other state jurisdictions (Bokenkamp et al. 
2005).  Devra Wang noted:  “It’s something that a number of utilities have done on their own 
without  regulatory  direction  in  the  U.S.  because  it’s  a  huge  risk  for  them.    …  the  federal 
discussions around climate policy, certainty this is one of the primary reasons that the utilities 
companies have come out now in favour of the cap …they're saying: ‘how the heck can we make 
investments when we don't know what you're planning to do?’ And these investments are going to 
last for so long.  So we've seen it from a number of utilities … because they recognize that it’s 
prudent. Then we've also seen it from a number of regulators who are requiring their utilities to do 
it to protect their customers.” From this perspective, the use of a financial adder to account for the 
future regulatory risk of carbon-intensive investments is simply prudent business practice.  
The use of the GHG adder to account for financial risk of climate change in the power sector also 
aims to protect the long-term interests of those who have to pay the cost of power, the ratepayer.  
As  Lainie  Motamedi  of  the  CPUC  staff  said:  “…we’re  not  looking  at  it  as  environmental 
regulation per se, but we’re looking at overall financial health … and risk as well as upholding the 
tradition  of  environmental  mandates  in  the  state.    We’re  looking  at  overall  efficiencies  and 
balancing of risk on behalf of the ratepayers.” Given the mandate of the CPUC [and CEC] to 
deliver reliable, affordable and environmentally sound energy to Californians, the GHG adder is 
one means to deliver on these goals.  As noted in Chapter 5, one important effect of the adder is to 
dampen investment in conventional coal power generation technologies.   
Shannon Eddy, special advisor to the CPUC, highlighted that prior to the adder policy, plans were 
emerging to build new transmission capacity from the coal state of Wyoming to supply power to 
California.  Known as the “Frontier Line” such a project would have most likely increased the 
amount of coal-fired power being brought to California and thus the greenhouse gas footprint of 
the state in the western US region.  Shannon Eddy said: “People were very nervous about that.  
They’re nervous from several perspectives.  You can look at it from the climate perspective… 
You can look at it from the whole idea of California exporting its criteria pollutants, which is also 
problematic. But I think if we look at it simply from the perspective of economic risk that’s where 
these guys were coming from.  You’ve got a situation where California and the nation [are] 
…looking down the barrel of climate regs [regulations] of some level.”  This view reiterates the 
notion that climate change carries significant financial risk due to future regulatory changes. 
Future dependence on coal-fired power through infrastructure projects (e.g. transmission lines and 
power plants) built today carries financial risk associated with a carbon-constrained world of the 
future. By taking policy action today to regulate GHG, California has begun to explicitly limit the Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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investment risks of its companies and begun to construct the markets of the future that will deliver 
clean coal and other clean energy technologies. 
Another example of the understanding of climate change as “financial risk” is found in a series of 
actions taken by the California institutions established to manage the retirement funds of the large 
number of state government employees and public sector school employees and teachers. These 
institutions  are  the  California  Public  Employees’  Retirement  System  (CalPERS)  and  the 
California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). As of 10 January 2008, CalPERS’ 
annual institutional investment was estimated to have a total market value of  $247.5 billion, 
while as of November 30, 2007, CalSTRS’ assets were valued at $174.2 billion.
121  The thrust of 
their action to favour environmental protection and investments is captured in what was originally 
called  the  “Green  Wave  Initiative”  and  begun  in  2004  by  former  California  Treasurer  and 
gubernatorial  candidate  Phil  Angelides.    The  Green  Wave  Initiative  includes  action  in  three 
distinct  areas:  1)  to  invest  roughly  half  a billion  dollars  in  cutting-edge  technologies  and 
another billion dollars in environmentally responsible companies; 2) to work through shareholder 
initiatives to prod companies in which the two funds invest to address the financial risks posed by 
environmental  liabilities  and  global  warming,  and  to  disclose  these  liabilities  through  public 
reporting; and 3) to reduce energy consumption in their massive real estate holdings (CST 2005).  
An initial assessment of the CalPERS initiative suggests that this move, which represents only a 
very minor share of the total investment portfolio, has increased rather than decreased the market 
value of invested sums compared to the conventional investment strategy (Barber 2006).  
Former  Secretary  of  California  EPA  and  real  estate  investment  advisor,  Winston  Hickox, 
explained that Treasurer Angelides’ decision to launch the initiative and the support from the 
CalPERS board was facilitated by off and on interactions between financial and climate change 
experts on the one hand, and decision-makers on the other.  Winston Hickox facilitated some of 
these encounters, first as CalEPA Secretary and later in his role as an investment advisor to 
CalPERS.    For  example,  in  November  2004,  he  organised  a  workshop  for  CalPERS  Board 
members, the aim of which was to brief key decision-makers about the nature of financial risks 
associated with climate change from a business perspective.  The November 2004 workshop 
featured  interventions  from  Dr.  Stephen  Schneider  and  Peter  Schwartz,  the  leader  of  the 
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progressive business organisation Global Business Network.
122   Winston Hickox described the 
effect of the Schneider and Schwarz expert presentations on the CalPERS Board: “…they put the 
fear in them that, in fact, these forces creating climate change were of such a size and magnitude 
that it would, ...over time ...make winners and losers out of countries and companies and therefore 
investors.”  Winston Hickox underscored the argument that climate change was linked to the core 
mandates of the CalPERS and CalSTRS; he described the bottom line as: “… it’s our fiduciary 
responsibility to better understand these forces that are going to create risk and change.  The 
world that lies ahead is highly likely to be very different from the world we see in the rear view 
mirror.”  In this view, climate change is increasingly a financial liability and forward looking 
companies  and  investors  will  be  recognizing,  quantifying  and  actively  managing  these 
liabilities.
123  
8.6.  Expert evidence: economic modelling and analysis  
Economic analysis is an important source of expert knowledge that could be used to assess and 
construct  evidence  for  a  preferred  mitigation  strategy,  for  example  through  the  economic 
modelling of alternative mitigation strategies.  Presumably if mitigation policies were “win-win,” 
economic modelling would show economic benefits deriving from emission reduction strategies 
over time.  Yet California’s climate policy process to date lacks examples of rigorous ex ante 
economic analysis in the evaluation of policy options.  However there are some examples of ex 
post analysis entering the policy debate to support the “recommended” policy package.  Instead 
“economic” arguments for (or against) a particular set of policies appear to rely as much on local 
and experiential knowledge as on formal economic analysis. Experiential knowledge stems from 
the  large  array  of  energy  and  environmental  and  air  pollution  policies  already  in  place  in 
California. This type of knowledge appears to have been more influential than formal economic 
analysis in influencing the climate policy discourse throughout 2006.  
                                                         
122  Note  Stephen  Schneider  was  interviewed  for  this  research  and  he  also  mentioned  the  CalPERS 
workshop as an important event, reaching an important  and influential audience in terms of business 
investment for climate-friendly outcomes (Schneider 2006i). As for Peter Schwartz, beyond advocating 
attention to climate change from a business perspective, he was the lead author of an influential report to 
the  US  Pentagon  on  the  links  between  climate  change  and  national  security.  See:  (Schwartz  and 
Randall 2003).    This  report  received  significant  media  attention  at  the  time,  e.g. (Townsend  and 
Harris 2004). 
123 Increasingly the business case to identify and manage financial risk associated with carbon liabilities 
is being made by Ceres which is “a national coalition of investors, environmental groups and other public 
interest organizations working with companies to address sustainability challenges such as global climate 
change. Ceres also directs the Investor Network on Climate Risk, a group of more than 50 institutional 
investors managing $3.7 trillion in assets” (Gardiner 2007).  See also Cogan 2006. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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A historical example can be found in knowledge of costs and economic performance under past 
regulatory decisions relating to energy efficiency versus investment in new electricity generation 
capacity  (see  Chapters 4  and  5).    In this  case, analysis  at the time  (Roe  1984) showed that 
investment in energy efficiency and conservation was economically advantageous compared to 
new supply-side energy investment. This was originally a contentious argument and contested by 
companies who had a vested interest under the existing regulatory regime to increase investment 
in capital equipment and thus boost rates and revenues.  Policymakers ultimately chose to alter the 
regulatory framework to establish incentives to both demand-side and supply-side investment, 
with the resulting outcome being higher investment in energy efficiency (demand-side actions) 
displacing otherwise expensive additions to power and natural gas supply infrastructure with 
lower cost investments in energy efficiency.  Although the exact form of the policy has shifted 
over time, the intent of the policy framework has largely remained stable and has been shown to 
deliver long-lived economic and environmental benefits (CEC 2005a). Financial and economic 
analysis was the basis for the strong regulatory approach taken in California to establish these 
incentives for energy efficiency.  
There  is  now  also  substantial  local  experience  and  knowledge  of  the  cost-effectiveness  of 
investment in energy efficiency as a means to displace investment in more expensive energy 
supply options. Beyond extensive ex ante and ex post assessments in the state’s “grey literature” 
on the performance of energy efficiency standards and investments (e.g. see CPUC 2005a; Chang 
2006a), relatively fewer studies attempt to assess these savings in a macro-economic framework.  
However two studies stand apart and are worth mention here. First, a study by RAND (Bernstein 
et al. 2000) reviews energy efficiency programmes across the state and reports results along three 
different dimensions of policy benefits: economic performance, air pollution and distributional 
effects on low-income households.  The authors estimate the economic gain from investments in 
energy efficiency in the state of California since 1977 to be about 3% in 1995 ranging from $875 
to $1300 per capita, with a cumulative return on investment that ranges from 80 to 170 percent.  
They also conclude that over the nearly twenty year period of study (1977 to 1995) the strong 
energy efficiency performance of the state reduced air pollution from stationary sources by about 
40% and produced a range of other benefits for consumers in the form of lower energy bills and 
lower energy prices, both of which benefited poor households relatively more than others.   
Second is a more recent study by Roland-Holst at UC Berkeley (Roland-Holst 2008).  This study 
builds on the Bernstein et al among other studies, using a computable general-equilibrium model 
for California to consider the impact of past policies on employment and more generally the 
economy.  Roland-Holst’s analysis concludes that household efficiency measures since 1972 have Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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led to the creation of nearly 1.5 million new jobs with $45 billion in payroll.  This is because 
consumers save money and spend it on less carbon intensive sectors, which in turn are more 
employment intensive than those that loose from these policies.  Overall Roland-Holst (2008) 
estimates that the energy savings since 1972 to 2005 have resulted in more than $56 billion in 
household savings and avoided the construction of 24 power plants. Both of these studies present 
clear evidence of win-win investment in energy efficiency in California as a result of regulatory 
policy. 
Climate change as an issue is more comprehensive and far-reaching across the economy than 
previous energy and environmental policy issues. For this reason alone, it could be said to warrant 
thorough  economic  assessment  prior  to  target-setting,  or  at  a  minimum  prior  to  the 
implementation of new policies to achieve a given emission target (Anon3 2006i). Within state 
institutions there is an ongoing faith in the value of economic analysis to guide decision-making.  
For example, when asked about whether economic arguments are driving climate policy decisions 
in California, Nancy Ryan, a PhD economist and chief energy advisor to Michael Peevey of the 
CPUC, said: “…there are instances where it is driving the policy.  ...For example with the work 
the Commission is doing on energy efficiency, even to a large extent on the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard….  If you look at the energy efficiency programs here, they pass rigorous cost-benefit 
tests.  I think if you conduct thoughtful cost-benefit analysis that takes into account pricing the 
risk associated with fossil fuels, that the RPS Program is going to pencil out, so that’s attractive to 
me [as an economist].  My impression based on a short record [at the CPUC] is that it’s not 
inconsistent  in  its  application  of  those  principles,  but  it  is  very  much  a  part  of  how  this 
organization does business; it’s very focused on cost-benefit principles.” Despite this belief in the 
value of economic analysis from inside a key state institution, there is little evidence to date of a 
strong influence of ex ante analysis on climate change policy.  
When  asked  about  how  economic  analysis  is  integrated  in  the  policy  process,  Nancy  Ryan 
responded: “There is almost a religious, faith on the part of the people who believe in the things 
we’re  doing  that  if  you  look  carefully  at  economics  in  the  right  way,  they  will  pencil  out.  
Therefore the bold policy initiative comes first, and the studies come later. The risk is that the 
studies are done to justify the policy, that was chosen.” Nancy Ryan elaborated on the nature of 
that risk, when she said:  “I mean my own view is that it’s got to be the case that there’s an 
upwards sloping supply curve for carbon reductions and that it would be nice to understand what 
that is and so we focus on - walking up that instead of selectively grabbing things along it.  And 
it’s not clear to me that that’s what the approach is.  Or even that that mindset is forming [in] how 
they’re approaching it.”  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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A similar story emerges from Michael Hanemann, who is a professor of economics and public 
policy at University of California at Berkeley (UCB) and also a prominent international expert on 
environmental  and  resource  economics.  Michael  Hanemann  explained  that  the  role  of 
macroeconomic modelling of mitigation climate policy options, with particular reference to the 
possible role of cap and trading systems, was first discussed within a UCB circle of experts in 
2003.  He said: “We were developing a CGE [computable general equilibrium] model and we 
were interested in policy debate, you know, participating in the policy debate on cap and trade in 
some way.  The problem was there wasn’t a policy debate yet or people who were thinking about 
it weren’t interested in talking to us, so we were kind of all dressed up, but nobody was inviting us 
out.”  Michael  Hanemann  explained:  “…when  the  Governor’s  announcement  came  along  [in 
2005]… I saw that part of it had to do with policy including a report about cap and trade. I hoped 
and, I guess, assumed that we might be involved in that.  I don’t mean, you know, exclusively, but 
a bunch of economists and others around campus had sort of thought about that and so, but that 
didn’t happen.  I made offers and suggestions.”  But apparently CalEPA, which was running the 
policy process kicked off by the Governor’s announcement, expressed little early interest in this 
type of comprehensive economic modelling of the policy packages.   
The earliest trace of formal economic analysis to inform climate policy decisions appears in the 
summer of 2004. The Energy Foundation had assisted the western states to move towards a 
declaration on climate policy by funding Tellus Institute to assess the mitigation potential and cost 
of various options to reduce emissions in California, Oregon and Washington as part of a West 
coast  Governors’ initiative  (Bailie  et al. 2004).    This  work  was  eventually deepened  to look 
in-depth at California alone and it was this study that appears to have provided a key expert input 
in the lead up to the Governor’s announcement in 2005 (Bailie and Lazarus 2005) (referred to 
below  as  the  “Tellus  study”).
124    Michael  Hanemann  noted  that  the  Tellus  study  had  been 
reviewed  by  University  of  California  at  Berkeley  economists  on  behalf  of  the  Energy 
Commission.  He noted concern that the analysis was overly simplistic when he said: “...and so 
actually a memo was sent.” Yet the government was relying upon this single study claiming that 
climate policy would boost the California economy and create jobs (Bailie and Lazarus 2005).
125   
                                                         
124 Personal communication with Michael Lazarus of the Tellus Institute (co-author of the 2005 study), 11 
January 2006.  Also the final CAT recommendations (see below) contains reference to the important role 
of the Tellus report, stating:  “CalEPA worked with the ARB, CEC and Tellus, a technical contractor, to 
develop the targets in the 2010 and 2020 timeframes” (CAT 2006:18). 
125  Note  that  as  far  as  this  author  is  aware,  this  study  was  never  formally  released  although  it  was 
developed in consultation with and for the California state agencies that were eventually tasked with Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Tracing the origin of the first set of policy recommendations from the Climate Action Team in 
early 2006 under the Governor’s Executive Order provides an example of the limited role of 
economic  analysis  in  the  initial  policy  process.  By  December  2005,  a  draft  set  of  policy 
recommendations had been released by CAT (CAT 2005); in parallel the draft Tellus study had 
been used to provide initial economic analysis of near-term policy options in the policy process 
leading up to the release of these draft recommendations including public briefings. The Tellus 
report highlighted small economic benefits that would result from the recommended mitigation 
policy package (Bailie and Lazarus 2005).
126 However the Tellus report fell far short of a full 
macro-economic policy analysis, which some of the experts and the business community believed 
was warranted.  Some recognition of the need for more thorough analysis emerged in this period, 
as rather than presenting the partial or “bottom up” technical economic estimates that had been 
reported by Tellus and influential in the initial identification of mitigation options (Bailie and 
Lazarus 2005), the CAT reported: “Preliminary economic analyses are underway for inclusion in 
the report to the Governor and Legislature” (CAT 2005: 11). By choosing not to present the 
Tellus  results,  the  state  government  had  begun  to  distance  itself  from  the  partial  economic 
analysis that it contained. 
Meanwhile Michael Hanemann, had been pressing CalEPA to fund a more thorough analysis of 
policy options and by late 2005 they had agreed.  Michael Hanemann remembers meeting Cal 
EPA Deputy Secretary Anne Baker for the first time in September 2004.  He recalled:  “…I had 
sent her an e-mail, kind of warning her, although, not in very blunt terms, that the Tellus report 
was not the greatest thing since sliced bread and offering to help, if they wanted. We were 
developing a CGE [computable general equilibrium] model and we could do a better analysis.”  
According to  Michael  Hanemann:  “…there  was never  any response.”     However  delayed,  a 
response did come about a year later when he finally received a request to contribute such an 
analysis in early September 2005. Pressure for comprehensive economic analysis had eventually 
come from the “consumers” of climate policy, that is, those who would be directly affected by the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
implementation of Assembly Bill 32 of 2006 and comprising the core of the California Climate Action 
Team.  It was originally posted to the Climate Action Team website as part of the documentation for a 28 
July 2005 Stakeholder Briefing meeting.  At this meeting a presentation was made on the results of the 
study by David Wooley of Tellus Institute.  Although background documentation is no longer posted, the 
agenda  for  this  meeting  can  be  found  on  the  internet  at: 
http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/notices/2005-07-28_meeting.html [last accessed 20 January 2008]. 
126  Ealier  drafts  of  the  study  had  been  available  to  CalEPA  as  indicated  by  the  dates  on  the  cover 
(December 2004; revised July 2005) but this was the first formal draft to have been posted on the CAT 
public website. The study has since been removed from the website and thus never finalised as far as this 
author knows. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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policy in the business sector.  Michael Hanemann said that in early September 2005: “…the 
Director of the Chamber of Commerce in Sacramento had gone around to Anne Baker and had 
told her that a nationally known consulting company had been asked by them to analyze the 
Governor’s emission targets and had concluded that they would destroy 300,000 jobs a year in 
California.    The  Chamber  of  Commerce  would  release  this  report  shortly.”  The  California 
Chamber of Commerce had thus forced the economic arguments forward as a means to challenge 
the Governor’s aggressive climate mitigation goals.  In turn, CalEPA’s response was to fund work 
required to bolster economic analysis of the CAT policy package recommendations that were to 
be made to the Governor.  
Working under an extremely short deadline, the UC Berkeley team set out to apply the CGE 
model (BEAR) that they had been building to the question of how the California economy would 
fare with mitigation policies.  Michael Hanemann commented on the team’s ambition for the 
work: “…it wasn’t just going to be the BEAR model because what I was interested in were flaws 
in the conventional economic analysis, both the market’s impact, but also of the cost of emissions 
reduction.   Because the point of our CGE model, the point about any model, but particularly 
CGE  models  is  that  they  have  a  representative  firm.    They  don’t  have  heterogeneity.    The 
heterogeneity creates gains from trade within a sector, …so you can’t use the CGE model to 
analyze within sector trades because there’s just a representative firm.  The whole business of 
technical  change,  induced  technical  change,  behavioural  change  in  demand  or  any  of  these, 
…none of these things are in the CGE models. …They have a huge influence on the conclusions 
of these models and so there are real issues …about model specification.” 
In January 2006, the macro-economic analysis of the UC Berkeley team was released but it was 
not part of the officially sanctioned set of reports from the Government that had been designed to 
provide evidence and support for the proposed policy recommendations.
127  CalEPA and the UC 
Berkeley team had had a falling out and the UCB report was released only as an independent 
study  (Roland-Holst  2006)  rather  than  as  an  integral  part  of  the  state  commissioned 
documentation  on  the  risks  of  climate  change  and  analysis  of  the  proposed  policy  response 
(CAT 2006).  Instead, CalEPA had worked with its own technical regulatory agency, the staff of 
the California Air Resources Board, to quickly develop its own economic analysis of the policy 
package being recommended to the Governor by the Climate Action Team (CAT 2006). This 
analysis used an older version of the UC Berkeley CGE model called EDRAM.   
                                                         
127 This policy package was targeting implementation of the Governor’s Executive Order focused on the 
2010 mitigation targets. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Although in the end a compromise was reached, there had been a major divide in the lead up to 
the  release  of  the  state  funded  macro-economic  analysis  reports.
128    As  Michael  Hanemann 
recalled: “…this then morphed into a turf war between EDRAM and BEAR.  …We had 3/10ths 
of a percent increase in employment in 2020 and EDRAM had 5/10ths of an increase, and 5 is 
bigger than 3. But this was, you know, like Holy war; three has to be wrong, five has to be right. 
Tenths of a percent.” Michael Hanemann said that CalEPA was eventually persuaded because: 
“…it was actually in their interest to have two reports reaching similar conclusions and so we 
were allowed to release the report.”  Thus both reports were released but by separate institutions.  
As anticipated by the UC Berkeley team, this was viewed by the press as adding credibility to the 
common finding between the two studies that despite the differences in specific numbers and 
differences in scope of the modelling, greenhouse gas abatement would lead to net gains for the 
California economy (McFarling 2006).
129 
Michael Hanemann elaborated on the role of experts and the need for corroborating evidence in 
constructing policy arguments.  He said: “The point is this is contentious …it’s like litigation.  … 
The point about litigation is, unfortunately…people want to destroy your reputation.  It’s not just 
that they  want to  destroy your numbers, but they  want  to show  that you  are  an idiot or  an 
incompetent, who doesn’t, you know, and they’ll do that using unfair means, you know.  They’ll 
do anything and you play into this if you’re not [ready analytically].”  Dr. Nancy Ryan, an 
economist working within the policy process as a chief energy advisor to Michael Peevey, had 
high  expectations  for  the  UCB  study.    She  said:  “I  have  enormous  respect  for  Michael 
[Hanemann] and his colleagues.  And so I’m optimistic that this is going to be a rigorous case. 
This is an all star cast of people who looked at this, but it was definitely after the fact.”   
In the end, time limited the scope of the UC Berkeley study such that it only took a rigorous look 
at a sub-set of the full set of proposed policies.  Perhaps the partial nature of the analysis is what 
drove  Cal  EPA  to  distance  itself  from  the  work.    It  may  also  have  been  that  the  team  of 
researchers were late in delivering the report, which had been commissioned with an extremely 
short lead-time, or perhaps that they were drawing different types of key conclusions from those 
of the policy community for whom they were working.  Even if the reasons for this conflict 
                                                         
128 One of the outcomes of this conflict appears to have been a suspension for some period of time of 
funding originally slated to go to UC Berkeley to support its participation and contributions as part of the 
California Climate Change Centre.  Clearly sensitive at the time the research was being conducted, none 
of those interviewed were willing to discuss this in any detail. 
129  Despite  the  apparent  consensus,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  conclusions  of  these  studies  were 
eventually challenged in the academic literature (Stavins et al. 2007).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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between state government and expert researchers are more complex (as they certainly are), the 
difficulty encountered may be indicative of the challenge of trying to bring state-of-the-art expert 
analysis to bear in a timely and effective manner in a high-profile and contentious policy process.  
The process, at least at this stage, was about constructing arguments and evidence to sell the need 
for mitigation policy in California.  It was not about a search for “truth” or even common views 
amongst  experts.    It  was largely  a political process, constructing  arguments  and  evidence  to 
support the Governor’s (pre-determined) mitigation targets.  It was also focused on assessment of 
the (now also pre-selected) set of policies recommended as part of the package to meet those 
targets.   
Many of the actors in the process also recognized that this debate was a prelude to a more serious 
debate about the pros and cons of adoption of legally-binding mitigation targets in the form of a 
new law.  The counter-arguments for this type of climate policy were widely known amongst the 
policy elite.  Nancy Ryan said: “…their argument is not so much the science isn’t there, but more 
like its not cost effective to do this at the state level. I mean the debate is just kind of conducted in 
a different way in this state, than it is at the federal level.”  And this difference between the need 
for state level versus federal level action was the principal argument that would be advanced by a 
part of the business community in California as the legislative debate over “AB 32” advanced in 
2006.  
K.C. Bishop of Chevron echoed the view of the conservative business community when he said: 
“...all of the economists that have ever done studies, except for the Climate Action Team in 
California, even the people that, you know, that are very ‘pro’ doing something immediate and 
dramatic will say that it costs some percentage of your GDP ... it’s just not free and it gets more 
expensive  the  more  energy  efficient  you  are.”    He  continued:    “If  you  can  make  sure  that 
everybody has all the goods and services they have now and you say that it costs them less and 
you plug that into a model. … Yes, sure enough, the economy does better because people have 
money to spend because they have all the stuff they had before plus extra money.  … What 
they’re essentially saying is that there are $20 bills laying on the ground that anybody just needs 
to pick them up and once we tell everybody to pick them up they’ll be better off and, if that’s true, 
they’re  right.”    Yet  California’s  past  experience  with  air  pollution  abatement  and  energy 
efficiency investments fundamentally challenges the notion that environmental performance is at 
odds with economic performance (Bernstein et al. 2000; Taylor et al. 2006; Sanstad et al. 2006; 
Roland-Holst  2008).    And  local  knowledge  from  this  experience  appears  to  create  a  strong 
bipartisan base of political support for action in California on climate change (see Chapter 7).  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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There are two key issues that arise from the literature in this area on economics of climate policy 
and its interaction with technology change.  First is the cost of policy – what does it cost over time 
and how can these costs be kept to a minimum for a given set of climate change goals?  Second is 
the role of technology and its influence on the cost of policy.  Regarding the first, there is a wide 
range  of  estimates  in  the  literature  reflecting  uncertainty  about  the  dynamics  of  how  policy 
interacts with the economy as well as a variety of different assumptions and parameters that drive 
results.  There  is  some  convergence  that  moving  emissions  onto  pathways  consistent  with 
ambitious long-term climate policy goals can be achieved for a few percent of GDP in 2050, and 
less in 2030, and that this is a small cost relative to the expected growth of the world economy 
between now and then (Barker et al. 2007; Fisher et al. 2007). However, a key parameter is the 
“without policy” baseline which determines the emission reductions required to achieve a given 
climate goal; a higher baseline will result in higher costs and vice versa (Barker et al. 2007).  
Regarding the second issue, a recent review suggests strong empirical evidence that innovation in 
the energy sector (and elsewhere) responds to policy incentives and most notably to changes in 
energy prices (Pizer and Popp 2007).  This finding challenges macro-economic simulations that 
ignore induced technology change.  It also suggests that technology change and thus the dynamics 
of the costs of mitigation vary between scenarios with and without policy (Pizer and Popp 2007). 
The California approach to endorse early action is aligned with a growing economics literature 
that  suggests that  early  and  clear  mitigation  policies  to  “put  a  price”  on  GHG  emissions  is 
necessary to stimulate technical innovation needed to address climate change in the long-term. 
(Barker et al. 2007; Barker et al. 2006; Edenhofer et al. 2006; Grubb et al. 1995; Grubb et al. 
2002; Sijm 2004). These should be complemented by but cannot be replaced by research and 
development policies (R&D). Low cost (or negative cost) innovation is expected to come from 
removing market barriers to more efficient use of energy or of materials (IEA 2006b; Levine 
et al. 1995), to the more efficient allocation of resources to technology related investments more 
generally (Barker and Ekins 2004; Edenhofer et al. 2006) and from internalisation of incentives to 
induce  technology  change  over time  (Barker et al.  2006;  Edenhofer  et al.  2006;  Grubb  et al. 
2002). Treatment of technology change as endogenous rather than exogenous to economic growth 
appears to lower mitigation costs over time and suggests the need for early action (Ekins 2000; 
Sijm 2004; Edenhofer et al. 2006; Fisher et al. 2007). The ability of endogenous technological 
change to lower costs hinges on both international knowledge spillovers and on the extent of 
crowding out effects (or opportunity costs, which pull in the opposite direction) for R&D that is 
stimulated by policy and price changes (Pizer and Popp 2007).  The treatment of endogenous Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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technological change in macro-economic simulations is still limited and where it exists, remains 
opaque and somewhat ad-hoc, although there is growing evidence for its inclusion.   
There  is nevertheless  ongoing  debate and  limited  empirical  evidence,  at  best,  about  whether 
near-term mitigation to achieve deep long-term targets rather than more gradual ramping up of 
policy and less ambitious long-term goals is sensible from an economic perspective (Hammitt 
2007; Kelly and Kolstad 1999; Nordhaus 2007; Nordhaus 2006; Stern 2007; Weyant 2004).  To a 
great extent this debate revolves around questions about economic “optimality” (and whether 
such a paradigm is appropriate) (Ekins 2000). Within this there are important questions and a 
range of legitimate views about controversial costing and treatment of climate damages given 
their uncertainty through time in assessment models (Weitzman 2007), and about the use of 
discounting to value distant damages compared to near-term consumption losses due to mitigation 
(Nordhaus 2007).  If however, a long- or medium term climate target is taken as given (i.e. a 
political or ethical judgement is made about how much climate change is acceptable and how 
much is too much), the economics paradigm becomes less technically complex and less politically 
contentious as an approach, focusing not on how much to mitigate in a given time period but on 
cost-effectiveness, i.e. on how to minimise the costs of achieving a given target.  
In California, debate about economic optimality of the state’s GHG targets is largely absent.  
Instead the focus is on how to cost-effectively implement the targets and early evidence compiled 
under the Governor’s Executive Order eventually became part of the compilation of evidence and 
argumentation for the 2006 legislative proposal of AB 32.
  In this exchange, the green business 
community  partnered  with  environmental  and  environment  justice  non-governmental 
organisations to argue in favour of strong and early emission targets to achieve local economic, 
clean technology and environmental benefits in parallel with greenhouse gas emission reductions 
and  longer  term  (avoided)  climate  change  benefits  (for  example  see  Hoerner 2006).  The 
influential  and  progressive  economic  voice  within  California  –  from  the  green  business 
community to that representing environmental justice -- has argued since the late 1990s that there 
would be economic benefits from aggressive GHG emission reduction at state level, driven by 
clear  legislated  targets  (CEC  1999a).    The  main  lines  of  the  argument  revolve  around  a 
technological  optimism  and  an  economy  within the  state that generates innovation  for better 
environmental outcomes while also generating new jobs and economic growth (CEC 1999a; E2 Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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and Progress 2004).
 130  These endorsements are however more cautious and less united when it 
comes  to  commenting  on  how  to  achieve  mitigation  goals,  with  some  stakeholders  strongly 
advocating cap and trade approaches (Michelson 2005), others advocating cap and trade with 
auctioning  to  generate  revenues  that  can  be  used  to  further  fund  technology  development 
(Hoerner 2006),  and  still  others  advocating  more  prescriptive  approaches  such  as  regulatory 
approaches that offer more certainty about the types of markets for new technology (SVLG 2006) 
(see also Box 6.4). 
In the end, economic models and expertise can only be seen as tools for policy that provide inputs 
to help to guide policy decisions by highlighting the relationship between key factors, such as 
how policies are designed, the pace and magnitude of change in response to such policy and their 
costs.  Insights  from  economic  modelling  can  complement  but  will  not  replace  experiential 
knowledge  from  real-world  experience  with  environmental  policy,  its  influence  on  technical 
change and cost. Indeed, though it is limited, some evidence exists that ex ante analysis typically 
overestimates the regulatory costs of environmental policies (Harrington et al. 2000). As noted 
above, this may be in part because of the difficulty to quantitatively estimate the dynamics of 
endogenous technology change that stem from the policy action (Pizer and Popp 2007). 
In the case of California, it seems that macro-economic models are only just now starting to treat 
the question of endogenous technology change as a serious driver of change and determinant of 
GHG mitigation cost. Yet past experience in California, drawing on over 30 years of pollution 
control  regulatory  action,  suggests  that  strong  economic  growth  can  accompany  stringent 
environmental policies (e.g. Bachman 2007).  Such lessons from the past augur optimistically for 
the future of GHG mitigation, implying that relatively large emission reductions can be achieved 
with manageable costs for society (IPCC 2007c; IPCC 2007d; OECD 2008 and 2008b) (CAT-ES 
2007).  In the words of a Californian expert, David Roland-Holst (Roland-Holst 2007) economic 
Professor at UC Berkeley: “…even modest assumptions about innovation show it has significant 
potential to make climate action a dynamic growth experience for the state economy.”
131   
                                                         
130  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  despite  the  apparent  consensus  in  the  2004-2007  economic  analyses 
commissioned by the state about “win-win” nature of mitigation policy, the conclusions of these studies 
were eventually challenged in the academic literature (Stavins et al. 2007). 
131 Note that interestingly, California state government issued an updated version of the macro-economic 
analysis of the climate action plan in 2007.  This quote is taken from this updated report which brings 
together in a more conclusive report the macroeconomic analyses from the state government (EDRAM) 
and the UC Berkelely (BEAR) modelling efforts.  As noted above the differences between these results 
had previously been a point of controversy in the policy debate whereas in 2007 they appear to be the 
source for a consensus view that the costs of achieving the 2020 emission reduction targets of the state are Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Another  view  in  the  win-win  policy  discourse  emerging  from  experiential  knowledge  in 
California is that significant financial risk, particularly in the energy sector, derives from not 
taking climate change into account in today’s financial decisions. If one assumes that climate 
change will be regulated in the future, taking into account liabilities associated with greenhouse 
gas emissions today is sound financial decision-making.  As Michael Peevey, Chairman of the 
CPUC, said:  “One has to have perspective here.  When we started down this road in California 
forty or more years ago, concerned about the land and natural resources and air quality and all, the 
state was less than half the size it is today.  California demonstrated clearly to me, that this kind of 
simplistic notion that the energy bill has to go hand in hand, lockstep, with economic growth, is 
just not true.  You can have a vital and vigorous growing economy and keep energy use constant 
on a per capita basis although admittedly they’ll go up, or even hopefully reduce it on a per capita 
basis by some margin.  … We have huge opportunities in the transportation field if we would just 
get our act together and move more dramatically in that at the federal level with CAFE standards 
and other things.  So, I don’t know what the risk is. .... It’s fair to say, though, that for the 
Midwest United States, which is largely dependent on coal, you’re going to take a little different 
view of this.”  
At  least  in  an  economic  and  geographic  context  of  California,  where  the  economy  is 
service-oriented  and  the  energy  system  is  coal-free,  past  evidence  suggests  that  strong 
environmental policy will strengthen rather than hurt the economy.  Although some would argue 
that carbon is different (Anon3 2006i), in the recent round of climate change policymaking in 
California, elite actors have constructed the arguments around these views, collectively referred to 
here as the “win-win” policy discourse. 
8.7.  Conclusion 
The “win-win” framing of climate mitigation policy is constructed in a much different way from 
that of “environmental risk.”  Rather than drawing largely on expert knowledge, it derives from 
past success of environmental policy in California and has its roots in local experience with 
relevant policies in the area of air pollution and energy. This framing seeks to avoid the difficult 
problem of what is economically optimal in terms of level of effort, or what effect California’s 
efforts will have on the global problem.  As Chuck Shulock, a CalEPA regulator confirmed: 
“What you do in California isn’t going to solve the problem.” Instead the “win-win” framing 
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argues that preventing or limiting dangerous climate change at global scale is only one of the 
(many)  benefits  of  mitigation  action  in  California.    It  argues  that  California  leadership  can 
mobilise change in the global (market) context, especially given the size of its economy and its 
past history of leadership in related policy arenas:  by stimulating innovation and new markets 
locally, strong mitigation policy in California will benefit the economy, the environment and 
human well-being thus leading to “win-win” outcomes in the state.  It is argued that it will also 
become  a  motor  of  technological  change  and  that,  through  increasingly  global  markets, 
technological breakthroughs in California will diffuse more broadly in the US and beyond.   
Formal economic policy analysis has played a relatively small role in the construction of this 
policy frame. Indeed, the policy process in California has been criticised by some experts and 
business  partners  alike  as  not  sufficiently taking  into  account  comprehensive  assessment  the 
economics of mitigation policy.  The case study shows that formal economic analysis is belated 
and used to a great extent to confirm policy choices.  With respect to its role in the 2005-06 “goal-
setting” phase for California policy, economic assessments are commissioned in part to support 
prior  decisions  (thus  ex  post)  rather  than  being  used  to  assess  options  in  advance  of 
decision-making.  Given wide uncertainty about the macro-economic costs of mitigation, even a 
robust and complete set of ex ante economic analyses could not have been expected to point to a 
single way forward. However formal economic analysis, across a range of different models could 
be expected to show a range of legitimate outcomes depending on assumptions about key drivers 
(e.g.  structural  change,  oil  prices  and  population  growth)  in  the  absence  of  policy.    In  any 
comprehensive model and scenario analysis exercise to assess the 2020 targets, estimated cost 
outcomes would undoubtedly vary along a continuum ranging from those that are disastrous or 
too high to bear, to those that are affordable, or ‘win-win’.   
Yet  somewhat  surprisingly,  the  California  policy  process  through  2006  demonstrates  only  a 
marginal role of formal expert knowledge on the economics of climate change. It relies instead to 
a  greater  extent  on  a  “belief”  that  derives  from  experiential  knowledge  that  environmental 
protection is an integral part of delivering sustainable economic development in California. While 
there is some evidence to anchor this “belief” in win-win outcomes (see above), deeper mitigation 
efforts  would  be  expected to  be  more  costly  (e.g.  IPCC  2007c;  OECD  2008b)
132  and  could 
therefore be expected to call for more careful economic assessment.   
                                                         
132 There is some evidence that policy leads to greater technological change in a given period, however, 
there are likely to be limits to the pace of innovation that can occur in a given time frame to lower the 
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The dominance of the ‘win-win’ discourse in California demonstrates a co-mingling of “facts” 
and  “values” in the policy  process in  California,  which  in turn  supports  a  co-constructionist 
explanation of policy change. An outstanding question raised in the introduction to this chapter is 
who stands to benefit from the win-win policy frame and the pursuit of aggressive mitigation in 
California.  Some policy elites argue that it is Californians who will benefit and this may turn out 
to be true.  However, it is also true that those venture capitalists and other green business actors 
who  have  invested  heavily  in  green  technology  and  energy  services  (e.g.  energy  efficiency 
suppliers) may be amongst the frontrunners of those who gain from this policy.  As noted in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the poorest of California’s citizens may not gain from the strong mitigation 
emphasis in the emerging climate policy framework, particularly if it detracts from the other 
equally urgent part of the agenda, adaptation.  Broad understanding of this is one of the reasons 
that  the  voice  of  the  environmental  justice  community  is  expected to  significantly  influence 
implementation decisions for AB 32 (see Chapter 6) and to steer adaptation to the forefront of the 
next round of policy in California (see Chapter 7).  As we will see in the next chapter, the 
dominance  of  this  policy  frame  emerges  in  part  through  support  from  a  strong  coalition  of 
different  types  of  actors,  not  only  from  the  green  business  community  but  also  from  well-
resourced environmental non-governmental actors.  
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9. WHY CALIFORNIA? WHY NOW? 
9.1.  Introduction 
California’s regional (sub-national) scale presents a range of opportunities and constraints for 
climate policy at this level of governance.  The issue of scale shapes both the motivations of state 
policymakers and their fears, depending upon the framing of this issue it can constrain or enable 
action. The leadership of individuals in key institutions is also determining the how and the why 
of action on climate change in California.  This chapter explores the questions: Why California 
and why now? It identifies the interconnections between scales of action, interaction between 
different  types  of  actors  and  individual  and  institutional  leadership  as  features  of  multilevel 
governance that at least partially explain action and its timing in California  
9.2.  Push and pull between federal and state level action 
The void in federal policy presents the opportunity to demonstrate leadership that may in turn 
influence other states in their efforts to deal with climate change in a bottom-up manner.  Wendy 
Pulling of PG&E said of the climate policy process in California: “…the pulse of California has 
really increased, and since the activity on the Federal level has subsided, it’s shifted the activity to 
the states. California is one of them, New England, Northeast states are the others.”  Thus the void 
of activity at national level has created a new type of pressure for the states to act in the absence 
of national level leadership.  In the US system of decentralised governance, it is possible for them 
to act independently on a wide range of policy issues (e.g. energy and environmental policies) and 
to align themselves with their voters’ preferences when they call for leadership to address climate 
change. 
There are both problems and opportunities associated with the lack of policy at the federal level. 
Pierre duVair of the CEC noted this influence:  “Everyone recognizes that climate change is a 
national and international issue.  Whereas you need action at the state level… you need policies 
that are set at the national and international level. So many of the big players don’t want to 
support state efforts because they don’t want fifty different sets of regulations… You can’t have 
fifty different ways of doing things. But you can have a couple of states [moving ahead] – you 
often hear the federal agencies say that the states are your proving grounds for experimentation.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  253 
Before you have to jump into it at the Federal level, let the states see what works and doesn’t 
work.”  
Tackling climate change at sub-national scale also has some advantages over decision-making at 
larger scales of management, sometimes making the barriers to policy more tractable. As John 
White said:  “… the NGO community at the national level has been paralyzed because of the 
Congress and the President.  … What do you do?  Just fight and resist and lose.  Whereas at the 
state level it’s a much more open game.” On the role of environmental NGOs, and in particular 
the philanthropic foundations that often support their efforts, Eric Heitz – President of Energy 
Foundation, said: “It might not need to be as big a role if the federal government wasn’t so 
reluctant.  But …we have such a long way to go.  While it’s promising to see California and other 
states do exciting things, those are baby steps compared to where we need to go.  So I think there 
will be a role for this element of the civil society ...going forward.”   
Within the US, California is ahead of the curve on mitigation policy action.  This position is due 
in large part due to the leadership coming out of core state institutions in the energy and air 
pollution areas as well as to the leadership of Governor Schwarzenegger and the legislature.  
Deputy Secretary of Cal EPA Anne Baker, noted:  “We’ve had some aggressive efforts in the 
regulatory  areas,  the  Public  Utilities  Commission  and  the  Energy  Commission,  on  energy 
efficiency.  When people ask are we really doing it in California, what we’ve done on energy 
efficiency and Renewable Portfolio Standard, even before you get to Pavley, if you take just those 
together, the rest of the country, if they did the same thing, would meet the Kyoto standards.”   
Of course scale can, and has, been used as an argument against unilateral state action especially 
on the global environmental issue of climate change…. K.C. Bishop, environmental lobbyist in 
Sacramento for Chevron Corporation said:  “we don’t think that doing a California only thing 
makes …much sense.  In fact, we think it makes very little sense.  ... We don’t think putting a cap 
on California’s emissions would be the right thing to do and I think all of the industry actually 
feels that way....   We think there ought to be a federal system. .... If nothing else and if you have 
that it really needs to be part of a bigger worldwide system...” This view was also dominant 
amongst the policy elite, or at least in the Governor’s Office, prior to the passage of the Pavley 
Bill (2002) and to Governor Schwarzenegger’s election (Boyd 2006i).   
Another example of scale as an argument against action can be seen within the government under 
past California leadership.  California Energy Commissioner Boyd explained how a multi-year, 
multi-agency collaborative effort culminated in a set of policy recommendations at the end of 
2001 in the effort to place climate change on the state policy agenda in 2002. Commissioner Boyd Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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said:  “we gave the then Governor in December 2001 a stack of work; we called it the Climate 
Initiative, a proposal, for a lot of initiatives within state government.  Actually, this was …a not 
for publication recommendation of things that then Governor Davis might utilize in his 2002 state 
[State of the State] address.  In other words, we were trying to get California government to 
overtly… move into the climate change arena. …We’d spent a couple of years working the 
subject amongst the many state agencies, and the major agencies.” Despite the careful preparation 
of these recommendations, Governor Davis rebuffed the recommendations and the report was 
shelved.   
According to California Energy Commissioner Boyd part of the challenge was to show that action 
on climate change could be effective at a scale other than the federal level.  Governor Davis [a 
Democrat] was waiting for the federal government to act.  In many ways the policy ideas and 
recommendations that emerged from these early consultations on climate change were ahead of 
their time. Having emerged from policy elites within state government, many of the ideas from 
the “Climate Initiative” are relevant to today’s debate (e.g. how to more aggressively promote 
energy efficiency where regulatory authority already exists) and some are still to emerge but will 
undoubtedly be important with time (e.g. adaptation).  The Climate Initiative placed significantly 
more  emphasis  on  the  role  of  adaptation  than  what  is  found  in  the  policy  process  today 
(Joint-Agency-Climate-Team  2001)  and  recommended  a  comparatively  cautious  approach  to 
mitigate (see Chapter 6).  This may have been because of the close relationship between the CEC 
and the energy sector, combined with a general acceptance of the view that climate policy was 
necessarily an issue requiring a federal approach rather than a more fragmented state-by-state 
approach.  
California’s early action on climate policy raises a complex set of questions about how best to 
construct steps at the state-level to fit with inevitable, yet unknown dimensions of national policy 
on this issue. Mary Nichols highlighted: “… [The] biggest challenge is the fact that our national 
government doesn’t have any overarching policies in this area, so the state has had to strike out on 
its own and try to do things that we hope would make sense when there is a national policy and 
that would be good models for the national government to use.  But even a state with as large an 
economy and as independent in outlook as California still has some major challenges in taking 
action on its own on a global issue. … The whole question of whether this is an area that a state, 
even a state that’s allowed to set its own air standards, can embark on…. I think that hasn’t 
deterred California from moving forward anyway, but it’s made it much more difficult than it 
would  have  been  otherwise.”    More  specifically,  with  respect  to  the  legislative  process  in 
California, Mary Nichols said: “…it’s pretty clear that legislation will pass this year… How they Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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will craft it at the end of the day so …it does something but at the same time doesn’t bring down 
the whole world on California’s shoulders is going to be an interesting feat.”   
By  September  2006,  state-wide  legislation  requiring greenhouse  gas  emission  reductions had 
passed and, along with other companion legislation, this has extended the legal framework in 
California  to  address  climate  change.  In  at  least  one  instance,  the  new  legislation  targeting 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  specifically  acknowledged  the  likelihood  of  overlapping  federal 
legislation on climate change.  For example, in the Perata Bill establishing a GHG emissions 
performance standard in the power sector, the likelihood of federal legislation on this issue in the 
coming decade is presented as evidence of a “potential financial risk to California consumers for 
future pollution-control costs” (CA-Code 2006b; SB 1368, p. 4).  The standard is thus presented 
as a means to internalise such costs and reduce financial risks to consumers in a timely manner 
and therefore to position California favourably once such regulation comes (see also Chapter 7).  
Some of those interviewed suggested that the distant 2020 target codified in state legislation was 
explicit recognition that federal legislation might emerge in parallel and require adjustment of 
state-wide implementation plans for mitigation policy.   
Increasingly there will be an interest in linking California’s mitigation actions through carbon 
markets with markets in other parts of the US or internationally.  For example in the New England 
region, RGGI is moving forward with a cap and trade programme covering only the power sector.  
Anne Baker noted the relevance to next steps in California:  “...people have been contrasting us 
with the RGGI system in New England and saying ...the tons they’re going after there are much 
less [costly]; they’re going after tons for energy efficiency and renewables that we’ve [already] 
gotten through regulation. So if we’re going to ratchet down the next level, at what point… are 
those funds better spent somewhere else?” While not questioning California’s commitment to 
lower GHG emissions, Anne Baker noted that in implementing its mitigation policy, California 
might want to target policy for economic reasons on achieving reductions also outside of the 
state’s boundaries. She said:  “We’ve been proceeding so far like this is another environmental 
reg [i.e. regulation].  But as we look to ratcheting down across the less traditional sources and 
people raise the issue of market based and cap and trade and those kinds of issues, how we fit into 
the national/international stage… [This] is a fair question.  If it costs a huge amount of money to 
get the next level here, are we better creating a fund that does technology in China? …At what 
point  do  you,  …[and]  where  do  you  decide  that  issue?”  These  statements  underscore  the 
economic considerations and industrial competitiveness issues that inevitably will play a role in 
the decisions to come on how to implement the recently legislated GHG emission targets in 
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9.2.1.  California as a nation-state? 
The large scale of California’s economy is a reason that its leadership can potentially make a 
difference to national and international policy in this area.  It represents 10% or more of the U.S. 
economy  and  market  for  vehicles  and  other  goods  and  thus  creates  a  large  territory  for 
experimentation. As Commissioner Boyd said: “Sometimes I start speeches out with a 1500s 
representation of the United States, which has California an island, and I say: ‘sometimes we wish 
we were….’ But I talk about the nation-state of California, [the] fifth largest economy,
133 fifth 
largest user of energy in the world, second largest consumer of gasoline and diesel fuel....  So 
having established that framework … why should we act on climate change? …We’re such a big 
market for so many things; it gave us the opportunity to do things that other states [cannot do on 
their own]. All the Northeast states have to band together to have equivalent clout.  …When we 
join with them, which is what we’ve been doing the last decade or more on various issues, it 
begins to mean something.”   
Successful environmental policies, or those that stimulate technical innovation in California, have 
made a difference to global technology markets in the past and are expected to continue doing so 
on  GHG  mitigation  technical  innovations.  This  “can-do”,  technologically  optimistic,  attitude 
derives in large part from the evidence of past success in the area of air pollution policy and 
vehicle regulations, where aggressive standards have shaped industry innovation and technologies 
in the vehicles markets (Carlson 2003).   
The “can do” attitude is not isolated but seems to permeate views across a variety of different 
actors in the California policy process, ranging from technical experts to political advisors to 
business leaders to environmental activists and lay-persons. John White explains:  “…it’s sort of a 
conceit of ours that we just do it better, we do it sooner than the federal government and if we 
were to wait for them it would take forever and then they wouldn't even do it right.  …We’re big 
enough to be influential  and  yet small enough to  be  experimental.    … 10%  of  the vehicles 
[nationwide].  That’s a huge platform, a huge number, a huge amount of money – [but] it’s still 
something that can be flexible.”  Thus the California experience is important in part because it is 
small enough for experimentation but large enough to have influence should that experimentation 
succeed. 
                                                         
133 California is no longer the 5th largest economy in the world but estimated to be the 8th largest (2006 
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Jeffrey Callison, a public radio talk-show host, made a similar comment: “…Californians see 
themselves as important ...as somewhat different from the rest of America.  They’re very aware of 
their demographic and economic power and their ability to actually make things happen, even if 
the federal government doesn’t want something to happen. California, because of its own powers 
and because of its constitutional powers and because of its economic power is actually able to do 
a lot.  …[It would be] easier if California was just a small place and they would just throw their 
hands up in the air and go ‘I wish things were different in Washington; there’s nothing we can do 
about it.’  Here, California can say ‘you know what?  We’re going to do something about it, 
because we can.’” 
But not everyone in the United States agrees on the need to have California lead the way.  As 
Steve Schiller also said: “there is certainly an attitude in California, which you might be familiar 
with, of you know, the nation-state of California?” In talking with people from out-of-state, Steve 
Schiller recalled the response: ‘God, you know, you people have an attitude issue.’  Yet he still 
thought there was value in the state’s leadership on the climate change issue. Regarding the 
balance between state and federal action he said: “yes, we need a national plan.  But how long do 
you wait?  …   And California has a history of having leadership role in environmental regulation 
and this will just be another example… We can’t keep waiting for the Feds, …its irresponsible to 
keep waiting for them.”  Interestingly Steve Schiller also saw a direct connection between what 
was happening in California and what would happen at the federal level.  He said: “… our job is 
to continue to keep pressure on the federal government to do something.  Because if California ￿ 
huge  economy  -  if  California  says  we’re  doing  something  then  at  some  point  …through 
businesses, through politics, various things, it’s going to continue to put pressure on the Feds to 
finally do the federal program.” 
9.2.2.  Large enough to be influential, small enough to be experimental 
Terry Tamminen, former Secretary of EPA and now energy and environmental advisor to the 
Governor in Sacramento, agreed that significant national, and possibly global, benefits might 
derive from experimentation with new policy approaches in California.  He said: “We felt that by 
addressing this on the world stage we could highlight the fact that ...this was like many other 
things with respect to the environment in California.  It’s about not only California doing the right 
thing and contributing its share, but setting standards that might lead the world, because with our 
Air Board, with our unique regulatory structure, we can do things that very soon become standard 
throughout the country, and then hopefully around the world.  So whether it’s on auto emissions 
or whether it’s on energy efficiency, or you know, different renewable portfolio standards with Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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energy or other things, we hope that this could be the laboratory where the United States would 
change  first  and  that  hopefully  would  help  the  rest  of  the  world.”    Thus,  Terry  Tamminen 
underscored  this  experimentation  and  leadership,  where  others  would  necessarily  follow,  as 
among the major benefits of California’s climate policy initiative. 
In this view, the uniquely large size of California’s economy was combining with its strong 
political will to move on GHG  mitigation to create a “living laboratory” for change.  Terry 
Tamminen elaborated: “…hopefully, …California becomes more of a magnet, more of a place… 
a living laboratory. …Having a state this big, you know, with 36 million people and kind of a 
world class research, education system, and having all the high tech innovation of Silicon Valley 
and the environmental innovation that we’ve had over the years.  When you put all that together, 
it makes this the logical place to be that living laboratory.”  Some evidence exists that such 
experimentation, for example in the motor vehicles sector and as well as in stationary source air 
pollution control technology, has led to a vibrant business sector centring on clean technology.
134 
This experimentation appears to be at the heart of California’s approach to climate change policy. 
As one of the chief architects of the Schwarzenegger policy on climate change, Terry Tamminen 
was well-placed to comment on how the issue of scale plays into the politics of the issue, and 
naturally  provides  a  window  of  opportunity  for  the  Governor  (and  California)  to  make  a 
difference  on  a  world  scale.    He  referred  to  the  California  delegation’s  participation  in  the 
Montreal (2005) Conference of the Parties on the UN FCCC,
135 noting that:  “… people of course 
always focus on the absence of the United States and the policies of the Bush administration.  The 
next point is always then: ‘okay, but what’s happening in the United States despite the federal 
government, the various states are doing things?’  And they frequently then quote Governor 
Schwarzenegger saying while there’s others who want to continue to debate the science, you now 
have this leading voice who’s looked at the science and says no, no, no, debate’s over.  Let’s get 
on with the solutions.”  He underscored the global significance of California’s action when he 
said: “…I mean, anyone can reduce greenhouse gases, but [the challenge is to do it] in some way 
that actually will make a difference, both in California and worldwide.” 
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There was much agreement amongst those interviewed on the potential for California to influence 
worldwide trends through these early actions on climate change.  For example, Jeffrey Callison, 
noted:  “And so California tries to do what it can to mitigate climate change.  Of course to a 
certain extent it’s symbolic because there’s only so much the state of California can do to mitigate 
global warming.  But nevertheless with California being as large as it is, and …having such a 
huge economy and so much industry in California, that nevertheless it is substantial...” Ralph 
Cavanagh, of NRDC, also noted the conscious effort of California policymakers to affect action 
across multiple scales: “California leaders on this issue are without doubt trying to influence 
national action.” At a minimum, California’s leadership sends a market signal that a significant 
global  economic  power  is  taking  serious  action  to  address  climate  change.    This  marks  the 
beginning of a new regulatory era where emitting carbon or other GHG carries a price tag. 
There  remains  a  question  about  whether  it  is  possible  to  take  ideas  or  policies  successfully 
demonstrated at a smaller scale in California and reproduce them across the US or elsewhere. 
John White asked a question about whether this would be possible given the scale differences 
involved, when he said:  “And yet the scale of it to me is still [a problem], the question is whether 
we can actually take states’ action and replicate it.” There is a view held among at least some 
central participants that California’s leadership on climate change is valuable because it can (and 
likely will) have influence beyond the borders of California, through a “demonstration effect.”
136 
While the extent to which California actions are directly replicable beyond its borders remains in 
question,  there  is  no  question  that  what  California  has  done  in  the  past  on  energy  and 
environmental  as  well  as  on  air  pollution  issues  has  led  the  way  for  action  in  other  states 
(Carlson 2003; Vogel 1995; Vogel et al. 2006; see also Chapters 5 & 6).  Nevertheless an open 
question remains whether GHG policy experiments begun today will be successful and further 
whether they provide models or lead to technological innovation that can be “exported” beyond 
state boundaries.      
9.3.  Who is making policy happen in California?  
A key driver of politics of climate change is who is advocating and who is opposing policy and 
how different interest groups and actors are combining forces to support (or oppose) policy.  
Bringing the solutions forward in policy decisions requires a broad base of political support and a 
narrowed base for naysayers who would choose either to ignore the problem or to define it as a 
national or international issue to be tackled only on a grander scale.  Several different groups of 
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actors are relevant in the climate policy arena in California and each of these are outlined briefly 
here: non-governmental actors, most notably the environmental advocacy community and the 
business community; governmental actors and their political leadership, most importantly from 
the  Governor  himself  but  also  from  state  legislators and,  from  within  the  state  bureaucracy, 
high-level  political  appointees  representing  various  state  institutions  with  responsibilities  for 
implementing policies in areas relevant to climate change. 
9.3.1.  The unique role of Governor Schwarzenegger 
The Governor’s 2005 announcement of GHG emission reduction targets was anxiously awaited 
by environmental advocates and was seen by many as a “turning point” for climate change policy 
in California.  Many of those interviewed point to the Governor’s leadership as the driver that 
moved climate change from the back burner to the front of the State’s policy agenda. Adrienne 
Alvord confirmed that Assemblywoman Pavley, already a champion of climate change policy in 
California, was among those awaiting the Governor’s leadership. She said that in 2004: “…Fran 
decided to introduce AB32 as kind of a ‘spot’ Bill on climate and move it along and see where 
Schwarzenegger got to, because she felt it was important to have somebody of his stature do 
something positive, everybody said he was going to.” As Shannon Eddy, of the CPUC, said: 
“What the Governor did was monumental in terms of setting policy and setting the agenda.  Not 
just for California, but putting California on the map nationally and even globally.” At least one 
person interviewed had a more cynical view of the Governor’s leadership on the issue, suggesting 
that  it  was  politically  motivated.  Referring  to  other  contentious  policy  reforms  that 
Schwarzenegger had advanced in this period, Norm Miller said:  “…the Schwarzenegger thing is 
a political issue. ...Schwarzenegger has made a shift from being an aggressor against certain 
aspects of the non-business sector of the state so he can get re-elected.”  
This suggests that Schwarzenegger may have used climate change to position politically on a 
highly  visible  environmental  issue.    Vic  Weisser,  President  of  the  California  Council  for 
Environmental and Economic Balance – a not-for-profit business organisation – said: “…he is 
your classic West coast L.A. Republican.  You know, liberal on social issues, liberal on the 
environment,  conservative  fiscally.    …  I  think  it’s  very  important  to  him  to  differentiate… 
politically to differentiate himself from Bush to win in California.  This is a perfect issue for him.” 
Another interviewee also suggested at least some level of political motivations in saying: “I mean 
it’s also true that he’s always looking for the next blockbuster movie he can star in. Like millions 
and millions of dollars of levee restoration or, you know, blowing up boxes” (Anon2 2006).  But Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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is Governor Schwarzenegger advancing the climate change issue only because it is a vote winning 
move? 
Most of those interviewed considered the Governor’s leadership to be founded in his own beliefs 
about climate change as a serious environmental problem and one that merits policy attention. 
Assistant Secretary of California EPA - Eileen Tutt
137 - said: “...what motivated him was the 
science, was looking at what was going to happen to this state.  And even if we took actions and 
the whole world joined us, we’re still going to have to adapt to the impacts that we’ve already 
created or brought upon ourselves for the next 100 years.  So it’s just a matter of how bad are you 
going to let it get?  And that really motivated him.”  
Most  of  the  interviewees  believed  that  Schwarzenegger’s  stance  on  climate  change  was  not 
politically motivated, but was instead driven by genuine concern about the issue.  This was the 
case for Dr. Nancy Ryan, who moved from a position as an environmental advocate at NRDC to 
become a civil servant and the personal advisor of CPUC President Michael Peevey. She said: “I 
don’t believe it’s a political ploy. …When he came in, he kept the people in place, and the ball 
rolling.  He did that despite what the Chamber of Commerce has had to say about it.  So, I’m a 
Democrat, worked in an environmental organization, I have no problem, no discomfort about 
working in this administration, because I don’t think I’m participating in window dressing.” An 
independent expert who is active in California energy policy circles, Steve Schiller said of the 
Governor’s interest: “…his advisors [tell me] …his eyes light up, he gets excited and he’s really 
interested in dealing with climate change.” Finally, Michael Peevey, President of the California 
Public Utilities Commission, stated: “Schwarzenegger became Governor and took an interest in 
this topic, where[as] before there hadn’t been any interest in the Executive branch of government, 
other  than  in  the  regulatory  bodies  like  the  PUC  and  the  California  Energy  Commission.”  
Michael Peevey also noted that the Governor is not originally from the United States and that this 
may have influenced his views: “…the fact that he grew up in Austria, …suggests in many 
respects he has a European attitude, more, more sensitive on environmental issues than some 
would expect.” 
A pragmatic explanation of the Governor’s leadership links to California’s cultural bias to favour 
environmental  protection  through  policy  and  broad  bipartisan  support  for  action  on  climate 
change (see above).  When asked why California was moving ahead on climate policy, Chuck 
Shulock of Cal EPA said:  “the real driver was almost the citizens’ and the leaders’ view of what 
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California’s about from environmental protection.  You know, we’re a world leader, we’re always 
out there on the cutting edge, and it just kind of seemed like well, this was the next frontier, and 
so of course, California needs to move into that policy space.”  Others reinforced this idea. Steve 
Schiller, said: “…there are people who are really proud that we’re a leader.  The Governor has 
said that.  Says you know, we’re a leader, we’re not a follower, we’re a leader.  We're going to 
show how this is done.  And so …that attitude I think is part of it” 
The Governor’s leadership position on climate change has most certainly also been influenced by 
his political advisors.  A prominent figure in this respect is Terry Tamminen, former Secretary of 
the California Environmental Protection Agency and now chief energy and environmental advisor 
to the Governor. Several of those interviewed linked the Governor’s position on the issue to 
Terry.  For  example,  Amy  Luers  of  UCS  stated:  “The  role  of  Terry  Tamminen  is  huge  and 
incredibly central to this being an issue.” Having been with the Governor at the outset of his 
political  career,  Terry  Tamminen  designed  the  environmental  platform  used  by  Arnold 
Schwarzenegger during his election campaign and has worked hard to position the Governor for 
leadership on this issue. He is also a personal friend of the Governor’s and has been influential in 
his thinking on this issue (Tutt 2006i). Initially in the position of Secretary of CalEPA and later in 
the position of energy and environmental advisor for the Governor, working in the Governor’s 
inner office, Terry Tamminen continued to influence the Governor’s position on the issue of 
climate change throughout 2006. 
The Governor and Terry Tamminen also have close ties to Bobby Kennedy, Jr. who is known in 
US circles as an environmental leader (Hertsgaard 2004).  Shannon Eddy, the CPUC advisor who 
works directly for the Governor’s Office, said of the Governor: “He’s got a personal commitment. 
It doesn’t hurt that his wife is a pretty liberal democrat...”  His wife is also Bobby Kennedy Jr.’s 
first cousin and so part of the well-known liberal Democrat Kennedy clan. According to Shannon 
Eddy, the Governor aspires to be:  “… the most environmental Governor this state has ever seen.”  
Leadership from the governor on the difficult issue of climate change may have come at the 
expense of dialogue and consultation around the issue, at least in the early days of setting the 
initial state-wide policy goals.  As Dominic Dimare of the California Chamber of Commerce said: 
“…he  announced  these  goals  without  really  consulting  anyone  from  the  general  business 
community.”  But political leadership does not occur in a political vacuum; it is also linked to 
public opinion. As noted above, public opinion research in California indicates that environmental 
issues  generally  matter to the  public  and,  since  2000,  there  appears  to  have  been  bipartisan 
support for action to address climate change and this in many ways empowered the Governor.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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California’s leadership on climate change is thus driven in part by its cultural preference to protect 
the  environment.  California’s  socio-environmental  history  has  contributed  a  strong  base  of 
experiential knowledge to help shape this cultural preference for environmental protection into 
what appears to be a strong social norm to support political action on climate change today. 
Whether or not the Governor is seriously committed to the issue of climate change is perhaps less 
important in the long run than whether he enables and supports state institutions to effectively 
implement Assembly Bill 32 and to set in place a framework for action over time.   
9.3.2.  State institutions and their leaders: Commissioners Boyd and Peevey  
Governor Schwarzenegger’s climate policy initiative reframed the debate about climate change in 
California.  Under the Governor’s leadership, the debate shifted away from the view that global 
climate change is not an issue for state action.  Instead, his starting point is one that highlights past 
strengths of California’s leadership in key areas of related policy, positioning California to gain 
economically from leadership on this issue.  
Politically  savvy  leaders  on  the  climate  change  issue  can  be  found  in  different  parts  of  the 
government.  Although Governor Schwarzenegger’s leadership propelled climate change to the 
top  of  the  policy  agenda,  California’s  actions  on  climate  change  pre-dates  Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s initiative (Chapter 5). Initial attention to climate change began in the state 
legislature,  led  first  by  State  Senator  Byron  Sher  from  1988  on,  and  then  later  by 
Assemblywoman Fran Pavley with the landmark vehicle legislation in 2002.  Similarly state 
government leadership on the climate issues emerged in the interim in the Resources Agency 
through former Resources Secretary Mary Nichols, and deputy Secretary James Boyd, and in 
CalEPA through Winston Hickox, in their efforts to raise awareness about the climate change 
problem across state government.  The first formal inter-agency task force on climate change 
began in the late 1990s and was led by the CEC.   
James Boyd became Energy Commissioner in February 2002
138 and he has provided essential 
leadership for the early inter-agency climate change consultative process within the state as well 
as for a consultative stakeholder process on climate policy.  Ultimately, both processes ceased to 
operate so as to make “room” for the new inter-agency Climate Action Team established by 
Governor Schwarzenegger in 2005. However the CEC led early consultative process clearly laid 
the ground for decision-makers, promoting understanding of the problem of climate change in a 
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California context and a range of possible solutions even before the business of climate change 
policymaking began in earnest (see Chapter 6). 
California’s attempt to deregulate electricity and the crisis of 2000-2001 was a turning point for 
energy policy in the state.  In energy policies to follow, attention to climate change and other 
environmental issues grew.   The state government reasserted itself as a champion of resource 
efficiency policy through collaborative action across state institutions that regulate the energy 
sector.  The CEC, through the leadership of Commissioner Boyd, brought attention to climate 
change as a key challenge in the energy sector in the period from 2002 on.  Collaborative activity 
among the state’s energy agencies increased at this time resulting in increasingly clear guidance 
on  climate  and  energy  issues  through  the  Energy  Action  Plans  I  and  II  (California  2003; 
California 2005e).   
Also by 2004 or before, the CPUC had become a central actor to contribute to the emerging 
policy and regulatory framework for GHG mitigation in the investor-owned utility sector (both 
electricity and natural gas). As Julie Fitch, a Director of Strategic Planning at the CPUC, pointed 
out, there is individual leadership on climate change at the level of the Commissioners within the 
CPUC.  She said: “I would say ...the reason we’re here is mainly due to the personal interest of 
the Commissioners.  …if there is one, I’d say it is President Peevey, who’s been the biggest 
driver, but certainly supported by others.” Shannon Eddy, special advisor in the CPUC reporting 
to  the  Governor’s  office  agreed  with  this  view,  when  she  told  the  story  about  the  GHG 
performance  standard  or  cap policy  for  the power  sector.    She  said:  “[Commissioner]  Mike 
Peevey is very interested in climate change.  [Commissioner] Dian Grueneich is very committed 
to climate change.  They actually went forth with the greenhouse performance standard against 
the  protest,  to  a  certain  degree,  of  the  [Schwarzenegger]  Administration.”  Thus  under  the 
leadership of the President of the CPUC Michael Peevey
139, the CPUC has set out bold new 
policies  and  strengthened  the  regulatory framework  for the  state’s  energy  and  environmental 
policy under the banner of climate change.  
Lainie Motamedi, Senior Policy Analyst of the CPUC Strategic Planning Division,  explained 
how climate change emerged as an issue in the CPUC.  She dates some of the initial thinking on 
the issue back to mid-February 2004.  She explained how the dialogue began with analysis of the 
issue in the California context:  “...we talked about this issue and decided to pitch it as a White 
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Paper to President Peevey… knowing that he personally has an interest in environmental forward 
thinking …and might be receptive to us… to [the] Strategic Planning [Division] doing a little bit 
of work to figure out how we fit into the California context.”  Lainie Motamedi continued to 
highlight the timing of this work on the first CPUC White Paper on climate change:  “I was 
writing the paper and working with him on this ...when Kyoto went into effect.  Russia finally 
ratified
140 and so ...it kicked off that whole process …you know, ‘Oh, wow.  Okay.  There’s even 
greater reason why, as a regulatory agency we should be aware of what’s happening on the 
international landscape.’  …that paper was really just to say generally what is climate change, 
what does the scientific community say about it, what are the emissions in the state of California 
and, what’s the intersection between the California Public Utilities Commission and emissions for 
California.”    This  White  Paper  became  the  basis  for  a  public  workshop  in  early  2005  and 
exchange on the issue of climate change, the first in the nation for a state-level public utilities 
regulatory commission (Motamedi 2005).   
This is an example where relevant institutions in California were aligning to lead the early charge 
to organise a coherent response to climate change, even prior to the Governor’s Executive Order 
and the legislature’s leadership to pass AB32.   Lainie Motamedi of the CPUC, noted that their 
February 2005 “en banc” workshop was particularly novel.  She said: “[It was] the first PUC type 
meeting in the country, where PUC said, ‘We care about climate change and we’re going to be 
[addressing this] in our regulated utilities -- to put them on notice that they need to start planning 
for these types of issues, specifically related to financial risk as well as sound environmental 
policy  going  forward  and  developing  strategies  to  reduce  their  emissions.’”  She  continued:  
“…there was a whole lot of energy that came out of that in ‘05 and especially because there … 
were so many agencies that came to preside over that meeting.  It wasn’t just a PUC thing.”   The 
2005 en banc workshop appears to have been a turning point for many government and energy 
sector decisionmakers, making clear that climate change was to become a regulatory issue in 
California. 
In March 2005, a follow up workshop continued the policy discussions on climate change (CPUC 
2005e).  Lainie Motamedi explained it was: “…specific to the regulated utilities, …talking about 
the concept of an emissions cap. …a really, really good discussion about …what was totally 
unworkable, what might be more workable and developed a framework for policy direction on 
that issue.” So the CPUC call to action had gained the attention of policy makers throughout the 
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state and begun to focus the policy debate on concrete questions of implementation of climate 
policies, even prior to the Governor’s bold announcement in June of the same year. 
In Lainie Motamedi’s view, the Governor’s announcement provided a platform for even stronger 
action at the CPUC on climate change.  She said: “all said, all these different pieces coming 
together ...have really opened up an opportunity for the PUC to push probably harder than we 
ever would have thought because having the Executive Order was hugely significant.” Shannon 
Eddy seemed to agree with this view.  When asked whether state policy to address climate change 
would have moved ahead in the absence of Governor’s Schwarzenegger’s initiative, Shannon 
Eddy said: “…what the Governor did was light a fire under people.”  More specifically Shannon 
Eddy noted that the Governor was not alone, that each of the different agencies and the legislature 
had important roles to play in moving the climate issue ahead:   “The PUC, I know, …will 
continue to move forward regardless of what’s happening in the [Governor’s] Administration.  
Obviously, the Air Resources Board here in California is working on moving forward with the 
Pavley reg [regulation] and the Legislature’s very interested in climate and has been moving 
forward.”  
9.3.3.  Other leadership across state institutions 
On the air pollution side, the largest and most experimental centre of technical innovation and 
expertise in the state is based in the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQM).  A 
number of individuals with leadership roles in the SCAQM District have gone on to provide 
state-level leadership on climate change and related issues.  In particular, Jim Lentz and Alan 
Lloyd were two prominent leaders of the regional regulatory institution. Jim Lentz is currently a 
member  of  the  Board  of  the  Energy  Foundation,  a  prominent  philanthropic  organisation 
supporting energy and environmental initiatives at state level across the US, as well as in China. 
Alan Lloyd went on to become CALEPA Secretary under Governor Schwarzenegger where he 
led the state Climate Action Team until his retirement in early 2006.  
The role of CARB is also one of leadership on the climate change issue. Historically its role on 
climate change was confined to the legislative mandate emerging from the Pavley legislation that 
required it to regulate vehicle CO2 emissions. More recently, the CARB has been charged with 
implementation of Assembly Bill 32 (see Chapter 5).  Prior to that and throughout the battle over 
the Pavley vehicle regulations, the CARB has been unwavering as the chief regulator for air 
pollution from vehicles, often in the face of strong industry opposition.  Following a long history 
of  adversarial  regulatory  relationships,  the  vehicle  industry  is  currently  contesting  the  legal 
authority of the state of California to regulate CO2 from vehicles (see Chapter 5).    Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The story about leadership would not be complete without a mention of the role of the state 
legislators to address the issue of climate change.  In a prescient manner, Senator Byron Sher was 
the first to put the climate change issue on the map of environmental laws in the state, with his 
landmark legislative actions of 1988 and later.  The Registry Bills came next (2000/01) and this 
was followed by the Pavley Bill targeting vehicle CO2 emissions and championed by Senator 
Fran Pavley of Santa Monica.   More recently Senators Nuñez and Pavley worked together to pass 
a mandatory cap on state-wide emissions for the year 2020 (AB-32), and Senators Perata and 
Levine led efforts to extend the coverage of CPUC regulatory measures on GHG emissions and 
energy efficiency in the power and natural gas sectors to municipal utilities.  Combined these 
measures demonstrate that leadership on the climate change issue spans now roughly two decades 
and  emerges  from  actions  from  a  number  of  individuals  across  a  range  of  legislative  and 
government  institutions.    It  is  the  alignment  of  the  leadership  with  relatively  independent 
authority across these institutions that has helped to propel climate change into the public sphere 
and to the top of the policy agenda in California (see also Chapter 6). 
9.3.4.  Coordination between large institutional players  
An ongoing challenge for the state in developing climate change policy is ensuring that all state 
institutions and agencies move in the same direction, or while not necessarily at the same pace, at 
least in harmonious directions. This challenge is evident in the effort to design concrete measures 
to implement the Assembly Bill 32. As British Petroleum (BP) environmental affairs manager in 
the western US, Denise Michelson, said in 2006: “…coordination between all the agencies is 
another issue that I see [that] potentially jeopardizes a well-designed program.  …So you have 
one agency stepping out in front of another agency and there seems to be lack of coordination 
when it comes to a cohesive program….”  Denise Michelson was particularly concerned about the 
cap and trade rules that might emerge in California, and the risk of CPUC policy preceding a 
more broad-based trading rule that could emerge across multiple sources in the state.  BP has 
argued that a cap and trade system is the most economically efficient way to proceed with the 
implementation of the state’s aggressive mitigation targets (Michelson 2005).  In its original 2005 
policy statement laying out the intent to cap GHG emissions in the power sector, the CPUC had 
stated its intention to move towards an offsets or cap and trade system in this sector (CPUC 
2005f), a policy that is technically possible because the CPUC regulates investments made by 
investor-owned utilities (see Chapters 4 & 5). The CPUC policy statement preceded the broad 
debate at state level that accompanied passage of the 2006 legislation and was clearly making 
some large industry players nervous about pre-empting a larger, better coordinated effort.   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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It is interesting to note the origins of the independence of CPUC and hence its authority to move 
ahead on an issue such as climate change, even if other parts of state government are not entirely 
in  agreement  or  moving  at  the  same  pace.    The  CPUC  is  an  independent  body,  led  by  a 
Commission of five people appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the legislature.  It is one 
of the few state agencies that is constitutionally created and therefore functionally independent of 
the  Governor’s  office,  once  appointed.    As  Julie  Fitch,  a  manager  at  the  CPUC,  explained:  
“We’re separate …the obvious reason for that is because no Governor wants to be too closely 
associated with ratemaking, you know, raising electricity rates or gas or water, so that’s the 
answer  to  structure.    It  started  out  as  the  Railroad  Commission...”    Now  the  focus  of  the 
Commission’s  work  is  the  regulated  investor  owned  utilities,  spanning  telecommunications, 
natural gas and the power sector in California.  
Shannon Eddy, special CPUC advisor to the Governor’s Office, explained that the CPUC is often 
out in front and noted the challenge to keep its policies aligned with others in the state.  She said: 
“There are some cases where the PUC maybe moving a little faster than others feel comfortable 
with, but I think that’s just the nature of even working in teams.  You’ve got to negotiate things.  I 
mean you’ve got to work with people and different people’s goals and drivers.”  However it is 
most likely a healthy state of affairs to have some “competition” amongst state institutions and 
leadership on issues and some moving faster than others.  After all, some of the good ideas for 
new policy often originate at a smaller scale, i.e. within a particular agency, and are then more 
widely legislated throughout the state.  This was certainly the case for the GHG standard in the 
power sector, which was originally advocated within the policy discourse of the state’s energy 
agencies (CEC 2003b; CEC 2005b), then targeted and eventually mandated by the CPUC across 
the investor-owned utility sector in the period 2004-2006, and finally legislated with full coverage 
of the utility sector, including municipal utilities, through the Perata Bill in 2006 (see Chapter 5). 
9.3.5.  Non-governmental participation and the California climate policy process 
There is both a vibrant environmental activist community in California and a strong business 
sector, and both are active in climate policy decision-making.  With the economy and population 
growing  far  above  national  averages,  pressure  on  the  environment  and  natural  resources  is 
omni-present.  California is also politically pro-business and interested to attract ongoing business 
investments to continue to generate new wealth and jobs across the state.  
Notable in the California policy debate is the active engagement of a core of articulate scientific 
experts  and  more generally the  careful  construction of  scientific  evidence  about  the  risks of 
climate change in the California context.  In the case of the environmental risk frame, this reflects Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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a deliberative-analytic or science for policy circuit of power and influence.  The legitimacy of this 
argument for policy is based in scientific information and understanding but the production and 
communication of science has been shaped by the demand from the policy community and the 
nature of the debate within that community. 
Often  filtered  through  the  media  and  other  boundary  objects  or  organisations  (e.g. outreach 
materials from UCS), this information has shaped perceptions of the California policy elite  such 
that climate change is perceived to present a threat to the health and well-being of California’s 
citizens,  to its  economy and to its natural systems.  Broad understanding amongst these actors 
that  California  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  climate  change  has  provided  a  main  source  of 
argument to promote pro-active responses in the form of aggressive mitigation.  In the words of 
one NGO participant, this argument is about “let’s motivate mitigation” and it has permeated all 
of the debate to date that led up to and accompanied passage of the state-wide mitigation targets in 
2020.   
As noted in Chapter 7, interpretation of the regional science is emerging through an epistemic 
network of academic scientists working in tandem with state government to shape evidence about 
the effects that climate change will have in California. California regional science assessments, 
funded by both the state but building on a base of support from the federal government, are 
designed to be policy-relevant and timely to support debate.    
This orchestration of the science demonstrates the active co-construction of knowledge in the 
climate  policy  process  in  California,  where  the  environmental  risk  argument  is  constructed 
through  an  active  interaction  between  this  epistemic  network  of  scientific  researchers, 
environmental advocacy non-governmental organisations with the policy community.  Combined 
their efforts have solidified understanding of the principal ways in which (unabated) climate 
change could affect California and Californians: e.g. through increased temperatures, fire risk, 
poorer air quality and coastal zone erosion and heightened flood risk.  Yet while the regional 
science  of  climate  change is  essential to propel  climate  change onto  an  overcrowded policy 
agenda, it is not sufficient on its own to garner policy attention and to generate action on the issue.  
Many  non-governmental  organisations  are  well-organised  and  resourced  to  influence  policy 
decisions.  Environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) are particularly influential 
in the legislative arenas as well as other policy and regulatory policy processes (e.g. in the CPUC 
regulatory hearings and decision-making).  One reason for their influence is their strong technical 
and legal expertise and technical credibility with the policy community.  Another reason is the 
routine access that they have to policy decisions, especially through regulatory arenas where their Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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presence is permitted through clear institutional rules to allow non-governmental participants to 
be part of the policy process.   
In the climate change and energy area, the largest and most prominent of the ENGOs include 
those  that  have  national  operations  and  satellite  offices  in  California;  these  include  Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) as well as Union of 
Concerned Scientists (UCS).  A number of other local organisations also play a prominent role 
such as Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies (CEERT).  As Shannon Eddy, 
Special Advisor to the CPUC, said: “The Enviros are very strong in California on many issues 
and particularly on climate...”   
The influence of the ENGO community is woven into the legislative and regulatory history of 
California on energy and environmental issues.  This influence is evident from policy decisions in 
the late 1970s to place investments in energy efficiency on an equal footing as a supply option to 
be considered alongside of other energy supply investments (e.g. nuclear, coal or natural gas) (see 
Chapter 5).  It was also evident in the passage of the more recent Pavley (vehicle) Bill in 2004 and 
the 2006 legislation (Hall and Taplin 2007; see also Chapters 5 & 7).  
The ENGO community is also active in bringing scientific and technical information to bear on 
the policy debate through the interaction with the news media and the internet. This interaction is 
documented in the case of UCS (Cole and Watrous 2007), but the same is also true of the other 
major ENGOs. Chapter 7 highlights the science-policy interface or boundary organisation role 
that UCS has played on climate change to popularise regional climate change impact science in 
California.  The existence of this boundary function in turn renders information about impacts in a 
California  context  more  accessible  to  the  media,  to  the  public  and  to  policy-makers  alike. 
However there was also a strong base of context specific scientific research upon which they 
could draw and without this crucial ingredient any media campaign or outreach effort would 
inevitably have failed. 
The  ENGO  community  also  plays  an  important  “watchdog”  role  in  environmental  policy 
processes (Brown Weiss and Jacobsen 1998). Shannon Eddy saw this role as intertwined with 
media coverage of the climate change issue.  She said: “I think the media’s watching to see if this 
is real and so are the ‘Enviros’.  They’re certainly watching the Administration to see if words 
will be met with commensurate action.  …in a lot of ways the media is fuelled by the Enviros…  I 
mean you’ll see close linkages between the leaders of the environmental community and the 
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to think that leaders in the environmental community will pick up the phone and call their liaisons 
or their contacts in the media and say, ‘Look.  You should follow up on some of this.’”  
Vic  Weisser,  of  the  non-profit  business  organisation  known  as  the  California  Council  for 
Environmental and Economic Balance (CCEEB) and California Environmental Dialogue (CED), 
highlighted that the media role was particularly important in the early days when climate change 
was just moving into the public sphere.  He said: “the debate was initially brought to light by 
scientists and naturalists observing funny things happening, and that was reported and picked up 
by the environmental community who … I think very thoughtfully and successfully engaged the 
media.”  Thus the environmental community is widely recognised to work closely and effectively 
with the media on the issue of climate change, a strategy that appears to have helped to build 
political support for action.  He continued: “Once the media became engaged, some politicians 
embraced the issue as one that they felt might have legs both in terms of the potentially disastrous 
consequences and in terms of their own political career.” In the end, Vic Weisser concluded that: 
“…[it was] a combination of … both elected officials and appointed officials seeing the potential 
negative consequences of climate change as a real threat and a real political opportunity.”   
Business  organisations  appear,  as  compared  to  environmental  organisations,  to  be  less 
homogeneous in their interests and less effective in their influence on the directions and the shape 
of climate policy. Vic Weisser stated this outright when he said: “The environmental lobbyists are 
better than business lobbyists.  They’re more effective than the business…  on this issue and by 
and  large  on  all  issues,  environmental  issues.”  When  asked  why,  Vic  Weisser  elaborated: 
“They’re  more  credible,  they  have  much  more  effective grass  roots operations,  they’re  what 
politicians see as golden for campaigns, they’re credible in the media and to the public far more 
than any business lobbyists are. … I think the environmental advocates in Sacramento run circles 
around the business community.”   
When Shannon Eddy was asked whether business actors were equally well organised as ENGOs, 
she responded:  “No.  But I think they’re probably getting there.  They’re in a reactive state where 
the Enviros are working on an agenda that they’ve had for a long time, so I think the business 
interests are more reacting to what they’re hearing.”  For example, there was active opposition 
from certain elements of business in California to the 2006 legislative initiative as well as to the 
Pavley Bill in 2004. Leading the charge of opposition to climate change legislation was the 
California Chamber of Commerce.  They were joined by the conservative oil industry group, 
Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA).  Umbrella groups for industry, organisations like 
WSPA are typically very conservative, more conservative than individual membership.   Minnie 
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the main challenges for climate policy in the state: “…it relates back to the fact that it is a one 
state only policy versus a global policy or even a national policy.  I think that creates a challenge 
in terms of how do you do this so that you don't have disparate economic problems in California.  
How do you do it so that you don't end up having leakages
141 in California so that people move 
out of California?”  
Vic Weisser pointed out that the business community was late in coming to recognise climate 
change as an issue.  He said: “…climate change to many of the businesses in California years 
ago… four, five years ago… was an issue they wished would just go away.  We don’t want to 
deal with it -- make it go away.”  But over time, according to Vic Weisser, they are moving 
ahead: “…in fits and starts …to first, understand, ‘oh God,’ it’s not going away.  Second, [to] 
understand we’re going to be part of the solution…”  Over time, Vic Weisser suggested that if we 
are to limit and reverse climate change, this is about changing the “business model  … because 
virtually every business, just like every person, is going to be affected directly by climate change 
and [by] the programs and policies that are put in place to deal with the underlying causes, the 
human causes of the climate.” 
Denise  Michelson of  British  Petroleum,  USA,  further  explained the  mainstream  view  of  the 
business community and the divide amongst businesses: “There is a huge divide between the 
business  community  and  the  environmental  community  …here  in  California  the  business 
community is staunchly opposed to any mandatory type programs around climate change.  They 
feel that energy efficiency and voluntary programs can help get us there.” Of course BP itself has 
not  aligned itself  with this  more  conservative  business  community, but instead  has  “…taken 
voluntary actions and precautionary actions because we feel that government and business should 
work together in order to address the climate change issue” (Michelson 2006i).  In other words, 
BP was initially in front of the legislative wave and pressing for change, against the mainstream 
view of the business community.  
Referring to climate change policy generally but also to the debate about Assembly Bill 32 (prior 
to its passage), Denise Michelson confided: “I think that BP has been swimming upstream on this 
issue …from mandatory reporting, which has always been our position, [to] cap and trade.  Our 
pro-activeness has helped ...with access to the policymakers, but our pro-activeness has not made 
us friends in the industry.”  Nancy Ryan also highlighted BP’s pro-active role when she said: “BP, 
                                                         
141 Leakages in economic terms refers to activity changing location, in this case economic and GHG 
emitting activity such as business operations, due to differentials in cost or desirability of one location 
over another. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  273 
they’re the only oil company that’s actually joined the Registry. They positioned themselves, their 
whole beyond petroleum advertising campaign, so they’ve positioned themselves as being, for 
lack of a better word, green.” However, in the end, BP did not support Assembly Bill 32 because 
it did not feature a strong requirement for emission trading (see Chapter 6). 
The public utility companies are on the front line of the regulatory policy on climate change in 
California and  as  a result  are  very  concerned.   Shannon  Eddy  noted:  “…they have  a  lot of 
concerns about ratepayer impacts of the greenhouse gas performance standard and really of all 
the, of those load cap issues that are being discussed at the PUC.  I mean that’s something that 
they’re definitely concerned about.”  Yet even amongst the utility companies, there are important 
divisions on the issue of climate change policy.  For example, Nancy Ryan of the CPUC pointed 
out the differences between southern California Edison (Edison) and Pacific Gas and Electric 
(PG&E) when she said: “I don’t think that Edison is in the same league as PG&E on this. I mean 
PG&E is really much more interested in being proactive.”  Indeed, some of those interviewed 
cited Edison as one of the only companies actively questioning the scientific basis of climate 
change in the policy circles and debates. These differences reflect different business approaches 
or corporate cultures, which inevitably influence whether companies are leaders or laggards with 
respect to environmental performance. 
Interestingly, Minnie Tsunezimi also cited wealth and business prosperity as one of the reasons 
California was able to tackle climate change.  She said:  “California is prosperous enough to be 
able to be talking about these issues.  I think that if California were less prosperous and had more 
immediate  pressing  issues,  then  they  would  not  have  the  opportunity  to  be  talking  about 
greenhouse gas as a priority issue.”  Yet, the long history of aggressive air pollution, and energy 
and  environmental  policy  has  not  crippled  California’s  current  economy.    To  the  contrary, 
California’s economy is one of the fastest growing in the US and this phenomenal growth has 
occurred  despite  the  strong  environmental  laws  and  policies  at  state  level,  sometimes  far 
exceeding those required at national level (see Chapters 4, 5 & 8).   
9.3.6.  Progressive business intertwines with “enviros”   
Importantly, California is home to some powerful green business lobbies, which tend to partner 
with the ENGOs to move policy towards greener outcomes than would otherwise be the case.  
Green business lobbies in California have generally favoured aggressive action on climate change 
(Doerr 2007; E2 and Progress 2004; SVLG 2006).   
Progressive business interests therefore have intertwined with the “enviro” voice to press for 
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when she said: “Progressive companies have actually been thinking about what this means for 
their business and - viewing it as an opportunity or something …[where] they have to manage the 
risk proactively, as opposed to try to eliminate the source of the risk.  Organizations like Silicon 
Valley  Leadership  Group,
142  I  think  they  represent  a  really  different  part  of  the  business 
community. …the Silicon Valley Leadership Group, represents - a different slice of California 
that’s very vocal and influential.  And there is so much money down there.  …. The big guys of 
all those companies …running the venture capital firms and the private equity funds.  Those 
people  are  major  campaign  donors  and  they’re  very  influential.    A  lot  of  them  are  more 
Libertarian in their perspective, but they also think if you don’t address something like this, it’s 
going to come back and get us, one way or another. We dealt with them a lot in my old job.  
Those  are  the  kind  of  people  who  are  heavily  represented  among  funders,  certainly  for 
Environmental Defense, but I think also probably for the other major non-profits in the area.” 
Thus at least in financial terms there is an intertwining of funding from green businesses or from 
new technology and knowledge economy firms and that of the environmental community in 
California, to support ENGO activities in the policy arena. Such a coalition is also consistent with 
the Baptist and bootlegger alliances that have been shown to be influential in both domestic and 
international environmental policy arenas (Vogel 1995; see also Chapter 3). 
Julie Fitch of the CPUC also noted the strong support of the local green business community on 
the recent California Solar Initiative.  She said: “ ‘New Voice of Business’ is a group of business 
folks from San Francisco that are supportive and signed hundreds of letters of support on the 
Solar Initiative… the other one is the Bay Area Economic Forum, [they] actually came out in 
support of the Solar Initiative, too, which I was actually surprised at both of those.”  Combining 
the strong support of the green business community with that of the ENGOs has helped climate 
change or climate-related policies to emerge even in the face of some opposition from much of 
the mainstream business  community. As Nancy Ryan said: “I don’t think the Chamber represents 
the whole business community. But they’re - more like the old fashioned, business community.” 
Interestingly, there is not a formal alternative to the Chamber of Commerce for green businesses 
                                                         
142  The  Silicon  Valley  Leadership  Group  represents  a  significant  slice  of  California’s  economy;  the 
Group’s  website  describes  their  membership  of  more  than  200  companies  as  employing  more  than 
250,000 people,  constituting   of the private sector workforce in the region, and “contributing more than 
$1 trillion to the global economy.”  The group was founded in 1977 by David Packard; its mission is to 
cooperate  with  local,  regional,  state  and  federal  government  to  address  major  public  policy  issues 
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but there is at least one organisation – the CEERT – that is a lobbying group for energy efficiency 
and renewable technology companies.
143 
Box 9.1: Non-governmental participation and CPUC decision-making: an example 
Non-governmental  organisations  are  active  in  the  CPUC  regulatory  process  and  a  recent 
innovation is to try to open elements of the policy implementation process more generally. These range 
from environmental groups to other specialised organisations with the social aim of protecting ratepayers 
and poor communities and companies. Devra Wang highlighted the energy efficiency goals set by the 
CPUC for the electric utilities and said: “…that's something that I worked on with my colleagues here quite 
extensively.” Analytical inputs are also gathered and evidence presented through the regulatory process 
on different aspects of these issues and these inputs shape the final administration rulings.144   
However the deliberative process for decision-making in this regulatory setting is also constrained 
by the legalistic nature of the process.  While access is not formally limited, the technical and legal aspects 
of the regulatory system effectively limit participation to only technical experts and lawyers. Participants in 
these proceedings are largely large environmental non-governmental organisations or consumer interest 
groups or business organisations.   
One  interesting  example  of  a  non-technical  participatory  mechanism  is  the  establishment  of 
advisory bodies to guide utility decision-making and provide oversight to energy efficiency investments 
(CPUC 2005a).  These Energy Efficiency Advisory Groups have been established for each individual 
investor-owned utility in California.  In principle such a mechanism offers a less technical and therefore 
more  accessible  means  of  participation  to  knowledgeable  and  interested  individuals  or  businesses.   
However, a prominent expert working in the field,  Jeanne Clinton, expressed concern that even these 
mechanisms remain inaccessible to those who might be well-placed to advise for a variety of reasons.  
She said: “who has the time and resources to participate in the public advisory groups?  No one is paid.  
So they either have to come from organizations who are doing it pro bono and they have other resources 
to be able to afford to do this, or they’re good citizens who .. have time and ability to [participate]. ... But 
you won’t find businesses represented there, because businesses don't have time for this.  And you won’t 
find business associations there, because they want to influence the rules, but they’re not going to sit 
around  and  help  design  programs  or  figure  out  what  the  strategies  should  be.”    This  highlights  the 
difficulties of any mechanism attempting to “democratise”  oversight and governance of these specialised 
regulatory programmes. 
The opportunities for dialogue between non-governmental actors and policymakers do not always 
have to be formal to be influential (see Box 9.1 and also discussion Chapter 6). One example of 
deliberative process is found in the early CEC led intergovernmental consultative process that 
began through dialogue to develop understanding about climate change among the individuals 
responsible  for  environmental  issues  throughout  the  large  state  government  bureaucracy.   
Another example, though less well documented, was the California Environmental Dialogue, 
                                                         
143 For example, CEERT was a sponsor of the “Coal Shadow” report discussed in Chapter 5.  
144 While technically these are not “public” hearings, they are open to non-governmental organisations 
choosing to register and then participate.  Effective participation does require significant resources and 
expertise as the issues are often complex and legalistic as well as lengthy, running sometimes for a year or 
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which  took  place  through  the  California  Council  for  Environmental  and  Economic  Balance 
(CCEEB) (Weisser 2006i; Ryan 2006i). The CCEEB brought key business and environmental 
stakeholders together with policymakers in informal exchanges about how to shape climate policy 
responses.  
In both of these examples, i.e. that of CCEEB (California Environmental Dialogue) and that of the 
CEC led consultative process, off the record exchanges of views on policy options and strategies 
among elite actors appear to have helped to consolidate a sense of the importance of climate 
change as a public policy issue and to lay the ground work for the more focused policy action to 
come.  Both processes were off the record exchanges and emanated from leadership or one or 
several individuals rather than being central to any formal policy process. 
9.4.  Conclusion 
The research has explored broad questions of sources of legitimacy in decision-making in the case 
of regional climate policy in California and attempts to identify and to understand drivers of 
policy and social change. In a public policy context, Habermasian discourse theory of democracy 
highlights the power of communicative rationality, where legitimacy is derived from the circuits 
of power and influence that flow from the periphery of the decision-making process to the core 
and  back  again  (see  Chapter  2).    This  provides  a  theoretical  framework  for  understanding 
interactions between “suppliers” of change on the one hand, and “customers” for change on the 
other  (see  Figure  3.3;  Chapter  3).  This  theoretical  structure  provides  a  means  to  assess 
California’s policy processes and identify more practical lessons for climate policy across two 
main themes: i) the nature and extent of communicative action as a driver of change; ii) the 
implications of this model for social learning and the evolution of policy. 
California’s experience leading up to the passage of the Global Warming Solutions Act in 2006 
demonstrates a strong influence of an epistemic community, made up largely of non-state actors 
including local researchers, academics and NGO experts. It also shows an intertwining of interests 
from green businesses (ranging from technology and knowledge economy firms to venture capital 
firms)  and  that  of  the  environmental  community  in California, to  support pro-climate  policy 
lobbying activities and participation in the policy process. Such a coalition is a type of “Baptist 
and bootlegger” alliance where groups with fundamentally different interests align to support a 
comment cause or environmental policy endpoint (Vogel 1995; see also Chapter 3). Combined 
these different networks of actors and organisations, working from the outer-periphery of the 
policy  process,  have  been  instrumental in  putting  the  issue  of  climate  change  on the  policy Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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agenda, to generate and promote new ideas and approaches in policymaking, and to keep the issue 
of climate change in the public sphere within the state. 
It is thus possible to identify layers of actors that have been influential in driving change (see 
Table 9.1). In the core area, we find those in the government administration and with formal 
climate policy decision-making powers in California. This is a limited number of people and 
institutions, from the Governor and his office to the California state legislature.  Going on to the 
next  layer  of  the  inner-periphery,  we  find  a  large  number  of  semi-autonomous,  issue-based 
institutions with broad authority to design and implement policy within the confines of their legal 
mandates and responsibility. These actors range from the Energy Commissions (CEC) to the 
Department of Forestry and Fire Prevention (see Chapter 6, Box 6.2). An important sub-set of 
these institutions played an active and important role in setting out climate policies and priorities 
prior  to  the  2006  passage  of  the  Global  Warming  Solutions  Act.    Most important  were  the 
California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) in 
the establishment of energy related climate change policies, and of course the CARB with their 
responsibility for the design (and eventually implementation) of the Pavley Bill regulations on 
CO2 from motor vehicles. 
Combined, this broad array of different types of actors and organisations and their formal and 
informal  interaction  with  the  California  policy  process  have  provided  a  rich  variety  of 
information,  perspectives,  evidence  and  arguments  to  support  decision-making.    Deliberative 
interactions  amongst  governmental  and  non-governmental  actors  in  each  of  these  core  and 
inner-periphery policy processes have nourished new ideas and helped to shape outcomes that led 
up to and eventually culminated in the broad political support for climate policy and passage of 
the AB 32 in 2006.   
Taking advantage of the change in direction, these “suppliers” of change have contributed to the 
active re-framing the issue of climate change (Kingdon 1984; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Schön 
and Rein 1994) under Schwarzenegger’s leadership, presenting it as a “win-win” policy for the 
environment and the economy in the California context. The problem was at this point no longer 
framed as a global problem that could only be effectively tackled through national policy but it 
became a priority policy issue at state level.  This breakthrough was made possible not just by the 
Governor’s shift in position or in the more local framing of the issue, but by the bottom-up 
engagement of non-governmental actors in the outer and inner-peripheries of decision-making. 
The Governor, building on earlier efforts of select legislators and leaders within semi-autonomous 
state institutions, worked with non-governmental “suppliers” of ideas to replace “conventional” 
understanding with a new vision of the future.  Collectively, they have re-framed the issues to Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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move policy ahead and to begin to move down the pathway of delivering this low-emission 
future. 
Table 9.1 Habermas: Circulation of Power for Public Decision-making 
Centre-Periphery 
Axis 
Actors and circulation of power  California examples – leadership across 
the circle of power 
Core area  Government administration, judicial 
system, parliamentary bodies: 
formal decision-making powers. 
Capacity to act varies with 
organisational complexity. 
Governor’s office (from 2005) 
Legislature: Sher legislation (1988 & 
2000); Pavley Bill (2002); Global Warming 
Solutions Act ( 2006). 
Inner-periphery  Various institutions equipped with 
rights and self-governance 
delegated by the state 
(i.e. universities, public insurance 
systems, professional agencies and 
associations, charitable 
organisations and foundations): 
informal decision-making powers, 
significant autonomy  
California Air Resources Board; California 
Energy Commission; California Public 
Utilities Commission;  CalPERS  
Outer-periphery  Suppliers of ideas and customers 
and decisions: this includes experts, 
businesses, and consumers as well 
as the media; it is the civil-social 
infrastructure of the public sphere.  
Academia, epistemic network on the 
impacts and science of climate change. 
Environmental advocacy: Environmental 
Defense; National Resources Defense 
Council; Union of Concerned Scientists.  
Business advocacy (green): Silicon Valley 
Leadership Group; E2; Center for Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Technologies. 
Environmental justice, social justice (pro-
poor): Redefining Progress 
Business advocacy (conventional): 
California Chamber of Commerce; 
Western Petroleum Association; California 
Council for Environmental and Economic 
Balance (CCEEB) and California 
Environmental Dialogue (CED).   
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10. CONCLUSIONS 
10.1. Introduction 
This concluding chapter aims to summarise both pragmatic and theoretical insights from the 
research, pulling out general 
conclusions.  It returns to the 
key  research  questions  and 
the  working  hypothesis  set 
out in Chapter 1 (Box 10.1) 
to  comment  on  the  lessons 
learnt,  putting  them  into 
conceptual  context.  The 
chapter  is  largely structured 
according  to  these  research 
questions.   
Beyond  addressing  each  of 
these  questions,  the  chapter 
also  comments  on  the 
usefulness  of  the  thesis 
methodology  and  on 
outcomes of the research in a 
more personal context, that is 
what  I  learned  as  a  policy 
practitioner  in  undertaking 
this research project. Finally 
chapter returns to the main hypothesis of  work to conclude on the last overarching research 
question: Does  local action on climate change make a difference to action at broader scales and if 
so how?  This last section of the chapter also highlights a number of emerging research themes 
that could usefully be investigated further. 
Box 10.1: Key research questions and working hypothesis 
Overarching questions: 
•  What  triggers  policy  action  on  global  climate  change  at 
regional scale? 
•  What  are  the  principal  arguments,  lines  of  evidence 
underlying the regional decisions to act on climate change?  
•  How do the “winning” arguments gain salience? What kind 
of decision-making process facilitates closure and action at 
local  scale,  when  science  and  economic  evidence  is 
ambiguous, and politics high? 
•  How  might  regional  action  affect  climate  policy  discourse 
nationally or internationally? 
Cross-cutting themes: 
•  Regional  risk  characterisation  of  climate  change  and  the 
science-policy  interface:  framing  or  “sensemaking”  of 
climate change in a regional context;  
•  Issue-linkages:  how  do  climate  policies  build  on,  fit  or 
interact with other policy issues at this scale; 
•  Scale-linkages: how does governance of climate change at 
regional scales interact with national and global scale policy 
developments? 
The working hypothesis of the research is: the growing scope and 
capacity to act on climate change at regional levels of governance 
have potential to exert a “bottom-up” influence on national and 
international action. 
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10.2. What triggers policy action on global climate change at regional scale? 
The initial research question is what triggers action on climate change at sub-national or regional 
scale.  The question is meant to ask quite simply why? Given the broad economic and scientific 
understanding of climate change as a global environmental issue, requiring global co-operation 
for effective policy solutions, no nation-state or sub-national government could be expected to 
gain directly from unilateral action to mitigate emissions (see Chapter 2).  Why would a state 
government, even if large, voluntarily choose to mitigate?  
In tracing recent key developments in California on climate change the research has shown that 
the  answer  to  this  question  may  be  found  at  least  in  part  in  California’s  pro-environmental 
regulatory history.  A story emerges about how and why climate policy could move quickly in the 
absence of Federal action.  It is a story that connects climate policy developments to California’s 
past experience and institutional competence in related policy areas. This interpretation derives 
from  looking  “inside-out”  at  the  policy  process.    It  originates  from  the  perceptions  and 
recollections of actors that are directly engaged in climate policy decision-making in California 
today, one that sees climate change policy as a natural evolution of previous action in related 
areas, notably, as an extension of air pollution regulation and energy and environmental policies.  
As Hall (1993) suggests, it demonstrates social learning that builds on past experience to derive 
lessons for the future to shape policies on the relatively new yet related issue of climate change. 
The historical timeline in each of these areas in California shows that the action was in part in 
response to scientific discoveries and events beyond California’s boundaries or direct experience. 
For example, the discovery in the late 1940s of the harmful effects of indirect air pollutions from 
vehicles leading to the view that regulations were needed, and later in the 1970s, general concern 
about energy security and the spread of nuclear power which in turn focused attention in the US 
and  in  California  on the  need  for  energy  efficiency.   While  federal  attention  also turned to 
regulatory solutions, the timelines show that action in California was generally swifter and more 
aggressive, eventually leading the nation’s efforts in both areas.  This past experience has in turn 
emboldened California’s leaders of today to move forward quickly on the issue of climate change.   
The case study shows that historical development of policies in areas related to climate change – 
notably  to  control  air  pollution  and  to  boost  clean  energy  –  can  be  usefully  situated  in  a 
conceptual framework for multilevel and social-practice governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003; 
Young 2002). Multilevel governance exists where authority to legislate and regulate is nested and 
hierarchical  as  well  as  polycentric  in  nature  (i.e.  organised  around  issues).    The  history  of 
developments in California’s regulatory institutions to address air pollution and energy policy was Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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originally driven by “grassroots” or “bottom up” action from a variety of non-state actors, notably 
affected  stakeholders,  policy  entrepreneurial  experts  and  environmental  non-governmental 
organisations.   Furthermore, this  multilevel  governance  framework suggests  that the  scale of 
governance can be an important driver of change.  While regional sub-national authority to make 
policy decisions is necessarily nested in national authority and policy frameworks (Dietz et al 
2003; Hooghe and Marks 2003), powerful and large state governments, such as California’s, 
expect to lead change and directly influence federal decisions if the opportunity arises.  
Consistent with the social practice model of governance, the case study shows the social and 
political environment in California has shaped decision-making through institutions and policy 
elites  within these to  mould  new  rules,  conventions and  beliefs.  In  particular,  California  has 
shaped regulatory institutions to deliver on the promise of clean air and clean energy.  This has 
occurred  to  a  great  extent  through  a  polycentric  network  of  devolved  institutional  authority 
(Foster 1997; Hooghe and Marks 2003), a governance framework that in turn has delivered a 
powerful  force  of  innovation  to  deal  with  issues  related  to  climate  change.  As  Starr  (2005) 
highlights,  California  has  had  a  tendency  to  devolve  authority  and  to  govern  through  the 
establishment of issue- or location-specific boards and commissions (Chapter 4).  The institutions 
relevant to climate policy include the CARB and its regulatory authority over air pollution, which 
has shaped the Pavley regulations of CO2 from motor vehicles. They also include the CEC and the 
CPUC in the area of energy and environmental policies, working through regulation of public 
utilities for electricity and natural gas to bring forward energy efficiency and other clean energy 
solutions.  
While authority is overlapping (i.e. for energy policy between the CEC and the CPUC), it has also 
been relatively independent. A more centralised state-wide political process on climate change, 
such as was launched under AB 32, is necessarily more complex and slower to act.  In spite of the 
lack  of a  formal policy framework at the  centre  of  state  or  federal  government, the  relative 
independence of these institutions in the middle of the decade helped to create a window of 
opportunity  for  their  leaders  to  move  climate  policy  forward.    Furthermore,  past  regulatory 
achievements  to  curb  air  pollution,  enhance  energy  efficiency  and  boost  clean  energy  in 
California have created a sense of technological optimism and understanding that environmental 
performance can go hand-in-hand with a strong economy (Bernstein et al. 2000; Sanstad et al. 
2006; Taylor et al. 2006; Roland-Holst 2008).  
California institutions are not fixed in time but rapidly evolving in an iterative manner along with 
the discourse that they help to shape. As the state has exercised decentralised authority in these 
climate-relevant policy arenas, it has begun to gain experience that is empowering a network of Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  282 
actors and interests to support strengthened and more focused  action on climate change.  Actions 
within individual state institutions on particular pieces of the climate change problem significantly 
pre-date the more recent movement in 2005-06 to create a comprehensive state-wide climate 
policy framework for mitigation.  Specifically, early has grown in an organic manner from pre-
existing institutional authority in related areas, in part due to the influence and leadership of 
individuals within these institutions to create “policy spaces” to bring change forward (Grindle 
and  Thomas  1991).  Notable  in  this  respect  is  the  leadership  found  in  the  CEC  through 
Commissioner Boyd and the CPUC through President Peevey, both working together to lead early 
energy  policy  reforms,  from  2003  on,  that  integrate  concern  about  climate  change.    This 
experience underscores not just the role of the devolved institutional structure but also the role of 
individual leadership to bring about change in a way that integrates the new issue of climate 
change into existing policy frameworks. 
10.3. What arguments and lines of evidence underlie the policy discourse at regional scale? 
A second question for the research is: What are the principal arguments, lines of evidence and 
interests underlying the decision in California to act on climate change, to move climate change to 
a priority place on the policy agenda? The thesis uses the notion of policy frames to explore these 
questions  where  these  are  broadly  defined,  after  Miller  (2000:  211)  as  “perceptual  lenses, 
worldviews  or  underlying  assumptions  that  guide  communal  interpretation  and  definition  of 
particular issues.” 
The California case clearly demonstrates the power of shifts in policy frames as a means to 
re-focus argument and interpret facts to support and enable policy decisions on contested issues 
such as climate change (Majone 1989; Schön and Rein 1994), where active frame construction 
was central to climate policymaking in California in the period 2004-2006.  Consistent with 
earlier  work on other topics  (Miller  2000;  Schön  and  Rein  1994),  the  California  case  study 
documents how the use of policy frames in the climate policy process evolves, both interacting 
with and affecting the interests of different stakeholder groups over time. Two dominant frames 
are  identified  in  the  climate  policy  discourse  in  this  period  and  a  third  master  frame,  or 
meta-narrative, emerges when looking across these two.  The first presents climate change as 
long-term  problem  of  regional  environmental  risk  in  California,  and  thus  a  policy  problem 
requiring  urgent  attention.    The  second  presents  climate  change  policy  solutions  as  a  set  of 
“win-win” opportunities that benefit both the economy and the environment.  These two policy 
frames  intertwine  and  are  complementary.  Each  focuses  on  a  different  part  of  the  policy 
discourse,  dealing  with  a  different  aspect  of  the  policy  challenge.  One  seeks  to  establish  a Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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common understanding of the environmental problem to be addressed through policy, and the 
other focuses on the nature of the solutions to be advanced. When combined, these frames lead to 
a master frame, or meta-narrative that argues that regional action on global climate change matters 
and that it is imperative to act at the regional scale, especially in the face of inaction elsewhere.    
There are of course competing narratives or policy frames and no single, correct interpretation of 
the “facts” (Majone 1984; Hawkesworth 1988; Schön and Rein 1994). These frames co-exist and 
necessarily compete over time, confirming findings from other interpretive policy analysis (Miller 
and Edwards 2001a; Schön and Rein 1994; Yanow 2000).  These range from presenting climate 
change as a problem of global environmental degradation, where the world is broadly at risk from 
human activities, to one of local disaster management where solutions are largely through local 
adaptation  (Miller  2000).    Another  possible  frame  is  to  define  climate  change  as  an  energy 
problem where technological management is a key to resolving it (Miller 2000; Lindseth 2004). 
Given the multilevel governance dimensions of climate change, a central research challenge is to 
understand how tension is resolved over contested meanings and frames for interpretation in any 
decision-making context (within and across scales) across a wide range of relevant actors and 
organisations.  In other words part of the analysis attempts to understand how these policy frames 
have come to dominate.   
The case study shows a change in dominant policy frames in California, where prior to 2002 
climate  change  was  presented  largely  as  a  global  issue  to  be  dealt  with  principally  through 
national policy.  By 2005, clear shifts in dominant policy frames had occurred, which combined  
to present climate change as an urgent issue for regional policy action.  This suggests that there is 
power  in the  ability  to  construct  and shift  policy  frames  through  persuasive  arguments  in  a 
regional context. The dominance of the policy frames ‘climate change as regional environmental 
risk’ and mitigation policy as ‘win-win’ in California demonstrates a co-mingling of “facts” and 
“values” in the policy process in California, and an intertwining of expert and local knowledge, 
which in turn supports a co-constructionist explanation of policy change.  Further the construction 
of these policy frames interacts with and affects the interests of different stakeholder groups at 
regional scale, demonstrating a social-practice model of environmental governance.   
10.3.1.   Climate change as regional environmental risk 
A first dominant policy frame for climate change in California is to present it as a problem of 
local environmental risk.  This policy frame is built upon evidence from regional assessments of 
climate scenarios and of predicted impacts and appears in recent legislative and administrative 
action on climate change in California (2004-2006). In this framing, Californians are seen as Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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particularly exposed to even small changes in the climate, where impacts are expected to be 
particularly compelling and extraordinary.  The dominant discourse advances action to protect the 
global climate as a moral imperative, calling on the state and its citizens to lead the nation and 
even internationally in the fight against climate change.  In parallel, there is clear recognition that 
California  on  its  own  would  not  alter  local  impacts  of  climate  change.    This  policy  frame 
nevertheless establishes action on climate change as a logical extension of the long history of 
Californian  leadership  on  environmental  issues,  and  calls  for  targets  and timetables  to  make 
similar progress on the issue of climate change.    It thus interacts with the second dominant 
policy  frame,  which  advances  climate  policy  as  win-win  to  deliver  benefits  for  both  the 
environment and the economy (see below). 
This regional environmental risk policy frame is unusual because it is used to frame mitigation 
policy (rather than adaptation policy).  It becomes the explanation for why climate change is a 
problem that requires attention from regional policymakers.  It is the answer to the question: Why 
do we need to mitigate? The use of this policy frame therefore becomes a means to shape social 
norms and understanding about what the problem of climate change means in the California 
regional context.   
Adaptation and environmental risk are also typically coupled in climate policy discussions at 
national and international scales, where it is rare to find mitigation coupled with environmental 
risk. For example, California’s use of regional environmental risk as a policy frame for mitigation 
also varies significantly from the approach that has been institutionalised by the IPCC.  Since 
2001, the IPCC’s comprehensive assessment of the climate change literature has been structured 
in three separate volumes: science; impacts, vulnerability and adaptation; and mitigation (e.g. 
IPCC 2007a, b, and c). This frame structures the environmental risk or impact and vulnerability 
dimensions of the climate change problem alongside of an adaptation policy solution set, treating 
mitigation policy largely as a technical and economic set of challenges to limit emissions cost-
effectively.    Such  an  approach  functionally  separates  mitigation  from the  environmental  risk 
outcomes that derive from choices in this area.  Further, the separation of impacts information 
from discussion of mitigation policy runs the risk of weakening the argument for action.  It does 
not answer the question: why should we mitigate? The California policy elites appear to have 
anticipated this problem and structured their arguments to pro-actively respond to this seemingly 
simple  question,  effectively  helping  to  shift  the  debate.    In  the  words  of  one  policymaker: 
“…you’ve got to tell people why you should care about this”  (Tamminen 2006i). Thus the 
California  mitigation  policy  frame,  presenting  climate  change  as  problem  of  regional 
environmental risk, is unusual but perhaps essential in a regional context.  Without such a framing Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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to  contextualise  climate  change  it  is  difficult  to  derive  meaning  for  the  issue  to  support 
policymaking. 
The regional environmental risk policy frame relies to a great extent upon expert knowledge, in 
particular upon regional climate impact science.  As a result, an active science-policy exchange is 
a  central  part  of  the  discourse  in  California  and,  in  this  context,  science-policy  “boundary 
organisations” and “boundary objects” serve an essential function (Gieryn 1999; Gieryn 1983b; 
Jasanoff 1990).  The boundary functions serve to popularise and communicate research findings, 
in part through the use of ‘availability heuristics’ including images and metaphors that resonate in 
the California context. Indeed, research has shown that the persuasiveness of climate change 
science depends in part on its representation in the popular media and on the use of metaphors 
that  easily  resonate  with  the  local  cultural  experience,  communicated  in  part  through  affect 
imagery (Leiserowitz 2006). 
An active epistemic network exists in California to support a science-policy exchange on climate 
change. This network,  in turn, it has contributed evidence to support the dominant ‘regional 
environmental  risk’  policy  frame.  Comprised  of  representatives  of  the  scientific  research 
community  and  of  non-governmental  organisations,  the  network  has  helped  to  shape 
understanding of climate change in the California context.  To some extent, the epistemic network 
has been facilitated by the state’s active research programme on climate impacts in California; 
however on-going federal research funding on regional climate science provides another stable 
source  of  financial  support  to  keep  researchers  engaged  in  state-of-the-art  regional  scientific 
assessment.  The non-governmental community is directly engaged, working with scientists to 
package scientific findings for communication to a lay audience, including the policy elite.  One 
environmental non-governmental organisation (ENGO) in particular, the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, has usefully played a “boundary” organisation role, working to bridge the boundaries 
between science and policy. However having an ENGO play this role is not without controversy; 
the affiliation with an advocacy organisation is seen by some scientists to potentially taint the 
credibility and usefulness of their research findings.  In several instances, scientists have played 
policy entrepreneurial roles to directly communicate scientific findings to lay audiences through 
the use of the media and through face-to-face exchanges with policy makers (including those 
organised by UCS).  UCS outreach activities have, in any case, systematically served to enhance 
dialogue between policy elites and the scientific community at critical junctures in the policy 
process thus strengthening understanding of climate change science and solidifying the general 
policy rationale for action to protect the climate.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The cultural context for decision-making on climate change is also important.  Public opinion 
polls in California suggest that some of the explanation for policy change may lie in the cultural 
beliefs of Californians, who enjoy a particular respect for the environment and support strong 
environmental action (Baldassare 2000-2006). This typically translates into bipartisan support for 
environmental policy. There are nevertheless multitudes of contradictions and contrasts embedded 
within the pro-environmental cultural bias found in California.  These range from the strongly 
pro-growth policies of the current government to the issue of unfettered individual consumption 
with little attention to the link to environmental outcomes.  One example is the explosive growth 
in  vehicle  use in the state,  where  increases in the  volume  of  vehicles  miles travelled offset 
important gains from ongoing investments to limit the emission intensity of vehicle use.  
A base of regional climate science is an essential ingredient, but science alone is not sufficient to 
advance policy arguments for action. The State’s particular vulnerability to climate change in 
areas that are emblematic or that have strong cultural as well as economic value is present in the 
minds of the policy elite. Further, both the state government and the ENGO community have 
actively used photography and other visual media (i.e. film and internet) to communicate the 
meaning of climate change risk to lay audiences. Typical environmental cultural metaphors, such 
as snow pack in the sierra and water,  have become central in efforts to communicate climate 
change in the California context.  In addition, California’s long-standing vulnerability to fires, 
heat waves and water shortages, which will only worsen with climate change. These are a filter 
through which ordinary people and policymakers alike have come to “make sense” of the climate 
change problem and to relate it to their own experience. This understanding has been shaped in 
part  by  the  popularisation  of  climate  change  impact  science,  which  in  turn  is  shown  to  be 
undertaken by politically-savvy ENGOs and, increasingly, by the state government itself. These 
metaphors and imagery have also served to heighten public awareness in the already “green” 
cultural context found in California. California’s use of the local environmental risk policy frame 
supports a public perception of climate change as an “environmental bad” and may also have 
helped to align strong bipartisan political support for aggressive mitigation action. 
In  summary,  the  regional  environmental  risk  argument  was  constructed  through  interaction 
between  an  epistemic  network  of  scientific  researchers  and  representatives  of  the  ENGO 
community working with policy elites to solidify understanding of the principal ways in which 
climate change would affect California and Californians.  Broad understanding amongst these 
actors that California is particularly vulnerable to climate change has, in turn, provided a main 
source  of  argument  to  promote  pro-active  responses  on  mitigation  goal-setting  and  policy 
implementation.  In the words of one ENGO participant, this argument is about “let’s motivate Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  287 
mitigation” and it permeated all aspects of the debate that led up to and accompanied passage of 
AB-32, the legislation that codified state-wide, medium term mitigation targets (i.e. for 2020).
145   
10.3.2.   Regional climate change mitigation as ‘win-win’ 
The second dominant policy frame presents mitigation policy as a ‘win-win’ option for California. 
It argues that California leadership can mobilise change in the global (market) context for clean 
technology, especially given the size of its economy and its past history of leadership in this area.  
It is argued that by stimulating innovation and new markets in California, strong mitigation policy 
will  benefit  the  local  economy,  local  environments  and  human  well-being  thus  leading  to 
“win-win” outcomes.  Such policy is expected, in this view, to become a motor of technological 
change,  which  will  diffuse  more  broadly  in the  US  and  beyond through increasingly  global 
markets.  Contrary to the environmental risk policy frame, this frame does not rely upon formal 
expert knowledge but to a great extent on knowledge from past regulatory experience.  
Predictably, the policy process in California has been criticised as not sufficiently considering 
comprehensive assessment the economics of mitigation policy. The policy process through 2006 
demonstrates only  a  marginal  role of  formal  expert knowledge  on the  economics of  climate 
change, relying instead to a greater extent on a “belief” that derives from experiential knowledge 
that environmental protection is an integral part of delivering sustainable economic development 
in California. While formal economic analysis is available today, and is increasingly used to 
support arguments in the policy process, much of the most relevant analysis was commissioned ex 
post in part to support prior decisions rather than being used to assess options in advance of 
decision-making.  
With respect to expert economic arguments for (or against) climate change action, it appears that 
a serious knowledge gap existed in 2005 when Schwarzenegger announced the new policy, and 
that to some extent this gap persists today. While initial expert analysis provided some evidence 
about the costs of mitigation measures in the California context suggesting that there would be net 
economic gains from mitigation action rather than net costs (Bailie and Lazarus 2005). Later 
studies  provided  more  comprehensive  and  formalised  macro-economic  assessments  but 
                                                         
145 The special vulnerability of the state to climate change impacts also emerged as one of the key legal 
arguments in the state’s defence of its right to regulate CO2 e.g. in the legal battle over the Pavley vehicle 
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confirmed the basic conclusion (CAT-ES 2007; Roland-Holst 2007).
146  In spite of strengthening 
the “official” macro-economic analysis over the period 2005-6 (and beyond), it is clear that the 
state government used economic analysis largely to bolster political argumentation for decisions 
already taken, i.e. on greenhouse gas reduction targets and on preferred policy approaches to meet 
them. As such, expert knowledge was not the most important source of evidence used to support 
the decision on aggressive mitigation policy.   
A main source of argument in favour of mitigation is past experience in the business, regulatory, 
and political arenas from dealing with environmental issues.  This experience appears to have 
brought about a sense of technological and economic optimism, arguing that it is possible to push 
the technological frontier forward over time.  It experience has also shaped norms and beliefs that 
environmental performance improves with technological progress and that the costs are non-
existent or at worst, affordable given the wealth of the state.  Notably, California’s experience is 
based on past adversarial politics on energy and environmental issues, where regulators have 
challenged vested industry interests that fight against change.   
In  an  analytically objective  context,  it  would  be  necessary to  highlight that  macro-economic 
evidence, which is ambiguous at best with respect to the potential for “win-win” outcomes.  Some 
evidence  exists  to show  that  California’s  economy has  benefited  from  past  actions  to invest 
heavily in energy efficiency and air pollution control technologies, with a range of promising 
benefits: cleaner cities and healthier environments for people; lower energy bills for the poor 
relative to the wealthy;  and a vibrant, high-growth economy including a range of high technology 
industry and research clusters throughout the state (Bernstein et al. 2000; Roland-Holst 2008; 
Sanstad et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2006).  This optimistic picture must be countered however with 
economic modelling of GHG mitigation that typically predicts some slow-down of the economy 
with imposition of  significant  emission  constraints  (Barker  et  al. 2007;  IPCC  2007c;  OECD 
2008b).
 147 While some of California’s own modelling studies show “win-win” outcomes for the 
2020  target  (e.g.  Roland-Holst  2008),  these  results  rely  on  expectations  about  endogenous 
technical change for which empirical evidence is still thin (Pizer and Popp 2007).  It is therefore 
equally possible to design studies to show the opposite (e.g. Stavins et al. 2007).  Interestingly, the 
California policy process has managed to largely by-pass the “duelling models” discussion on the 
                                                         
146  Despite  the  apparent  consensus,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  conclusions  of  these  studies  were 
eventually challenged in the academic literature (Stavins et al. 2007). 
147 Even if a policy scenario leads to greater technological change in a given period, there are likely to be 
limits to the pace of innovation that can occur in a given time frame to lower the costs of mitigation. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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cost of GHG mitigation.  In the regional political context, California decisionmakers have relied 
instead on more anecdotal evidence from past action in related regulatory arenas, building on 
local knowledge and “belief” about the benefits of pro-environmental policy to build persuasive 
arguments for mitigation policy.   
To some extent, the limited role to date of formal economic analysis and information in the policy 
process may be attributed to the early stage of policy development. California is in the earliest 
stages of climate policymaking, where the key first step is problem recognition (Lasswell 1971), 
or in Kingdon’s terms agenda-setting. Of course, there will be winners and losers in any shift 
away from business-as-usual and identifying these becomes a critical part of policy design and 
implementation,  where  alternative  policy  instruments  and  options  are  considered.  Ideas  on 
alternative policy solutions have not been absent from the discourse to date but they have not been 
the main area of action either. Other than specific actions through existing regulatory authority, as 
noted above, the main climate policy discourse in the period 2004 - 2006 focused on establishing 
a role for state policy and on goal-setting. Once the mitigation goal of policy is agreed, as it is 
now,  economic  analysis  can  help  to  identify  least-cost  pathways,  for  the  given  set  of 
environmental objectives, identify the winners and losers of various implementation approaches 
and thus help to design policies to deal with the losers in a transition to a new future.  In this phase 
of policymaking, California has begun to grapple with macro-economic questions and it is here 
that such model-based analysis of the planned policy action may become more central in the 
policy debate (CAT-ES 2007; Roland-Holst 2007). As the policy process begins to focus on 
design and implementation stages of policymaking, it would seem to be an opportune moment to 
invest in such information.  However it remains to be seen whether actors will align in the future 
to further develop and move to the forefront expert information on the economics of mitigation as 
a main line of argument for policy decisions.  
The use of local, experiential knowledge in the ‘win-win’ policy discourse in California is a 
demonstration of social learning, where past experience informs current action (Hall 1993), where 
paradigm shifts are possible and dependent a range of non-governmental actors bringing in new 
ideas, different types of experience and knowledge to the policy debate. Clearly some of the 
explanation for strong political support for action on climate change comes from the existence of 
an influential green business community that has profited from past action in related energy and 
environmental policy arenas. In particular, environmental and green business advocates partnered 
to construct arguments about the potential economic gains of early action on climate change.  
Combined these actors used anecdotal evidence for the win-win policy frame to support the 
notion that climate change mitigation policy would bring aggregate benefits rather than costs for Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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the California economy over the long term. A more objective, analytically-based assessment of 
aggressive mitigation goals adopted in California under AB 32 may have presented outcomes as 
“affordable,” given expectations for on-going growth in wealth and cultural bias in California for 
pro-environmental action.  However clearly the ‘win-win’ argument was simpler to communicate 
in a political context and one that resonated with some notion of technological optimism and a 
coalition of influential actors that have grown out of past experience on energy and environmental 
issues. 
10.3.3.    Climate change as a regional policy issue 
A meta-narrative or master policy frame emerges from the two other dominant frames and argues 
that it is imperative for California to act, especially given the vacuum of leadership at the national 
level in the United States.  It argues that regional policy action will lead to an economic win for 
the State of California and, through positive technology and knowledge spillovers, other states or 
nations may learn from and possibly follow California’s lead to significantly reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions.   This argument rests upon a view of the “nation-state” of California, where its lack 
of nation-state powers does not hinder its economic power to influence the market for clean 
technology and the political landscape of action on climate change. Building on past successes in 
other areas, and in particular on its successes in leading US policy initiatives towards cleaner air 
and more efficient use of energy, the policy discourse portrays California as having a unique 
opportunity  and  responsibility  to  take  leadership  to  mitigate  climate  change.    The  argument 
continues that lack of (mitigative) action, or delayed action in California could slow national and 
international mitigation efforts, which in turn will aggravate the environmental risks and climate 
change and their economic impacts.   
From the late 1980s until the election of Governor Schwarzenegger in late 2003, the dominant 
climate policy frame in California was to characterise climate change as a global and national 
policy problem that could not be usefully addressed at sub-national or state scale.  For example, 
under the administration of California’s Governor Gray Davis (1999-2003), global climate change 
was a seemingly intractable problem for state government.  This policy frame was challenged 
while Governor Davis was still in office by the California legislature, in 2002, when they passed 
the Pavley Bill to regulate vehicle emissions of CO2 in California (CA-Code 2006a).  Following 
on from this landmark development, the Schwarzenegger administration took office and actively 
re-framed global climate change as an issue of regional environmental risk with local win-win 
solutions.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The evidence used to construct this argument is essentially a combination of that used to support 
the other two parallel policy frames.  Per above, the environmental risk policy frame captivates 
media and public attention, eventually helping to establish climate change as a regional issue and 
mobilise support for policy action.  Similarly the win-win policy frame could be said to do the 
same, focusing on the solutions rather than the definition of the problem.  Each of these policy 
frames (risk and win-win) build on and further expand pre-existing networks of actors in support 
of change.   
Following  Majone  (1989)  and    Hawkesworth  (1988),  this  meta-narrative  demonstrates  the 
intertwining of “fact” and “value” in the policy process, where the policy process necessarily 
helps to shape the normative values upon which policy is eventually built. A back and forth 
interaction, where reflection about the meaning of climate change in socio-political contexts, is 
easier  done  at  regional or  national  scale than  at  international  scales  of governance.    This  is 
because it is possible to draw on and relate climate change to common experience through history 
and cultural identity of people and businesses in a particular location.   
Framing climate policy as a regional issue can be said to represent a shift in policy paradigm (Hall 
1993; Roe 1994) from past approaches.  This shift is driven by the  "anomaly" in the climate 
policy process at federal level that broke down the previous master frame – that of climate change 
as a uniquely global and national policy issue. In this case the Bush administration had pulled out 
of its Kyoto obligations to create a void of federal action on climate change. In turn, the shift in 
policy paradigm permits a fundamental change in the way climate change policy is approached 
and acted upon in California and in other states in the US. This paradigm shift coalesced through 
the leadership of Governor Schwarzenegger, even though many other “visible participants” or 
members of the policy elite within the state government laid the groundwork for this to happen.  
In  Kingdon's  terms  (1984),  Governor  Schwarzenegger’s  election  in  2003  combined  with  the 
national  void  of  leadership  during  the  Bush  administration  (2001  –  2008)  to  open  a  policy 
window that facilitated a major shift in policy – a change in policy paradigm.  Coincidentally this 
void in federal leadership occurred at a time of political turmoil and transition in California, 
culminating in the recall election in 2003 due in part to the electricity crisis (2000-01).  These 
events created a unique “policy window” for action on climate change at state level in the US.   
Within this multilevel governance master policy frame, a number of key actors facilitated this 
interpretation  of the policy  imperative  for  action  in  California.    Among these  is  the  role  of 
non-governmental organisations and foundations (e.g. the Energy Foundation) as well as state 
legislators who have identified the void in federal policy as an opportunity to move California into Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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a leadership role among states in the US context.  Legislators have seized upon the “California 
effect” of leadership on past environmental issues (Vogel 1995b) to argue that similar leadership 
is  possible  and  called  for  on  climate  change.    Through  issue-based  institutional  authority, 
government leadership is also actively developing and exploiting this master frame.  Beyond 
advancing state regulatory decisions on climate change through existing authority, this leadership 
extends  also  to  international  scale  action  through  agreements  to  partner  with  and  exchange 
experience internationally on energy efficiency and other clean technology and mitigation efforts, 
working through local counterparts in other countries (i.e. the agreements with Sao Paulo and 
with Jiangsu Province, China) and with like-minded nations such as the UK (California 2006a; 
CPUC 2005; Reid et al. 2005) (see Chapter 2). 
This master frame for state action may not have emerged had there been active leadership at 
federal  level  in  the  US  to  move  state  level  actions  forward  in  unison.    Indeed  the  Bush 
administrations’ withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, combined with the ongoing effort 
of the international community to strengthen collaborative action – as evidenced by the entry into 
force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 – may have created a unique window of opportunity for 
California  and other  state  level  actions  to  gain prominence in the  US.  The  California  recall 
election also offered a unique opportunity for the new governor to “fill the gap” that had been left 
at federal level, and for the California legislature to consolidate this leadership through law that 
would ensure action, regardless of the inevitable waxing and waning of state executive leadership 
on the climate change issue.   
The breakdown in the previous "global" and “national” narrative framings for climate change 
cannot  be  attributed  to  a  single  event  or  a  single  person’s  leadership  (or  lack  of  federal 
leadership). Rather it derives from a confluence of socio-political forces in the 2002-2006 period 
– starting with the Pavley legislation and finishing with the passage of AB 32 – that came together 
to bring about the paradigm shift.  Included in this suite of events is the international context 
where  nation-states  have  become  deadlocked  in  negotiations  about  the  timing  and  the 
responsibility of individual nation-states to mitigate climate change.  This is also a time when the 
United States – the world’s largest emitter and largest economic power – withdrew from the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Further, there is no international agreement in sight on the key policy challenges 
presented by climate change. In this broader international political context, solutions being sought 
and brought to the table via non-state actors, such as state and local governments, are particularly 
visible and have the potential to wield even greater influence than if they were in advancing in 
parallel, or in competition with, significant national policy action in the US or internationally.   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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10.4   How do “winning” arguments gain salience? 
Another set of questions concern how “winning” arguments or policy frames gain salience at 
regional scale.   Of particular interest is the decision-making process: is it possible to identify 
certain types of decision-making processes that facilitate closure and action at regional scale, 
particularly when science and economic evidence is ambiguous and politics are high?  This set of 
questions concerns not only policy process and the types of knowledge that support it, but also 
issues about agency, representation or participation and reconciliation of different interests in the 
policy process.  
10.4.1.   What types of knowledge matter? 
The foregoing analysis of policy frames, and the evidence and argument used to construct them, is 
situated  in  a  co-constructionist  conceptual  framework  that  combines  the  strengths  of  realist, 
scientific discovery on one hand with contextual insights and lay knowledge on the other.  In this 
conceptual  framework,  social  processes  mediate  meanings  of  global  warming  to  interpret 
scientific  and  expert  knowledge  in  a  political  context  for  decision-making  (Jasanoff  1990; 
Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Woodgate and Redclift 1998).  The California case study confirms that 
this occurs in culturally specific ways to shape understandings of climate change in the policy 
process (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). 
Evidence to support the framings for climate policy had to be constructed and interpreted from 
available facts and information about climate change. In some instances, the policy process called 
for and generated new information to bolster policy arguments.  The environmental risk and 
win-win policy frames for climate change are anchored in both expert and local knowledge. Two 
types  of  expert  knowledge  that  are  essential  to  these  arguments:    scientific  and  economic 
knowledge.  This is a familiar pattern in environmental policy where technocratic policy advice is 
often dominant, and scientists and economists have privileged access and influence in the policy 
process (Layzer 2006). Local knowledge, on the other hand, derives from experience and public 
perceptions about the policy issues, which are in turn driven by local business and environmental 
social movements, by media and ‘availability’ heuristics than formal analysis. Combined this 
forms a broad base of local or experiential knowledge to bolster the case for climate policy.  
The  policy  frame  examples  demonstrate  the  difference  between  knowledge  and  information 
(Herrick 2004; Majone 1989).  At its best, information takes the form of incontestable facts, 
whereas knowledge comes from the creation of common frames of reference and understanding 
of those facts in a particular context (Herrick 2004).  For knowledge to emerge, local context and Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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experience intertwine with facts or information to shape understanding.  In the California case, 
local knowledge provided an essential foundation for the advancement of climate policy.  Across 
this entire period when climate policy began to emerge (i.e. from the late 1980s), the basic “facts” 
about climate change remained the same.  The main difference across time was how those facts 
were interpreted, framed and presented in argument to support state policy action.  This is not to 
say that scientific and expert knowledge did not provide an important and increasingly influential 
base or set of “facts” supporting a common technical understanding about climate change and 
policy alternatives.  They did.  However the key change that enabled action on climate change in 
California was not what these “facts” were, but how they were interpreted in particular by “visible 
participants” or leaders in the policy process (Grindle and Thomas 1991; Herrick 2004; Kingdon 
1984; Majone 1989). 
10.4.2.   What types of decision-making processes bring closure? 
On the types of decision-processes that facilitate action, given the broad uncertainty and high 
decisions  stakes  on  issues  like  climate  change,  many  authors  have  argued  that  procedural 
legitimacy is as much or more a determinant of success as the substantive content of the decisions 
themselves (Dietz et al. 2003; Dietz 2003b; Hajer and Wagenaar 2003). Majone (1989) argues 
that the function of argument in the policy process is to shift the boundaries of what is possible, 
shaping values and attitudes about what is fair and acceptable (Majone 1989). Further, what is fair 
or  acceptable is shaped  by people’s  attitudes  and these  attitudes  are  likely to shift based on 
dialogue, policy analysis and evidence over time. 
The California case study underscores the value of deliberative policy process in the agenda 
formation stage of climate policymaking and, within this, value in deliberative-analytic exchange 
around the science of climate change.  Early in the policy process there was recognition from 
leaders within state institutions of the need to create a “policy space” for active learning on 
climate change as an emerging policy issue.  In particular, a few key members of the policy elite 
enabled  deliberative  exchange  between  the  scientific  expert  community  and  policy 
decision-makers (e.g.  from the late 1990s on Mary Nichols, James Boyd and Winston Hickox – 
under the Davis administration, and later Terry Tamminen).  The exchange extended beyond 
policymakers, to reach other stakeholders and decision-makers were also relevant in the policy 
process, including business and other social communities e.g. church organisations.  Active and 
dialogue  oriented,  these  deliberative  spaces  or  outreach  efforts  appear  to  have  promoted  a 
common understanding about climate change as an issue of environmental risk, an understanding Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  295 
that eventually became one of two main anchors in the climate policy discourse as it moved front 
and centre on the policy agenda in 2005-6.  
Several other examples exist of deliberative policy processes each with a slightly different format, 
some formal, others informal.  This suggests that there was a role for policy entrepreneurs to use 
such activity to quietly shape common understandings among elite actors of how to address 
climate change. This is found, in the early CEC led intra-governmental consultative process and 
the  California  Environmental  Dialogue,  which  was  led  through  the  California  Council  for 
Environmental and Economic Balance (CCEEB) (Chapter 8). Both processes were off the record 
exchanges and emanated from leadership by one or several individuals rather than being central to 
any formal policy process. 
The California case thus shows that there is value to an open dialectic process, however it also 
demonstrates a need to close in the process to advance policy decisions.  A demonstration of such 
a  “closing-in”  came  in  2005  when  the  Governor’s  Executive  Order  formalised  an 
intra-governmental  coordination  process  to  work  through  a  newly  formed  “Climate  Action 
Team.”  This change in the decision process institutionalised and centralised several of the more 
informal settings for dialogue, focusing attention on a series of public hearings and workshops 
intended to lead to concrete outcomes.  While these events allowed public space for the sharing of 
different views on policy issues, they were mostly characterised by formal statements to establish 
a  “public  record”  of  various  views,  rather  than  by  open  exchange  and  discussion  of  the 
substantive issues.  More informal exchanges, such as one led by the CEC, were suppressed so as 
to avoid overlap and ensure that there was a single focussed policy process engaging all key 
stakeholders and decision-makers. Although this “closing in” of the policy process had the effect 
of  suppressing  more  open-ended  forums  for  exchange  of  earlier  days,  it  may  have  been  an 
inevitable  stage  in  the  policy  process.  Indeed  a  “closing-in”  of  the  debate  may  have  been 
necessary to allow policy decisions to emerge in a timely manner.  Only time will tell if it leads to 
“good” outcomes that have lasting influence both in procedural and substantive terms. 
One  important  force  of  change  in  California  is  an  active  array  of  non-governmental,  social 
movement organisations operating in the outer-periphery of the policy process. When combined 
with a relatively open process, this has generated a variety of timely ideas for policy responses, 
some of which were taken up and used in the formal policy process.  Examples include the “coal 
shadow” notion of California taking responsibility to regulate emissions from imported power 
(Milford  et al.  2005),  which  eventually  became  an  argument  for  a  shift  in  policy.    Another 
example came in the 1970s with presentation of energy efficiency investment as a replacement for 
energy supply investment (Roe 1994; Chapter 5).  More recently the framing of climate change as Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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a  problem  of  regional  environmental  risk  can  be  linked  to  ongoing  efforts  in  the  research 
community and with non-governmental actors to present the issues in such a manner (Hayhoe 
et al. 2004; Field et al. 1999). 
The generation and uptake of ideas between the core (formal governmental policymaking powers) 
and the periphery of non-governmental and (semi-autonomous) institutional partners, is clearly 
two-directional,  demonstrating  the  openness  of  the  decision-making  process  (Chapter  9). 
California policy decisions were influenced by different kinds of agents, from individual leaders 
at  the  top  of  state  government,  to  activism  based  in  well-organised  non-governmental 
organisations, to green business alliances and an epistemic network of academic researchers and 
experts engaged on policy issues. 
The California case also demonstrates the potential for an important back-and-forth in federalist 
systems between institutional innovations at lower scales of governance and broader national 
trends.    In  itself,  this  has  been  shown  to  be  a  powerful  force  for  change  in  the  area  of 
environmental policy, with innovations diffusing in part to broader scales through the pressure of 
increasingly inter-linked markets for technology and business pressure to harmonise regulations 
(Vogel et al. 2006).  The strength of early action in such a model is demonstrated only if and 
when regional action by states is adopted at federal scale.  While it is too soon to comment on 
whether this will occur in the case of California, this is clearly one of the drivers of change that 
emerges in discussing with the policy elite what motivations exist for early climate action at state 
level. 
10.4.3.   What actors have influence and how are diverse interests represented? 
In  2006,  a  variety  of  well-organised  (and  resourced)  advocacy  organisations,  including  an 
influential “green” business community, directly shaped the policy proposals and the outcomes. 
For example, central actors in construction of the win-win argument appear to have been an 
alliance  between  “green”  business  and  environmental  advocacy  organisations  in  the 
outer-periphery  of  the  policy  process  operating  through  what  has  been  called  “Baptist  and 
bootlegger” coalitions (see Chapter 9).    While joined in a common discourse these different 
actors  have  different  motivations  (Yandle  1982  and  Vogel  1995;  Chapter  3);  the 
environmentalists (the “Baptists”) are motivated to save the Earth and society from the perils of 
climate change whereas the green business communities (the “bootleggers”) has an overarching 
interest to create markets and profit from new, clean technologies (Doerr 2007). Environmental 
advocacy organisations relay experience from the past based on their “watchdog” role, actively 
documenting  past  experience  and  following  new  developments  with  significant  expertise  in Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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related areas. The green business community is central to the political dynamics, representing not 
just financial backing for politicians (which should not be underestimated) but also a vision of the 
future that combines strong economic growth with environmental performance. Both have been 
key forces in legitimising and advancing the win-win storyline in arguments, working along side 
of green business participants, in favour of aggressive mitigation action.   
The question of in whose interest is the push for mitigation policy raises some difficult issues, 
including questions about why adaptation was largely missing from the debate in the 2005-06 
period.  Indeed, the California policy process sidelines adaptation in this period, despite the large 
and growing body of research on climate change impacts.  This goes against a general trend 
observed in climate policy where there is growing attention to the critical role of adaptation in the 
policy mix at national scales (Gagnon-Lebrun and Agrawala 2008).  Instead there appears to be a 
need  to  maintain  a  central  focus  on  mitigation  to  the  detriment  of  attention  to  adaptation.  
Although adaptation has since been taken up, it was not a central issue in the initial push for 
policy, demonstrating a notable lack of leadership in this area.
148  One possible reason for this 
could be that the political interests driving mitigation are more powerful than those supporting 
adaptation or that potential adaptation advocates are relatively unorganised or unaware.  This may 
be part of a generic problem with adaptation, where those who stand to gain the most may be 
amongst the poorest and least politically powerful. As noted in Chapters 6 and 7, the poorest of 
California’s citizens may not gain from the strong mitigation emphasis in the emerging climate 
policy framework, particularly if it detracts from the other equally urgent part of the agenda, 
adaptation.  Broad understanding of this is one of the reasons that the voice of the environmental 
justice community is expected to significantly influence implementation decisions for AB 32 and 
to steer adaptation to the forefront of the next round of policy in California.  By contrast, the 
champions for mitigation policies include an increasingly powerful green business lobby working 
in tandem with well-resourced and knowledgeable ENGOs.  In particular, venture capitalists that 
have invested heavily in green technology may be amongst the frontrunners of those who gain 
from aggressive mitigation policy.  
A number of authors have also pointed to the importance of individuals, in shaping the policy 
process and its outcomes such that they are widely accepted and viable over time (Kingdon 1984; 
                                                         
148 This appears to be the case today.  On 14 November 2008, the Governor issued an Executive Order 
calling for preparation of a: “statewide climate change adaptation strategy that will assess the state's 
expected climate change impacts, identify where California is most vulnerable and recommend climate 
adaptation  policies  by  early  2009.”    See  California  (2008)  and  the  Governor’s  Press  Release: 
http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/11035/ [last accessed 16 December 2008]. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Grindle and Thomas 1991). As noted above, in the case of California this is can be related to the 
polycentric, issue-based structure of institutions and policy decision-making more generally (see 
section 10.2). 
10.5.  Cross-cutting themes of investigation 
10.5.1.  Regional risk characterisation of climate change 
This research raises the question of whether environmental risk framings of climate change in 
policy discourse can bring meaning to climate change on national, regional (sub-national) and 
local geographic scales (Lindseth 2004) and support political action at this scale of governance. 
Global-local linkages in governance are inevitable, since both the impacts and solutions to such 
problems are regional and local in nature (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Dietz et al. 2003; Fairhead 
and Leach 2003; Jasanoff and Martello 2004a; Young 2002). Earlier work on this issue suggests 
that establishing an understanding of climate change risk at regional scale may provide a means 
for “localizing” climate change to establish a rationale for policy action (Brunner 1996; Harris 
2001). It could thus be argued that creating such an information base is  a central task of regional 
climate policy processes. 
The California case supports the conclusion that regionalising climate science has made a positive 
difference to the policy process in California. It provides evidence from which to contextualise the 
climate change problem and to bring it down to a scale that is politically relevant (Brunner 1996; 
Harris  2001).  But  critical  support  for  policy  action  also  derives  from  the  learning  and 
interpretation that has developed over time, for example, through regular face-to-face interactions 
between an epistemic network of researchers and academics on the one hand, and elite policy 
actors on the other.  
This  research  demonstrates  that  opportunities  exist  at  the  regional  level  for  meaningful 
characterisation of climate change as a regional environmental risk issue.  This opportunity stems 
in part from the ability (and obligation) for regional decision-makers to interact directly with 
affected stakeholders in the formulation of framings of the climate change problem and possible 
policy responses.  While framing climate change from an environmental risk perspective raises 
both adaptation and mitigation as part of any comprehensive policy response (Corfee Morlot and 
Höhne 2003; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2005), motivating political support for adaptation at the same 
time as for mitigation remains problematic at regional scale.  Inevitably, adaptation is set aside to 
focus on the challenge of “motivating mitigation” as a first order problem in the governance of 
climate change.  Of course the danger in sidelining adaptation to a “mitigation only” approach to Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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climate policy is that early actions to adapt cost-effectively may be overlooked, ultimately leaving 
vulnerable populations and locations unnecessarily exposed to inevitable climate changes. 
The California case shows that regionalisation of the climate change has helped to strengthen 
understanding of the issue and through this it has strengthened bipartisan support for action.  
Regional  climate  science  has  provided  inputs  for  communication  about  the  issue  of  climate 
change  in  ways  that  are  meaningful  to  local  actors  and  in  local  contexts.  Broadening 
understanding  about  the  impacts  of  climate  change  is  linked  to  ‘availability  heuristics’  (i.e. 
metaphors  and  images)  through  which  the  science  is  understood  by  laypersons  (Leiserowitz 
2005). In providing a locally relevant basis for understanding global climate change, regional 
science assessment has became an important boundary object that serves to mediate between 
science activity on one side and the policy discourse on the other. While not sufficient on its own 
to  motivate  policy  action,  regional  science  assessment  has  become  part  of  the  basis  for 
interpretive understanding of the problem and therefore an important driver of policy change. 
The  California  policy  case  is  also  characterised  by  extensive  efforts  by  expert  and 
non-governmental  (environmental  advocacy)  communities  to  work  together  discursive 
communication effort to strengthen common understanding of the issues amongst the lay public 
and to policy elites. Media attention is an important vehicle to diffuse information and garner 
attention to the issues. Overall the case study points to the co-construction of climate as regional 
environmental risk as a successful argument to ‘motivate’ mitigation action, in part through the 
use of an analytic-deliberative process (Stern and Fineberg 1996) supported by non-governmental 
actors working carefully with experts. 
10.5.2.  Issue linkages in the policy process 
Climate change is a multi-faceted problem where policy responses can be linked to a number of 
other sectoral policy issues.  As noted above, the California policy process for addressing climate 
change built upon at least two other well-established policy platforms – air pollution regulatory 
policy and energy and environmental policy, including energy efficiency programs.  The research 
confirms that the linkage of climate change to pre-existing policy issues and agendas can be a 
means to accelerate action. The integration of climate change into the domains of air pollution 
control  and  energy  and  environmental  policy  in  California  avoided  the  creation  of  new 
self-standing institutional mechanisms, allowing early policy action to grow out of pre-existing 
policy authority and priorities e.g. efficient energy use as an alternative to new, more expensive 
and polluting supply investments as well as to advance clean vehicle technologies to limit air 
pollution. Such an integrated approach offered efficiencies in carrying out new policy functions to Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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deal with climate change (Warrick and Riebsame 1983; Young 2002), for example, building 
monitoring  for  CO2  into  pre-existing  performance  monitoring  responsibilities  for  energy 
efficiency or air pollution policies within the CEC and the CARB respectively. In this way, global 
climate change has become interconnected to the other state policy priorities in related areas, 
joining the global to regional and local concerns.   
In the California case, issue linkage thus became a means to create and extend networks for action 
on  climate  change.  For  example,  “green  business  networks”  which  had  emerged  partly  in 
response to past energy efficiency and environmental policy action eventually became one of the 
main constituencies calling for climate policy action.  Better integration of climate change into 
mainstream policies has also offered a mechanism to build concern for this issue into other high 
priority policy areas and this quickly raised the profile of climate change.  This observation is 
consistent with some of the findings of literature on opportunities for “mainstreaming” climate 
change into other policy areas (Agrawala 2004; Beg et al. 2002; Heller and Shukla 2003).  Yet as 
the profile and level of ambition on climate change policy grows, treatment of climate change as 
part and parcel of other policy issues necessarily complicates action, requiring more extensive 
consultation and coordination across many different institutions and actors with different and 
sometimes conflicting policy agendas.   This is because mitigation is not a discrete set of actions 
on its own (Barker et al. 2007) but part and parcel of economic development pathways.  An 
example of such a challenge is the slowing of the CPUC load-based cap on greenhouse gas 
emissions due to broader efforts to policies under the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 
32).  The governance challenges of harmonising the integration of climate change across a large 
set of regional scale policy issues and institutions are part of the implementation agenda, which 
California is now starting to grapple with. 
Although adaptation is also an essential part of climate policy, attention to it is still nascent in 
California.  This research has not investigated adaptation in any depth, in part because of the lack 
of attention to it in California’s formal policy process for climate change through 2006.
149 Despite 
the lack of formal policy attention, there is some indication that adaptation is being integrated into 
key areas such as water resources management policy from the “bottom up.” This recognition and 
effort to mainstream adaptation is due to the policy entrepreneurship of key individuals within the 
state government. It is also due to the risk of inaction and opportunities inherent in early action to 
                                                         
149 The issue of adaptation has since been taken up as a statewide policy initiative. For discussion, see 
Chapter 7 and California (2008) and the Governor’s Press Release: http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/11035/ 
[last accessed 16 December 2008]. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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avoid building long-lived infrastructure that is quickly obsolete due to a changing climate. In spite 
of the void of official state policy in this area, government experts working in affected areas, such 
as water, agriculture and forestry management, have already begun to plan for a future that differs 
from the past due to climate change. 
10.6. Reflections on the methodology  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the thesis was developed through the use of ethnographic methods and 
“thick” description of contextual factors shaping change in California on the policy front.  Thus 
the core of the empirical data in the thesis is collected through interviews with about fifty different 
elite actors active in the climate policy process (see Chapter 1 and Appendix for details of the 
methodology). 
My own professional experience is largely in the international climate policy arena; it places me 
within an international “elite” group of policy actors on climate change, a position that inevitably 
facilitated my access to decision-makers in California.  I also actively engaged in conversations 
with  interviewees  and  inevitably  “heard”  more  than  was  explicitly  “said”  in  any  particular 
statement or conversation.  Yet throughout this research project, I have listened to the stories 
about the California climate policy process and through analysis of the interviews and other 
related source materials, I have related these stories climate policy developments in national and 
international policy contexts.   
The thesis centres on how climate change emerges in a local policy context and on the challenge 
of  understanding  how  this  change  occurs  and  why  in  California.    I  have  asked:  How  did 
California come to prioritise climate change on an inevitably over-crowded policy agenda? And 
why did this occur?  These are very broad questions about social change and society’s interaction 
with a complex global environmental issue at local scale.  As such, the research project has 
challenged  me  to  leave  the  more  familiar  domain  of  technical  (or  largely  economic)  policy 
analysis and enter a new area that frames the questions and the policy problems in an entirely 
different way.   
Rather than focusing on what expert knowledge and information has to offer in the way of advice 
about preferred policy alternatives, this research has addressed the question of how such expert 
knowledge interacts with other forms of knowledge to influence policy decisions and change. It 
has started from a notion of human wellbeing that includes, but is not limited to, economic wealth 
and  individual utility  and  preferences  for  wealth,  thus going beyond  conventional notions  of 
welfare economics.  The research is designed to explore changing social norms and attitudes Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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about global environmental change in local economic, cultural and political contexts (Golding 
1992; Martello and Jasanoff 2004; Miller and Edwards 2001b; North 2005; Young 2002).   
Using a social practice model to think about these issues has changed the way that I have come to 
understand policy processes  and their  outcomes.    This  model  challenges  us to think beyond 
quantitative assessments to factor in the importance of qualitative understanding.  In this model, 
“culture, norms and habits” are sources of behaviour and they are also forces for social change.  
Fortunately each of these sources of change will evolve with time through discursive exchange to 
build knowledge and understanding, thus we are not necessarily wedded to “bad” habits of the 
past.   
Interpretive and qualitative in design, the research provides a means to situate change in local and 
regional understandings of climate change in a broader context of social practice in California. At 
the  outset,  I  occasionally  questioned  the  need  to  focus  on  understanding  why  change  was 
happening, wanting very much to have conclusions and findings from the research that would be 
“policy relevant” and speak to how to close the “policy gap” that exists on climate change.  As the 
research project evolved, I began to realise that understanding how change occurs is a first step to 
affecting change.  
This type of research raises awareness of the power of language, argument, and dialogue, working 
in combination with expert inputs, to shape social norms and beliefs about what is possible and 
what is desirable in terms of policy end-points. When combined with individual leadership and 
good institutional design to include regular interaction with non-governmental actors, and good 
media access to information, it can then help to bring about policy change.  The research findings 
also points to the strength and influence of expert knowledge especially when it is designed to 
interact  and  resonate  with core policy  questions  as well  as  local  knowledge  and  experience.  
Focusing on how decisions are made in parallel with what decisions are made provides insights 
into how to improve climate policymaking processes.  Key process conclusions are on the need to 
offer opportunities for early and open exchange between expert and non-expert decision-makers. 
The experience of conducting this research has fundamentally changed my own views on the role 
of expert knowledge in the policy process, situating it as one amongst other important inputs. 
10.7. Summary: does regional action make a difference to broader scale climate policy? 
Starting with a broad conceptual framing for decision-making on climate change, this research has 
focused to a great extent on questions related to the scale of the climate policy process:  How do 
regional scales of decision-making and debate emerge, what are regional framings for climate 
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question do regional policy processes matter? Thus the research investigates the (re)framing of 
global climate change as a state and local policy issue. Creating regional policy frames for climate 
change  is  shown  to  be  part  of  a  process  of  social  learning  where  global  climate  change  is 
interpreted in new ways to build on local knowledge and a regionally specific cultural context.  
As noted above, shifting the policy discourse to focus on regional environmental risk is facilitated 
by the use of metaphors that translate complex issues to everyday life and experience (Harrison 
and Burgess 1994; Leiserowitz 2006; Ungar 2000), thus helping to shift beliefs and perceptions 
about the need for action at regional scale.  
The California case demonstrates several different scale-based drivers of change.  The first is the 
dynamic interaction in the United States between scales of decision-making, in particular between 
state level action and federal policymaking on environmental issues. Second, California’s sheer 
economic  prowess  in  a  federalist  system  provides  it  with  the  market  power  to  potentially 
influence national and international technology developments and innovation. Third California is 
large enough to be influential and small enough to be experimental.  These three “scale” factors 
appear to have combined to empower state level leadership in California and to promote action on 
prominent environmental issues over time. 
The California case also confirms the importance of coalitions of non-governmental actors that 
cut  across  conventional  groupings  to  work  towards  common  endpoints  based  on  common 
discourses or framings and interpretations of the climate change problem.  The case shows how 
experts  within  environmental  advocacy  organisations  interacted  closely  with  green  business 
interests to promote the dominant win-win framing for mitigation policy. These networks of 
non-governmental  social  and  corporate  actors  suggest  an  influential  sub-politics  of  climate 
change.    As  noted  in  Chapter  3,  this  influence  is  labelled  “sub-political”  because  it  is  not 
necessarily  formally  operating  in  the  public  sphere  but  rather  circulating  in  private  sphere 
networks that interact with and influence public policy decisions.   
Yet inevitably, California’s actions are necessarily nested within a larger network of partners 
within the multilevel governance regime that exists for climate change, where nation-states are 
formally  committed  to  work  together  and,  individually  to  advance  national  policy  agendas. 
Within this responsibility is the expectation that national policy will emerge out of a back and 
forth with regional, local or other non-state partners. There is thus a natural push and pull or 
tension between nation-states and their sub-national governments.  However if and when there is 
a void of national leadership, as was the case in the US from 2001 to 2008 on climate policy, then 
there is opportunity and indeed some pressure for local and regional (sub-national) governments 
to seek and promote their own, locally adapted solutions to global change problems.  Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The California experience shows that the political barriers to climate policy may become more 
manageable at sub-national scale than at national or international scales.  The case reveals an 
active  environmental  and  progressive  business  community  combined  with  a  long-standing 
environmentally  progressive  voice  of  government;  this  coalition  of  actors  and  interests  has 
emerged in part from the governments own past efforts to advance technical and policy solutions 
to air pollution and to advance energy efficiency.  The coalition in turn has played a large role in 
shaping early action on climate change out of these same policy arenas.  This socio-environmental 
history  provides  a  base  of  evidence,  knowledge,  and  belief  that  a  clean  environment  can 
accompany a strong economy.  Combined this experience has creates “circuits of power” where 
ideas and common interpretations of possible policy solutions move from the outer- to the inner- 
periphery of decision-making and back again, where non-governmental actors from the green 
business  community  align  with  environmental  non-governmental  organisations  to  fight  for 
change.  This in turn, has strengthened bipartisan political support to encourage leadership to 
emerge on the issue of climate change at state level in California. 
Some of the argument for regional action is based upon the notion that early action at the level of 
state government will set an example and provide legal precedent to influence federal action when 
it eventually comes.  For example, if and when California is able to achieve greenhouse gas 
emission reductions through new or ongoing policy initiatives, through firm-level and household 
responses to state policy initiatives, it will be in a position to contribute new information and 
knowledge about the cost and means to mitigate GHG emissions.  Since there is little experience 
to date with mitigation policy, there is even less data and understanding about how to go about it 
and what it will actually cost (Dowlatabadi et al. 2004). Assuming that early actions are limited to 
relatively small-scale experiments, where the intent is to learn about costs and alternatives for 
mitigation, and adjust policies based on this learning, there may be little down-side risk to early 
action, as long as it is modest in scope and iterative (i.e. designed to feed lessons learnt in through 
regular adjustments). Furthermore, those who have first hand experience with mitigation action 
will inevitably have influence to shape broader policy efforts.  
Taking regional differences into account – in this case “California differences” - is an integral part 
of any regional climate policy discourse.  For example, Californians are proud of their heritage of 
environmental activism and largely tackle environmental protection as a bipartisan issue.  In 
addition,  the  policy  discourse  argues  that  California  is  different  from  an  institutional, 
technological and economic point of view.  The large scale of California’s economy, combined 
with  decentralised  authority  and  polycentric  institutions  allows  the  policy  elite  to  champion 
change and to move ahead relatively independently to reduce GHG emissions. Working largely Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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through regulatory authority, standards and other policies that force technological innovations are 
able to come about faster than would be the case in a different institutional context.  At the same 
time, there is a belief and some evidence that technical innovations have led the way to better 
economic performance in the state.  Moreover, given its large size, California’s strategies affect 
not only local markets and performance but also global technological and environmental trends.   
An important observation in the policy process is that there is a commonly held “belief” among 
California  decision-makers  that  “California  is  different.”  California  has  historically  had 
considerable success in driving the (national) environmental agenda, forcing technological change 
while also maintaining a healthy and vibrant economy.  This understanding of the California 
“difference” has become a rationale for climate change decisions across government: from the 
executive branch to the legislature, as well as within the powerful bureaucracies of the state 
government, which are responsible for regulating industry.  Connecting climate change policy to 
this local history and base of experiential combined with its willingness to experiment, has helped 
to make the issue of climate change politically tractable and has facilitated action.  Localising the 
discourse on climate change has provided a source of empowerment and ownership for regional 
actions,  indeed  to  help  shift  the  discourse  such  that  state-level  action  on  climate  change  is 
imperative, particularly in the face of a void of federal action. 
How  the  policy  process  is  designed  institutionally  will  determine  the  possibility  for  local 
knowledge to emerge on climate change and to influence decision-making. An open process that 
facilitates participation of a wide range of non-governmental elite actors and organisations raises 
the possibility for innovative ideas to come from the outer periphery to influence decisions on 
policy.  Designing  the  policy  process  to  allow  for  an  active  analytic-deliberative  exchange 
amongst  non-governmental  actors  at the periphery,  and  governmental  decision-makers in the 
centre of power is an important part of any local policy process.  Such a process encourages 
debate about competing interpretations amongst elite actors and ultimately increases the number 
of ideas for policy circulating at any one time.  Moving from debate to action is of course also an 
essential  step  and  this  step  necessarily  requires  a  “closing-in”  of  the  policy  process;  it  also 
requires leadership to steer the process to useful conclusions about policy. 
The research brings attention to interpretive framings of the science and the policy problem to 
demonstrate that a number of viable framings exist and necessarily compete over time (Miller 
2001). It confirms previous research findings that seemingly intractable policy controversies can 
be addressed by structuring decision-making to re-frame issues in a new way (Schön and Rein 
1994; Yanow 2000). Consistent with the “argumentative turn” in policy analysis, the research 
thus highlights the role of interpretation and human experience in that interpretation, and raises Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
  306 
questions about the ability or even the desirability to separate “facts” and “values” in the policy 
process (Fischer 2003; Fischer and Forester 1993; Hawkesworth 1988).  
In conclusion, localising a global environmental problem or situating it as a problem of regional 
environmental risk provides a key to motivating meaningful mitigation action with potential to 
unlock regional solutions that could make a difference at broader scale. Situating climate change 
as regional environmental risk brings the problem down to a meaningful scale and facilitates 
decision-making on how to address at this scale. The science-policy interface is important and 
boundary work provides a valuable input to regional policy processes on climate change to blur 
the distinction between science and interpretation for local decision-making. Winning arguments 
for climate change action are shaped and gain salience when local knowledge joins formal expert 
knowledge in a local decision-making process. Thus empowering regional policy processes on 
climate change not only has the potential to increase experimentation given the smaller scale of 
action, it also has the potential to accelerate technical and social learning to provide invaluable 
lessons for decision-making at broader scale.  This is certain to be the case in a location such as 
California given large size of its market economy and large population, and its role as a national 
environmental leader the US.  However, just as each region will inevitably differ in its search for 
regionally adapted solutions, its size and influence as an independent actor will also vary widely. 
Given the somewhat unique power of the California example, it is difficult to argue on the basis 
of this case alone that regional policy initiatives will make a significant difference to broader 
climate policy processes (e.g. internationally or even nationally) on their own. The potential for 
regional action to exert significant power or influence at larger scales is only possible if such 
actions can be situated within a larger transnational network of regional scale action, actors and 
experience. Regional actions can also be seen as an important testing ground for new ideas and 
policy alternatives.  They have the advantage of working to a narrower set of local constituents 
and interests which can in turn open the opportunity to be relatively more experimental and 
innovative  than  policy  processes  working  at  larger  scales,  with  necessarily  more  diverse 
audiences.  Where such experiments are successful, and even possibly before, it may be possible 
to demonstrate movement away from status quo in new directions for an acceptable level of cost 
(or benefit) to local economies and people.  Especially when combined to reflect significant 
shares of the population or of the economy within a nation, or across national boundaries, such 
regional efforts may begin to wield influence to shape markets and business interests in new 
directions,  and  to  create  new  constituencies  for  action.    Growing  transnational  networks  of 
influence already exist, and may continue to grow to link efforts across city and other sub-national 
governments with those at national or international scale (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004).  When Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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these new sub-political forces combine with increasingly global markets for technologies they 
may  show  that  new  forces  of  change  are  emerging  on  climate  change.  Fully  enabling  such 
developments  across  regional  scale  actions  will  only  be  possible  once  there  is  more 
acknowledgement and empowerment of these actors and may require some decentralisation of 
resources  and  authority  to  regional  governments  to  move  climate  policy  forward.    Were 
empowerment of regional actors and institutions to occur, new ideas and visions of the future, 
based  in  part  on  regional  experience,  could  emerge  and  spread  quickly  across  regional  and 
national boundaries.  In such a context, local initiatives have potential to lead the way to broader 
diffusion of innovative policy approaches, as well as to become social and technological forces of 
change.   
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW BACKGROUND MATERIALS 
This appendix contains a brief description of how interview data were treated in the research.  It 
also contains the two different interview protocols that were used to develop the data. Short 
background notes are included in each of the protocols.  Both the questions and the background 
notes  were  circulated  in  advance  to  interviewees.    The  appendix  supplements  information 
contained in Chapter 1 on methodology and approach to the research. 
1.1.  Interview data: how was the story constructed? 
Written transcripts were developed from fifty of the audio and written interview records and used 
as  the  basis  for  interpretive  analysis.  A  large  number,  but  not  all,  of  the  formal  interview 
transcripts (38 out of 50)
150 were coded and analysed. Those transcripts that were not coded 
served as background for the analysis.  Coding for interviews was undertaken in three distinct 
stages, each corresponding to a higher level of understanding and insight that I gained from 
previous stages of the work: 
•  An initial set of codes was developed based on theoretical notions (e.g. which actors, 
deliberative  process  or  not)  and  on  policy  themes  (e.g. mitigation  –  energy, 
adaptation). This approach was used to code a number of the first round of interview 
transcripts ( 7 interviews) but was found to be too complicated with too many layers 
and levels of coding to provide clear insights. 
•  A second stage was the initial interpretive analysis and memoing on conceptual and 
thematic issues emerging from the data.  It is in this stage that a number of new 
themes emerged from the data, in particular the importance of experiential knowledge 
and  of  the  differential  framing  of  expert  knowledge  and  climate  issues  in  the 
California context.  The insights gathered in this second stage of research stimulated 
further investigation of theoretical writings on these topics. 
                                                         
150 Note, although 52 interviews were conducted, only 50 were recorded and provided transcripts and thus 
the basis for a textual analysis.  Two of the interviews were entirely off the record. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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•  In the third stage a final set of codes was developed and used to guide the coding of a 
majority  of  the  interview  transcripts.  The  codes  corresponded  to  the  analytical 
framework laid out in Chapter 3. This approach was more simplified and aimed to 
investigate the issues that were emerging from the interview data initially analysed.   
In parallel a simplified interview protocol was developed along these lines and this 
was used to complete the remainder of the interviews (36 interviews of the 50 formal 
long interviews).   
1.2.  Interviewees and summary statistics 
Among state actors, I interviewed fourteen civil service officials that were chosen from a large 
number  of  different  branches  of  government  (e.g. energy;  air  pollution  and  environmental 
institutions; water, agriculture and forests). I also interviewed five individuals who were political 
appointees – one from the  legislative branch, two from the Governor’s Office , and two political 
appointees – Commissioner James Boyd of the CPUC and Shannon Eddy, special advisor to the 
Governor’s Office on the CPUC. These five people are important because they are more closely 
linked to origin of policy, and the political process surrounding such action, while those from the 
civil  service  are  most  active in  the day-to-day  climate  policy implementation  and  regulatory 
process.    
Among non-state actors, the interviews extended to three main categories of people focusing on 
those  that  are  most  active  in  the  California  climate  policy  process:  8  representatives  of 
non-governmental  organisations;  and  10  representatives  of  business  organisations  or  of 
corporations; and 11 independent experts (e.g. academics or consultants). I also interviewed one 
person from the local media covering public policy issues, including climate change. 
Within each of the main groupings of state and non-state actors, I selected interviewees in part on 
the basis of their expertise or specialised competence in two key sector areas related to climate 
change:  water and electricity sectors. Electricity was chosen because it is typically a major source 
of greenhouse gas emissions, and its large, centralised structure, as well as its history of being a 
regulated industry, often means it is one of the first sectors to be included in climate change 
mitigation strategies. I chose water as a second thematic area of the interest because adaptation is 
an important aspect of climate policy and I wanted to see what if anything was occurring to deal 
with climate change in this sector. Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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Nine of the interviewees can be considered specialists on the interface between electricity and 
climate change.  Interviewees were selected to represent the different interests within this sector.  
Two  interviewees  were  from  municipal  and  two  from  investor-owned  utilities.  Another  four 
interviewees were from the regulatory agency overseeing operations of investor-owned utilities in 
the  state,  and  at  least  four  others  are  from  non-governmental  organizations  with  extensive 
experience in this electricity regulatory process in the State of California.  Two interviewees 
represented municipal utility interests. 
On the theme of water, four interviewees are water policy experts or specialists; these experts 
included two government officials, one representative from a non-governmental organisation, and 
one independent experts. 
1.3.  Background Note and Protocol I – January 2006 
1.3.1.  California  in  the  Greenhouse:  Regional  Climate  Policies  and  the  Global 
Environment 
The  scientific  community  has  made  an  increasingly  compelling  case  for  political 
action to address climate change. Social recognition of climate change has grown along with 
scientific understanding, helping to propel global warming to near the top of the international 
political  agenda.  Despite  the  urgency  accorded  by  the  international  community  to  climate 
change,  concrete  actions  are  lagging  [1].  Policy  implementation  rests  largely  with  national 
governments, however regional and local governments also have a role to play, as do business 
and  environmental  organizations  [2,  3].  A  central  challenge  is  moving  from  relatively 
well-established global framings of the policy problem to salient framings at smaller scales.  
Aim: Through an in-depth case study of California (US), the research project aims to identify 
constraints  and  opportunities  of  regional  (sub-national)  processes  to  promote  sound  climate 
policies. It will:  
•  set California policies in the context of  national and international developments; 
•  take California as a leadership example and analyze how and why climate policies are 
moving forward; 
•  investigate how different actors and institutions interact with climate impact science, 
taking a detailed look at adaptation and mitigation in electricity and water sectors; Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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•  explore the notion of climate change risk and how understandings of risk affect policy 
responses. 
Establishing an understanding of climate change risk is potentially a central task of 
any regional policy process as it can “localize” climate change and helps to establish a rationale 
for policy action [4, 5].   
Approach: The project is designed to test the following hypotheses: 
•  State-of-the-art impact science has helped to establish a broad risk framing of climate 
change  in  California  that  is  broadly  accepted  across  a  wide-range  of  actors  and 
institutions, which in turn has provided a political basis for climate action; 
•  California has a long-standing precedent of innovative energy-environmental policies, 
including significant networks linking institutions and actors, which provide a strong 
experience base from which to craft climate policies.  
The research approach is interpretive, qualitative analysis [6, 7] to be based on the 
results of a series of semi-structured interviews with key actors directly and indirectly involved 
in the California climate policy process and on analysis of reports and records in the public 
domain [8-12].  The sources will be drawn from government and scientific community, as well 
as affected stakeholders such as businesses and environmental organisations. 
My interest in this project stems from more than a decade of work through the OECD 
with  national  government  decision-makers  on  climate  change  issues.  The  OECD  is  an 
inter-governmental forum for policy assessment and dialogue amongst national policymakers on 
a  wide  range  of  topics  including  environment.  Its  main  mission  is  to  promote  economic 
cooperation and development.  Although I am currently on academic leave, I will return to the 
OECD Environment Directorate in October 2006, where I am head of the climate program.  
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1.3.2.  Interview plan 
These questions provide the broad scope for the interviews.  They will be used to 
guide  our  discussions;  ideally  we  will  focus  on  those  questions  that  are  central  to  your 
experience with the California climate policy process.   
Please let me know at the start of the interview if you have a preference to keep the 
interview, or particular statements, off-the-record, and/or not to be named as a source in this 
work. Unless agreed otherwise, the interviews will be recorded and will be considered to be Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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on-the-record  so  as  to  provide  a  direct  source  of  research  data.  Short  excerpts  from 
on-the-record interviews may be used in the research report, either citing the interviewee as the 
source, or not, depending upon the context for the citation and of course on your preferences. 
Proposed interview questions/themes 
1.  Drivers  of  policy  and  leadership:  What  are  the  main  drivers  of  the  current  climate 
change process and leadership on climate change in California?  Science? Economics?  
Politics? Social considerations?  
2.  The role of scientific knowledge: How is scientific knowledge, for example in the form 
of climate impact assessment, influencing the California policy process?   
3.  The role of other expert knowledge:  How have other forms of technical or expert 
knowledge been influential in the policy process? For example, how influential was the 
2005  Tellus  report  on  the  potential  for  clean  technology  and  energy  efficiency 
developments to boost both economic and environmental performance in California?  If 
so, why and how did this influence work in the policy circles? 
4.  The  balance  between  mitigation  and  adaptation:  Even  though  recent  impact 
assessments  indicate  that  some  types  of  impacts  are  clearly  unavoidable,  such  as 
increased  frequency  and  intensity  of  heat  waves,  almost  the  entire  policy  thrust  in 
California seems to be on mitigation.  Why is this? 
5.  Influence of different actors and actor networks: Describe some of the key networks 
of actors influencing the climate policy process, how they operate  e.g. business groups, 
environmental  organisations,  scientific  community,  different  parts  of  the  state  (or 
national) government, the media (tv, radio, newspapers, internet sites or blogs).   
6.  Influence of the role of different institutions: What are some of the key institutions 
(e.g. research or academic institutions, governor’s administration and its respective parts, 
the state legislature, the CPUC, nationally-based government institutions such as EPA, 
pension-funds and other institutional investors, California Climate Action Registry) that 
are influencing, or will, in your view, influence the climate policy process in California?  
1.4.  Background Note and Protocol II – May to June 2006 
1.4.1.  California  in  the  Greenhouse:  Regional  Climate  Policies  and  the  Global 
Environment Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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The  project  sets  California  policy  developments  in  the  context  of national  and 
international climate policy. Through an in-depth case study on California, I will explore how 
mitigation and adaptation policies are developing at a regional level (sub-national), looking in 
particular at the interface between scientific and other expert knowledge, politics and policy.  
The analysis will look at how different people and organizations are interacting with science and 
other expert knowledge to advance climate policy as well as how and why policy is moving 
forward.   Relevant  actors  span  businesses,  environmental  organizations,  scientists  and  other 
experts,  the  media  and  various  parts  and  scales  of  government.    The  objective  is  to  better 
understand how ideas have emerged, leadership coalesced and agendas established to advance 
climate policies, with attention to key sectors such as electricity and water.  
Leadership on climate change mitigation is relatively recent and the benefits of such 
leadership are still heavily contested (e.g. the US and Australia cite economic reasons in their 
national decisions to back away from the Kyoto Protocol).  While regional governments are 
well positioned to implement climate change policies, given responsibility for issues such as 
land use, human settlement patterns and transport systems, it is less clear what the possibilities 
are for regional governments “to set the agenda” for climate policy.  By setting the agenda, I 
refer  to  the  establishment  of  broad  policy  frameworks  and  goals  to  guide  action  over  the 
long-term. Any political decision to deal with climate change inevitably involves balance and 
tension amongst a range of choices with one challenge being the balance of effort “now versus 
later.”  Further,  dealing  with  climate  change  implies  shifting  investment  patterns  and 
redistributing public resources. Governments need political support for any decision to address 
climate change and finding that support on a contested issue, such as climate change, can be 
difficult. 
Using California as a “leadership” example in regional climate governance, the project 
will  explore  recent  and  historical  policy  developments  to  understand  why  it  has  taken  a 
leadership position and how this has occurred.   One hypothesis is that state-of-the-art impact 
science has helped to establish a broad risk framing of climate change in California that is 
broadly accepted across a wide-range of actors and institutions. Additionally California has a 
long-standing  precedent  of  innovative  energy-environmental  policy  that  provides  a  strong 
experience base from which to craft climate policies. Thus a second hypothesis is that early 
action on climate related issues such as energy-environmental policy, has facilitated the political 
transition  to  a  low  greenhouse  gas  future  by  aligning  political  interests  and  establishing 
networks  linking  a  range  of  powerful  institutions  and  actors  in  a  common  direction.  When Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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combined  these  two  factors  have  opened  a  range  of  political  possibilities  in  California  and 
provided  a  platform  for  political  leadership  on  the  contested  issue  of  climate  change.  The 
project is designed to test these hypotheses.  
1.4.2.  Interview plan 
The interviews are expected to last about one hour.  With your permission, I would 
like to record the interviews.  Please assume that all of the information obtained during the 
interviews is off the record and not for direct attribution unless we have agreed otherwise. If 
there are interview segments that I would like to use in academic publications I would send you 
a list of quotes for approval for attribution, and use only if and after your approval.  Please let 
me know how you would like to be contacted for approval for using quotes from the interview.  
Proposed interview questions/themes 
1.  Please begin by introducing yourself, the focus of your position within your organisation 
and how that relates to climate change policy in California.   
a.  What is your academic and professional background – and how did you come to be in 
this position? 
2.  What are the main challenges for California climate change policy? 
3.  Shifting now to policy responses, what is the main way that the State of California is 
addressing these problems?   
4.  What is the main reason that the California state government has chosen to address these 
climate change problems?  How did these problems come to the forefront of policy and 
why?   
5.  How have these policies and programs come forward as responses?  
a.  What was the main driver for these policy responses? 
6.  Looking down the road to the next ten years, do you expect a shift in the problems or 
solutions to be dealt with in the climate change area? Is so, what issues will move to the 
forefront and why? 
7.  Who is most influential in shaping the climate change agenda in California (i.e. framing 
the problems, proposing and advancing policy solutions)?   
a.  Which  types  of  people  are  most  influential  and  on  what  issues?  (e.g. industry Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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representatives or business groups, environmental organisations, the media, scientific 
community, legislators, or interest groups in different parts of the state or at national 
level). 
b.  Which  institutions  are  most  influential  and  why?  (e.g. research  or  academic 
institutions,  science  and  research  or  policy  making  and  implementing  institutions, 
governor’s  administration  and  its  respective  parts,  the  state  legislature,  the  CPUC, 
nationally-based  government  institutions  such  as  EPA,  pension-funds  and  other 
institutional investors, California Climate Action Registry). 
8.  What do you think is the role of the media? 
a.  How important and influential are the media in the California policy process and how 
is this playing out (tv, radio, newspapers, internet sites or blogs)?   Jan CORFEE MORLOT, California in the Greenhouse Regional Climate Change Policies and the Global Environment, 2009 
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1.5.  List of interviewees participating in the long-interview 
Name  Given Name  Affiliation  Type I  Type II  Date - Prot 
Alvord  Adrienne  Pavley’s Office   S-Legislator    May-June II 
Baker  Anne  CalEPA  State    May-June II 
Beebe  Bud  SMUD  NGO  Bus  Jan I 
Bishop  K.C.  Chevron  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Boyd  James  CEC  S-Appointee    May-June II 
Brown  Susan  CEC  State    Jan I 
Burroughs  Timothy  ICLEI  NGO/Local  ENV  May-June II 
Callison  Jeffrey  KXJZ  Media    May-June II 
Cavanagh  Ralph  NRDC  NGO  ENV  Jan I 
Chung  Francis  DWR  State    May-June II 
Clinton  Jeanne  Independent  Expert    Jan I 
Dale  Larry  LBL  Expert    May-June II 
Dimare  Dominic  CCC  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Douglas  Karen  EDF  NGO  Env  May-June II 
duVair  Pierre  CEC  State    Jan I 
Eddy  Shannon  Gov Office  S-Legislator    May-June II 
Fitch  Julie  CPUC  State    Jan I 
Franco  Guido  CEC  State    Jan I 
Gleick  Peter  Pacific Institute  Expert    May-June II 
Graff  Tom  EDF  NGO  ENV  May-June II 
Hanemann  Michael  UCBerkeley  Expert    Jan I 
Heitz  Eric  Energy 
Foundation 
NGO  ENV  Jan I 
Hickox  Winston  CALPERS  State    May-June II 
Luers  Amy  UCS  NGO  ENV  Jan I 
Michelson  Denise  BP  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Miller  Norm  LBL  Expert    May-June II 
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Table continued 
Name  Given Name  Affiliation  Type I  Type II  Date - Prot 
Nichols  Mary  UCLA Env Inst  Expert    May-June II 
Peevey  Michael  CPUC  S-Appointee    May-June II 
Price  Lynne  LBL  Expert    May-June II 
Pulling  Wendy  PG&E  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Raney  David  Honda  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Roos  Maurice  Dept of Water 
Res 
State    May-June II 
Ryan  Nancy  CPUC  State    Jan I 
Sanstad  Alan  LBL  Expert    May-June II 
Schiller  Steve  Independent  Expert    May-June II 
Schneider  Steve  Stanford  Expert    Jan I 
Shaffer  Steve  Dept of 
Agriculture 
State    May-June II 
Shulock  Chuck  CARB  State    Jan I 
Sterkel  Meredith  CPUC  State    May-June II 
Sutley  Nancy  LA City / 
LADWP 
S-Local    May-June II 
Tamminen  Terry  Gov Office  S-Legislator    Jan I 
Tsunezumi  Minnie  Shell  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Tutt  Eileen  CalEPA  State    May-June II 
Vine  Ed  LBL  Expert    May-June II 
Wan  Fong  PG&E  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Wang  Devra  PG&E  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
Weisser  Vic  CEEB  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
White  V. John  CEERT  NGO  ENV  May-June II 
Wickizer  Doug  Dept of Forests 
& Fire 
Prevention 
State    May-June II 
Wittenberg  Diane  CCAR  NGO  Bus  May-June II 
 